Central Recycling Services, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage

Citations: 389 P.3d 54; 2017 Alas. LEXIS 13; 2017 WL 542467Docket: 7150 S-16036

Court: Alaska Supreme Court; February 9, 2017; Alaska; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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A recycling company, Central Recycling Services, Inc., sought rebates under a municipal ordinance that offers reduced fees for disposing of solid waste residue at the Anchorage landfill. The municipality's interpretation of the ordinance resulted in lower rebates than expected by the company. After Central Recycling sued the Municipality of Anchorage and the superior court ruled in favor of the municipality, the company appealed.

The ordinance, AMC 26.80.055, provides fee reductions for businesses engaged in recycling specific materials, including paper, plastic, glass, and metals. Central Recycling, which processes materials from construction and demolition waste, submitted multiple rebate requests from 2010 to 2014. It received its first rebate in 2012 but later disputed the municipal interpretation, arguing that the fee reduction should apply to a broader range of materials beyond those explicitly listed in the ordinance.

In January 2014, Central Recycling filed a lawsuit claiming that the ordinance was misinterpreted and sought a declaratory judgment along with damages for unpaid rebates. The Municipality moved for summary judgment, asserting that the ordinance only allowed rebates for the specified seven materials. The superior court agreed with the Municipality, stating that the ordinance's language was clear and limited to the listed materials. Summary judgment was granted against Central Recycling, leading to the appeal, where the company contends that the superior court misinterpreted the ordinance. The appellate court ultimately affirms the superior court's decision, emphasizing that legislative intent supports the Municipality's narrower interpretation.

Review of the grant of summary judgment is conducted de novo, focusing on the interpretation of AMC 26.80.055. The parties disagree on the level of deference to be afforded to the agency's interpretation. Central Recycling advocates for independent judgment, arguing the issue lacks agency expertise, while the Municipality argues for the reasonable basis test due to underlying policy considerations. However, the court affirms the superior court’s decision under either standard, rendering the debate unnecessary.

Interpretation of statutes and municipal ordinances follows the same principles, involving plain language and legislative history. A sliding scale approach is used, whereby clearer language requires stronger evidence to suggest contrary intent. The purpose of the statute is also considered. Under AMC 26.80.055(A), certain recycling entities qualify for a reduction in landfill disposal fees for solid waste residue, provided they meet specific conditions. The dispute centers on whether the fee rebate applies to residue from the seven specified recyclable materials only or if it extends to residue from other materials if listed items are recycled.

The Municipality contends that the fee rebate applies solely to residues from the specified seven items, arguing the list is exclusive. Central Recycling’s position is less clear; it may assert the list is illustrative or that recycling any listed material qualifies for rebates on residue from any materials. The court notes that the plain language of the ordinance does not suggest the list is merely representative, as this would render it meaningless, contradicting the principle that legislative language is purposeful. 

Ultimately, the ordinance is deemed ambiguous. The fee reduction, while targeting specific materials, does not explicitly limit eligibility to residue solely from them. Both interpretations proposed by the parties could be supported by statutory construction principles, but the ambiguity prevents a clear determination based solely on the text.

Central Recycling argues that the ordinance's language supports the eligibility of businesses recycling listed materials without limiting rebates to residue from those materials. Central Recycling recycles both listed items, such as cardboard and plastic, and additional unlisted materials, asserting that this broad interpretation fulfills the requirements for rebates as it does not specify that residue must come exclusively from the seven listed materials. The ordinance states that the rebate applies to "solid waste residue resulting from the recycling operation," suggesting that any residue from recycling post-consumer solid waste qualifies. Central Recycling believes the Anchorage Assembly intentionally chose wording to promote recycling of all materials, not just the specified seven.

Conversely, the Municipality contends that the ordinance's language implies an exhaustive list of eligible materials for rebates, arguing that the initial restrictive clause indicates the “recycling operation” pertains only to the seven listed items. The Municipality cites statutory construction principles, highlighting that specific provisions take precedence over general ones. They assert that the expressio unius principle applies, inferring that the omission of other recyclable materials from the list means they are excluded from the rebate program. The Municipality argues that allowing rebates for unlisted materials would lead to impractical outcomes, such as a business recycling primarily unlisted materials receiving rebates while those recycling the listed materials might not, negatively impacting the municipality's finances and landfill operations.

Ambiguity in the ordinance's language necessitates examination of its legislative history to ascertain the intent behind its provisions. The Anchorage Assembly adopted the ordinance in April 1996, initially stating that businesses engaged in recycling would receive a 50% reduction in disposal fees for residue from recycling activities, indicating an intent to discount residue from any recyclable material. The main sponsor emphasized that recycling reduces waste destined for landfills, supporting the proposal's goal of preserving landfill capacity through incentivizing recycling.

Subsequently, a seven-item list was added to the ordinance to limit the types of waste eligible for reduced fees. The Mayor’s explanation indicated that the list aimed to define traditionally recycled materials, excluding residues from unlisted materials, thereby clarifying eligibility. Although the initial language suggested a broader intent, the addition of the list was intended to narrow down the materials qualifying for the fee reduction.

Central Recycling's interpretation incorrectly relied on a later assembly statement about the ordinance’s purpose. This statement, made four years after the ordinance was enacted, was deemed less relevant for determining the original legislative intent. Consequently, the legislative history supports the Municipality's interpretation that AMC 26.80.055(A) specifies an exclusive list of materials whose recycling generates residue eligible for the disposal fee reduction. The superior court's decision was affirmed.