United States v. Jamayal Mannings

Citations: 850 F.3d 404; 2017 WL 875020; 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 3920Docket: 16-1492

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; March 5, 2017; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Jamayal Mannings, also known as Mal and Slim, appeals his sentence following a conviction related to drug distribution in St. Joseph, Missouri, from January 1, 2009, to February 20, 2013. He was charged with seven counts, ultimately pleading guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute crack and powder cocaine. Initially, he entered a plea agreement stipulating a base offense level of 38 and a sentence of 300 months. After withdrawing this plea, he re-pleaded guilty without a written agreement, leading to an amended presentence investigation report (PSR) that calculated a lower base offense level of 36, with enhancements for firearm possession and his role in the offense. His total offense level was ultimately determined to be 38, with a recommended sentencing range of 292 to 365 months. Mannings contested the drug quantity calculation and enhancements at sentencing, which was supported by testimony from a co-conspirator and an ATF agent. The district court overruled his objections and sentenced him to 292 months in prison, followed by five years of supervised release. The Court of Appeals, affirming the district court's findings, noted that the government must prove drug quantity and enhancements by a preponderance of the evidence, and it reviewed the case under established standards for factual findings and sentence reasonableness.

Turner testified about purchasing and distributing crack cocaine from Mannings, detailing Mannings' method of converting powder cocaine into crack. This testimony was supported by Special Agent Herring, who provided evidence from surveillance and undercover operations, as well as consistent reports from other cooperating witnesses. Mannings contested this testimony, noting the lack of corroborative evidence like recordings or forensic analysis. However, the court can consider uncorroborated hearsay if it has reliability and allows for rebuttal. The district court found the testimony credible, emphasizing its discretion in determining drug quantity based on such evidence. 

Mannings also contested a two-level enhancement for firearm possession, arguing he was not directly found with a firearm during his arrest. However, the enhancement does not require direct possession; it can apply based on circumstantial evidence. SA Herring reported finding firearms and other items in a vehicle associated with Mannings, while Turner claimed Mannings carried a gun during drug activities. The district court upheld the enhancement based on this evidence. 

Additionally, Mannings challenged a three-level enhancement for his managerial role in the drug conspiracy, asserting insufficient evidence of being a "manager or supervisor." The court has interpreted these terms broadly, allowing for such an enhancement even if the defendant managed or supervised just one other participant in the conspiracy.

Key factors in assessing management or supervisory authority in criminal activity include control over participants and the organization of the crime. Mannings and at least four co-conspirators were involved in the possession, transportation, and distribution of powder and crack cocaine in the St. Joseph area from January 1, 2009, to February 20, 2013. Mannings obtained cocaine from co-conspirator Larry Brooks and directed others to collect it for him, with no objections raised to these facts in the amended Presentence Report (PSR). The court accepted these facts for sentencing, as a lack of objection allows this assumption. Testimony from SA Herring supported the claims, indicating Mannings sent a confidential informant to Kansas City multiple times for drugs, and co-conspirator Turner identified Mannings as the leader of the operation, stating that he was the go-to person for drugs in St. Joseph. Mannings was also involved in converting powder cocaine into crack cocaine for sale. The district court's enhancement of Mannings' role in the offense was justified based on these factors.

Mannings contested both the procedural and substantive aspects of his sentence, arguing the district court did not adequately explain its decision. However, since he did not object at sentencing, the claim was reviewed for plain error, which requires demonstrating that a more detailed explanation would have led to a lighter sentence. The court is not required to list every factor verbatim from 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) as long as it is clear that the factors were considered. The district court delayed the sentencing to reflect on the evidence presented and later discussed the nature of Mannings' conduct, the dangers of drug trafficking, public safety, and deterrence, providing sufficient reasoning for its sentence. 

Mannings also argued that the ten-year statutory minimum was adequate, but the district court’s decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. He did not show that the court ignored any relevant factors or misweighed them. Since the imposed sentence was at the lower end of the guideline range, it is generally presumed reasonable. Thus, the court did not find his sentence substantively unreasonable, leading to the affirmation of Mannings' sentence.