Thomas Reid v. New Hampshire Attorney General

Citation: 169 N.H. 509Docket: 2015-0499

Court: Supreme Court of New Hampshire; December 22, 2016; New Hampshire; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

The opinion, subject to potential rehearing and revision before publication, addresses Thomas Reid's appeal against the New Hampshire Attorney General regarding the denial of his Right-to-Know Law petition. Reid sought unredacted records from the Attorney General’s investigation into former Rockingham County Attorney James Reams. 

The relevant facts include Reid's role as Deputy County Attorney until November 6, 2013, when the Attorney General suspended Reams' criminal law enforcement authority and placed Reid on paid suspension. Subsequently, Reid and Reams were barred from the county attorney's office at the Attorney General's request, with an assistant attorney general appointed as interim county attorney. A criminal investigation into Reams, conducted alongside federal authorities, lasted until March 2014. Reid resigned on January 17, 2014. 

Reams filed lawsuits against the Attorney General and county commissioners, claiming their actions were unlawful. The Superior Court denied Reams’s requests for injunctive relief and discovery, citing the ongoing investigation. After the investigation concluded with no charges against Reams, the court found no need for discovery and ruled Reams's suspension unlawful, ordering his reinstatement while allowing for an appeal from the Attorney General and county commissioners. The opinion is vacated and remanded for further proceedings.

The attorney general and county commissioners appealed to the court for an extension of a stay, which was denied. On June 18, 2014, both proceedings were settled. The plaintiff requested disclosure of records related to the investigation of Reams on April 17, 2014, seeking various materials, including investigative reports, memos, emails, and records justifying actions taken against him. The requests included specifics about the initiation of a criminal investigation, assignment of a state trooper, potential discrimination at the Rockingham County Attorney’s Office, and a retaliation claim involving a county employee. A subsequent request on April 24, 2014, sought additional documentation regarding supervisory modifications and personal notes from the plaintiff's tenure. The defendant acknowledged the need for at least 30 days to compile the materials but failed to respond for approximately seven months, prompting the plaintiff to initiate legal action. The defendant moved to dismiss, admitting to the delay but asserting no improper withholding of information. By December 20, 2014, he began disclosing documents in a “rolling production.” The trial court ruled on January 14, 2015, that the defendant violated the Right-to-Know Law by not timely supplementing his responses.

The court awarded the plaintiff his costs but denied a review of redacted documents in camera, instead requiring the defendant to submit a comprehensive affidavit to justify the redactions. The court found that the defendant acted in good faith and therefore denied the plaintiff's requests for a civil penalty and for attorney's fees, as the plaintiff was self-represented. The defendant submitted a final status report, including an affidavit from Associate Attorney General Anne Edwards, outlining nine legal bases for the withheld or redacted information under RSA 91-A:5. These bases included personnel information, medical information, grand jury records, and attorney work product, among others. A Bates-numbered document list indicated the applicable exemptions for each document. The defendant sought dismissal of the case, claiming full compliance with the plaintiff’s requests. In response, the plaintiff requested additional time to review the materials and filed motions to compel a complete index of records and unredacted documents, challenging only the personnel information exemption. The defendant objected, and on July 10, 2015, the court denied the plaintiff's motions, stating the defendant had complied with the previous orders and that the requested documents were exempt under the Right-to-Know Law, specifically relating to an investigation into misconduct involving personnel practices. The court concluded the redactions were valid under RSA 91-A:5, IV. The plaintiff then appealed, arguing that the trial court's ruling violated the New Hampshire Constitution, misclassified the investigative records, and incorrectly stated the nature of the investigation conducted jointly with Rockingham County.

The court addresses a statutory interpretation issue regarding RSA 91-A:5, IV, which outlines exemptions from the Right-to-Know Law. The court emphasizes that statutory interpretation follows the ordinary rules of statutory construction, prioritizing the plain meaning of terms. It adopts a broad interpretation for disclosure provisions and a narrow one for exemptions. The specific exemption in question relates to records about internal personnel practices, among other confidential information. 

The trial court previously determined that the investigative records involved the Rockingham County Attorney’s Office’s personnel practices, which the plaintiff contests, arguing that the term "internal" should not apply since the Attorney General is not the County Attorney's employer. The court agrees with the plaintiff’s interpretation, stating that the records of the investigation do not pertain to internal practices as defined in the statute, and vacates the trial court’s decision for further proceedings.

The court reviews relevant precedents, notably the Fenniman case, where it upheld an exemption for investigatory documents related to internal personnel practices within a police department. It highlights that the terms "internal," "personnel," and "practices" are broad and must be interpreted in their plain meaning while also cautioning against overly expansive interpretations that could undermine the Right-to-Know Law's intent. The conclusion reached emphasizes the necessity of a precise interpretation of statutory language in determining the applicability of exemptions.

A balancing test to assess the benefits of nondisclosure versus disclosure is inappropriate when the legislature has defined certain documents as categorically exempt. In interpreting the "internal personnel practices" exemption in Fenniman, the court moved away from traditional Right-to-Know Law interpretations by not applying a narrow interpretation or a balancing approach. The court did not analyze the relevant portion of RSA 91-A:5, IV in connection with other statutory language, especially regarding the privacy exemption for personnel files. This omission raises questions about whether a broad interpretation of "internal personnel practices" could render the privacy exemption redundant. The court emphasized that all statutory language should be considered collectively to avoid redundancy, referencing precedent that asserts legislative intent is to avoid superfluous language. Although consulting decisions from other jurisdictions is a common practice in interpreting the Right-to-Know Law, the court did not do so in Fenniman. While the New Hampshire Right-to-Know Law shares similarities with the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the court's interpretation of the "internal personnel practices" exemption in RSA 91-A:5, IV is broader than that of its federal counterpart. The federal exemption primarily aims to relieve agencies from the burden of maintaining records of little public interest.

The interpretation of the "internal personnel practices" exemption under RSA 91-A:5, IV was affirmed in the case of Hounsell v. North Conway Water Precinct. This case involved a Right-to-Know Law request for an investigative report created by external investigators following a harassment allegation by a precinct employee. The court upheld the denial of the Right-to-Know petition, concluding that the report related to "internal personnel practices" as it was generated during an investigation into employee misconduct. The court found unpersuasive the argument that the investigation lost its internal status simply because it involved outside investigators, emphasizing that RSA 91-A:5, IV does not prohibit such an exemption under these circumstances. 

The court indicated it would not reconsider prior rulings in Fenniman or Hounsell and affirmed that investigations into employee misconduct are considered personnel practices. However, the court declined to extend these interpretations beyond their specific factual contexts. The plaintiff attempted to differentiate Hounsell based on the nature of the investigators' engagement, arguing that the potential for disciplinary action alone does not qualify an investigation as an internal personnel practice. The court acknowledged this distinction, focusing on the statutory term "internal," and reiterated the importance of the plain meaning of statutory language while considering legislative history only if ambiguity arises. It was noted that the terms "internal" and "personnel" modify "practices," establishing the scope of the exemption, which deals with human resources matters and employee relations.

Conditions of employment within federal agencies encompass hiring, firing, work rules, discipline, compensation, and benefits. The term 'personnel' inherently relates to employment matters, as established in prior cases like Fenniman and Hounsell. Internal personnel practices are defined as those that exist within the employment relationship, meaning investigations into employee misconduct must be conducted by or on behalf of the employee's employer. The current case involves a dispute over whether an investigation into alleged misconduct was 'internal,' as it was conducted by the attorney general, not the defendant's direct employer. The defendant claims that the attorney general's interests align with those of an employer regarding operational effectiveness, asserting that the investigation falls within the attorney general’s statutory authority. The court has not previously ruled on whether county attorneys are considered employees of the attorney general. Past cases, such as State v. Dexter and Samaha v. Grafton County, illustrate that factors determining employment relationships include managerial and fiscal control. The attorney general does not hire county attorneys, who are elected by voters, and any vacancies are filled by the superior court or county convention.

The attorney general lacks the authority to dismiss a county attorney, as established in Eames v. Rudman, 115 N.H. 91 (1975), which confirms that removal power lies with the superior court. The attorney general can only suspend a county attorney's criminal law enforcement authority temporarily. Salary determinations and payments for county attorneys are managed by county conventions and commissioners, as per RSA 23:7 and RSA 23:5. However, the attorney general does have supervisory authority over county attorneys regarding criminal cases, as outlined in RSA 7:6, RSA 7:11, and RSA 7:34, which collectively indicate a legislative intent to place ultimate criminal law enforcement responsibility with the attorney general. Despite this supervisory role, a county attorney’s duties extend beyond criminal prosecutions to civil matters, as noted in New Hampshire Bar Ass’n v. LaBelle, 109 N.H. 184 (1968). The relationship between the attorney general and county attorney does not resemble a traditional employer-employee dynamic, lacking key elements such as salary setting and termination authority, thus the attorney general is not considered Reams's employer. The court refrains from deciding whether the Rockingham County Commissioners could be classified as Reams's employer for the purposes of the "internal personnel practices" exemption or addressing the plaintiff’s claims regarding the nature of the investigation into Reams.

An investigation is classified as "internal" if conducted on behalf of the employer of the investigation's target, as established in Hounsell. Joint participation alone does not qualify. The defendant did not assert that it acted as an agent or outside counsel for the Rockingham County Commissioners, which would have allowed the investigation to be considered internal under the relevant exemption. While the defendant characterized its investigation as a joint effort with Rockingham County, it did not argue that this justified the application of the personnel exemptions stated in RSA 91-A:5, IV. Consequently, the court declined to address the plaintiff's claim of error regarding joint participation, and vacated the trial court's decision, which had applied the internal personnel practices exemption to records from an investigation outside an employment relationship.

The defendant argued that the personnel exemptions exist to protect the privacy rights of employees, asserting that the investigation by the attorney general’s office does not negate the employees' rights to confidentiality. However, this argument does not change the court's conclusion and is more appropriately analyzed under the section of RSA 91-A:5, IV relating to personnel, medical, and other files whose disclosure would invade privacy. The defendant claimed exemptions for various withheld information, specifically citing both the internal personnel practices exemption and the personnel files exemption, which the trial court acknowledged as applicable.

The court's decision was primarily based on the "internal personnel practices" exemption, neglecting to assess whether the disputed materials qualified for the exemption concerning "personnel files whose disclosure would constitute invasion of privacy" under RSA 91-A:5, IV. On remand, the parties are permitted to litigate this latter exemption, with the trial court tasked to determine its applicability. The court provides guidance for this analysis, emphasizing a two-part test: first, whether the material qualifies as a “personnel file” or part of one, and second, whether disclosing that material would infringe on privacy rights. This two-part analysis aligns with similar tests in other jurisdictions regarding personnel and medical files. If the material is not part of a personnel file, the exemption does not apply. Additionally, unlike the "internal personnel practices" exemption, the "personnel files" exemption is not absolute; it requires balancing the privacy interests against the public's right to know. A three-step analysis is mandated for evaluating potential invasion of privacy: confirming a privacy interest exists, weighing the public interest in disclosure, and determining whether disclosure would indeed invade that privacy interest. If no privacy interest is found, disclosure is required under the Right-to-Know Law.

The excerpt evaluates the balance between public interest in disclosure and the government's and individuals' interests in nondisclosure, particularly regarding the privacy rights of employees who provided sensitive information during investigations. The defendant cites the privacy rights of current and former Rockingham County Attorney’s Office employees who reported issues such as sexual harassment and discrimination. Case law from various jurisdictions, including references to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), supports the notion that witnesses in internal investigations possess legitimate privacy interests. Notably, federal courts have acknowledged that disclosing identities of those who cooperate in investigations could lead to personal harm, and there is a public interest in protecting these individuals' privacy. However, the document highlights that the investigation in question was not internal, which may differentiate it from precedents. It also draws parallels between FOIA provisions and state law exemptions regarding law enforcement investigatory records, noting that such disclosure could cause stigma or reputational damage. The trial court is advised to consider the potential embarrassment or harm to individuals when determining the relevance of privacy interests in the disputed materials.

Information's exemption from disclosure due to privacy concerns is assessed using an objective standard, independent of any party's subjective expectations. Case law indicates that certain types of information, particularly concerning allegations of misconduct by elected officials, may reasonably be expected to become public as investigations progress. A clear privacy interest exists for identifying information, such as names and addresses, even if such information is already publicly available. However, the privacy interest concerning the substantive information provided by witnesses or interviewees differs from that of their identities, as the latter may maintain some privacy rights even when involved in public trials.

In assessing privacy interests, a balancing test is applied, weighing the privacy interest against the public's interest in disclosure. The public has a significant interest in understanding the thoroughness and accuracy of government investigations, especially in cases involving high-ranking officials and serious allegations. The specific context and facts of each case are crucial, as the public's interest may outweigh individual privacy concerns, particularly regarding the actions of government officials and the rationale behind their conduct.

The Court evaluates the public interest in disclosure against private interests in nondisclosure by considering the rank of the public official and the severity of the alleged misconduct. In CREW v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, the court highlighted a significant public interest in disclosing documents related to high-profile public corruption allegations. The public's interest is linked to the Right-to-Know Law's goal of providing transparency about government actions. Disclosure is not warranted if it does not fulfill this purpose, regardless of public preference for the information. An individual's motives for seeking disclosure are irrelevant.

The balancing process involves the public's interest in disclosure, the government's interest in keeping information private, and individual privacy concerns. The Right-to-Know Law emphasizes the importance of public access to governmental actions and accountability, placing a heavy burden on public entities to justify nondisclosure. The considerations in this analysis are not exhaustive, leaving it to trial courts to weigh the interests appropriately.

Concerns about disclosure deterring reporting of misconduct are acknowledged but are countered by the need for transparency. Past cases affirm that the potential for compromised investigations does not outweigh the public's interest in accessing information. The Court's decision vacates the prior ruling and remands the case for further consideration, with concurrence from Justices Hicks, Conboy, and Bassett.