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Daniel Manuel Castorena A/K/A Daniel Castorena v. State
Citation: Not availableDocket: 02-15-00200-CR
Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; November 30, 2016; Texas; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Daniel Manuel Castorena, the appellant, is appealing his plea-bargained conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, resulting in a six-year sentence. His appeal, permitted by the trial court, centers on the claim that the trial judge compromised his due process rights by allegedly advising him on the merits of his defense, thus abandoning a neutral role. Initially indicted for engaging in organized criminal activity, which is a first-degree felony, Castorena agreed to plead guilty to a lesser-included second-degree felony charge of aggravated assault. The plea agreement included written admonishments signed on March 2, 2015, and was made without a recommendation from the State, allowing for a punishment range of two to twenty years. During the April 10, 2015, sentencing hearing, the trial court outlined the procedural history, confirming that the State would accept a plea to the lesser charge if Castorena accepted responsibility. Legal documents were executed in court, including a sworn judicial confession where Castorena acknowledged his identity, age, and lack of prior felony convictions while accepting legal responsibility for the offense. The court found him competent to waive his rights and enter the plea. A presentence investigation report was ordered and completed prior to sentencing. Both parties agreed to the court’s summary of events leading to the plea. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. Prior to the proceeding, the court reviewed an interview summary from the PSI, which includes the Defendant's account of the events leading to the charge. The summaries potentially raise a self-defense argument; however, the court clarified that legal principles limit such claims, especially where provocation is involved. Attorney Ms. Vigil confirmed she has discussed self-defense laws and their limitations with the Defendant, who expressed no desire to pursue a trial or self-defense claim. The court emphasized the necessity for the Defendant to understand that provocation disqualifies one from claiming self-defense unless the encounter is clearly abandoned. The Defendant acknowledged understanding these points, including that his account of the incident, particularly regarding a perceived threat, does not constitute a valid self-defense claim under the law. The court reiterated that ignorance of the law is not a defense and confirmed the Defendant’s wish to proceed with a guilty plea and sentencing without a trial, as he and his attorney believe a self-defense claim would not be legally viable. The Defendant affirmed his understanding and intent to continue with the plea. The court indicated that if a legal claim of self-defense arose, the Defendant could withdraw his plea, and the State would not oppose this. Defense Counsel suggested that the Defendant's self-defense claim might be valid if his version of events were true, but noted concerns regarding the timing and circumstances of the incident. The court addressed whether any historical issues needed to be documented, confirming that both parties had nothing further to add. The appellant argued that the trial judge compromised his neutrality by discussing plea negotiations and assessing the difficulty of proving self-defense, claiming this infringed on his due process rights. The appellant contended that the judge improperly assumed the role of counsel and influenced the plea process. However, the court found that the appellant did not preserve this complaint by raising it in the trial court, as required for appeal. The court also assessed whether the trial judge's comments indicated bias or a predetermined sentence, concluding that there was no evidence of partiality. The judge's remarks were viewed as a concern for ensuring that the plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. The trial judge, having seen the Presentence Investigation (PSI) report weeks after the plea was made, could not have influenced the plea at that time. After the comments, the trial judge proceeded with the sentencing process. The court ultimately ruled that the trial judge's questioning was aimed at clarifying issues and did not demonstrate partiality. Thus, the appellant's claim was overruled, and the trial court's judgment was affirmed.