Preslie Hardwick v. Marcia Vreeken

Citation: Not availableDocket: 15-55563

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; January 2, 2017; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The Ninth Circuit Court affirmed the district court's denial of absolute and qualified immunity for social workers accused of using perjured testimony and fabricated evidence to unlawfully remove Preslie Hardwick from her mother, violating her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court found that the social workers' actions went beyond their legitimate roles and that the plaintiff provided sufficient evidence to dispute claims of constitutional violation. The panel emphasized that social workers should be aware that using criminal behavior to interfere with an individual's constitutional rights is impermissible. The appeal stemmed from the social workers' argument that the law they allegedly violated was not "clearly established" at the time of their conduct, but the court rejected this claim. The case is linked to prior litigation in which Hardwick's mother successfully sued the same social workers for similar misconduct.

The court remanded the case to the trial court to remove injunctive relief from the judgment while affirming the judgment in all other respects. The California Court of Appeal found that the jury determined that social workers Vreeken and Dwojak committed perjury, falsified evidence, and suppressed exculpatory evidence relevant to the dependency court's custody decision regarding Fogarty-Hardwick, acting with malice. These findings indicate that qualified immunity is not applicable per the Supreme Court’s criteria. The Court of Appeal recognized the defendants’ acknowledgment that substantial evidence indicated egregious misconduct by the social workers in the dependency case. The appeal was interlocutory, addressing only the legal issue of immunity claims, without commenting on the merits of the case, which are for the district court to decide. The court examined the facts favorably for Preslie while conducting a de novo review of the legal issues. Absolute immunity for social workers applies only when they perform quasi-prosecutorial or quasi-judicial functions in juvenile dependency court. The evaluation of whether their actions fall under absolute immunity depends on whether these actions were investigative/administrative or part of advocating for the state. Preslie's allegations against the social workers include false statements and omissions in court reports, deceptive comments during court discussions, fabrication of evidence, and corrupt recommendations concerning her detention despite knowing they misled the court.

Defendants’ actions that Preslie aims to prove as false include: (1) misleading the dependency court on February 17, 2000, by claiming Deanna caused her daughters to miss a mandatory visit, whereas the issue stemmed from visitation monitor Hector Delgadillo; (2) asserting that Deanna influenced her children against the monitor; and (3) alleging that Deanna told her children their father intended to take them away, when in fact defendant Vreeken made inappropriate threats to the children regarding potential placement in a home if they did not visit their father. Based on these claims, the dependency court decided that Deanna was "using" her children, resulting in the immediate removal of the girls from her custody to the SSA and the defendants, after which they were placed in the Orangewood Children’s Home. On February 23, 2000, the court authorized their return to Deanna, but social workers instead placed them in foster care until May 2000.

Preslie's complaint challenges actions outside the social workers’ legitimate quasi-prosecutorial role. The precedent set in Beltran v. Santa Clara County establishes that while social workers may have absolute immunity for functions critical to the judicial process, they do not have such immunity for fabricating evidence or making false statements in dependency petitions. Consequently, the district court's denial of absolute immunity to these defendants is affirmed. 

Regarding qualified immunity, Preslie argues for collateral estoppel, asserting that this issue was conclusively decided against the defendants in California courts. However, as the same conclusion is reached here, the necessity of determining whether offensive collateral estoppel applies is bypassed.

Preslie also invokes the constitutional rights of parents and children to live together without state interference, which is a protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has consistently recognized this fundamental right, affirming that personal choice in family matters is safeguarded by the Due Process Clause.

The Constitution safeguards the integrity of the family, a core institution rooted in American history and tradition, essential for transmitting values and culture. Defendants acknowledge that Preslie possessed constitutional Due Process and Fourth Amendment rights against the government's use of false testimony and fabricated evidence in dependency court, aimed at disrupting her relationship with her mother. However, they argue that the specific right to be free from such fabricated evidence in civil child dependency cases was not "clearly established" prior to the proceedings in question, despite the existence of such rights in criminal cases. 

The legal standard for determining whether a right is clearly established requires that its contours be sufficiently defined so that a reasonable official would understand they were violating it. This standard allows government officials some leeway for reasonable mistakes but protects against actions by those who are incompetent or knowingly violate the law. Notably, an official action may still be deemed unlawful even if it has not been previously judged as such, provided that the unlawfulness was apparent based on existing law. 

The critical question is whether the legal context as of February 2000 provided fair warning to the involved social workers that their alleged conduct—using false testimony and fabricated evidence to sever Preslie's familial bond—was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court's inquiry in the related case, Hope, extended beyond judicial opinions to include the inherent cruelty of the disputed actions, which should have alerted the officials to potential constitutional violations. The Court also referenced relevant regulations and reports indicating the unconstitutionality of the disputed practices to support its conclusion that a reasonable person would recognize such actions as unconstitutional.

The district court correctly identified relevant legal precedents regarding collateral estoppel, particularly referencing *Greene v. Camreta*, where the plaintiff's children were removed based on a social worker's intentional misrepresentation in an affidavit. The Ninth Circuit established that the plaintiff's right to be free from deceptive evidence during protective custody proceedings was clearly defined prior to the affidavit's filing in 2003. The court noted that earlier case law, including *Devereaux v. Perez* and *Hervey v. Estes*, supported this constitutional right. The defendants argued that *Greene* was inapplicable since the affidavit was filed in 2003 and the opinion was published in 2009; however, the court explained that *Greene* was based on precedents involving conduct from the 1990s. Additionally, *Snell v. Tunnell* (1990) was cited, which held that social workers who fabricated evidence for child removal orders were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court clarified that *Snell* pertained to civil child dependency issues, not criminal proceedings, and emphasized that social workers involved in the current case allegedly violated both state and federal law by knowingly submitting false evidence, constituting perjury.

18 U.S.C. § 1621 and California Penal Code § 118 classify perjury as a crime without distinguishing between criminal and civil proceedings, indicating that qualified immunity does not protect officials who engage in malicious conduct. The Supreme Court, in Sheehan, reaffirmed that officials who knowingly break the law are ineligible for immunity. During oral arguments, it was confirmed that social workers are aware that perjury is impermissible in court, and there is no justification for creating false evidence. Unlike cases of excessive force or cruel and unusual punishment, any amount of perjury or false evidence is unacceptable, as it violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process rights. The social workers’ actions did not occur under pressing or ambiguous circumstances that might excuse their behavior. 

Additionally, California Government Code § 820.21 explicitly states that civil immunity does not apply to juvenile court social workers if their actions involve malice, such as perjury or fabrication of evidence. Malice is defined as conduct intended to cause injury or carried out with conscious disregard for the rights of others. This statute was established following the controversial case James W. v. Superior Court, which highlighted the need for accountability in social workers’ actions resulting in child removals. The legislation, Assembly Bill 1355, faced significant opposition from various organizations but was enacted due to public concern over such abuses. It is implausible that social workers were unaware of this significant legal change by 1999.

The excerpt emphasizes that a pertinent state statute clearly warns defendants about the consequences of lies and deception, specifically the loss of immunity in legal proceedings. This statute addresses wrongful behavior affecting dependency proceedings, which are central to Due Process rights. The Court draws parallels to a previous case, Hope, where clear misconduct should have alerted officials that their actions violated constitutional rights. It argues that social workers must inherently understand that criminal actions cannot be used to interfere with fundamental constitutional liberties. The defendants claim the law was not clearly established by February 2000, citing Costanich v. Department of Social and Health Services, yet the distinction between the rights in that case and the fundamental rights at issue here is significant. Unlike Costanich, which involved foster care licensees, the present case concerns the more clearly established rights of parents and their children as recognized by the Fourteenth Amendment. The excerpt references landmark cases that affirm the fundamental liberty interests in familial relationships.

Parents hold the primary custody, care, and nurturing rights of their children, as established in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972), which emphasizes a parent's protected interest in their children's companionship and management. In contrast, a foster parent's rights stem from state law and may vary based on specific circumstances, as noted in Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845–46 (1977). When interests arise from a contractual relationship with the state, state law defines the expectations and entitlements of the involved parties. However, the fundamental liberty interests of legal parents and their children are not subject to such individualized assessments. It is reasonable to expect social workers to understand these fundamental rights, which are safeguarded by Due Process. The case of Costanich is deemed distinguishable and not controlling. Preslie has provided sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute regarding whether her removal from her mother's custody violated her constitutional rights. The defendants’ claim for qualified immunity lacks legal support, and the case will proceed to a final judgment in the district court.