Michael Dwight Ward v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 06-16-00059-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; December 8, 2016; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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In early 2015, narcotics detectives in Corsicana, Texas, stopped Michael Dwight Ward's vehicle for failing to signal a left turn, leading to the discovery of a substantial amount of drugs on both Ward and his passenger, Pamela Wilson. Ward was subsequently convicted of possessing with intent to deliver over four but less than 200 grams of cocaine and phencyclidine, receiving concurrent sentences of fifty-four years imprisonment. On appeal, Ward contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the State failed to supplement discovery, which he claims warranted a continuance that the trial court denied. 

The appeal was transferred from the Tenth Court of Appeals to the Sixth Appellate District for docket equalization. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding sufficient evidence to support Ward's guilt despite his arguments regarding the nature of possession, which relied on Wilson's uncertain testimony about the drugs' ownership. The court emphasized that its evaluation of legal sufficiency considers evidence in favor of the trial court's judgment and allows the jury to resolve conflicts in testimony and draw reasonable inferences. Ward's motion for a new trial was denied, and the appeal focused solely on the discovery issue, which the court found to be non-harmful.

The jury holds the exclusive authority to assess the credibility of witnesses and the significance of their testimony, being able to accept all, part, or none of it. A jury's credibility assessment is given significant deference, and a conviction must be upheld if a rational fact-finder could have established the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Both circumstantial and direct evidence are equally valid in proving a defendant's guilt, with legal sufficiency being evaluated based on a hypothetically correct jury charge that accurately reflects the law relevant to the indictment without increasing the State's burden or limiting its liability theories.

To be convicted of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, the State must prove that the defendant knowingly possessed a controlled substance with the intent to deliver it. This includes demonstrating that the defendant exercised care, custody, control, or management over the substance, intended to transfer it, and knew it was a controlled substance. "Deliver" is defined as the actual or constructive transfer of a controlled substance. Intent can be established through expert testimony or circumstantial evidence, such as the manner of possession and packaging of drugs.

Factors considered in determining intent to deliver include the location of the arrest, quantity and packaging of drugs, presence of drug paraphernalia, additional cash found, and the defendant's drug-use status. In a specific case, although most drugs were found with one individual, a detective noted patterns consistent with drug trafficking behavior involving female associates passing drugs to evade detection. Observations of the individuals involved and their movements led to the discovery of drug paraphernalia, reinforcing the inference of intent to deliver.

Wilson was found in possession of a crack pipe, which she dropped when approached by Andrews, who handcuffed her and asked if she had more contraband. Wilson admitted to having more drugs in her bra. Upon the arrival of a female officer, she retrieved a sock containing marihuana, phencyclidine (PCP), crack cocaine, and powder cocaine. During this time, Andrews observed Ward, who was nervous and attempting to provide identification but produced credit cards instead. Ragan, assisting Andrews, confirmed that Ward admitted to having illegal contraband in his pocket, which Ragan retrieved. 

A search of Ward's vehicle revealed various drug paraphernalia, including pocket knives, pipes, and a notebook with currency amounts indicating debts. Ragan believed the notebook contained records related to drug sales, noting that the drugs were packaged separately, a common practice among dealers. A total of 120 grams of cocaine and 36 grams of phencyclidine were confirmed by a laboratory report. 

Andrews, experienced in narcotics arrests, testified that carrying significant amounts of drugs typically indicates distribution rather than personal use. He noted that most cash found on Ward was in small denominations, consistent with narcotics sales practices. Wilson, who lived with Ward, initially confirmed Andrews' account regarding the drugs but later expressed uncertainty about whether Ward had given her the drugs. On redirect, she reaffirmed that Ward did provide her with the drugs.

On re-cross-examination, Wilson described her memory as "hazy," acknowledging prior drug use and being "high" at the time of the incident. She confirmed familiarity with multiple drug sources and stated that she was not compelled to obtain drugs from Ward, indicating they intended to "stash" the drugs. The jury was permitted to evaluate her testimony. Despite her inconsistent statements, evidence supported the convictions. Officers Andrews and Ragan observed suspicious behavior between Ward and Wilson after stopping their vehicle. Andrews, with extensive narcotics experience, noted that it is typical for drug sellers to have a female passenger who receives drugs when police are present. He also indicated that possession of nearly six ounces of cocaine suggests distribution rather than personal use. The lab report indicated they possessed 120 grams of cocaine and 36 grams of phencyclidine, alongside cash and a notebook indicative of drug distribution. 

Ward challenged the State's failure to provide recorded calls and visits from Wilson's pretrial confinement and the trial court's denial of his request for a continuance to review this information, claiming harm. The trial court found no error, as the State had previously complied with discovery requests by providing recordings up to August 19, 2015, and later supplied additional recordings upon Ward's request during the trial. The court granted a continuance to allow Ward to review the recordings and reconvened the following day, at which point Ward objected to a segment of a recording offered by the State. The court subsequently extended the continuance to February 16, 2016, for further review.

On February 16, 2016, Ward requested an additional thirty-day continuance to review jail records, which the State opposed, citing concerns about indefinite delays due to Ward's ongoing calls from jail. The trial court denied the motion, and the trial proceeded. Ward alleged that the State violated Article 39.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure by not timely disclosing supplemental information, which requires the State to provide exculpatory evidence in its possession. While some discovery materials were provided to Ward prior to trial, including recordings of his jail calls, he claimed there was exculpatory evidence within those recordings regarding his innocence.

Specifically, Ward pointed to statements from Wilson indicating he did not give her drugs on the day in question. However, there was no record confirming the existence of these statements, and Ward’s late assertion of their relevance demonstrated a lack of diligence. The court noted that since Ward participated in the conversations, he could have identified any exculpatory evidence earlier. The court did not need to determine if the State failed to disclose all relevant recordings, as the mere possibility of undisclosed evidence aiding the defense does not imply materiality. Rather, the omission must be evaluated against the entire record; error is only established if the omitted evidence creates reasonable doubt. 

Wilson’s testimony was inconsistent, vacillating between stating Ward gave her drugs and later denying it. Presenting the alleged exculpatory statements would likely have been cumulative and would not have significantly impacted the trial's outcome. Thus, there was no indication of harm resulting from the alleged omission of evidence.

Ward contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a continuance. The court has broad discretion to manage its proceedings and ensure justice is served while protecting the rights of all involved. A trial court's ruling on a motion for continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion. To reverse such a ruling, the appellant must show both error and harm resulting from the denial. Diligence in preparing for trial is necessary for a continuance request based on the need for additional preparation. 

Ward's trial counsel claimed that reviewing 150 hours of recorded evidence was unfeasible due to time constraints, despite being granted two continuances totaling 106 hours. The counsel’s affidavit overlooked that Ward was involved in the conversations and could have aided in identifying relevant exculpatory evidence, thus lessening the burden of reviewing all recordings. Ward indicated in court that he could assist in pinpointing pertinent sections of the evidence. Therefore, the court found no actual prejudice from the lack of additional preparation time and concluded there was no reversible error in denying the continuance. The trial court's judgment was affirmed.