Paul Durousseau v. State of Florida

Citations: 218 So. 3d 405; 42 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 124; 2017 Fla. LEXIS 228Docket: SC15-1276

Court: Supreme Court of Florida; January 30, 2017; Florida; State Supreme Court

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Paul Durousseau appeals the denial of his motion to vacate his first-degree murder conviction and death sentence by the Fourth Judicial Circuit Court, filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. The Florida Supreme Court affirms the denial of postconviction relief but vacates Durousseau's sentences, remanding for resentencing due to the implications of Hurst v. Florida and Hurst v. State. The case involves the 1999 murder of Tyresa Mack, whose body was discovered with evidence linking Durousseau to the crime, including his DNA. Durousseau was indicted for multiple murders and convicted of Mack's murder in 2007, with the jury recommending death by a 10-2 vote. The trial court identified four aggravating factors for sentencing but found no statutory mitigating circumstances, although it recognized sixteen nonstatutory mitigating factors, assigning varying weights to each. These factors included Durousseau's troubled upbringing, military service, familial relationships, and behavior during the trial, with most factors receiving little to moderate weight. The Florida Supreme Court had previously rejected all of Durousseau's claims on direct appeal in 2010.

Durousseau raised multiple claims on direct appeal, including: (1) the trial court's error in admitting evidence related to two other murders; (2) the denial of his motion for acquittal on felony murder due to insufficient evidence for the pecuniary gain aggravator; (3) the rejection of expert testimony on mental mitigation in favor of lay testimony; (4) insufficiency of evidence for a first-degree murder conviction; and (5) the unconstitutionality of Florida’s capital sentencing scheme. On October 1, 2012, he filed a postconviction motion citing ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request further testing and for not conducting effective voir dire, although he later abandoned the first claim. An evidentiary hearing began on April 9, 2015, lasting two days, after which the court denied his claim regarding additional testing. Durousseau appealed, focusing on the failure of his trial counsel, Ann Finnell, to perform a meaningful voir dire. During his appeal, the Supreme Court's ruling in Hurst v. Florida prompted him to argue for the vacating of his death sentence. The court rejected his ineffective assistance claim, affirming that his counsel's actions during voir dire did not fall below acceptable standards. However, it concluded that his death sentence was unconstitutional under Hurst v. Florida, leading to its decision to vacate the sentence without further addressing the voir dire arguments.

A strong presumption exists that trial counsel’s performance is not deficient, requiring a fair evaluation free from hindsight bias. The defendant must overcome this presumption by demonstrating that the challenged actions by counsel were not sound trial strategy. Judicial review of counsel’s performance is highly deferential, with strategic decisions deemed effective if alternative strategies were considered and rejected. Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to present meritless arguments, especially if a substantive claim has already been rejected on its merits. To show prejudice, the defendant must prove a reasonable probability that the outcome would have differed but for counsel’s errors. Both prongs of the Strickland test are mixed questions of law and fact, leading to a mixed standard of review: factual findings are upheld if supported by substantial evidence, while legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Effective assistance during voir dire requires competent jury selection, ensuring jurors can set aside bias and decide based solely on trial evidence. Counsel's performance must be assessed in the context of the time of the trial, and a strong presumption favors reasonable professional assistance. If the defendant fails to prove one prong of the Strickland test, there is no need to assess the other. Establishing deficiency requires pinpointing specific actions outside the realm of competent performance, with the court upholding strategic decisions that align with professional norms. The focus is on the reasonableness of the strategies employed rather than hindsight evaluations.

Durousseau contends that his trial counsel, Finnell, was ineffective due to her reliance on collective questioning during voir dire instead of individual inquiries, which he claims compromised his ability to exercise juror challenges effectively. The postconviction court found no prejudice resulting from this approach, affirming that Durousseau’s assertions were speculative. He argues that individual questioning could have revealed jurors’ views that would have allowed for a more favorable jury selection; however, he fails to specify what information would have emerged or how it would have impacted the jury composition. 

Additionally, Durousseau challenges the postconviction court's determination that Finnell was not ineffective for not exhausting peremptory challenges or challenging the jury panel. The court noted that Durousseau did not identify any jurors who would have been better qualified than those seated, a significant flaw in his argument. Durousseau specifically questioned the handling of three jurors: Markley, Norrie, and Cummins. The court found that Finnell's questioning was adequate and that Markley, as an alternate juror, did not affect the trial's outcome. The findings of the postconviction court were thus affirmed, concluding that Durousseau did not demonstrate any prejudice resulting from Finnell’s actions.

Prejudice in juror bias claims requires a showing that an actual biased juror participated in the verdict. Juror Markley served only as an alternate and did not impact the jury's decision, thus no prejudice was demonstrated, affirming the postconviction court's findings. For jurors Norrie and Cummins, who were part of the deliberating jury, the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for insufficient questioning is rejected, as Durousseau failed to specify what additional questioning would have revealed. Speculative assertions are insufficient to prove counsel's ineffectiveness. A movant must demonstrate actual bias, not mere doubts about a juror's impartiality, which Durousseau did not do for any of the jurors in question. The postconviction court’s decision to uphold the rejection of his claims is affirmed. Additionally, Durousseau’s argument against the application of the 'actual bias' standard is dismissed; it is the responsibility of the movant to prove juror bias regardless of counsel's actions. Finally, Durousseau's death sentence, which was imposed under an unconstitutional capital sentencing statute as established in Hurst v. Florida, is recognized as retroactively applicable to his case, as his sentence became final in 2010.

The Hurst error, relevant to Durousseau’s penalty phase, was determined to be not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court referenced the harmless error test established in Chapman v. California, which places the burden on the state to prove that the error did not contribute to the verdict. This assessment requires a rigorous application, particularly in cases of constitutional error. In this context, the state must demonstrate that the jury’s non-unanimous findings regarding aggravating factors did not influence the imposition of the death penalty. 

Specifically, the jury's recommendation of death was made by a 10 to 2 vote, and there was no clear evidence that all necessary aggravating factors were unanimously found or that they outweighed mitigating circumstances. The court emphasized that the analysis should focus on whether the error had a reasonable possibility of affecting the sentence. As such, because the jury did not make the requisite unanimous factual findings necessary for a death sentence, Durousseau's death sentence was vacated, and the case was remanded for a new penalty phase. The court also rejected Durousseau’s claim for resentencing to life imprisonment under Florida Statutes.

LABARGA, C.J., PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ. concur, while CANADY, J. concurs in part and dissents in part, and PERRY, Senior Justice, concurs in part and dissents in part. CANADY, J. agrees with the affirmation of the denial of relief concerning Durousseau’s conviction but dissents on the decision to mandate a new penalty phase, arguing that the ruling in *Hurst v. Florida* should not have retroactive application. PERRY, Senior Justice, concurs with the affirmation of the denial of relief related to Durousseau’s convictions but disagrees with the majority's approach to remand for a new penalty phase instead of directly imposing a life sentence, citing Florida Statute 775.082(2), which necessitates life imprisonment following an unconstitutional death sentence. PERRY emphasizes that the statute does not hinge on constitutional amendments or specific court decisions and should be interpreted to provide a clear remedy for individuals previously sentenced to death. The case originated from the Circuit Court in Duval County, with representation for both appellant and appellee noted.