Brandon Lee Bradley v. State of Florida

Citations: 214 So. 3d 648; 42 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 391; 2017 WL 1177618; 2017 Fla. LEXIS 690Docket: SC14-1412

Court: Supreme Court of Florida; March 30, 2017; Florida; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Brandon Lee Bradley appeals his conviction for first-degree murder and death sentence, with the Supreme Court of Florida affirming his convictions for first-degree murder, robbery, fleeing and eluding, and resisting arrest with violence. However, the Court vacates his death sentence, remanding for a new sentencing proceeding. 

On March 6, 2012, Bradley and Andria Kerchner were observed stealing property from the Econo Lodge in Melbourne, Florida. When confronted by motel staff, they attempted to flee, during which Bradley hit maintenance man Andrew Jordan with his vehicle. Econo Lodge owner Mohammad Malik reported the incident to police, providing details of the vehicle and its occupants.

Deputy Barbara Pill, responding to the dispatch, spotted Bradley's vehicle and initiated a traffic stop. Despite multiple commands to exit the vehicle, Bradley refused. During the stop, he brandished a semiautomatic firearm and fired eight shots at Deputy Pill, severely injuring her. Witnesses confirmed the incident and provided descriptions of the suspects. Deputy Pill later succumbed to her injuries, with an autopsy confirming she was shot at close range. Bradley evaded capture, driving through residential areas, while Kerchner sought gasoline at a nearby house.

Bradley parked in Gerard Joseph Weber’s driveway on Janewood Lane, where Weber discovered Kerchner hiding in his garage. After instructing her to take what she needed, Weber called the police and reported the incident, leading to a pursuit of Bradley and Kerchner, who fled in an Explorer. Law enforcement, aided by a helicopter, attempted to stop them using stop sticks, but Bradley evaded them until the vehicle eventually crashed after running over the stop sticks, landing in a ditch. Police arrested both individuals after approximately twenty minutes when they broke the rear window of the vehicle. Forensic tests confirmed that the handgun found in Bradley’s vehicle matched bullets retrieved from Deputy Pill, who was shot and killed during the incident.

Bradley did not testify at trial, but a video of his March 6, 2012, police interview, in which he stated he shot Deputy Pill in self-defense, was shown to the jury. The trial judge noted the murder was recorded on Deputy Pill’s dash camera and deemed the evidence of Bradley’s guilt as overwhelming. Bradley was indicted for first-degree premeditated murder of a law enforcement officer, robbery, aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude law enforcement, and resisting arrest with violence. Kerchner faced charges for felony murder, robbery, and burglary. Both were tried separately, with Bradley’s trial occurring from February 24 to April 1, 2014, resulting in convictions for all charges. 

The penalty phase ran from April 3 to April 8, 2014, concluding with a jury recommendation of death by a 10-2 vote. Bradley waived a Presentence Investigation Report and a Spencer hearing took place on June 5, 2014, without defense evidence. Both parties submitted sentencing memoranda on June 18, 2014. The trial court found five aggravating factors proven beyond a reasonable doubt, including that the crime was committed by an individual under legal supervision, involved prior violent felonies, occurred during a robbery, aimed to avoid arrest, and was carried out in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner.

The trial court identified one statutory mitigator regarding the defendant Bradley's age at the time of the crime but assigned it no weight. It recognized several nonstatutory mitigating factors, granting varying weights: significant childhood abuse (both physical and emotional), the failure of his mother to protect him from his stepfather, witnessing domestic violence, the absence of a father figure, and a close bond with his brother, among others, with most receiving "some" or "little weight." Factors such as brain damage and emotional trauma from family deaths received no or minimal weight. Bradley's cooperation with law enforcement and appropriate courtroom behavior were also acknowledged but given limited weight. The trial court concluded that the weight of five aggravating factors outweighed the mitigators, leading to Bradley's death sentence on June 27, 2014.

In his appeal, Bradley raised eight claims, including alleged errors during the trial and issues regarding jury instructions and sentencing phases. The court affirmed his convictions but remanded for a new penalty phase in light of the Hurst v. Florida decision, indicating that the Hurst claim necessitated this new phase and that other claims regarding the penalty phase or sentence proportionality would not be addressed.

Bradley challenges the trial judge's discretion regarding juror questioning during voir dire. He contends that the judge improperly limited inquiries about jurors' openness to mitigation given the State's proof of specific aggravating factors, including prior violent felonies and the victim's status as a police officer. Bradley claims this restriction prevented the exploration of potential juror bias against felons and probationers. Despite assuming the judge's decision was an abuse of discretion, any resulting error is deemed harmless. The defense had ample opportunity to probe juror biases through other permitted questions, and overall jury questioning indicated that any limitations did not constitute reversible error. Bradley failed to demonstrate that any juror was biased in favor of the death penalty or unable to fulfill their duties impartially. Consequently, this claim for relief is denied.

Additionally, Bradley argues that the testimony of probation officer Charles Colon, describing himself as a "high risk specialist officer," was inappropriate and could mislead the jury into viewing Bradley as a "high risk" probationer. While the State argues the objection was not preserved, trial counsel did object shortly after the comment, preserving the issue for review.

An objection to improper inquiry does not always need to be made immediately, and the trial court's denial of a mistrial motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion, while overruled objections are assessed for harmless error. Vague references to a defendant’s prior felonies can prejudice a jury, as seen in various cases, including one where a victim's restraining order unfairly enhanced their credibility. In the current case, Bradley claimed a reference to an officer's job title was prejudicial; however, this single reference did not warrant a mistrial, especially given the evidence presented, including a video of the crime and Bradley's confession. 

Regarding the impeachment of witness Amanda Ozburn, the trial court's decision to allow the State to present an otherwise inadmissible statement was scrutinized for abuse of discretion. It is established that a party cannot call a witness mainly to introduce inadmissible statements, but can impeach a witness if they provide harmful testimony. The court must assess whether the calling party primarily sought to introduce impeachment and whether the impeachment's value is minimal. Factors considered include whether the witness’s testimony harmed the party and the substantive value of the impeachment.

Witness testimony that is relevant and probative, despite potential impeachment, does not constitute error. This principle is illustrated through a hypothetical scenario where a prosecutor calls a witness with a prior inconsistent statement to impeach them, which can be seen as an abuse of evidence rules if the sole purpose is impeachment without legitimate forensic value. In this case, Ms. Ozburn’s testimony was favorable to the State, making the impeachment attempt improper. However, any related error was deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in the guilt phase due to overwhelming evidence against the defendant, including video evidence and witness testimonies. While the cumulative effect of impeachment could confuse the jury, it did not affect the trial’s outcome. In contrast, the penalty phase error's impact remains unaddressed, as the defendant is entitled to a new penalty phase under Hurst. Prosecutors are advised to strictly follow evidence code requirements to prevent retrials. The sufficiency of evidence supporting Bradley's convictions was independently reviewed and confirmed, despite no challenge from Bradley on this issue.

Bradley is entitled to a new penalty phase in his case following the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Hurst v. Florida, which established that a jury must unanimously find all aggravating factors necessary for a death sentence. The court agrees with Bradley’s assertion that Florida's death penalty scheme is unconstitutional since his jury did not make the required unanimous findings. The court cites Hurst v. State, emphasizing that the jury must unanimously determine the presence and sufficiency of aggravating factors, as well as recommend a death sentence. The court concludes that the error in Bradley's case is not harmless and reverses the trial court’s decision regarding the penalty phase, mandating a new jury hearing. However, the court rejects Bradley's argument that he should automatically receive a life sentence under section 775.082(2) of the Florida Statutes. The trial court's denial of Bradley's guilt phase claims is affirmed. The decision includes concurrence from several justices and notes that it is not final until the time for filing a rehearing motion has expired.