Valerie Jamison v. Mason Holden (mem. dec.)

Citation: Not availableDocket: 82A01-1608-JP-1932

Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; March 29, 2017; Indiana; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

The Memorandum Decision indicates that it is not to be cited as precedent, except for specific legal doctrines. Valerie Jamison appeals the trial court's order that modified custody of her child, J.H., transferring it from her to the father, Mason Holden. The appeal raises the central issue of due process violations during the custody modification hearing. Jamison contends that she was denied due process when her attorney withdrew on the hearing day, her request for a continuance to secure new counsel was denied, and she was subsequently not allowed to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, or represent herself.

The factual background reveals that Holden established paternity of J.H. in 2012, with Jamison having primary custody. Following Jamison's arrest in June 2015, the Indiana Department of Child Services opened child in need of services (CHINS) cases for both J.H. and Jamison’s other child. On the same day, Holden filed an emergency petition to modify custody, asserting concerns for the child's welfare. The CHINS court placed J.H. with Holden during initial proceedings. By October 2015, the CHINS and paternity cases were consolidated, leading to an agreement that gave Holden temporary custody of J.H., with Jamison allowed supervised parenting time. A modification hearing was set for June 13, 2016. The court ultimately concluded that the trial court's handling of the custody modification hearing denied Jamison due process, leading to a reversal and remand of the decision.

On June 7, 2016, Mother's counsel filed a motion to withdraw, citing a lack of communication and Mother's failure to fulfill her contractual obligations to the attorney. At a modification hearing on June 13, the trial court granted the withdrawal without objection from Mother. During the hearing, Mother expressed uncertainty about her representation and indicated a desire for an attorney, but the court noted that she had previously hired counsel and failed to cooperate. The court clarified that the matter would not be delayed further.

The trial court then addressed a motion to quash filed by the Department of Child Services (DCS), concerning records subpoenaed by Father related to Mother's other child. Father's attorney referenced a previous court order that conditioned Mother's parenting time on her compliance with services in the other child's case. The court denied the motion to quash but restricted the dissemination of information from the other child's case.

Subsequently, testimony was provided by a DCS case manager, who had not contacted Mother during his two and a half months overseeing the other child, who had been in foster care since June 2015 and was reportedly doing well. The trial court ruled in favor of Father's petition for custody of J.H., aligning Mother's parenting time with J.H. to that of her other child through DCS. Mother contested the ruling, insisting she had not been heard, but the court maintained its decision based solely on her performance in the CHINS case and ordered custody to Father with supervised parenting time for Mother.

The trial court issued a written order following a hearing where it permitted Mother’s attorney to withdraw and denied her request for a continuance to secure new representation, citing the scheduled hearing date. The court emphasized the importance of judicial economy and the child’s need for permanency, referencing Mother’s inadequate communication with her prior attorney. The court took judicial notice of a CHINS case related to Mother’s other child and received testimony from the case manager. After reviewing the evidence and arguments, the court determined that the best interests of J.H. were served by granting Father permanent custody. Mother’s subsequent motion to correct error was denied, leading to her appeal.

The Court of Appeals of Indiana applies an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing custody modifications, providing deference to trial courts in family law matters. It does not reweigh evidence or assess witness credibility, reversing decisions only if they contradict the facts presented.

Mother argued that her due process rights were violated due to her attorney's withdrawal, the denial of her continuance request, and the lack of opportunity to present her case. The Due Process Clause protects individuals from unfair state actions that deprive them of fundamental rights, including parental rights concerning child custody. Indiana courts recognize the necessity of procedural due process in custody matters to protect these rights, mandating reasonable notice and opportunities for parties to be heard before custody changes are made.

A due process right established by the State must be upheld. In custody and modification cases, Indiana law mandates specific procedural requirements, including filing a petition for modification, providing notice to the other party, and conducting a proper evidentiary hearing where both parties can present their case regarding changes in circumstances and the child's best interests. An opportunity to be heard is critical before altering custody arrangements.

In this case, although the Father requested a change in custody, and the Mother was notified and attended the hearing, the trial court did not afford the Mother a meaningful opportunity to present her case. The court allowed her counsel to withdraw due to alleged non-cooperation, despite the Mother being in rehab during the week leading up to the hearing and only being released the day prior. The trial court denied her request for a continuance to find new representation or prepare for self-representation. While the court has discretion in granting continuances, denying one can be an abuse of discretion if good cause is shown, which was the case here given the Mother's circumstances.

Although the Mother did not object to her counsel's withdrawal, this was likely due to her expectation of more time to prepare. The trial court's expediency in resolving the custody matter is acknowledged, but since the Father had temporary custody, a short continuance would not have prejudiced him or harmed the child. The court must weigh whether denying the continuance unjustly prejudiced the opposing party, which, in this instance, was not established.

The trial court's denial of Mother's motion for a continuance did not, by itself, constitute a due process violation; however, this denial must be evaluated alongside the overall conduct of the hearing. The court failed to provide Mother with the opportunity to cross-examine the witness, present her own witnesses or evidence, or speak for herself. While both the trial court and Father claimed that no error occurred because Father was also restricted from presenting evidence, this does not mitigate the trial court's failure to allow Mother to be heard. The only evidence presented was related to a CHINS proceeding involving Mother's other child, with no information regarding J.H., the child in question. Indiana law requires that a substantial change in statutory factors regarding the child be established for custody modifications, yet the trial court could not have adequately considered these factors without relevant evidence pertaining to J.H. The procedural shortcomings in the trial court's handling of the modification hearing were significant enough to deprive Mother of due process. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the custody modification order and remanded the case for a proper hearing where all parties can present evidence relevant to J.H.'s best interests. The court emphasized that Mother was not given a meaningful opportunity to be heard, leading to the reversal and remand for a complete hearing.