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Smith v. Pavan
Citation: 2016 Ark. 437Docket: CV-15-988
Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; December 8, 2016; Arkansas; State Supreme Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Nathaniel Smith, M.D., in his capacity as Director of the Arkansas Department of Health, appealed a circuit court ruling that granted declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to three couples—Marisa N. Pavan and Terrah D. Pavan, Leigh D.W. Jacobs and Jana S. Jacobs, and Courtney M. Kassel and Kelly L. Scott—who are challenging the Department's refusal to include both spouses' names on their minor children's birth certificates. The appeal raised issues concerning the applicability of res judicata and the constitutionality of two state statutes in light of the Obergefell v. Hodges decision, which recognized same-sex marriage as a fundamental right. Smith contended that the circuit court erred in its findings that previous court rulings on similar issues provided grounds for the current case, that Obergefell resolved the birth certificate issuance matters, and that the Department's refusal constituted violations of due process and equal protection rights. The court noted that the appellants were married couples who conceived children via artificial insemination and had been denied inclusion of the non-biological parent's name on the birth certificates. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed and dismissed the circuit court's decision. Appellees sought to compel Smith to include both spouses' names on the birth certificates of their minor children and requested corrected birth certificates. After Smith responded, both parties submitted motions for summary judgment. The circuit court indicated it would order Smith to amend the birth certificates and denied Smith's motion for a stay. Subsequently, the court ordered Smith to issue amended birth certificates for three couples but dismissed claims made in their capacity as representatives of their children. The court applied res judicata based on a prior ruling in Wright regarding birth certificates and found certain provisions of Arkansas Code Annotated section 20-18-401(e)(f) unconstitutional. It also stated it would interpret section 20-18-406(a)(2) in a way that aligns with constitutional requirements. Smith appealed the decision. The court noted that summary judgment is appropriate when no material facts are in dispute, and in this case, both parties appeared to agree on the facts. The court would review legal issues de novo. Smith's petition for an emergency stay regarding the order to provide amended birth certificates was denied, while a stay on other parts of the order was granted. The American Civil Liberties Union was permitted to file an amicus curiae brief. The central issue regarding children’s rights related to their birth certificates was not argued or ruled upon in the circuit court. Smith contends that the circuit court incorrectly applied res judicata to the case, arguing that the earlier decision in Wright did not explicitly grant injunctive relief concerning birth certificates. The circuit court found that Smith was a party in Wright and that the plaintiffs had sought a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the issuance of birth certificates for children of same-sex couples married in other states. The May 15, 2014, final judgment in Wright indicated a clear intent to grant the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, which included injunctive relief against enforcing certain Arkansas laws that did not recognize same-sex marriages. The court concluded that the claims of the Pavans and Jacobses were fully litigated in Wright and that the injunction from that case is binding on Smith. On appeal, Smith argues that the Wright court did not specifically grant injunctive relief regarding birth certificates, despite the May 15 order indicating that the plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction was granted. The applicable laws were identified in the Wright complaint, and the circuit court's decision referenced the need for clarity in injunctions according to Arkansas Rule 65(d)(1), which requires that injunctions state their reasons, terms, and the acts restrained in detail, rather than by referring to other documents. The discussion also touches on collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, which prevents re-litigation of issues that were previously determined in a final judgment, outlining the necessary elements for its application. The Wright orders did not address birth certificate issues, as they were not mentioned in the rulings, which focused on the constitutionality of amendment 83 and marriage statutes. The circuit court concluded that the Wright judgment could be treated as res judicata but noted that Smith could have raised any issues regarding the specificity of the injunction under Rule 65(d) during the Wright appeal. When the court dismissed the Wright appeal as moot, Smith missed the chance to highlight unresolved injunction issues related to Obergefell. The circuit court's granting of declaratory relief was based solely on Obergefell and involved Arkansas Code Annotated section 20-18-401, which outlines rules for birth registration, specifically regarding the identification of the mother and father on birth certificates based on marital status and paternity affidavits. The statute stipulates that if the mother is married, the husband is listed as the father unless paternity is determined otherwise by a court or through notarized affidavits. If the mother is unmarried, the father's name requires an affidavit of paternity. The section emphasizes that if paternity is established by a court, that information must be reflected on the birth certificate. The circuit court determined that the statute improperly linked the term "parent" to rights and presumptions within a marriage, utilizing outdated gender-specific terms "husband" and "wife." This language effectively denied same-sex married couples access to the same spousal benefits available to opposite-sex couples. Consequently, the court ruled that significant portions of the statute were unconstitutional under the precedent set by Obergefell. Specifically, Arkansas Code Annotated section 20-18-406(a)(2) allows for the establishment of a new birth certificate if certain conditions are met, including proof of legitimation or paternity acknowledgment. The circuit court interpreted this to include children of same-sex couples married after the child's birth, allowing for an amended birth certificate if the necessary documentation is provided. However, if a biological parent is listed on the original birth certificate, a court order is required for amendments. The analysis also indicated that if either spouse had a prior marriage at the child's birth, a court order naming the current spouses as parents is necessary for any amendment. The document contests the circuit court's conclusions, asserting that Obergefell did not specifically address Arkansas's birth certificate statutes and only acknowledged that states have the autonomy to determine the benefits conferred upon married couples. The Supreme Court's reference to birth certificates was limited to highlighting the broader context of marital benefits, not issuing explicit directives regarding state laws on birth certificates. Marriage is recognized as a fundamental constitutional right applicable to same-sex couples, as established in Obergefell. The Court in Obergefell chose not to delay the recognition of rights associated with marriage for same-sex couples, emphasizing the importance of these rights. However, this ruling does not alter the validity of existing statutes regarding birth certificate issuance, which are considered constitutional. A strong presumption of constitutionality applies to all acts, and any doubt about a statute's constitutionality must be resolved in its favor. Statutory interpretation is guided by the intent of the legislature, with language given its ordinary meaning. Under Arkansas law, specifically section 20-18-401(e), the mother is identified as the woman who gives birth, while subsection (f) identifies the father based on the marital status of the mother at the time of conception or birth. The term "husband" refers to a married man, and "father" denotes the biological father. If the mother is married, her husband is listed as the father unless a court determines otherwise regarding paternity. The focus of the statute is on the biological relationships rather than the marital status of the parents. The circuit court's conclusion that the statute improperly combined "parent" rights with marriage presumptions through the terms "husband" and "wife" is rejected. Arkansas Code Annotated sections 20-18-401(e, f) and 20-18-406(a)(2) are upheld as consistent with Obergefell, as the latter does not mandate the inclusion of a same-sex couple's minor children on birth certificates if the couple married after the child's birth. The statute allows for a new birth certificate when it can be shown that the child's biological parents married post-conception, aligning with the regulation that a new certificate is issued upon an affidavit of paternity and marriage record. The court clarifies that the challenge presented was a facial challenge, seeking to invalidate the statute rather than an as-applied challenge, since the couples had received the relief they sought—birth certificates with both spouses named. The valid recording of the biological parents' relationship on the birth certificate is emphasized, with severe penalties for false statements in vital records underscoring the importance of accuracy. The only supporting evidence was provided by Melinda Allen, the ADH’s Vital Records State Registrar. The vital records system's primary purpose is to ensure the accuracy of records such as birth, death, and marriage certificates, enabling the Arkansas Department of Health (ADH) to compile and analyze vital statistics crucial for public health research and trend identification. Accurate identification of biological parents through birth records is essential for both public health analysis and individual health inquiries, particularly regarding genetic conditions. In surrogacy cases, the initial birth certificate lists the biological mother, with an amended certificate later issued for the intended parents, while original birth certificates are sealed but retained by ADH. This retention is vital for children's potential health-related needs concerning biological parentage. The state has a legitimate interest in maintaining this information under seal, accessible only through court orders. The document references a due process challenge to certain Arkansas statutes, highlighting the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process. This protection extends to fundamental rights central to individual dignity and autonomy, including personal identity. The court must exercise reasoned judgment in identifying such fundamental rights. The appellees argue that the exclusion of same-sex spouses from birth certificates adversely impacts their legal status concerning their children, affecting rights related to Social Security, medical care, and inheritance, among others. However, the circuit court noted that its ruling did not resolve these issues legally. Appellees failed to provide evidence or statutory authority supporting their claim that the issues at hand are resolved by the designation of mother and father on a birth certificate. The Obergefell decision established that same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, the Supreme Court recognized that the Due Process Clause protects parental rights regarding child care and custody decisions. However, the circuit court erroneously conflated marriage rights, parental rights, and vital records, as the current case solely addresses whether Arkansas birth certificate statutes violate due process. These statutes aim to accurately reflect the biological relationships of parents to their children. The court determined that listing a non-biological spouse on a child's birth certificate does not constitute a fundamental interest warranting protection under the statutes. In response to the equal-protection argument, the court noted that the statutes record biological relationships, and while male spouses of female mothers may be listed as fathers, this designation can be challenged under Arkansas law. The court emphasized that acknowledging biological differences is not a violation of equal protection and that the distinctions in the statutes are based on real differences rather than misconceptions or prejudice. Thus, the court maintained that recognizing these biological truths is consistent with the principles of equal protection. An equal-protection claim requires establishing that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the means used are substantially related to achieving those objectives. In this case, the evidence provided by Smith, particularly an affidavit from the vital records state registrar, demonstrated that the classification in question serves the significant governmental purpose of tracking public health trends and assisting individuals in identifying personal health issues and genetic conditions. The requirement that parents listed on a birth certificate be biologically related to the child was found to be substantially related to these objectives. Smith referenced Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-10-201(a), which deems children born via artificial insemination to a married woman as legitimate if the husband consents. He conceded that this statute is constitutionally problematic and suggested that amending it could address concerns raised by the appellees. However, the court clarified that it cannot amend statutes, as this falls under the legislative branch's authority. The circuit court did not rule on the constitutionality of this statute, leading to Smith failing to preserve this issue for appeal, and the court declined to address his argument. The court noted that discussions regarding the right of a child to know their biological parentage were not addressed by the parties involved. Ultimately, the court found that the circuit court erred in its application of the law and in ruling that certain Arkansas statutes violated the appellees’ rights to due process and equal protection, leading to a reversal and dismissal of the case. Additionally, in a prior ruling, the court had noted inappropriate remarks made by a judge regarding constitutional rights in another matter, indicating intent to review those comments further. Justice Wood argues for the reversal and vacating of a circuit court's order for a full evidentiary hearing based on concessions by the State, although the parties have not requested such action and consider the case fully litigated. The court should not remand for retrial simply to allow additional evidence or issues to be raised when no trial error has occurred. The court has established that extraneous matters outside the record are inadmissible on appeal. Justice Wood further suggests a remand to await potential legislative action regarding birth certificates, but finds no indication that the General Assembly will address this issue. The court emphasizes adherence to the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct, which mandates judges to uphold the law impartially and to maintain public confidence in the judiciary's integrity. Judge Timothy Davis Fox is admonished for inappropriate remarks made in his judicial capacity, as such comments can undermine public trust. While Chief Justice Brill and Justice Wood concur in part and dissent in part, Justice Danielson argues against cautioning Judge Fox, claiming the cited cases do not pertain to judicial conduct. The court ultimately reverses and dismisses the case, highlighting the ethical obligations of judges to maintain decorum and respect while serving. The Supreme Court has ruled that state bans on same-sex marriage violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, establishing that same-sex marriage is legal nationwide (Obergefell v. Hodges, 2015). Six plaintiffs seek judicial relief to obtain birth certificates for their children, arguing that individuals need not wait for legislative action to assert fundamental rights. This opinion highlights the distinct roles of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government, affirming some circuit court rulings while reversing others. The ruling in Obergefell is narrow, explicitly legalizing same-sex marriage but also implying broader implications for marital benefits, including birth certificates. The case questions whether married same-sex couples are entitled to birth certificates for children born to one of the spouses. The opinion argues that, under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, same-sex couples should receive birth certificates on the same basis as opposite-sex couples. The analysis includes a comparison of two scenarios: one involving a married heterosexual couple using an anonymous sperm donor and another involving a married same-sex couple in the same situation. Arkansas law currently recognizes the husband of a woman giving birth as the father, while the law lacks clear language regarding same-sex couples. However, the State of Arkansas conceded that, following Obergefell, the same-sex couple is entitled to a birth certificate listing both women as parents. The State proposed replacing "husband" with "spouse" in Arkansas Code section 9-10-201(a), but this issue was not fully litigated or ruled upon by the circuit court. The court approved the issuance of birth certificates for two married same-sex couples without addressing this statutory change, which prompted a dissenting opinion. The dissent argues that the circuit court should be affirmed in its decision to issue the birth certificates. It highlights two unmarried couples using anonymous sperm donors for artificial insemination—one heterosexual and one same-sex. Though both couples seek birth certificates post-marriage, they face challenges due to section 9-10-201(a), which restricts access to those married at the time of insemination. The dissent questions whether the burdens on same-sex couples are disproportionately greater than those on opposite-sex couples following the Obergefell decision. Further, Arkansas Code section 20-18-406(a)(2) states that a new birth certificate can be issued based on evidence of legitimation or court-determined paternity. The dissent expresses concern over the ambiguity of these terms, particularly for same-sex couples, and concurs with the majority that the circuit court overstepped by defining "legitimated." The dissent also notes that the circuit court's actions could unintentionally affect other parents beyond this case. It argues for the necessity of legislative and executive action to comply with Obergefell, supported by an affidavit from the Vital Records State Registrar, stating that birth certificates are issued based on hospital documentation without regard to the parents' sexual orientation or marital status. Melinda Allen's affidavit indicates that the Arkansas Department of Health (ADH) amends birth certificates to include a parent when there is a court order determining parentage, granting parental rights, or approving adoption by an intended parent. ADH processes these amendments without consideration of the parent’s sexual orientation, marital status, or other characteristics. The circuit court relied on this affidavit to conclude that an unmarried, same-sex couple was entitled to a birth certificate at their child's birth. However, the affidavit's reference to "intended parent" does not align with existing Arkansas statutes, suggesting a potential inconsistency. Legislative and executive actions are necessary to address these discrepancies. In scenarios involving two married couples—one opposite-sex and one same-sex—both couples must pursue adoption to establish parenthood, as neither spouse can give birth. Following the Obergefell decision, both couples are entitled to equal treatment under the law, which is now gender-neutral, allowing them to seek adoption and obtain a birth certificate. The document emphasizes that individual beliefs do not alter the obligation to follow the law, citing the supremacy of the U.S. Constitution. State judges, legislators, and executive officers are sworn to uphold both the U.S. and Arkansas Constitutions. The court acknowledges its lack of authority to compel legislative or executive changes. Following Obergefell, Governor Asa Hutchinson stated the state's obligation to comply with the Supreme Court's ruling, directing state agencies accordingly. The excerpt also references relevant case law affirming constitutional rights and the separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. The judicial branch is tasked with interpreting laws, while the executive branch is responsible for enforcing them. The evolving societal response to the same-sex marriage ruling necessitates a reversal, vacation, and remand of the circuit court’s order concerning the constitutional challenges to specific Arkansas statutes. The prudential-mootness doctrine, which the court is encouraged to adopt, suggests that courts may refrain from granting relief when considerations of prudence and respect for the legislative and executive branches warrant such restraint. The case is characterized as fluctuating and underdeveloped, particularly due to the legislature's failure to amend Florida’s birth certificate statute in light of the Obergefell decision. The justice emphasizes the need for comprehensive legislative review to ensure equal marriage benefits for all couples and urges the legislature to address related statutes to prevent further litigation and confusion. The prudential-mootness doctrine is particularly relevant in this context, as the circumstances surrounding the case have changed since its inception, with the state issuing appropriate birth certificates and acknowledging compliance with Obergefell. The procedural posture involves cross-motions for summary judgment, which does not automatically negate genuine issues of material fact, highlighting the complexities of the case. Both parties asserting that there is no genuine dispute of fact does not automatically lead to a trial being deemed unnecessary, nor does it grant the court the authority to issue a judgment at its discretion. Even in cross-motions, undisputed or unresolved facts may still exist, requiring the court to assess whether the material facts necessary to substantiate the allegations are present. Significant changes have occurred since the appeal, including both parties recognizing alterations in material facts, the State's application of Arkansas statutes, and its interpretation of Obergefell. The State Registrar of Vital Records has indicated that birth certificates will list both same-sex parents if the hospital provides appropriate documentation. However, there is contention regarding the actual application of this policy. The State has acknowledged that children born through artificial insemination should have both parents recognized as natural parents, regardless of their sexual orientation, under Ark. Code Ann. 9-10-201. As a result, it is anticipated that same-sex couples will have both names on the birth certificate without needing a court order, provided the child was conceived via artificial insemination, the marriage occurred prior to insemination, and the non-biological parent consented. This development may moot legal challenges presented by certain same-sex couples if the trial court finds the facts as discussed during oral arguments. The case now pivots to the constitutionality of section 20-18-406, which governs the issuance of new birth certificates based on evidence proving legitimation. The relevant regulation requires an affidavit of paternity from the biological parent alongside a marriage certificate. The State argues that the affidavit necessitates a declaration of biological parentage, positioning this requirement as a legitimate basis for the regulation that withstands an equal-protection scrutiny. However, the circuit court did not review the affidavit, preventing both it and the appellate court from assessing whether the State's argument meets the rational-basis standard. Both parties failed to establish their claims for summary judgment due to a critical material fact still being in dispute. The court relies solely on the existing record and arguments from the trial court, adhering to the principle that matters outside the record are not considered on appeal. The fluctuating circumstances since the circuit court's summary judgment raise doubts about the accuracy of the registrar's affidavit. The State has now conceded on appeal that some plaintiffs are eligible for relief under a different statute, which warrants the application of the prudential-mootness doctrine. The court suggests refraining from addressing constitutional issues and remanding the case to the circuit court to reconsider in light of the new disputed facts and State's concession. The dissenting opinion argues for affirming the circuit court's order, asserting it aligns with previous rulings, including the Pulaski County Circuit Court's permanent injunction in Wright v. Smith, which prohibited state laws from denying same-sex couples the rights and benefits of marriage, including access to birth certificates. The dissent contends that the majority misinterprets the relationship between the Wright injunction and birth certificates and that the issue has already been litigated and decided, invoking collateral estoppel to prevent re-litigation. The dissent emphasizes that legislative amendments may be necessary to align state law with the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, which recognized same-sex marriage rights. Smith argues that the Wright injunction does not fulfill the specificity requirements set by Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) and (e). However, the circuit court deemed this argument a collateral attack on the judgment, as established in Rose v. Harbor E. Inc. A collateral attack challenges the integrity of a judgment outside of the original action or appeal, except in cases declaring judgments void ab initio. Such attacks are only viable if the judgment is void on its face or if the issuing court lacked jurisdiction. Smith's recourse for alleged specificity issues in the Wright orders is an appeal. Additionally, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges asserts that states cannot deny same-sex couples the benefits associated with marriage, specifically mentioning rights related to birth and death certificates. The Court's ruling also highlighted the importance of recognizing same-sex marriages for the welfare of children, emphasizing that marriage provides stability and recognition essential for family integrity. Excluding same-sex couples from marriage undermines this stability and results in harm and humiliation for their children. The majority's assertion that the right to be named as a parent on a birth certificate is not a marital benefit is incorrect. Arkansas law mandates that the name of the mother’s “husband” be recorded on a birth certificate irrespective of biological ties, based solely on marital status at the time of conception or birth. Legitimizing children is emphasized as a key goal, with the inclusion of a parent’s name on a birth certificate recognized as a marriage-related benefit. The ruling in Obergefell mandates that this benefit be extended equally to same-sex and opposite-sex spouses. The dissent criticizes the majority for rebuking a circuit judge's critical comments, citing the First Amendment's protection of free discourse on governmental matters, including judicial conduct. It argues that criticism of judges should not be suppressed to protect their reputations, as judges are not immune from scrutiny and must remain aware of their public responsibilities. Historical cases are referenced to support the notion that public confidence in the judiciary cannot be enforced through silence, and that open criticism is integral to democracy. The dissent contends that personal offense taken by court members does not justify claims of disciplinary violations regarding the judge's remarks.