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Ralph v. Weyerhaeuser Co.
Citation: Not availableDocket: 91711-6
Court: Washington Supreme Court; December 28, 2016; Washington; State Supreme Court
Original Court Document: View Document
The legal opinion, filed in the Supreme Court of Washington, involves multiple consolidated cases stemming from a 2007 flood of the Chehalis River in Lewis County. The main petitioner, William Ralph, along with others, filed claims against Weyerhaeuser Company and Green Diamond Resource Company, as well as the Washington Department of Natural Resources, alleging various torts including negligence, trespass, and violations of state environmental laws. Previously, the court addressed issues of venue and subject matter jurisdiction, determining that RCW 4.12.010 pertains to venue rather than jurisdiction. Following this, the trial court had granted motions to transfer venue to Lewis County. However, the Supreme Court reversed this decision, clarifying that RCW 4.12.010 does not limit venue exclusively to Lewis County, as other venues, including King County, may also be appropriate under RCW 4.12.020(3) and 4.12.025(3). The court remanded the case for the trial court to reconsider the venue transfer, particularly regarding the convenience of witnesses, in line with this opinion. The factual basis includes claims that the respondents' forestry practices contributed to the flooding, leading to damage to the petitioners' properties. The court's opinion emphasizes the need for proper statutory interpretation regarding venue in such cases. Respondents moved to dismiss cases based on RCW 4.12.010(1), claiming exclusive jurisdiction in Lewis County due to the location of the real property involved. The trial court granted the motions, which the Court of Appeals affirmed. However, the court later reversed this decision, rejecting petitioners' argument that RCW 4.12.010(1) only pertains to real property title injuries and not to monetary damages. The court clarified that RCW 4.12.010 is jurisdictional, necessitating dismissal if filed outside the local county, but overruled past precedent, determining that the statute addresses venue rather than jurisdiction. If a tort action regarding real property is improperly filed, the remedy is a venue change rather than dismissal. The court remanded the case for proceedings consistent with this interpretation. Following this, respondents moved for a venue change to Lewis County, asserting it was the proper venue under RCW 4.12.010(1) and a more convenient forum. They also contended that if Lewis County was indeed the exclusive proper venue, petitioners should bear the transfer costs under RCW 4.12.090(1). The trial court granted these motions, leading to direct discretionary review and consolidation of actions. Key issues include whether respondents waived venue provisions, if the trial court correctly granted the venue change, whether petitioners should cover transfer costs, and if respondents are entitled to attorney fees on review. The court determined that prior interpretations of RCW 4.12.010 regarded it as jurisdictional, and therefore it does not provide exclusive venue in Lewis County, as other statutes allow for King County as an alternative proper venue. Thus, respondents did not have an automatic right to a venue change, and the record did not clarify if a convenience-based venue change to Lewis County was considered by the trial court. The court reversed and remanded the case for the trial court to exercise its discretion in accordance with the opinion provided. If the venue is transferred to Lewis County, the petitioners will not incur transfer costs, and the respondents are not entitled to costs or attorney fees upon review. The court addressed threshold issues raised by both parties but rejected these arguments due to the procedural history. Regarding waiver, the petitioners argued that the respondents waived their right to object to improper venue when they moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. However, the court found no waiver as the objection was not legally available before the precedent set in Ralph I. The respondents contended that proper venue under RCW 4.12.010(1) cannot be waived, but this stance relied on a now-rejected interpretation linking the statute to jurisdiction instead of venue. Following Ralph I, the statute pertains solely to venue, and objections under CR 12(h)(1) apply only to available defenses. Thus, the respondents did not waive their objection by moving to dismiss. On the scope of Ralph I, the respondents misinterpreted the ruling, claiming it established Lewis County as the exclusive proper venue. The court clarified that Ralph I addressed the applicability of RCW 4.12.010(1) but did not mandate exclusive venue. The remand was for further proceedings consistent with the opinion, not specifically for transferring the case to Lewis County. The court dismissed the respondents' arguments for a cumbersome transfer process to maintain land title stability, reaffirming that RCW 4.12.010 is not jurisdictional and that legislative action on this matter has not occurred. However, the court acknowledged the possibility of considering such stability arguments in specific cases to determine discretionary venue changes, as permitted by RCW 4.12.030(3). The court evaluated whether Lewis County is the exclusive proper venue for the actions at hand, focusing on statutory interpretation. The respondents sought to transfer the venue to Lewis County based on two grounds: as a matter of right under RCW 4.12.030(1) and for convenience under RCW 4.12.030(3). The trial court incorrectly granted the transfer based on the first ground, and it remains unclear if the second ground was considered. The court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded for further proceedings. Venue determination is primarily statutory, with the plaintiff generally selecting the venue, provided it is statutorily authorized. If the plaintiff files in an improper venue and the defendant objects, the defendant is entitled to a transfer to a proper venue, which is a matter of law. The court noted that when faced with equally applicable venue statutes, they can be interpreted as complementary. The petitioners argued that despite venue being proper in Lewis County under RCW 4.12.010(1), RCW 4.12.020(3) also allowed them to file in King County. The court agreed, stating the petitioners were seeking damages for emotional distress and personal property injuries, which made both venue statutes applicable. The court affirmed that both RCW 4.12.010, which mandates that actions for injuries to real property commence in the county where the property is located, and RCW 4.12.020(3), which allows plaintiffs to sue in the county where the cause arose or where the defendant resides, use mandatory language and serve complementary purposes. Thus, the option to file in King County was valid. RCW 4.12.010 dictates the commencement of legal actions, while RCW 4.12.020(3) allows plaintiffs the option to sue in specific venues. Despite RCW 4.12.010's language, both statutes are equally mandatory and specific regarding venue. RCW 4.12.010(1) addresses actions related to real property injuries, whereas RCW 4.12.020(3) pertains to personal property or personal injury claims. The current case differs from the Eubanks precedent, which prioritized a specific statute over a more general one; here, both statutes are specific only regarding the basis for the action. The respondents argue that RCW 4.12.010(1) is the most specific venue statute, limiting venue to Lewis County. However, this interpretation overlooks the need for plaintiffs to exercise the options provided by RCW 4.12.020(3). It would be illogical for the legislature to grant a venue option if it is ultimately limited to a single choice. Moreover, RCW 4.12.010(1) could allow multiple venue options depending on the facts, such as when real property spans several counties. In cases involving both real and personal property injuries, both statutes apply, granting the petitioners the option to sue in King County under RCW 4.12.020(3). Additionally, the petitioners contend that RCW 4.12.025(3) permits venue in King County for actions against corporations, as both Weyerhaeuser and Green Diamond are based there. The venue is thus proper under this statute. The respondents claim that RCW 4.12.025 is general and applicable only if no more specific statute exists, referencing relevant case law to support their position. RCW 4.12.025(1) allows a defendant to have an action commenced in their county of residence, but this does not apply to RCW 4.12.025(3), which was amended after the Russell decision to include specific provisions. In 1998, RCW 4.12.025(2) was added to address actions regarding unlawful checks. Venue for actions under RCW 4.12.025(2) and (3) is proper in both Lewis County and King County, as specified by RCW 4.12.010(1) and RCW 4.12.020(3). Consequently, Lewis County is not the exclusive venue, and the respondents cannot claim a change of venue as a matter of right under RCW 4.12.030(1). Regarding discretionary transfer of venue, the respondents argued for a change based on witness convenience under RCW 4.12.030(3). The trial court's handling of this issue is unclear, and thus the case is remanded for the court to exercise its discretion appropriately. The trial court did not clearly deny the respondents' motions based on improper venue, leading to ambiguity about whether it considered witness convenience. Costs for changing venue are governed by RCW 4.12.090(1), which states that the party requesting the transfer pays the costs, except in certain cases where the plaintiff pays. Since the venue should not have been transferred as a matter of right, the petitioners cannot be charged transfer costs, even if the trial court decides to transfer the venue on remand. The request for costs and attorney fees by the respondents on review is denied, as the trial court's orders for venue change are reversed. Proper venue interpretation is a statutory matter of first impression, and it is concluded that Lewis County is not the sole proper venue for these actions. The case is reversed and remanded for further proceedings in line with this opinion. A concurring opinion also acknowledges the reclassification of RCW 4.12.010 as a venue statute rather than a jurisdictional one.