In re Marriage of McLain

Citations: 7 Cal. App. 5th 262; 2017 WL 65412Docket: E062884

Court: California Court of Appeal; January 6, 2017; California; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The Court of Appeal of the State of California affirmed the family court's judgment in the dissolution of the marriage between Colleen and Bruce Y. McLain. The family court ordered Bruce to pay Colleen $4,000 monthly in spousal support, granted her $5,500 in attorney’s fees, and denied Bruce's request for reimbursement of separate property contributions for constructing their residence. 

Bruce raised three issues on appeal: he argued the family court incorrectly awarded spousal support by recognizing Colleen's right to retire, that the award of attorney’s fees to Colleen was erroneous, and that he had adequately traced his separate property, warranting reimbursement. 

The couple married on October 13, 2001, separated on March 14, 2014, and had no children. At the time of separation, Bruce was 68 and Colleen was 66. Both had retired in 2005, with Bruce receiving approximately $10,000 monthly in retirement income and Colleen receiving a monthly social security income of $746, reduced by $198 for Medicare. 

Bruce worked as a firefighter, while Colleen was a licensed real estate agent but primarily focused on household duties post-retirement. They built a house in Big Bear City valued at $775,000, funded through joint accounts, with funds from refinancing Colleen's Fawnskin property and proceeds from the sale of Bruce's San Dimas house, to which Colleen’s name was added for title insurance purposes during its sale. The construction of the Big Bear house cost approximately $507,700.

The family court ruled that the Wife is entitled to spousal support to address her financial needs and to approximate the marital standard of living, awarding her $4,000 per month in support and $5,500 in attorney’s fees. The court found it inappropriate to impute income to the Wife, noting a lack of evidence for potential earnings and acknowledging both parties are retired beyond the typical retirement age. The Husband's claim that the Wife has an obligation to become self-supporting was rejected, emphasizing that both parties have the right to retire. The court cited precedent indicating that no individual can be compelled to work beyond retirement age to maintain spousal support levels.

The ruling also discussed the statutory framework under Section 4320, which outlines factors to consider in spousal support decisions, including the age and health of the parties. The court acknowledged a conflict between the supported spouse's obligation to become self-supporting and the recognition that older individuals may not be able to work. It emphasized the importance of interpreting the 'age' factor in the statute, suggesting that age should be considered in the context of the likelihood of employment capability, particularly noting that 65 is generally recognized as the retirement age. The court's interpretation aligns with previous case law that underscores the significance of age in spousal support determinations.

Age is a relevant factor for courts in determining spousal support, particularly to assess if the parties are younger or older and whether older parties have reached the customary retirement age of 65. The trial court has broad discretion in awarding spousal support, guided by statutory guidelines, and must weigh the facts and equities of each case to achieve substantial justice. The court must consider the earning capacity and needs of each party based on the marital standard of living established during the marriage. This standard is a general description of the couple's life at separation, rather than a precise measurement. 

In this case, the court found that the Wife required spousal support to approach the marital standard of living and determined that imputing income to her was inappropriate due to a lack of evidence of her income, available jobs, her retirement status, and her right to remain retired. The court's consideration of the Wife's retirement was consistent with recognizing the parties' achieved station in life. The court explicitly noted that the marital standard of living included retirement, and therefore, it would not issue a Gavron warning, which would typically alert the supported spouse about the expectation to become self-supporting. The court's analysis reflected a balance between the goal of self-sufficiency for the supported party and the maintenance of the marital standard of living that included retirement.

The court evaluated relevant factors in determining spousal support, considering the parties' retirement in 2005 and the Wife's age of 66 in 2014. The family court's reasoning was closely linked to the evidence presented, demonstrating that it did not abuse its discretion. The decision fell within legal bounds, as established in In re Marriage of Weinstein, where abuse of discretion is defined as exceeding reasonable limits. 

Husband argued that the court erred by not requiring Wife to seek self-sufficiency, focusing on her ability to work. However, the court reasonably weighed the evidence, placing greater emphasis on Wife's age over her potential to work. The court acknowledged the factor regarding the earning capacity necessary to maintain the marital standard of living, but concluded that it was not feasible for Wife to seek employment given her retirement status and age.

Husband also contended that the court failed to consider the goal of self-sufficiency for the supported party. The court, however, indicated that it had considered this goal and chose not to issue a Gavron warning, recognizing Wife’s retirement and age as significant factors. Thus, the court did not overlook any required considerations but prioritized Wife’s age.

Regarding attorney’s fees, Husband claimed the court erred in awarding need-based fees to Wife by incorrectly assuming her right to retire. Nevertheless, the court justified the fee award based on the previously discussed factors and the income disparity between the parties.

The family court's ruling prioritizes the 'spousal support' section, indicating that its analysis influenced the award of attorney's fees under sections 2030 and 2032, which permit such awards based on the parties' financial circumstances. Relevant factors include assets, debts, earning capacity, ability to pay, marriage duration, and the parties' age and health. In this case, the court noted the Wife's retirement and its relation to the marital standard of living when awarding fees, concluding that the court acted appropriately.

Regarding separate property, the family court determined that the Husband did not adequately trace his separate property used for constructing the Big Bear house, as he failed to provide supporting documentation despite testimony. The Husband argued that documentation was not a statutory requirement, referencing section 2640(b), which allows reimbursement for contributions to community property if traced to separate property sources without requiring interest or adjustments. The statute does not define 'tracing,' but precedent establishes that property acquired during marriage is presumed community property, placing the burden on the asserting spouse to prove its separate nature. If separate funds are commingled with community funds, the spouse must maintain records to demonstrate that community income was exhausted at the time of the purchase. The court affirmed its adherence to this precedent, indicating it could not contradict the Supreme Court's interpretation.

Tracing of separate property requires documentary proof, as established by the Supreme Court, to ensure records are available for court evidence. In this case, Husband claims he provided adequate evidence through a handwritten note detailing funds from the sale of his San Dimas house. Although Wife's attorney stipulated to the note's admissibility, this does not signify agreement on its evidentiary sufficiency regarding tracing separate property. Wife's testimony acknowledged that some funds from the San Dimas sale were used for the Big Bear house construction but lacked specificity on the amounts, thus failing to provide substantial evidence for tracing. Additionally, the total construction cost of the Big Bear house was around $507,700, while available funds from Wife’s refinances and Husband's claim of separate property exceeded this amount, making it unclear how much of Husband's separate property was actually used for the construction. Consequently, the judgment is affirmed, and the Respondent is awarded costs on appeal.