Johnson v. All American Quality Foods, Inc.

Citations: 340 Ga. App. 664; 798 S.E.2d 274; 2017 WL 943962; 2017 Ga. App. LEXIS 117Docket: A16A1724

Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; March 10, 2017; Georgia; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Motions for reconsideration must be received in the clerk’s office within ten days of the decision to be considered timely. In the case of Johnson v. All American Quality Foods, the Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to All American Quality Foods, the parent company of Food Depot, in a slip-and-fall incident involving shopper Balinda Johnson. Johnson argued that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, which is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The court reviews such decisions de novo, favoring the nonmovant's evidence. Johnson slipped in a puddle of liquid from packaged meat, and surveillance footage showed her traversing the area multiple times before her fall. An employee had inspected the aisle about 38 minutes prior, and after the incident, the manager found a trail of blood and meat products. All American claimed it had no actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard and that Johnson had superior knowledge of the risk. The trial court agreed, concluding there was no material fact dispute regarding All American's lack of constructive knowledge and deemed its inspection reasonable.

Johnson contended that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding when the hazard occurred and the reasonableness of the inspection. The appellate court sided with Johnson, emphasizing that her prior crossings of the area did not inherently imply knowledge of the spill. It reiterated that All American had a duty to exercise ordinary care in maintaining safe premises and noted that in premises liability cases, the plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant’s actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard and that the plaintiff lacked knowledge due to the defendant's actions or control over conditions.

To survive a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must provide evidence that, if construed in their favor, would allow a rational trier of fact to conclude that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of a hazard. In this case, All American did not dispute having actual knowledge of the hazard. To prove constructive knowledge, Johnson must establish either that a store employee was near the hazard and could have seen it or that the hazard was present long enough that diligent employees should have discovered it. Constructive knowledge can also be inferred from inadequate inspection procedures. The store must not only have a reasonable inspection program but also demonstrate that it was implemented at the time of the incident.

Evidence indicates that All American had an hourly inspection policy, with the last inspection allegedly occurring 38 minutes before Johnson's fall. However, the individual responsible for the affidavit regarding the inspections did not actually perform them, raising questions about their reliability. The court noted that even if the inspections occurred shortly before the incident, the frequency required in a supermarket setting may necessitate more frequent checks due to the nature of the business and the risk of slip and fall incidents. The trial court incorrectly ruled that the hourly inspection protocol absolved All American of liability, indicating there were still factual questions about the reasonableness of the inspections.

The concurring opinion highlighted the fact-sensitive nature of slip-and-fall cases, suggesting that summary judgment is generally inappropriate unless there is indisputable evidence of proper inspection procedures being in place and followed. The evidence presented did not meet this standard, leading to the reversal of the trial court's summary judgment in favor of All American.

Summary judgment in slip-and-fall cases may be granted if the plaintiff fails to present evidence that the supermarket had constructive knowledge of the hazard. The determination of a supermarket's inspection reasonableness is fact-specific, and the current case does not qualify for summary judgment. A dissenting opinion argues that the trial court correctly found the supermarket's inspection procedures reasonable and established a lack of actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard. The supermarket relied on an electronic inspection monitoring system's report, which was challenged by the plaintiff as inadmissible hearsay due to insufficient authentication. Under OCGA 24-8-803 (6), such reports can be admissible if they meet criteria related to timing, personal knowledge, business practices, and authentication. The store's co-manager provided an affidavit affirming that inspections were conducted hourly using the Gleason ESP monitoring system, detailing the inspection process and documenting compliance. The affidavit and inspection report confirmed that employees were vigilant for hazards throughout the day and that formal inspections occurred as scheduled, showing effectiveness with nine hazard clean-ups logged during the 13-hour period on the incident day. Thus, summary judgment is not warranted without clear evidence that inspection procedures were either inadequate or not followed.

A hazard occurred approximately every 1.4 hours, contrasting with the appellee’s inspection schedule of once per hour. Key points include: the area of the appellant's fall was inspected roughly 37 minutes prior; the substance on the floor was likely meat product or blood; surveillance video captured the appellant's friend in the area about six minutes before the fall, shopping with meat packages; multiple patrons, including the appellant, safely crossed the area in the same timeframe; no store employees were present near the hazard; and the store had no prior knowledge of leaks from its meat packaging. The defendant's compliance with reasonable inspection procedures shifted the burden back to the plaintiff, who needed to demonstrate how long the substance had been on the floor to attribute constructive knowledge to the defendant. The appellee provided evidence of adequate inspections, while the appellant failed to present competent evidence to establish constructive knowledge. Although prior cases found jury issues regarding inspection reasonableness with shorter intervals, those involved prior notice of specific hazards. The appellant referenced an unidentified employee's comment about improper meat packaging, which was inadmissible hearsay and did not qualify as an admission. The record showed no actual knowledge of the hazard by either party. Given the appellee's reasonable inspection efforts and the absence of evidence of constructive knowledge, the dissent argues that the trial court's summary judgment for the appellee should not have been reversed. Judges McMillian and Self concur with this dissent.