INGUTTI, FREDERICK v. ROCHESTER GENERAL HOSPITAL

Citation: Not availableDocket: CA 15-01950

Court: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York; December 22, 2016; New York; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The Supreme Court of New York's Appellate Division affirmed a lower court's order denying Rochester General Hospital's motion to dismiss certain causes of action in a negligence and medical malpractice lawsuit brought by Frederick and Mary Ingutti. The plaintiffs claimed damages after Frederick Ingutti, having signed a 'Release From Responsibility For Discharge' form, was found disoriented and frostbitten shortly after leaving the hospital. The court had previously ruled that the hospital was not liable for ordinary negligence for his discharge against medical advice. In the current appeal, the hospital sought to dismiss the remaining claims of medical malpractice, gross negligence, lack of informed consent, and loss of consortium. The court dismissed only the gross negligence claim and upheld the existence of the medical malpractice claim. The ruling emphasized that the legal standards for ordinary negligence and medical malpractice are distinct, allowing both claims to coexist in a complaint. The court reaffirmed the standard of review for motions to dismiss, requiring that pleadings be liberally construed and that the facts alleged be accepted as true.

An action for personal injuries can be pursued based on medical malpractice or simple negligence while under the care of a medical practitioner or facility. Both theories may be presented to the jury. In this case, the plaintiff's medical malpractice claim includes allegations that the defendant failed to properly assess the plaintiff’s medical and mental status, provided inadequate care, and discharged the plaintiff improperly. The plaintiffs provided affidavits from a psychiatrist and a registered nurse, detailing several deviations from the accepted standard of care in the treatment and discharge planning of the plaintiff. The court rejected the defendant's assertion that the plaintiff was not discharged, noting that the defendant’s own records contradicted that claim. The court found sufficient grounds for a medical malpractice claim, distinct from the previously dismissed ordinary negligence claim.

The defendant argued that the claim for lack of informed consent should be dismissed because the plaintiff's injuries did not result from a violation of physical integrity, but this argument was raised for the first time on appeal and deemed unpreserved. The court noted that the defendant failed to provide specific arguments regarding this cause of action, and thus declined to consider it, especially since the defendant's approach limited the plaintiffs' opportunity to address any potential deficiencies in their complaint.

The court upheld the plaintiffs’ medical malpractice and lack of informed consent claims, rejecting the defendant's motion to dismiss the derivative cause of action. However, a dissenting opinion argued that the entire complaint should be dismissed, referencing a prior decision that stated the defendant did not have a duty to prevent the plaintiff from leaving the hospital against medical advice, which was the basis for dismissing the negligence claim. The dissenting judge contended the same rationale should apply to the remaining causes of action.

Plaintiffs allege that the defendant improperly allowed the plaintiff to leave the hospital against medical advice, claiming negligence and medical malpractice. They argue that the defendant failed to ensure a safe discharge and did not adequately assess or document the plaintiff's treatment and condition prior to discharge. However, similar to the case of Kowalski, the core issue is whether the defendant had a duty to prevent the plaintiff from leaving the hospital. The record does not demonstrate any causal link between alleged protocol violations and the plaintiff’s injury. Consequently, the court concludes that the causes of action for medical malpractice and lack of informed consent should be dismissed, resulting in the dismissal of the derivative cause of action as well.