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Danielle Green v. State of Indiana
Citations: 65 N.E.3d 620; 2016 Ind. App. LEXIS 451; 2016 WL 7333544Docket: 58A04-1511-CR-2008
Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; December 15, 2016; Indiana; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Danielle Green appeals her conviction and sentence for murder following a jury trial. She raises three main issues: the exclusion of testimony from a defense psychologist and the admission of blood spatter evidence, the trial court's failure to consider her claims of domestic violence as mitigating factors during sentencing, and the appropriateness of her sixty-year sentence. On May 26, 2014, Green shot her ex-husband, Raymond Green, ten times using a .38-caliber revolver during an altercation while they were living together post-divorce. After the shooting, she disposed of evidence, including his body, by placing it in a locked metal storage box and removing stained materials from their trailer. When questioned by police, she initially misled them about Raymond's whereabouts and denied knowledge of the contents of the box, which later contained his body. After a recorded police statement, she admitted to the shooting but claimed it was self-defense, alleging that Raymond threatened her with a loaded gun. The court ultimately affirmed the conviction, rejecting Green's arguments regarding trial court errors and the appropriateness of her sentence. Green expressed that she feared for her life during a confrontation with Raymond, who lunged at her, prompting her to shoot him five times. After confirming he was still alive, she reloaded the gun and shot him five more times when he attempted to attack her again. Following the incident, Green provided a re-enactment to police, detailing the events that led to the shooting, including threats made by Raymond. On June 3, 2014, the State charged Green with murder. On August 29, 2014, she filed a Notice of Affirmative Defenses to pursue an insanity defense and to present evidence of self-defense, citing a history of abuse and fearing for her life due to Raymond's actions, including his attempts to take out a life insurance policy on her. In February 2015, two doctors were appointed to evaluate her insanity defense, and Green also engaged Dr. Karla Fischer, an expert on domestic violence, to assess her situation. Dr. Fischer determined that Green had experienced prolonged domestic violence and suffered from PTSD, concluding that she did not intend to kill Raymond. Shortly after her evaluation, Green withdrew her affirmative defenses. The State subsequently moved to exclude Dr. Fischer's testimony, arguing it was hearsay, that she lacked proper qualifications for diagnosing PTSD, and that her testimony was irrelevant following the withdrawal of defenses. An evidentiary hearing was held where Dr. Fischer testified that Green was in a traumatized state due to PTSD at the time of the shooting. Dr. Edward Connor, a licensed psychologist, testified on the distinctions among epidemiological, clinical, and forensic psychology, emphasizing that PTSD is a recognized mental illness requiring diagnosis by a licensed psychologist in Indiana. He criticized Dr. Fischer for not adhering to proper diagnostic protocols, particularly regarding reliability and validity scales for assessing potential malingering in Green, who faced criminal charges. In an August 2015 ruling, the trial court granted the State's motion in limine, noting Dr. Fischer's lack of clinical and forensic psychology experience, her inadequate training in PTSD diagnosis, and her failure to include necessary reliability measures in her evaluation. Consequently, the court excluded Dr. Fischer’s testimony regarding a potential insanity defense and findings related to PTSD. During the trial, evidence was presented about the relationship between Green and Raymond, who met in 2001 while he was married. Following the death of Raymond's wife in 2002, Green became increasingly involved in his life, leading to their elopement in 2004. They moved to Florida, where they purchased property and participated in a Cowboy Action Shooting Club, with Green excelling in competitions. As their financial situation deteriorated, they sold their property and faced challenges living apart in 2012. Green communicated extensively with George Mann, a former shooting club member, after moving to Indiana, while Raymond reconnected with his family. In 2013, Green's parents passed away. In late 2013, Raymond relocated from Florida to Indiana to live with Green in a trailer on her parents' property. He obtained a commercial driver's license and began working as a trucker. Seeking life insurance, Raymond contacted Select Quote to compare policies offered by his employer and consented to provide a quote for Green. Insurance agent Raymond Kwong offered policies for amounts between $100,000 and $500,000. Raymond also wanted to secure a life insurance policy for his daughter Tracey, but he wished to keep this from Green, fearing her reaction. He requested that no documents containing Tracey’s name be sent to their shared home. However, when such paperwork was mistakenly sent, Green inquired with Kwong, who claimed ignorance of the policy on Tracey. Evidence presented at trial indicated that Green expressed concerns to others about Raymond potentially taking out a significant life insurance policy on her, which she opposed. Witnesses characterized Raymond as kind and hard-working, noting no signs of abuse, while Green was described as controlling, having isolated Raymond from his family and managing their shared cell phone. Dr. Jennifer Schott, a deputy coroner, performed Raymond's autopsy, finding he had been shot five times in the head—four bullets entered from the back and one from the left temple. None exited his head. Additionally, two bullets penetrated his back and three entered his torso, with one passing through his arm. Dr. Schott stated that typically, gunshot wounds to the head render a person instantly unresponsive, while the torso wounds would not be immediately fatal, allowing for potential survivability of a few minutes. The order of the shots could not be determined, and Raymond died from multiple injuries. The State’s theory posited that Green shot Raymond while he slept, while Green contended she acted in self-defense after fearing for her life. She claimed Raymond confronted her with a gun, leading her to shoot him in self-defense. However, Dr. Schott later indicated that Green's account of events was inconsistent with the observed injuries on Raymond's body. The State presented evidence that several bullets penetrated the bedding before hitting Raymond, indicating he was shot while asleep. ISP Sergeant Stephen Weigel testified about blood spatter, which Green contested on the grounds of his qualifications. The court allowed his testimony after reviewing relevant case law. Weigel explained that "expirated blood" would suggest Raymond was lying down and expelling blood, with some droplets indicating they traveled downward. Additionally, evidence showed Green conducted internet searches regarding the effects of a .38 caliber gunshot to the head and how to manage Social Security benefit deposits shortly before and after the murder. During her defense, Green aimed to include pretrial evidentiary arguments and sought to have Dr. Fischer testify about Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) and PTSD, but the court upheld the exclusion of this testimony. Green claimed she shot Raymond in self-defense after he confronted her, supported by frantic texts to a friend and a conversation with Mann, who suggested contacting the police. Green did not testify at trial. The jury convicted her of murder on September 1, 2015. The trial court later determined that Green planned the murder, concealed evidence, and fabricated stories to others. Her claim of domestic abuse was deemed not credible, and she was sentenced to 60 years in prison. Green is now appealing her conviction and sentence. The trial court's decisions regarding the admission and exclusion of evidence are reviewed for abuse of discretion, defined as a decision contrary to the facts or misinterpretation of law. An evidentiary decision is given significant deference on appeal, with reversal occurring only in cases of manifest abuse of discretion that undermines a fair trial. The impact of an evidentiary ruling on a party's substantial rights is assessed based on its probable influence on the trier of fact. Indiana Evidence Rule 702 outlines the criteria for admitting expert testimony, allowing witnesses to qualify as experts through relevant knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education—only one of which is necessary. Testimony based on specialized knowledge rather than scientific principles is exempt from stricter admissibility standards. In this case, Green contends the trial court erred by excluding her proposed expert, Dr. Fischer, asserting that her testimony was crucial for her self-defense claim and countering the state's narrative of premeditated murder. Dr. Fischer, who holds advanced degrees in psychology and law and has experience in domestic violence consulting, evaluated Green and diagnosed her with PTSD stemming from prior abuse and the trauma of killing Raymond. She indicated that Green felt threatened by Raymond during the incident, leading to her actions afterward, which suggested a lack of premeditation. On appeal, Green argues that the trial court incorrectly ruled Dr. Fischer unqualified to diagnose PTSD or testify about its effects on Green's behavior. Despite Dr. Fischer's past testimony in Indiana about PTSD and state of mind, the trial court noted she lacked licensure or formal training as a clinical or forensic psychologist. Dr. Fischer provides "domestic violence consulting services" as an adjunct professor and diagnosed PTSD only for abuse victims, relying on research rather than clinical treatment methodologies. She conducted a domestic violence assessment of Green using the ABOC research instrument, which lacked reliability measures and did not assess for malingering. Dr. Connor, a licensed psychologist, stated that diagnosing PTSD requires licensure in Indiana and criticized Dr. Fischer’s methods as not aligned with scientific standards. The trial court found Dr. Fischer unqualified to testify about Green's PTSD due to domestic abuse by Raymond. Green attempted to use Dr. Fischer's testimony to demonstrate that her PTSD rendered her unable to conform her behavior to the law during the shooting; however, she had withdrawn her insanity defense and did not undergo required mental examinations per Indiana law, preventing her from presenting that defense. Additionally, Green withdrew her Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) affirmative defense, which, under Indiana law, can only be introduced in specific circumstances related to past violence by the victim. The trial court rightly concluded that admitting Dr. Fischer's testimony to support an insanity defense was not permissible after Green had retracted that defense. Ultimately, the trial court's decision to exclude Dr. Fischer's testimony was upheld, as it did not constitute reversible error. The trial court granted the State’s Motion in Limine, allowing consideration of Dr. Fischer's testimony on domestic violence relevance and admissibility, contingent on an offer to prove. However, Green failed to request or provide such an offer for limited testimony, resulting in waiver of any related issues. The State argued that Dr. Fischer's testimony should be excluded as it would be based solely on hearsay from Green, who did not testify, and lacked a factual foundation for claims of consistent and long-lasting abuse. The court expressed concerns that admitting her testimony without sufficient factual background could mislead the jury and unfairly support Green’s claims, leading to its exclusion. Regarding blood spatter evidence, Green contended that Sergeant Weigel, although trained in evidence collection, was unqualified to interpret blood spatter patterns and assert opinions about the crime scene, specifically about the position of the victim, Raymond. Green objected to Weigel’s qualifications throughout the trial. Testimony revealed Weigel had ten years of experience and had completed two weeks of blood spatter training but had not taken the requisite certification exam. The State clarified that Weigel would not be presented as an expert witness, but rather as a skilled witness. Weigel acknowledged he was not yet an expert and identified another qualified expert within the Indiana State Police. Sergeant Weigel testified about his observations of blood droplets at the scene of Raymond's shooting and shared his findings with Marks, who confirmed them. The trial court, citing Grinstead v. State, ruled that Weigel met the criteria to provide expert testimony on blood spatter. In Grinstead, the court allowed a police officer's testimony regarding blood spatter, which was critical in rebutting the defendant's claim of distance from the victim. The officer’s two-week training was deemed sufficient to qualify him as an expert, despite not being a serologist, with any shortcomings in his testimony being suitable for cross-examination. The court found no error in allowing Weigel's testimony. Even if there were errors, they were deemed harmless unless they affected the parties' substantial rights, assessed by the probable impact on the jury. The evidence’s admission is harmless if independent evidence of guilt is substantial enough to suggest that the improper evidence did not influence the verdict. Green argued that the positioning of Raymond’s body and the blood evidence were crucial to his conviction, indicating that the blood patterns suggested Raymond was lying down when he died, which undermined Green's defense. Green's defense claiming Raymond was upright and attacking when she shot him is undermined by evidence presented. Sergeant Weigel’s testimony clarified the nature of blood evidence, indicating that expirated blood on the furniture leg came from Raymond while he was on the floor, not from a position in bed, contradicting Green’s narrative. The distinction between Raymond being on the floor versus in bed is significant as it does not support Green's assertion that she shot him in self-defense. Green acknowledges in her brief that Raymond slid off the bed to the floor, which aligns with forensic evidence. Regarding sentencing, Green contends that the trial court abused its discretion by not considering her claims of domestic abuse as a mitigating factor. Sentencing decisions fall under the trial court's discretion and are reviewed for potential abuse, defined as decisions against the logical effect of the evidence. The court is not obligated to recognize all proffered mitigating circumstances. Green's argument highlights that the trial court did not accept her domestic abuse claims as mitigating factors, but it is not required to do so. The trial court's discretion in sentencing is not subject to review for the weight assigned to mitigating factors unless it overlooks substantial evidence clearly supported by the record. The defendant bears the burden to demonstrate that such mitigating evidence is significant. In this case, Green argued that the court failed to consider evidence of domestic abuse, citing testimonies from witnesses who described instances of violence by Raymond, including physical assaults and visible injuries on Green. However, the State presented contrasting testimonies from numerous witnesses who characterized Raymond as gentle and indicated they had not observed any abuse or injuries on Green. The trial court explicitly addressed Green's claims of domestic violence in its sentencing order, stating that no evidence was presented to support her allegations. It noted that statements made by Green to Dr. Karla Fischer were excluded from consideration due to methodological flaws and a lack of corroboration. Additionally, Green withdrew her defense based on the effects of battery, and the court found no credible support for her claims of abuse from any witnesses. Ultimately, the trial court deemed Green's allegations of domestic abuse as not credible and unsupported by evidence, reflecting this view in its sentencing decision. The trial court acknowledged as a mitigating factor that Green had no prior criminal history, although this was tempered by the gravity of her first offense, murder, which was described as an "execution." The court explicitly addressed Green's claim of domestic abuse as a mitigating factor but assigned it no weight, a decision that is not subject to review for abuse of discretion. Green contended that her sixty-year sentence was inappropriate, but the court clarified that it could revise a sentence only if it deemed it inappropriate based on the nature of the offense and the offender's character. Although the trial court's recognition of aggravators and mitigators informs this assessment, the standard is not whether another sentence might be more appropriate, but whether the current sentence is inappropriate. The advisory sentence for murder under Indiana law is between 45 and 65 years, with an advisory of 55 years. Green's actions, which included shooting the victim ten times and attempting to conceal the body, demonstrated a deliberate intent to kill. Her lack of remorse and inconsistent statements to authorities, contradicted by forensic evidence, further underscored the nature of her offense and her character. The court concluded that Green had not demonstrated that her character warranted a revision of her sentence and affirmed the sixty-year sentence as appropriate.