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Phillip Turner v. Driver
Citation: Not availableDocket: 16-10312
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; February 26, 2017; Federal Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Phillip Turner was video recording the Fort Worth police station from a public sidewalk when Officers Grinalds and Dyess approached and requested his identification. Turner refused, prompting the officers to detain him for investigation, claiming concern over an individual with a video camera. Despite Turner's inquiry about the reason for his detention, Grinalds stated they needed to know who was near their facility. After continued refusal to provide his ID, the officers handcuffed Turner without warning, seized his video camera, and placed him in the back of a patrol car, where he was left without adequate ventilation. Lieutenant Driver, the officers' supervisor, arrived but did not initially assist Turner. Subsequently, the officers rolled down the car windows, finding Turner lying down inside. Turner filed a lawsuit against the officers and the City of Fort Worth under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted the officers qualified immunity, leading Turner to appeal the decision. The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. Lieutenant Driver identified himself as the commander and questioned Turner, who was taking pictures from a sidewalk. Turner declined to provide ID, asserting he hadn't been lawfully arrested. Driver acknowledged this and walked away, later returning to engage Turner. Turner insisted he had done nothing wrong and should be released. After further discussions with his officers, Driver lectured Turner before releasing him and returning his camera. In October 2015, Turner sued Driver, Grinalds, and Dyess in their individual capacities in the Northern District of Texas, claiming violations of his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He sought damages, legal fees, and a declaratory judgment regarding the alleged constitutional violations. The officers moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), and Turner later amended his complaint to add the City of Fort Worth as a defendant. The district court granted the motions to dismiss based on qualified immunity, concluding Turner did not demonstrate that the officers violated any clearly established rights or acted unreasonably. The standard of review for such dismissals is de novo, accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and requiring that the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim for relief. To succeed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show a constitutional violation by someone acting under state law, and if qualified immunity is raised, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove its inapplicability by demonstrating a violation of a clearly established right. The court has the discretion to choose which aspect of qualified immunity to analyze first. In this case, the district court ruled that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity regarding Turner’s First Amendment claim, as he did not show their actions violated a clearly established right or were objectively unreasonable. The district court specifically determined that a First Amendment right to video record police activity was not clearly established. For a right to be considered clearly established, it must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would recognize that their actions violated that right, and this clarity must exist at the time of the conduct in question. The analysis requires identifying controlling authority or a strong consensus of persuasive authority that outlines the right with precision. If there is no controlling authority explicitly prohibiting a defendant's conduct, and if there is a split among federal circuit courts on the issue, the right cannot be deemed clearly established. The Supreme Court has indicated that it is unfair to hold officials liable for damages when judicial opinions diverge on a constitutional question. At the time relevant to this case, neither the Supreme Court nor the court in question had clarified whether First Amendment protections extend to the recording of police activities. Although Turner cites some district court conclusions asserting such protection based on general First Amendment principles, the Supreme Court advises against defining clearly established law in overly general terms. The district court noted a split among circuit courts regarding the existence of a clearly established right to record police, with the First and Eleventh Circuits affirming that the First Amendment protects individuals' rights to videotape police officers in action. Additionally, the Seventh Circuit has recognized that the First Amendment protects audio recordings of police, emphasizing that laws impeding such recordings require heightened scrutiny due to their impact on First Amendment rights. No circuit court has definitively ruled that the First Amendment does not protect the video recording of police activity, although some circuits have noted that the law is not clearly established regarding this right. In the case involving Turner, there was insufficient precedent to conclude that the officers' actions constituted a violation of a clearly established First Amendment right, thus granting them qualified immunity. Despite the lack of clarity at the time of Turner's recording, the document acknowledges that a First Amendment right to record police does exist, subject to reasonable restrictions on time, place, and manner. It emphasizes that the First Amendment encompasses freedom of speech and press, extending to the gathering of news, which is vital for an informed public. The Supreme Court has recognized a right to receive information and ideas, as well as a right to film, linking the act of creation with the resulting expression. This principle supports the right to film police, as a means of promoting accountability and facilitating democratic discourse. The document underscores that informing the public about governmental activities is a fundamental objective of the First Amendment. Filming police officers enhances public accountability, helps prevent abuse of power, and aids in shaping informed police policies. Such recordings can also benefit officers by providing evidence that may support their actions or exonerate them from allegations. Courts have recognized that documenting government officials, particularly law enforcement, aligns with First Amendment rights by promoting open discourse on governmental matters. While the right to film police is protected, it is subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, which must be narrowly tailored to serve significant governmental interests without being the least restrictive means. In the context of Fourth Amendment rights, Turner claims his rights were violated through unlawful detention and warrantless arrest by Officers Grinalds and Dyess. The legality of the initial questioning hinges on whether there was reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Courts assess reasonable suspicion based on the totality of circumstances available to the officers at the time of the detention. Even if Turner’s rights were technically violated, the officers may still be entitled to qualified immunity, as the detention might not be deemed objectively unreasonable under established legal standards. The principle that a Fourth Amendment seizure requires reasonable suspicion has been recognized, but general claims of this nature may not suffice to overcome qualified immunity defenses. Determining whether a right was clearly established at the time of the defendant's actions involves assessing the objective reasonableness of the official’s conduct. Courts must evaluate if the law explicitly prohibited the conduct, making it clear to all reasonable officials that their actions constituted a violation. The Fourth Amendment focuses on the reasonableness of a detention based on the totality of the circumstances. Turner, who was filming the Fort Worth Police Department while on the sidewalk, claimed his actions were merely recording routine activities, not an arrest or traffic stop. However, officers Grinalds and Dyess argued that, in light of recent attacks on police and heightened security concerns, a reasonable person in their position could have perceived Turner’s filming as suspicious, potentially indicating preparatory actions for criminal activity. Thus, their questioning and brief detention of Turner were deemed not "plainly incompetent" or a clear legal violation, granting them qualified immunity regarding Turner’s Fourth Amendment claim. Regarding Turner’s assertion of unlawful arrest, the parties disagreed on whether his detention constituted an arrest. A seizure is considered an arrest only if a reasonable person would perceive it as a significant restriction on their freedom of movement akin to a formal arrest. The "reasonable person" standard balances awareness of the seriousness of the circumstances without being excessively apprehensive. The determination of whether an investigative stop equates to an arrest is case-specific and hinges on the reasonableness of the actions taken. Actions such as using force, brandishing a weapon, or handcuffing do not automatically escalate a detention to an arrest requiring probable cause, but any detention must be temporary and not extend beyond what is necessary to accomplish its purpose. Turner claims he was handcuffed and placed in a patrol car without a specified duration for the detention, which he argues was excessive. Investigative stops do not have a strict time limit, but the duration must be justified by the police's diligent pursuit of an investigation that could quickly confirm or dispel their suspicions. Turner's allegations suggest that the officers' actions—handcuffing him and placing him in the patrol car—were disproportionate to any threat he posed or the needs of their investigation. The appellees reference similar cases to argue that their conduct did not constitute a de facto arrest, particularly citing a case where a defendant was detained for 30 to 45 minutes during a narcotics search. However, the court noted that in Turner's situation, there was no indication of a drug-related offense or any specific threat from Turner, which distinguishes his case from those cited. The officers' actions were deemed unreasonable, as there was no evidence that Turner posed a threat or had a weapon. A reasonable person in Turner's position would perceive the officers' conduct as a significant restriction on his freedom of movement, akin to an arrest. Unlike the cited cases where the officers acted with clear investigative intent and reasonable suspicion, Turner's situation lacked any such justification. Handcuffing a defendant for 16 to 20 minutes did not constitute a de facto arrest when it was deemed necessary for an investigation related to a report of men with guns. In contrast, Tonia Massey was handcuffed and detained in a police car for 2.5 to 3 hours without any investigation against her, suggesting that a reasonable officer should have recognized the need for probable cause rather than mere reasonable suspicion for her seizure. In Freeman v. Gore, the court found that a reasonable person would perceive a significant restraint akin to a formal arrest under similar circumstances. Turner's allegations indicate that his detention amounted to a warrantless arrest requiring probable cause. Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances known to an officer at the time are sufficient for a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed. Officers may take reasonable steps to ensure safety during encounters, but based on Turner’s complaint, the officers lacked probable cause for his arrest. He did not threaten or attempt to flee, and the only reason provided for his arrest was his failure to identify himself, which is not a lawful basis for arrest. Counsel acknowledged that if Turner was arrested, it would have been unlawful due to the absence of probable cause. The court affirms that Turner has sufficiently alleged a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights against unlawful arrest, which was established law at the time of the incident. None of the defendants claimed they had probable cause, nor that an arrest would have been objectively reasonable under the circumstances alleged. Grinalds and Dyess are denied qualified immunity regarding Turner’s Fourth Amendment claim, which alleges a violation of his right to be free from warrantless arrest without probable cause. The Fourth Amendment prohibits stopping and demanding identification from individuals without a specific basis for suspecting criminal activity. An arrest is deemed unlawful unless supported by probable cause. Although law enforcement may receive immunity for reasonable mistakes regarding probable cause, the court clarifies that it is established law that officers cannot extend an investigative detention without a valid purpose. The amended complaint does not allege that Turner posed a threat during his detention, allowing for the possibility of a Fourth Amendment violation. Regarding Lieutenant Driver, he is not liable for the actions of Grinalds and Dyess prior to his arrival. However, the court must assess whether Driver's conduct after arriving on the scene constitutes a separate constitutional violation. For liability under § 1983, Driver must have been personally involved in the alleged violation or engaged in conduct causally linked to it. Turner claims he was handcuffed and in a patrol car when Driver arrived, where Driver then interacted with Grinalds and Dyess. The allegations suggest that Driver's involvement fell short of personal engagement, necessitating further examination to establish whether his actions were objectively reasonable under the relevant legal standards. A plaintiff can meet the personal involvement standard by demonstrating that a defendant-supervisor either personally directed a violation or had actual knowledge of it and allowed it to continue. In the case concerning Turner, he did not allege any personal involvement by Officer Driver in his arrest or any action that would indicate Driver unreasonably prolonged his detention. The facts show that Driver acted promptly by consulting with other officers and releasing Turner, thereby pursuing a reasonable investigation. Turner failed to assert that Driver violated his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable detention or unlawful arrest. Even if a constitutional violation had been alleged, Driver's actions were deemed objectively reasonable, leading to his entitlement to qualified immunity. The court affirmed the qualified immunity granted to Officers Grinalds, Dyess, and Driver regarding Turner’s First Amendment and Fourth Amendment claims for unlawful detention. However, it reversed the qualified immunity for Grinalds and Dyess concerning Turner's unlawful arrest claim, remanding that specific claim for further proceedings. Circuit Judge Edith Brown Clement dissented, arguing against the majority's assertion of a First Amendment right to film the police and the reversal of qualified immunity for Grinalds and Dyess, citing that clearly established law must be particularized to the case's facts and not defined at a general level. There is a limited consensus regarding the First Amendment right to film police performing their duties in public, as illustrated by cases like Glik v. Cunniffe. However, Turner did not film police officers in public but rather filmed a police station. The majority did not conclude that the officers violated Turner’s First Amendment rights, potentially due to reasonable security concerns about filming police activities at a station. Without establishing a violation of the First Amendment, future officers in similar situations will not be considered to have breached clearly established law. Regarding the unlawful arrest claim, the majority reversed the district court’s decision granting qualified immunity to Officers Grinalds and Dyess, stating it was clearly established that an officer cannot extend an investigative detention without purpose. However, the majority failed to cite a case where an officer in similar circumstances was found to have violated the Fourth Amendment. Turner did not specify the duration of his detention and had requested a supervisor's presence, which could lead a reasonable officer to believe that waiting for the supervisor did not constitute a de facto arrest. Therefore, the officers acted reasonably in their decision to wait. The dissenting opinion argues against the majority’s reversal of the qualified immunity grant, stating that the officers’ actions were not objectively unreasonable.