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Christina Lee Cain-Swope v. Robert David Swope
Citations: 523 S.W.3d 79; 2016 WL 7422781; 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 986Docket: M2015-00872-COA-R3-CV
Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; December 22, 2016; Tennessee; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
In the case of Christina Lee Cain-Swope v. Robert David Swope, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee addressed multiple issues in a divorce appeal. The wife, Christina, contested the trial court's calculations regarding her child support obligation, arguing that the court failed to impute income to the husband and did not consider a downward deviation from child support guidelines for private school expenses, despite the parties' agreement that she would not be responsible for such tuition post-divorce. The court upheld the trial court's decision on child support, noting that the wife did not request a deviation for extraordinary educational expenses. Regarding alimony, the appellate court found that the trial court's findings did not meet the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01 concerning the wife's ability to pay and the husband's need for support. Consequently, the court vacated the $2,400 monthly alimony award and remanded the case for the trial court to provide proper findings of fact and legal conclusions regarding alimony. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decisions on all other matters, including child support and the allocation of attorney's fees. The case was adjudicated by a panel including Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr., and Judges Andy D. Bennett and Richard H. Dinkins. In actions tried without a jury, Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01 mandates that the court must make specific findings of fact and state its legal conclusions separately. Appellate courts review these factual findings de novo, presuming their correctness unless the evidence preponderates otherwise, which requires supporting a different finding with greater convincing effect. The requirement for findings and conclusions serves three primary purposes: facilitating appellate review, clarifying what is decided for future cases (supporting estoppel and res judicata), and encouraging careful decision-making by trial judges. While there is no strict standard for sufficiency, findings must include necessary subsidiary facts to show how the trial court reached its ultimate conclusions. A mere statement of decision does not satisfy the rule's requirements. If a trial court fails to provide a factual basis for its decisions, appellate courts may review the record de novo or remand for necessary findings. Legal determinations by trial courts are reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness. The issues raised by the Wife include: 1) alleged bias from the trial court's statements during opening arguments warranting de novo review of alimony; 2) errors in calculating child support regarding Husband’s alleged voluntary underemployment and extraordinary educational expenses; 3) errors related to the amount, duration, and type of alimony awarded to Husband; 4) the award of $10,000 in attorney’s fees to Husband; and 5) the request for Wife's attorney’s fees at trial and on appeal. Husband also seeks attorney’s fees for the appeal. Each issue will be addressed sequentially. Wife alleges that the trial judge exhibited bias during opening statements related to alimony, claiming that the judge prejudged factual issues before evidence was presented. She emphasizes the constitutional right to a fair trial and the requirement of impartiality, citing Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10, Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11, which mandates recusal in specific circumstances, including personal bias, familial relationships, significant campaign contributions, and public statements indicating a commitment to a result. Wife requests a de novo review of the alimony issue without a presumption of correctness, arguing that this would prevent financial hardship and that the record sufficiently captures the relevant evidence, making a new hearing unnecessary. The rules require that motions for disqualification be filed promptly after the grounds for disqualification are known; failure to do so results in a waiver of the right to contest a judge's impartiality. Wife did not raise her bias claim during the trial, despite the judge's statement occurring on the trial's first day, which undermines her argument and reflects against her procedural strategy. Wife's claim of bias against the trial court is deemed waived due to her failure to raise the issue until the appeal stage, suggesting she intended to use it as a fallback if the trial outcome was unfavorable. Courts discourage litigants from withholding known disqualification grounds to later assert them post-trial. Although the claim is waived, the court addresses the merits to uphold public confidence in judicial neutrality. Wife argues that the trial judge demonstrated bias by expressing opinions during opening statements regarding alimony, which she believes prejudged the case. The court notes that judicial comments must be evaluated in context to determine if they indicate partiality. The concepts of "bias" and "prejudice" imply an inappropriate predisposition towards a party that is excessive or based on improper knowledge. Not every negative view held by a judge constitutes grounds for recusal; opinions formed during proceedings are essential for making judicial decisions. A judge's expressions of frustration or dissatisfaction do not typically indicate bias unless they reveal a lack of fairness regarding the case's merits. Adverse rulings from a trial judge, even if erroneous, are generally grounds for appeal rather than recusal. In-court comments indicating a judge's bias from extrajudicial sources may warrant disqualification if they raise reasonable doubts about impartiality. A judge's personal views do not typically disqualify them unless such views are extreme enough to indicate an inability to be fair. The context of all comments and actions must be evaluated to determine perceived partiality. In the case at hand, the evidence does not support reasonable doubt regarding the judge’s impartiality, as the judge had been presiding over the case for nearly two years and did not show a predetermined bias. The Wife did not seek recusal during litigation, and her claims would lack merit even if preserved for appeal. Regarding child support, the trial court ordered the Wife to pay $793 per month. It found that neither spouse was voluntarily underemployed: the Wife left a higher-paying job to accept a position at Vanderbilt by mutual agreement, and the Husband was not underemployed as he agreed to be a stay-at-home parent. The court calculated child support based on both parents' incomes, determining the Wife's gross income to be $154,000 annually and the Husband's to be $26,647.44. The Wife challenges the child support ruling on two grounds: the trial court's failure to find the Husband willfully underemployed and its failure to provide for extraordinary educational expenses incurred for the children. The Basic Child Support Obligation (BCSO) is established using a Child Support Schedule that correlates parents' combined Adjusted Gross Income with the number of children involved. This Schedule accounts for average child-rearing expenses, including housing, food, transportation, and basic educational costs, but excludes health insurance premiums, childcare costs, uninsured medical expenses, special expenses, and extraordinary educational expenses. However, deviations from the presumptive child support order may be allowed for these excluded expenses. The trial court is required to utilize the Child Support Worksheet and Credit Worksheet from the Department of Human Services to determine the child support obligation. Accurate assessment of both parents’ gross income or ability to support is essential for fair child support awards. In cases of willful or voluntary underemployment or unemployment, Tennessee’s guidelines permit the court to impute additional gross income, aimed at preventing parents from evading financial responsibility. The burden of proof lies with the party alleging underemployment, and the determination of such status involves a factual analysis of each parent's employment history, education, and other relevant factors. Factual findings by the trial court are reviewed de novo, maintaining a presumption of correctness unless evidence strongly supports a contrary finding. Husband holds a bachelor's degree in Fine Arts from Middle Tennessee State University. After marrying, he and Wife relocated to Washington, D.C., where she attended medical school from 1991 to 1995. During her studies, Husband worked full-time at an art gallery and later as a bank teller. Following the birth of their first child in March 1995, they returned to Nashville, and Husband became a stay-at-home parent by mutual agreement. Wife completed her residency at Vanderbilt in 1999 and practiced privately until 2010, earning approximately $250,000 to $260,000 annually before joining Vanderbilt's medical staff at a salary of $154,000 per year, which she accepted for better work-life balance. While a stay-at-home parent, Husband held various part-time jobs, including as a sales associate and art preparator, but transitioned to a full-time position at Trader Joe’s, earning $13.85 per hour, by 2011. Wife argued that he could earn more given his education and criticized his job search efforts, claiming he submitted fewer than five applications and avoided higher-paying positions, including a museum specialist role that paid $42,000 annually. Husband acknowledged that his position at Trader Joe’s did not reflect his qualifications and admitted to not actively seeking higher-paying employment since starting there. He mentioned stress as a factor in declining to apply for certain jobs and noted the certification requirement for public school art teaching, which he deemed too time-consuming. Wife contends that Husband's reluctance to pursue better-paying work constitutes voluntary underemployment and urged the court to impute $42,000 in annual income to him based on the museum specialist position. No parent is automatically presumed to be willfully or voluntarily underemployed; the court must evaluate a parent's employment history, education, training, work ability, and other relevant facts. In this case, the Husband agreed to be a stay-at-home parent, which affected his career opportunities. Despite holding a bachelor’s degree, his highest earnings have been $14 per hour, with his current wage at $13.85. The evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that Husband is not voluntarily underemployed, thus preventing the imputation of additional income for child support calculations. Wife argues that the trial court incorrectly denied her request for a deviation in child support due to private school expenses for their children. Husband counters that Wife waived this argument by not formally requesting an order for ongoing private schooling expenses and highlights that their parenting plan stated neither parent is obligated to pay for private school. The court agrees with Husband, noting that the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines set a presumptive support amount and permit deviations for extraordinary educational expenses, such as tuition and fees, if justified. However, the Tennessee Supreme Court has not classified private schooling as an extraordinary expense in all cases, as it could impose an unmanageable financial burden on the non-custodial parent. The burden is on the party seeking a deviation to prove its necessity, and the court must articulate the rationale and quantify the support amount without the deviation when adjusting child support. When a trial court deviates from the presumptive child support guidelines, it must provide written findings explaining why the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate, and how the deviation serves the child's best interests, as per Tenn. Comp. R. Regs. ch. 1240-2-4-.07(1)(c). In this case, the trial court's Memorandum and Final Decree of Divorce did not address private school expenses beyond acknowledging the Wife's expense statement for private school tuition. Although the Wife argued for a deviation from child support guidelines, there was no record of her formally requesting this deviation during proceedings. Both parents acknowledged their children attended private school but did not seek a mandatory requirement for its continuation. Their parenting plan explicitly stated that private school expenses would be optional and not obligatory, aligning with the courts' stance that unraised issues in trial are waived on appeal. Consequently, the trial court's lack of consideration for a deviation was deemed appropriate. Regarding spousal support, the Wife contended that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding alimony in futuro instead of rehabilitative alimony, paralleling her argument on child support concerning the Husband’s earning capacity. The appellate review of alimony awards operates under an abuse of discretion standard, granting trial courts broad authority to determine the necessity, nature, amount, and duration of support. This standard does not allow appellate courts to replace the trial court's discretion but does permit scrutiny of the decision based on three criteria: evidential support, application of appropriate legal principles, and alignment within acceptable alternative dispositions. Appellate courts evaluate factual findings using a preponderance of evidence standard and assess legal determinations de novo, without presumption of correctness. When reviewing a trial court’s discretionary decision, an appellate court assesses whether the decision has a factual basis, if the correct legal principles were applied, and if the decision falls within acceptable alternative outcomes. In Tennessee, there are four types of alimony: rehabilitative, alimony in futuro, alimony in solido, and transitional. There is a statutory preference for rehabilitative or transitional alimony, but this does not eliminate the possibility of long-term support if warranted by the case facts. Alimony decisions must consider the factors outlined in Tennessee Code Annotated 36-5-121(i), focusing primarily on the economically disadvantaged spouse’s need and the obligor spouse’s ability to pay. The couple in question had been married for 24 years and had three children. At trial, the wife was 46 and the husband was 55, both in good health. Key factors for consideration include each party's earning capacity, financial resources, education, duration of marriage, age, and contributions to the marriage. The wife, a Board Certified obstetrician, had significant earnings during the marriage, working as a private practitioner before joining Vanderbilt’s medical staff. Wife was employed at Vanderbilt with an annual salary of $154,000 at the time of trial. Husband, who holds a fine arts degree, worked full-time during the first four years of their marriage, earning $12 to $13 per hour before becoming a stay-at-home parent after the birth of their first child. While staying home, he held part-time jobs earning $10 to $12 per hour. In 2011, he began working at Trader Joe's for $13.85 per hour. Although Wife testified that they agreed Husband would return to work when their youngest child started school in 2005, she also acknowledged that she had allowed him to remain a stay-at-home parent. Wife claimed that Husband neglected household duties, forcing her to manage work and family responsibilities, but admitted he was the primary caregiver and she did not request he work until 2010, after which he sought employment. The trial court awarded Husband $2,400 per month in alimony in futuro, stating that he is not capable of rehabilitation and is economically disadvantaged compared to Wife. The court noted Husband’s age (55) and his role as a stay-at-home parent, contrasting it with Wife's focus on economic stability. The court concluded that rehabilitation is not feasible for Husband to maintain a similar standard of living post-divorce. Transitional alimony was deemed inappropriate, and the payments will be made in two installments of $1,200 on the 1st and 15th of each month, starting after the sale of the marital home. Wife contested the decision, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion and that Husband is capable of rehabilitation. Wife's argument regarding alimony parallels her stance on child support, focusing on Husband's earning capacity. There is a statutory preference for transitional or rehabilitative alimony over alimony in futuro. However, alimony in futuro is warranted when there is relative economic disadvantage and rehabilitation is not feasible, as per Tennessee law (Tenn. Code Ann. 36-5-121). This type of alimony can be modified for substantial changes in circumstances and remains under the court's control for its duration. In this case, the trial court found Husband to be the disadvantaged spouse, unable to attain an earning capacity comparable to Wife's post-divorce standard of living. The court's conclusions were based on factors such as the parties' ages, education, training, earning capacities, and their contributions to the marriage. Notably, Husband's role as a homemaker and caretaker enabled Wife to advance her medical career. The law recognizes the economic detriment suffered by a spouse who prioritizes homemaking over personal career development and emphasizes the importance of both economic and non-economic contributions to the marriage. Given these considerations, the trial court determined that Husband has a demonstrated need for spousal support, affirming his status as the disadvantaged spouse due to his years as a stay-at-home parent. Husband's income at trial was approximately $26,650 per year, which is the highest he has ever earned. Factors such as his age, education, and limited work experience suggest he will not achieve a post-divorce earning capacity comparable to Wife's. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that rehabilitation was inappropriate and awarding Husband alimony in futuro. Wife argues the monthly alimony of $2,400 is excessive and unsustainable, requiring her to deplete her marital estate or rely on Social Security. The determination of alimony amount is within the trial court's discretion, and appellate courts will only intervene in cases of abuse of discretion. The trial court did not provide specific findings of fact regarding the amount of alimony awarded, which hinders the ability to presume correctness in its decision. Although the court found Husband unsuitable for rehabilitative alimony and deemed alimony in futuro appropriate, it failed to articulate the rationale behind the $2,400 monthly amount, necessitating a review of the record to assess the evidence supporting the alimony determination. Payments of $1,200 will be made in equal installments on the 1st and 15th of each month, starting immediately after the sale of the marital home. The trial court's decision to award $2,400 in monthly alimony is questioned due to insufficient findings of fact, which are necessary for appellate review as outlined in Rule 52.01. The court failed to provide a factual basis for determining the alimony amount, particularly regarding the obligee spouse's need and the obligor spouse's ability to pay, as highlighted in relevant case law. While it is acknowledged that the Husband has a need for alimony, the Wife's financial situation shows her expenses exceed her income, resulting in a deficit if ordered to pay $2,400 monthly. The trial court's discretion in alimony awards cannot lead to a substantial financial burden on the obligor spouse. Therefore, the alimony award is vacated, and the case is remanded for the trial court to reassess the appropriate alimony amount, requiring a factual examination of both parties' expenses and needs. The court may choose to reopen evidence regarding these financial matters. Additionally, the Wife argues against the trial court's decision to require her to pay a portion of the Husband's attorney's fees and contends she should have been awarded her own attorney's fees. Both parties are seeking attorney's fees for the appeal. An award of attorney's fees in divorce cases is classified as alimony in solido, particularly when one spouse lacks sufficient income to cover their attorney's fees and the divorce does not provide a revenue source for payment. The trial court must evaluate relevant alimony factors under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i) when deciding on attorney's fees and has broad discretion in determining the necessity of such awards, which will not be overturned on appeal unless there is an abuse of discretion. In this case, the trial court ordered the Wife to pay $10,000 of the Husband's attorney's fees, representing about one-fourth of his total fees. This amount is to be paid from the Wife's share of the proceeds from the sale of the marital home. The court justified this decision by noting the significant disparity in the parties' incomes and the Husband's economic disadvantage, alongside the Wife's superior earning capacity. The court found the Husband needed assistance with his legal fees and deemed it appropriate for the Wife to contribute, while denying her request for attorney's fees. The Wife argued that the trial court made an error in requiring her to pay any of the Husband's fees, asserting that he would have sufficient funds from the sale proceeds. She further contended that she should have been awarded attorney's fees for enforcing the alimony decree based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c), which allows a plaintiff spouse to recover reasonable attorney's fees from the defendant spouse at the trial's discretion. The court had previously recognized the Husband's entitlement to alimony due to the income disparity between the parties. The trial court’s award of $10,000 in attorney's fees to Wife was deemed reasonable, with no abuse of discretion identified. Although the appellate court might have denied Husband's request for fees, it respects the trial court's broad discretion in such matters. Both parties requested attorney's fees for the appeal; however, the appellate court, exercising its discretion, declined to award fees to either party after considering their ability to pay, success in the appeal, and other equitable factors. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment in part, vacated it in part, and remanded for further proceedings, assigning two-thirds of the appeal costs to Wife and one-third to Husband.