James F. Glass v. Gilliatte General Contractors, Inc. (mem. dec.)

Citation: Not availableDocket: 49A02-1607-MI-1642

Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; January 29, 2017; Indiana; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The memorandum decision, filed on January 30, 2017, addresses the appeal of James F. Glass against Gilliatte General Contractors, Inc. concerning the trial court's grant of Gilliatte's Petition for Confirmation of Arbitration Award and the denial of Glass's motion to correct error. The Court of Appeals affirms the trial court's decision.

Glass raises three primary issues on appeal: 
1. The alleged defectiveness of the trial court's judgment in favor of Gilliatte.
2. The claimed defectiveness of the trial court's order denying his motion to correct error.
3. The assertion that the trial court erred in rejecting his claim of fraudulent concealment.

The factual background outlines a contract between Gilliatte and Glass for a painting job at the Indiana Soybean Experience Building, which included an arbitration clause. Disputes arose during the project, leading to Glass's termination and Gilliatte's hiring of a replacement subcontractor. Glass sought arbitration, alleging breach of contract, while Gilliatte counterclaimed for costs incurred due to Glass's termination. The arbitrator ruled in favor of Gilliatte, ordering Glass to pay $24,868.10, including attorney’s fees.

Gilliatte filed for confirmation of the arbitration award in March 2016, to which Glass responded, claiming the award was invalid due to fraudulent concealment. The trial court confirmed the arbitration award on May 4, 2016, with approval from both Magistrate Caryl Dill and Judge Timothy W. Oakes, the latter's signature being a rubber stamp. Glass’s subsequent motion to correct error was denied on June 28, 2016, leading to this appeal.

Glass contends that the rubber-stamped signature undermines the validity of the judgment, while Gilliatte maintains that the execution was proper.

Indiana Trial Rule 58(B)(5) mandates that a judgment includes the date and the judge's signature, with an electronic signature considered valid under Ind. Trial Rule 83(7). A hand-stamped signature is deemed sufficient, as the validity of a judgment is assessed by its substance rather than its form (Henderson v. Sneath Oil Co. Inc.). Glass did not contest the presiding judge's authorization of the rubber stamp nor demonstrate any prejudice, leading to the failure of his claim.

Regarding Glass’s motion to correct error, he argues its denial was inappropriate because it was signed by Magistrate Dill, whom he believes lacked the statutory authority to do so. However, Gilliatte asserts that Glass has waived this argument. The court agrees, referencing City of Indianapolis v. Hicks, which established that challenges to a court officer's authority must be raised promptly. Glass raised this issue for the first time on appeal, over one hundred days later, asserting he lacked access to the Clerk’s Record. This claim is dismissed since the signing was evident on the trial court clerk’s Chronological Case Summary, and there was no evidence of denied access to records. Consequently, Glass waived his challenge to the magistrate's authority.

Lastly, addressing Glass's challenge to the trial court's affirmation of the arbitration award, Gilliatte contends that Glass waived his claim of constructive fraud by failing to present it within the required ninety-day period as specified by Indiana Code section 34-57-2-13. This statute mandates that such claims be made within ninety days of receiving the award, with the time frame extending only if the grounds for the claim were unknown. Gilliatte argues that Glass did not meet this deadline, rendering his claim untimely and therefore waived.

Gilliatte filed a petition to confirm an arbitration award, and Glass, the opposing party, attempted to assert defenses, including fraud. Indiana law allows a party to raise defenses against an arbitration award, even if they did not file a separate petition to challenge it. The court clarified that Glass could assert fraud despite not filing a separate petition, as doing otherwise would undermine statutory provisions.

Judicial review of arbitration awards is limited, and a party seeking to vacate an award must prove specific statutory grounds. Glass contended that the award was obtained through fraudulent concealment, claiming he was unfairly terminated and that the arbitrator hid evidence. However, the arbitrator considered Glass's claims and evidence from Gilliatte, ultimately ruling against him. The court concluded that Glass's argument was a request to reweigh evidence rather than a legitimate fraud claim, and affirmed that he was entitled to a fair proceeding, not a favorable outcome.

Gilliatte sought appellate attorney’s fees, alleging Glass's appeal was frivolous. The court stated that it exercises restraint in awarding such fees and found that while Glass did not prevail, his appeal did not meet the criteria for being frivolous or pursued in bad faith. Consequently, the request for attorney’s fees was denied, and the trial court's judgment was affirmed.