People v. Thompson

Citations: 1 Cal. 5th 1043; 384 P.3d 693; 210 Cal. Rptr. 3d 667; 2016 Cal. LEXIS 9432Docket: S033901

Court: California Supreme Court; December 1, 2016; California; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Catherine Thompson was convicted by a Los Angeles County jury on September 15, 1992, of conspiracy to commit murder and first-degree murder of her husband, Melvin "Tom" Thompson, with the jury also finding a special circumstance that the murder was committed for financial gain. The jury imposed the death penalty on September 28, 1992, following consideration of aggravating and mitigating evidence. The case was filed in the Supreme Court of California as an automatic appeal.

Prior to the murder, Melvin owned Kayser Service, an auto repair shop, and had separated from his first wife, Mellie Thompson, with whom he had a marital dissolution agreement regarding their jointly owned home. After marrying Catherine, she took over the business finances. Between 1986 and 1988, while working for another company, Catherine accrued a debt of over $33,000 and forged Melvin's signature on a deed of trust for their home to secure repayment. After defaulting on the payments, the home went into foreclosure.

Catherine attempted to negotiate the repurchase of the house under false pretenses, misrepresenting herself and her financial situation to the property owner while keeping Melvin unaware of the foreclosure. Simultaneously, she devised a scheme to fraudulently obtain a loan using Mellie's home as collateral, employing fake identification to impersonate both Mellie and Melvin during the mortgage negotiations.

Reik observed that the temporary licenses for "Melvin" lacked photos and were obtained on the same day, with the listed weight inconsistent with Phillip's appearance. She was informed that the Thompsons had recently lost their permanent licenses due to a robbery and that "Melvin" had been ill. Upon attempting to verify this, a woman named "Rene" confirmed the robbery story, although Rene Griffin, a friend of the defendant, later denied making such statements. Reik required independent witnesses for the Thompsons' identity, which were provided by Isabelle, Carolyn Moore, and Carolyn Sanders. Satisfied, Reik witnessed defendant and Phillip, posing as Mellie and Melvin Thompson, sign loan documents. This "hard money" loan amounted to $98,000, with $25,000 disbursed before closing and an additional $27,822 afterward, used primarily to pay off existing debts on the South Sycamore Avenue home.

Simultaneously, Isabelle sought legal assistance from attorney Bruce Blum regarding a foreclosure issue. Blum began representing the defendant in December 1989, aiding her efforts to reclaim a house on Hillary Drive, for which the defendant provided a $20,000 check from the Kayser Service account. Due to the defendant's poor credit, Blum attempted to negotiate a sale in Isabelle's name. When unsuccessful, the defendant acquired a driver's license and Social Security card under her maiden name, Catherine Bazar, and sought financing. In March 1990, she met with mortgage broker David Yourist, stating her intent to repurchase the Hillary Drive home and misrepresenting her banking information.

Yourist, relying on false verification of deposits from a bank using Kayser Service's address, moved to prepare loan paperwork for a sale that ultimately fell through when no actual payment was received. It was later revealed to Yourist that "Catherine Bazar" was in fact the defendant, Catherine Thompson. In December 1989, Mellie Thompson discovered her South Sycamore Avenue home was refinanced without her consent, prompting her to sue her ex-husband, Melvin, the defendant, and others for fraud.

In a separate matter, Phillip Sanders lived with his wife Carolyn and had a close friendship with Christine Kuretich, who moved in with them in May 1990. Kuretich overheard multiple discussions between Phillip and Carolyn concerning plans for Melvin Thompson's murder leading up to the actual event on June 14, 1990.

Conversations among housemates indicated a plot to kill Phillip Sanders for life insurance proceeds, with Kuretich hearing statements about financial arrangements for the murder. Carolyn Sanders mentioned a person named "Catherine" willing to pay "thousands and thousands" for the job and sought Kuretich's help in finding a hitman. Kuretich recorded multiple messages from someone named Cathy, who requested Phillip. Just before the murder on June 14, 1990, Kuretich overheard that Phillip would commit the murder due to a lack of hired help and that Carolyn's son, Robert Jones, was involved in procuring a gun.

On the day of the murder, Charlotte Wark, a neighbor, witnessed suspicious behavior from Melvin Thompson and heard gunshots, initially mistaking them for firecrackers. Michael Lutz observed two African-American males in a white Plymouth Acclaim near Kayser Service and noted the passenger’s return with concealed items under his jacket. After the shooting, Lutz identified Phillip as the passenger and Robert as the driver. Detective Kurt Wachter discovered Thompson dead from gunshot wounds at Kayser Service, where a letter revealed ownership had recently transferred to "Catherine Jacquet," a name associated with the defendant. 

The defendant, when interviewed at the hospital, claimed to have left the shop before the gunshots and reported seeing an unknown man leaving the scene. She did not identify this man as Phillip and later denied it to friends. Additionally, she mentioned her husband possessed a Rolex watch at Kayser Service.

Detective Wachter's search of Kayser Service did not yield a Rolex watch but revealed two large bags of empty aluminum cans. Investigating a license plate linked to Phillip, police found his rental car at his Sylmar home, parked with a warm hood. Detective Wachter entered the home with consent from Phillip's wife, Carolyn, who led them to Phillip sitting on the couch. Visible on the kitchen table were car keys with a Thrifty Rent-A-Car tag, and a piece of paper with Phillip's phone number. Phillip denied using the car after 6:00 p.m. or being in West Los Angeles that evening, claims he later admitted were false. Following Phillip's arrest, Carolyn contacted Kuretich, expressing distress and suggesting that Kuretich should blame Phillip's brother-in-law, Gregory Jones, for the murder. Initially, Kuretich accused Jones but later changed her statement to implicate Phillip and Carolyn after police suggested a lie detector test. 

Defendant's friend, Nancy Rankin, recalled that the defendant expressed regret about the murder, which she believed was related to the victim's Rolex watch. The victim, Melvin Thompson, had two life insurance policies totaling $250,000, with the latter including a double indemnity clause. Shortly after the murder, the defendant filed a claim on these policies and assigned them to Tony DeGreef to facilitate the purchase of a property. On June 18, 1990, just days after the murder, police arrested the defendant for allegedly hiring someone to kill her husband. During the arrest, she claimed she did not know Phillip Sanders, despite the officers not mentioning him. She was released shortly thereafter, and Melvin's funeral occurred while she was in custody.

Rene Griffin was instructed to retrieve all jewelry from the victim's body post-funeral and return it to the defendant, who later pawned the items to fund a gambling trip to Laughlin, Nevada, which Griffin and another individual, Rankin, claimed was their idea. The victim's son, Tommy Thompson, Jr., who worked alongside his father at Kayser Service, expressed concerns about the defendant's management style after Melvin Thompson, the victim, married her. Tommy noted that the defendant's friends frequently visited the auto shop and that he had seen Phillip Sanders and Robert Jones there shortly before the murder.

Following Melvin's death, the defendant had Griffin collect daily cash from the shop. When Tommy discovered that the rent had not been paid, he confronted the defendant, who lied about the payments. Tommy then took over the financial management of the business. He provided police with documents from the Kayser Service office, one being a letter from "Katrina Brazarre" on Guaranty Bank and Trust Co. letterhead, along with rub-on stencils for creating that letterhead and a letter detailing the victim's physical description and work schedule.

Phillip Sanders testified that he met the defendant through his mother and admitted to forging Melvin Thompson's name to help the defendant secure a loan. He was compensated $100 for his efforts, despite later concerns about the legality of the transaction. Phillip recounted that the defendant approached him about hiring someone to kill her stepson, Tommy, suggesting she would gain financially from his death. Although Phillip claimed ignorance about potential hitmen, he discussed the matter with his wife, who then relayed it to her housemate. A week later, the defendant again solicited Phillip regarding the murder for financial gain. Despite Phillip's denials about conversations concerning Melvin's murder, records indicated frequent communication between him and the defendant in the weeks leading up to the murder, contradicting his claims that their discussions focused solely on a car purchase, as evidence showed Girard had already bought a car elsewhere.

Phillip requested a $1,500 loan from the defendant, which she agreed to, and the money was received by Carolyn Sanders on June 11, 1990. On June 14, the day of the murder, Phillip planned to formalize the loan agreement at Kayser Service. After consuming alcohol and medication, he had his stepson, Robert Jones, drive him to Santa Monica to meet the defendant. Upon arrival, Phillip described entering the repair shop where the defendant, after signaling him to be quiet, unexpectedly shot a man in the bathroom. The victim was unknown to Phillip. The defendant handed Phillip the gun, instructing him to dispose of it and implying he would be compensated for his silence. Phillip discarded the gun in some ivy but later retrieved it after being urged by Jones. He eventually gave the gun to Jones and instructed him to destroy it. After his arrest, Phillip received letters in jail, believed to be from the defendant, urging him to change his testimony in exchange for financial gain, which he reported to his attorneys. Jennifer Lee, another inmate, testified about copying letters from the defendant. The document also details a legal discussion regarding jury selection in capital cases, specifically the exclusion of jurors opposed to the death penalty. The defendant argues that the removal of seven jurors violated her constitutional rights to due process and an impartial jury. However, it was concluded that the trial court acted correctly, citing precedents that emphasize the necessity of an impartial jury not biased by death penalty views.

The high court established the Witt test, which allows for the challenge of prospective jurors in capital cases based on their views on the death penalty. A juror may be excused for cause if their beliefs would prevent or substantially impair their ability to perform their duties according to the court’s instructions and their oath. Prospective jurors who would consistently vote for or against the death penalty, regardless of case circumstances, are subject to challenge. Even those who do not have a fixed stance can be removed if they cannot conscientiously consider all sentencing alternatives, including the death penalty.

The assessment of impairment must be substantial; mere personal opposition to capital punishment does not justify dismissal. Jurors can serve if they express a willingness to set aside personal beliefs in favor of following the law. Both state and federal courts emphasize that excluding jurors solely for expressing general objections to the death penalty is impermissible. The key consideration is whether a life-leaning juror can set aside personal views and adhere to the law as instructed by the judge. A juror's predisposition towards mitigating factors does not automatically disqualify them unless it genuinely obstructs their ability to weigh evidence and reach a verdict. Courts must ensure they have adequate information about a juror's mindset to make an informed decision on challenges for cause.

In People v. Leon (2015), the court acknowledges that prospective jurors often provide unclear, conflicting, or hesitant responses during voir dire, particularly in capital cases due to stress and unfamiliarity with legal complexities. This ambiguity necessitates that trial courts, informed by their observations of juror demeanor, resolve uncertainties in favor of the prosecution. Two key rules have emerged regarding juror bias in death penalty cases: first, a juror's bias does not need to be established with unmistakable clarity; the court only requires a definite impression of a juror's inability to follow the law. Second, the trial court's assessment of a juror's state of mind is afforded deference on appeal, as it is better positioned to evaluate the juror's demeanor and credibility.

The document then examines the case of Peter B., a prospective juror who, at 65, had a military background and generally supported the death penalty. He had previously supported the 1978 initiative to reinstate it and expressed that capital punishment serves to remove dangerous individuals from society. However, when asked about the application of the death penalty in specific cases, he indicated ambiguity, expressing that it "depends" and that he did not have strong feelings about voting for or against it in every instance.

During voir dire, Peter B. expressed that he believes the death penalty may be appropriate for particularly heinous crimes, specifically noting he would consider it for multiple killings. He placed himself in the middle of a scale regarding his willingness to impose the death penalty, indicating he might struggle with such a decision for single-victim murders, especially those motivated by financial gain. Initially favoring life imprisonment in such cases, he later acknowledged that he could potentially support the death penalty under certain circumstances, though he emphasized a strong aversion to capital punishment stemming from his military experiences in Vietnam. He articulated a moral conflict regarding the concept of executing individuals, stating that he sympathizes with those sentenced to death while recognizing that some may deserve it. His responses led the trial court to challenge his ability to serve as a juror, concluding that Peter B.'s views were substantially impaired. The defense argued that Peter B.'s stance on the death penalty was less problematic than two jurors dismissed in the Supreme Court case Adams v. Texas, which established that jurors cannot be removed for their views unless those views significantly impair their duties. The comparison was drawn between Peter B.'s voir dire responses and those of the jurors in the Adams case.

Using the Adams case as a reference for evaluating the excusal of juror Peter B. is inappropriate due to the distinct statutory framework in Texas concerning juror qualifications related to capital felonies. In Adams, the court determined that prospective jurors could not be disqualified based solely on emotional responses or uncertainty regarding the death penalty, as this fails to align with constitutional standards. The Texas statute allowed for the exclusion of jurors who were otherwise qualified under federal law, leading to the conclusion that the state cannot impose a death sentence from a jury lacking certain jurors.

Peter B.'s responses regarding the death penalty were initially mischaracterized by the trial court as inconsistent; however, it was clarified that he rated his general stance on the death penalty as a five out of ten but considered himself in the bottom ten percent of jurors willing to impose it for a single murder committed for financial gain. Although Peter B. expressed a tendency to prefer life sentences in such cases, he also acknowledged some potential for imposing the death penalty, leading to ambiguity in his position.

The trial court was justified in resolving this ambiguity in favor of dismissal since the juror's views were likely to impair his impartiality. Comparisons to the Adams case regarding the dismissal of other jurors were rejected for similar reasons, emphasizing that the trial court's ruling was significantly supported by the overall record. Ultimately, substantial evidence indicated that Peter B.'s views justified his removal from the jury pool.

Nancy N., a 54-year-old African-American librarian and Republican, expressed strong opposition to capital punishment in her juror questionnaire, citing concerns about wrongful convictions due to human error. She voted against the reinstatement of the death penalty in 1978 and indicated that no crimes warranted it, believing that the death penalty served little purpose as offenders are not deterred by societal approval. During voir dire, she attempted to clarify her stance, stating she would always vote against the death penalty but could consider it in extremely rare cases. When discussing notorious criminal Jeffrey Dahmer, she suggested the death penalty "could be appropriate" but estimated that only 1 in 100 cases would qualify. She confirmed she would not avoid voting guilty to prevent a penalty phase and would weigh all factors before making a decision, despite feeling "extremely uncomfortable" serving on the jury. The prosecutor challenged her for cause, and the trial court agreed, determining she was substantially impaired and did not exhibit a mindset conducive to fairly considering the death penalty. 

Maria G., a 36-year-old secretary, had a more ambivalent view of the death penalty, describing her stance as "50/50" and acknowledging that it would depend on circumstances, particularly in extreme cases like that of Dahmer. She disagreed somewhat with the notion that individuals who kill intentionally should always receive the death penalty, and her feelings were not strong enough to dictate her verdicts. Despite being Catholic, she did not fully align with church teachings on capital punishment. During voir dire, she indicated a belief that the death penalty had a place in society and that she could impose it in suitable cases. However, for a murder involving financial gain, she would prefer life without parole, revealing that such a decision would be challenging for her.

Maria G. indicated a willingness to consider the death penalty in extreme cases, rating herself a 2.5 on a 10-point scale regarding her likelihood of voting for death in a financial gain murder. She specified that she would support the death penalty for serial killers and individuals who rape or murder children, but expressed that her inclination to vote for death in cases involving financial gain was "slim" and "unlikely." The trial court sustained the prosecution's challenge to excuse her from the jury, citing that her views would "substantially impair" her ability to perform her duties as a juror, as under the Witt standard, a juror's views need only show a substantial impairment to their duties, not a complete refusal to consider the death penalty.

Brenda M., a 30-year-old administrative analyst, felt the death penalty was justifiable in very few cases, emphasizing her belief that wrongful verdicts cannot be rectified. She expressed disagreement with the notion that all intentional killers should receive the death penalty, acknowledging that not all circumstances are known. Her views were nuanced, indicating a reluctance to impose the death penalty broadly.

Anyone who intentionally kills more than one person should face the death penalty, although mental health issues should be evaluated. Brenda M. expressed during voir dire that she would generally struggle to vote for the death penalty, stating there are very few cases where she would support it. When asked if she could set aside her personal opinions and follow the law, she affirmed her ability to do so and indicated she could consider both life without parole and the death penalty if the defendant were convicted.

Brenda M. voiced concerns about the irreversibility of the death penalty, particularly if the defendant maintained their innocence. She stated that she would prefer life without parole in almost any case due to her discomfort with making a life-or-death decision. Although she indicated that an admission of guilt would ease her decision-making process, she ultimately expressed doubt about imposing the death penalty herself.

The prosecutor moved to challenge her for cause, citing her reluctance as a substantial impairment under the legal standard set in *Witt v. Wainwright*. Defense counsel argued that her statements showed she could impose the death penalty and manage her personal feelings. The trial court ultimately excused Brenda M., noting her significant internal conflict regarding the death penalty and concluding that her views could substantially impair her duties as a juror, deeming the situation a close call.

A prospective juror, referred to as Kusum P., expressed strong opposition to the death penalty, indicating that she did not believe it was a suitable punishment and that it failed to deter crime or serve a constructive purpose. Despite acknowledging that the death penalty might be considered in extreme cases, such as the torture of children, she consistently maintained that she could not personally support a death sentence or participate in the execution of an individual. During voir dire, she provided conflicting responses regarding her potential willingness to vote for the death penalty, suggesting it would depend on specific circumstances. Ultimately, the trial court determined that her biases against the death penalty significantly impaired her ability to consider both sides impartially. The court's decision to dismiss her for cause was supported by her responses and demeanor, underscoring her strong feelings against capital punishment. The ruling aligns with precedents indicating that jurors can be disqualified if they cannot fairly assess the legal standards required in capital cases.

Prospective jurors may struggle to predict their reactions to imposing the death penalty, potentially concealing their true feelings. Despite uncertainties in their statements, trial judges can form clear impressions about a juror's ability to apply the law impartially. For instance, in the case of Kusum P., the trial court’s assessment of her mindset was supported by substantial evidence, warranting deference to its decision.

Betty F., a 54-year-old African-American federal contractor, generally supported the death penalty, believing it deters unnecessary killings. She considered it appropriate for crimes against the mentally ill and children but expressed that individual case circumstances should guide her decisions. Initially hesitant about personally voting for execution, she later affirmed she could do so under certain circumstances but preferred life imprisonment for murder cases driven by financial gain. On a scale of one to ten, where one represents a person who would always impose life sentences, Betty rated herself a two, indicating difficulty in voting for death unless the crime was particularly severe. She clarified that for less egregious murders, it would be unlikely she would support the death penalty, a perspective the trial court sought to clarify during questioning. When asked specifically about a non-gruesome murder for financial gain, she indicated she would not impose the death penalty regardless of the circumstances.

Prospective Juror Betty F. expressed a firm stance against the death penalty, indicating she would always vote for life imprisonment. The trial court found her substantially impaired in her ability to serve as a juror due to her inability to comprehend the complexities of the case, which led to her being excused for cause. The court's determination was supported by substantial evidence, and it deferred to this decision.

Prospective Juror Yolanda N., a 54-year-old employee of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, showed ambivalence toward capital punishment. While she acknowledged that the worst crimes, such as those committed by rapists and child molesters, might warrant the death penalty, she hesitated to endorse it universally. During voir dire, she stated that her decision would depend on the specifics of the case and expressed that she would not acquit or convict solely to influence the penalty phase. When asked if she would impose the death penalty without knowing details about the case, she affirmed she would not, and indicated a preference for life imprisonment based on her religious beliefs, emphasizing the importance of allowing individuals a chance to repent. Ultimately, she stated she could personally vote for the death penalty only in rare circumstances, quantifying her willingness as "99.9 percent, no," highlighting her strong opposition to capital punishment. The trial court sought further clarification on her views regarding intentional murder for financial gain.

Yolanda N., a prospective juror, expressed that she would find it very difficult to vote for the death penalty, stating she would only do so 0.1% of the time. The trial court excused her, determining that her views on the death penalty would substantially impair her ability to fulfill her duties as a juror, particularly in cases of murder for financial gain. Despite initial indications that she might serve, further questioning revealed her strong inclination towards imposing life imprisonment instead of the death penalty. The court's conclusion that Yolanda N. was substantially impaired was supported by her own statements and aligned with precedent established in *Witt*. The defense challenged the excusal of several prospective jurors based on similar views, but the court's findings were upheld as adequately supported by the record.

In a separate matter, the defendant, along with co-defendants Phillip Sanders, Carolyn Sanders, and Robert Jones, was charged with conspiracy to commit murder and murder for financial gain. Phillip and Carolyn Sanders moved to sever their trials, which were partially granted, resulting in two joint trials. The defendant repeatedly sought to sever her trial from Phillip Sanders, but her motions were denied by both Judge Jacqueline Weisberg and Judge George Trammell. The legal framework for joint trials is established under section 1098, which mandates joint trials for jointly charged defendants unless a court orders otherwise, granting trial courts broad discretion in these decisions. The principles guiding this discretion were discussed in *People v. Hardy*.

The court may grant a motion to sever the trials of codefendants under several circumstances, including the presence of an incriminating confession, prejudicial links between codefendants, potential confusion from multiple counts, conflicting defenses, or the likelihood that a codefendant may provide exonerating testimony if tried separately. The denial of a severance motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion based on the facts known at the time of the ruling. A defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome in a separate trial to obtain relief on appeal, even if an abuse of discretion is found. Conversely, a reviewing court may reverse a conviction if the consolidation results in gross unfairness that denies the defendant a fair trial or due process.

On April 3, 1992, the defendant filed her first motion to sever her trial from codefendant Phillip Sanders, citing three main arguments: (1) Phillip's confession to a jail visitor would not be admissible against her in a separate trial; (2) evidence against Phillip was significantly stronger, leading to potential prejudice; and (3) she anticipated mutually antagonistic defenses. During the hearing, there was significant discussion about whether Phillip's confession could be redacted to protect the defendant's confrontation rights. The prosecution ultimately chose not to use the confession rather than hold separate trials. After reviewing the defense arguments, the court denied the motion to sever, stating that the issues presented were not uniquely problematic and that the defendant would still receive a fair trial despite the joint proceedings. The prosecution later decided not to call the jail visitor, Juanita Williams, as a witness.

Defendant contends that reversal is necessary due to Judge Weisberg's alleged failure to properly exercise discretion regarding severance based on conflicting defenses. She asserts that the judge overlooked the particularly antagonistic and mutually exclusive nature of the defenses. However, the record indicates that after reviewing the defense strategies in camera, Judge Weisberg concluded that the conflicts were not unusual and did not necessarily imply both defendants' guilt. The judge recognized the existence of conflicting defenses but determined that this alone does not warrant severance, as established in *People v. Homick* (2012). The court emphasized that a joint trial remains permissible despite conflicting defenses, which do not inherently demonstrate guilt or necessitate separate trials. According to precedent, severance is only justified if the conflicts are so prejudicial that they irreconcilably suggest both defendants are guilty. Sufficient independent evidence against the moving defendant can mitigate concerns regarding antagonistic defenses. Defendant argues that the existence of such defenses should compel severance more than previously indicated by case law, citing lower federal court decisions. However, these precedents predate the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in *Zafiro v. United States* (1993), which clarified that mutually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial by default and that severance is at the district court's discretion, regardless of demonstrated prejudice.

Proceeding with a joint trial despite inconsistent defenses is permissible under constitutional guarantees, provided there is no significant showing of prejudice or an unfair trial. The federal Constitution does not mandate severance in cases involving conflicting defenses among codefendants. The argument that heightened scrutiny of joinder is required in capital cases was rejected, as Judge Weisberg was aware of the capital nature of the case and deemed the inconsistencies in anticipated defenses as routine, demonstrating no abuse of discretion. 

Evidence presented, all admissible in a separate trial, indicated the defendant's involvement in a conspiracy to kill the victim for financial gain, including refinancing and insurance frauds, numerous calls with a co-defendant prior to the murder, and inconsistent statements made by the defendant regarding the crime. The defendant's claims that the denial of severance resulted in unfairness or a lack of due process were not substantiated. 

On May 11, 1992, the defendant renewed her motion to sever, citing new evidence from a polygraph examination in which a co-defendant implicated her in the murder. The defense argued this created antagonistic and mutually incompatible defenses, as acquitting one would necessitate convicting the other. Judge Weisberg denied this renewed motion, reinforcing her previous assessment.

The court exercised its discretion to deny the defendant's renewed motion to sever the trial from codefendant Phillip Sanders, despite the defendant's argument that they would present antagonistic defenses. Judge Trammell reviewed prior motions and heard arguments but found the defense could not identify any evidence that would be inadmissible in a separate trial. Although he acknowledged that Judge Weisberg could have granted severance, he chose to uphold the previous ruling, stating he did not see sufficient evidence to justify a change. The defendant argued that Judge Trammell misunderstood his discretion and gave undue deference to Judge Weisberg's ruling; however, the record indicated that Judge Trammell recognized his authority to reconsider the matter. He concluded that the evidence of differing defenses had not significantly changed since the initial denial. The court found no abuse of discretion or gross unfairness that would deprive the defendant of a fair trial or due process. Additionally, on June 24, 1992, during jury selection, the defendant made another motion to sever her case, which reflects the ongoing contention regarding the joint trial.

Defense counsel informed the court of an ex parte presentation made by Phillip's counsel on June 9, 1992, which could affect the decision on whether to grant a severance or separate juries for the defendants. Although the defense was unaware of the presentation's details, they cited it as the basis for renewing their motion for severance and, alternatively, for dual juries. The trial court denied both motions, stating that nothing from the ex parte hearing warranted such measures. 

Phillip's attorneys had previously presented evidence regarding letters received from defendant while they were in pretrial detention, which encouraged Phillip to recant his testimony in exchange for financial compensation. The prosecution agreed to postpone the discovery of these letters and the witness for their authentication, allowing for a delay in disclosing the letters to the defendant. The trial court was aware of the letters' contents and referenced them when denying the severance motion, concluding that they did not necessitate severance.

The court found no abuse of discretion, noting that the letters would have been admissible regardless of the trial arrangement. Defendant's claim of due process violation due to lack of formal notice was rejected, as she had authored the letters and was aware of their content. She failed to demonstrate how earlier disclosure would have impacted her defense or to specify which trial right was compromised by the joint trial. 

When the letters were eventually revealed during the trial, defendant sought a continuance, renewed her severance motion, and requested a mistrial, all of which were denied. The trial court maintained its discretion, asserting that the letters' admissibility would remain unchanged in a separate trial and that the defendant was not prejudiced by their delayed disclosure. Additionally, a separate analysis was required for her alternative motion for dual juries based on the ex parte presentation.

Judge Trammell acknowledged the potential use of dual juries but expressed a personal aversion to them, indicating that they should only be employed for judicial efficiency. When denying the defendant’s motion for dual juries, he stated that no significant information from an ex parte hearing warranted such a decision. The law permits separate juries for jointly tried defendants as a viable alternative to severance, but the choice to implement dual juries is largely at the court's discretion. Mistakes in denying severance or dual juries are not grounds for appeal unless there is clear evidence of prejudice or gross unfairness that impacts the defendant's right to a fair trial.

The defendant argued that Judge Trammell did not adequately exercise his discretion due to a lack of transparency regarding the ex parte hearing. However, the judge, who presided over that hearing, determined that the information presented did not justify the use of dual juries, a decision deemed appropriate given the absence of identifiable prejudice.

On July 21, 1992, just before the prosecution's opening statements, the defendant requested that co-defendant Phillip Sanders present his defense first, fearing that being forced to go first would place her at a disadvantage. The trial court denied this motion, recognizing concerns related to witness safety, particularly regarding Phillip's anticipated witness, Jennifer Lee. The prosecution asserted that Phillip was the shooter, while Phillip's counsel contended that the defendant was responsible for the murder, further complicating the joint trial dynamics. Following Phillip's opening statement, the defendant reiterated her request for severance, noting that the perceived unfairness of the joint trial had shifted from theoretical to practical concerns.

Phillip, a codefendant, has presented a defense theory that the jury finds untenable, placing the defendant in a challenging position of defending against both the prosecution and Phillip. The defendant sought empanelment of dual juries, but the trial court denied this request along with a renewed motion for severance without comment. The court's denial was deemed not an abuse of discretion, as the same motion had been previously denied multiple times, and the new assertions during opening statements did not introduce critical new evidence. The trial court maintained discretion over the order of proof in the trial, prioritizing witness safety, and found no benefit in requiring Phillip to present his evidence first since the defendant was aware of the letters she had written.

During the guilt phase, the defendant renewed her motion for severance three times. The first motion, on August 7, 1992, followed a ruling that sustained Phillip's marital privilege, preventing his wife Carolyn from testifying about Phillip's confession. The defendant argued that Carolyn's testimony was crucial to demonstrate she was not the shooter, especially during the penalty phase. Despite the complexity of the case and concerns about fairness, the court denied the severance. The second motion, on August 14, 1992, arose when Phillip disclosed letters he had received from the defendant, which the defendant's counsel had not seen before that morning. Counsel requested a mistrial and renewed the severance motion, claiming the late disclosure violated due process. The court denied these motions as well.

Phillip moved for severance during discussions about his marital communications privilege and the defendant's right to a fair trial, believing he could still assert his privilege in a separate trial. The trial court expressed serious consideration for severance and mistrial, emphasizing the need to ensure Mrs. Thompson's fair trial. However, no ruling was made at that time. On August 17, 1992, defense counsel argued that if Phillip's statements to his wife could not be used for impeachment, severance was the only option. The prosecutor contended that severance was premature, as it was uncertain whether Carolyn Sanders would testify. The court ultimately denied the severance motion as premature, noting the statutory marital communication privilege which could prevent Carolyn from testifying even in a separate trial.

After a brief recess, Phillip's counsel unexpectedly announced a waiver of the marital communication privilege, allowing Carolyn to testify in exchange for the prosecution's agreement not to seek the death penalty for Phillip. The prosecution clarified that both defendants would still face a penalty phase, but would not push for a death sentence for Phillip. On August 18, 1992, Phillip testified about receiving letters from the defendant, leading to another severance motion by defense counsel, who wanted to call Phillip's attorneys as rebuttal witnesses but anticipated they would invoke attorney-client privilege. The court denied this motion without comment. Ultimately, Phillip denied telling Carolyn he shot the victim, and the prosecution chose not to impeach him with her testimony. The defendant called Carolyn to rebut Phillip's claims, leading to her testimony that Phillip admitted to shooting someone.

The defendant did not specifically challenge the trial court’s denials of her severance motions but argued that collectively, they violated her constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as California's Constitution. She claimed that the repeated denials of severance constituted an abuse of discretion, depriving her of a fair trial and reliable penalty determination due to Phillip and his counsel acting as an additional prosecutor, which included delaying the disclosure of her letters and the existence of a key witness.

Defendant argues that a separate trial would have prevented Phillip from testifying, as he would have feared self-incrimination, thus eliminating the need to impeach him with Carolyn Sanders' testimony. She contends that Phillip's credibility would have been undermined by admitting to being an accomplice. However, the court finds no violation of her constitutional rights from the trial court's refusal to sever the trials. Regarding the delayed disclosure of jail letters and Jennifer Lee’s testimony, the court notes that the defendant was aware of the letters she authored, negating any harm from the delay. The trial court also offered to allow further cross-examination of Lee, which the defendant declined, indicating that advance notice would not have significantly changed her trial strategy. 

The defendant claims that being forced to call Carolyn Sanders to rebut Phillip's testimony was disadvantageous, but the court asserts that her testimony would still have implicated Phillip as the actual killer. Even in a separate trial, the defendant would have attempted to shift blame to Phillip and call Carolyn, who could have been precluded from testifying if Phillip had not reached a deal with the prosecution. The prosecution's decision to avoid calling Juanita Williams to protect the joint trial’s integrity would not have changed had the trials been severed. The court concludes that the denial of the severance motion did not disadvantage the defendant, as a joint trial serves public policy interests by providing a comprehensive view of the defendants’ conduct. The court reaffirms that a stronger prosecution case due to joint trials does not inherently render them unfair.

The prosecution's cooperation with Phillip and his counsel, while unusual, did not compromise the fairness of the defendant's trial, nor did it violate her rights to confrontation or a fair trial. The court found that the denials of the defendant's severance motions were within its discretion and did not result in an unfair trial. Even if there was an abuse of discretion, the evidence against the defendant was compelling, including her involvement in financial fraud, deceptive statements regarding recycling and a Rolex watch, multiple calls to Phillip prior to the murder, and incriminating remarks that indicated guilt. 

Regarding the denial of reciprocal discovery, the defendant contended that the trial court's failure to compel discovery from her co-defendant, Phillip Sanders, violated her constitutional rights related to a fair trial and due process. The court concluded that Section 1054 does not mandate one co-defendant to provide discovery to another, and the trial court's inaction did not infringe upon the defendant's constitutional rights. Additionally, any potential error was deemed harmless. 

As the defense concluded, Phillip intended to introduce letters from the defendant that suggested she sought to manipulate him regarding his defense. These letters were disclosed to the prosecution mid-trial, despite earlier awareness of their existence. The defense raised concerns about the late disclosure, highlighting a strategic delay by Phillip’s attorneys to maintain the element of surprise against the defendant, while also revealing fears of potential retaliation against a witness who could authenticate the letters.

Wesley and Lee expressed concerns about Lee's safety in jail if the defendant were to know that Phillip intended to use certain letters. The prosecution agreed not to seek disclosure of the letters initially, and the trial court ruled that Phillip's attorneys would not reveal Lee's existence until after the defendant testified. In a subsequent ex parte hearing on July 27, 1992, the court sanctioned an agreement allowing Phillip's counsel to submit the letters to a handwriting expert, with strict conditions on disclosure.

When the letters were eventually made known, the defendant moved for a continuance, a severance, and a mistrial, all of which were denied. The trial court did order the prosecution to provide copies of the letters to the defendant's attorneys. Phillip's defense commenced on August 17, 1992. Although the defendant later acknowledged writing one of the letters, she contested the introduction of letters not in her handwriting on grounds of lack of authentication. The court ruled that Phillip could not discuss the letters' content until they were authenticated, but denied the defendant's requests for production of the letters and a list of Phillip's witnesses, citing limitations within the discovery statute.

Phillip testified to receiving the letters but denied accepting any financial inducements from the defendant for altering his testimony, claiming he turned the letters over to his lawyers. Jennifer Lee authenticated the letters, revealing her role in copying them for the defendant. She also noted that the defendant and Phillip's wife were friends in jail and recounted statements made by the defendant regarding her wealth and lifestyle.

During closing arguments, both the prosecution and Phillip emphasized the letters as crucial evidence of collusion between the defendant and Phillip. The prosecutor argued that the letters indicated a conspiracy, while Phillip's counsel claimed they revealed the defendant's fear of Phillip's potential testimony and included a narrative suggesting a plan for Phillip to accept blame for the killing, with promises of future support from the defendant.

Section 1054 of the Penal Code, established by Proposition 115 in 1990, governs discovery in criminal cases and mandates reciprocal discovery to ensure fair and speedy trials, as outlined in article I, section 30, subdivision (c) of the California Constitution. This section specifies that discovery is only permitted as outlined in this chapter, other statutory provisions, or the U.S. Constitution. The chapter aims to promote truth in trials, conserve court resources, protect victims and witnesses, and limit discovery to the specified legal framework. Importantly, it clarifies that there is no requirement for one codefendant to disclose evidence to another, as demonstrated in statutory provisions such as sections 1054.1 and 1054.3, which focus on disclosure between the prosecution and defendants. The court has consistently upheld this interpretation, exemplified in People v. Ervin (2000), where it was noted that no legal basis exists for codefendants to exchange discovery regarding penalty phase witnesses. Although the defendant argued that the prosecution should have been informed about a witness’s testimony through another codefendant, the prosecution’s agreement to delay disclosure was permissible under the statutory framework.

Section 1054.7 mandates that discovery must occur at least 30 days before trial unless good cause is shown for denial, restriction, or deferral of disclosure. The defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion by allowing deferral without a finding of good cause. However, the statutory scheme does not necessitate discovery between codefendants, rendering the good cause provision irrelevant. Even if good cause were required, it was demonstrated by Lee’s fear of retaliation for cooperating with the prosecution, which aligns with the definition of good cause that includes threats to witness safety. 

The defendant also interprets section 1054, subdivision (b) as necessitating mandatory discovery between codefendants, arguing the terms "between" and "among" imply reciprocal discovery among all parties in a criminal case. Nonetheless, this interpretation is countered by more specific provisions in sections 1054.1 and 1054.3, which clearly outline discovery obligations between the prosecution and the defendant. Section 1054, subdivision (b) simply expresses a legislative intent for informal discovery attempts before seeking judicial enforcement, without authorizing reciprocal discovery among codefendants.

Regarding constitutional considerations, while section 1054, subdivision (e) restricts discovery in criminal cases, it allows exceptions for express statutory provisions or constitutional mandates. The court acknowledges that constitutional guarantees may compel discovery to ensure a fair trial. Previous cases illustrate that defendants are entitled to discovery of potentially impeaching material or crucial witness identities to prepare an informed defense, reaffirming the principle that a defendant must have access to relevant and accessible information for a fair trial.

Defendant claims that the failure to disclose certain letters, the identity of an authenticating witness (Lee), and the prosecution's waiver of discovery rights infringed her constitutional rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. However, the court finds that the defendant did not demonstrate how the lack of pretrial disclosure hindered her constitutional rights. The defendant was aware of the letters' contents, having authored them, and knew of Lee's involvement, suggesting she was not unprepared for her defense. Furthermore, she had the opportunity to cross-examine both Phillip and Lee regarding the letters. The court concludes that allowing Phillip to pursue a disadvantageous trial strategy did not violate her rights. 

Regarding the joint trial and motions for severance, the court notes that the defendant did not prove that these factors infringed her rights to due process or confrontation. The court cites prior cases to assert that the potential strength of the prosecution's case in a joint trial does not make it inherently unfair. The defendant's claim regarding the California Constitution lacks sufficient analysis. Even if the court found a statutory or constitutional right to earlier discovery, any error would be deemed harmless since the defendant was aware of the letters' significance and had opportunities to address them in court. Ultimately, the defendant could not demonstrate prejudice from the timing of the discovery.

Defendant claims entitlement to pretrial discovery from co-defendant Phillip Sanders regarding jail letters and argues for her right to be present at hearings where this discovery issue was discussed by Phillip's attorneys, the prosecutor, and the trial court. She asserts that her exclusion violated her constitutional rights to counsel and due process under both federal and state laws, as well as her statutory right to be present at critical stages of her trial. The defendant also contends that the ex parte hearing was unauthorized under section 1054.7, breached the California Code of Judicial Ethics, and impeded her right to effective counsel. 

The court rejects these claims, explaining that the Sixth Amendment grants defendants the right to be present at proceedings critical to their defense, while due process requires presence at stages impacting trial outcomes. The California Constitution's right to presence aligns with federal due process. The defendant briefly mentions another ex parte hearing regarding witness Christine Kuretich without providing details, and the Attorney General does not address this hearing. The court notes that the defendant failed to demonstrate statutory or constitutional error regarding the Kuretich hearing. 

The defendant argues that due process necessitated prior notice and the opportunity to be heard on her discovery rights, asserting that hearings should not have occurred without her presence. While proceedings in chambers are generally disfavored, a trial court can conduct them in a defendant's absence to protect confidentiality interests. The court concludes that, despite the ex parte nature of the hearings, any constitutional error was harmless, as they excluded both the defendant and her attorneys.

The ex parte hearings challenged involved letters sent by the defendant to Phillip Sanders in jail and the authentication of those letters by Jennifer Lee. The defendant was not surprised by the letters' content, as she authored them, and had ample opportunity to cross-examine Lee regarding her role. Thus, the defendant's exclusion from the hearing did not result in any prejudice. 

The defendant contends that her exclusion violated her statutory right to be present as outlined in section 977, which mandates the presence of the accused during specific proceedings, with limited exceptions. Section 1043 reinforces this by stating that a felony defendant must be present at trial, allowing absence only under certain conditions. Despite these statutes, it was determined that no prejudice arose from the defendant's absence, as she was fully aware of the letters and Lee's involvement, meaning the exclusion did not adversely affect her defense.

Additionally, the defendant raised three subsidiary claims, one being that conducting an ex parte hearing regarding Phillip's discovery obligations was unlawful under state law due to section 1054.7. However, the court found no statutory violation, as section 1054.7 does not explicitly prohibit ex parte hearings, and it was acknowledged that such hearings can occur if they adhere to due process principles.

A court possesses inherent discretion to conduct in camera hearings to evaluate objections to disclosure related to asserted privileges. The trial court's decision to hold an ex parte hearing regarding discovery issues between the prosecution and codefendant Phillip Sanders was permissible, as the defendant had no due process entitlement to pretrial discovery from a jointly tried codefendant. The cited case, City of Alhambra v. Superior Court, is not applicable because it dealt with a defendant's discovery request from the prosecution, whereas the current situation involves discovery between the prosecution and Phillip. 

The defendant argues that the ex parte hearing violated the Code of Judicial Ethics, which prohibits judges from engaging in ex parte communications concerning pending proceedings. While misconduct by a trial judge can warrant reversal of a judgment, mere violation of an ethical rule does not automatically lead to such a consequence. The defendant's cited cases, Haluck v. Ricoh Electronics and People v. Bradford, involved more severe ethical breaches affecting the defendants' rights, unlike the minimal impact of the ex parte hearing on the defendant's rights in this case. Thus, there is no demonstration that the hearing infringed upon her constitutional rights, and therefore, reversal of her convictions is not justified.

The trial court correctly excluded the defendant and her attorneys from a hearing regarding codefendant Phillip Sanders' discovery obligations, as the defendant did not possess a legal interest in that proceeding under canon 3B(7)(d). The defendant's claim that the ex parte hearing violated her Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel is unfounded; she fails to establish a right to representation at the hearing about Phillip's discovery obligations and cannot demonstrate any prejudice, given her knowledge of the letters discussed.

Additionally, the defendant alleges that the prosecution did not disclose four pieces of evidence before trial, violating statutory discovery rules and her constitutional rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. However, the court finds no reversible error. The discovery rules in effect during the defendant's 1992 trial were established by Proposition 115, which mandates exclusive adherence to the new discovery chapter. Under section 1054.1, the prosecution is required to disclose certain materials, including witness statements, at least 30 days prior to trial unless good cause exists to delay disclosure. Good cause is narrowly defined and does not apply in this case. Although section 1054.1 explicitly mentions written statements, some appellate courts have interpreted this to include oral statements as well. The court has not yet ruled on the application of this disclosure obligation to oral statements.

The eldest child of the victim testified about her professional background as a Department of Defense investigator, highlighting her training in assessing non-verbal communication. She observed the defendant at the hospital after the victim was shot, noting that the defendant displayed calmness at times but also expressed grief through screams, which were only present when observed by others, lacking genuine tears. This testimony supported the prosecution's claim that the defendant's grief was insincere, suggesting a guilty mindset. The defendant objected to this testimony, arguing that the prosecution did not disclose Jones as an expert witness prior to trial, but the court overruled this objection. 

The defendant contended that the lack of pretrial disclosure violated her constitutional rights, warranting a reversal of her conviction. The respondent argued that the primary issue was whether proper notice was given regarding Jones's expert testimony. Even assuming a discovery violation occurred, the court found reversal unwarranted for two reasons: the defendant did not request a continuance to address the new evidence presented at trial, which weakened her appeal, and she failed to demonstrate how earlier disclosure would have altered her defense strategy. Additionally, testimony from another witness, Tommy Thompson, corroborated that the defendant did not display genuine grief, further rendering any potential error harmless. 

The defendant also argued for reversal based on a lack of pretrial discovery regarding Tony DeGreef's testimony. DeGreef recounted a conversation in which the defendant expressed her desire to keep her husband unaware of negotiations related to buying back their house, and defense counsel objected, claiming ignorance of this testimony.

The prosecutor affirmed to the trial court that all written materials concerning a witness had been provided to the defense, and that the defendant was aware of the prosecution's intent to demonstrate the victim's ignorance regarding the foreclosure of the Hillary Drive house. The prosecutor stated that not every oral statement made by the witness could be disclosed pretrial. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial, noting that even if some oral statements were subject to disclosure, the defendant's failure to request a continuance undermined her claim. The court also observed that the defendant did not articulate how earlier access to these statements would have impacted her defense strategy. 

Furthermore, any alleged error was deemed harmless due to substantial circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s financial misconduct, including forging the victim's signature, failing to make payments, and allowing the property to go into foreclosure, suggesting the victim was unaware of his home ownership status. 

The defendant raised additional concerns regarding the lack of pretrial disclosure about the testimony of Tommy Thompson, the victim's son, and Jennifer Lee, who authenticated letters sent by the defendant. The prosecutor explained that the information about Thompson was newly acquired during the trial and the trial court denied the motion for discovery sanctions, finding no significant impact on the trial. 

Lastly, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by denying her motion to compel the discovery of witness Christine Kuretich's address, alleging violations of her constitutional rights. The court rejected these claims, affirming that Kuretich was indeed a key witness and that statutory requirements for witness disclosure were acknowledged.

Discovery obligations may be limited under section 1054.7, allowing a trial court to deny, restrict, or defer disclosure for good cause, with rulings reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. The court's proper exercise of discretion under this section does not infringe on a defendant's confrontation or due process rights. Witness Christine Kuretich testified at a preliminary hearing about incriminating statements made by Phillip and Carolyn Sanders and Robert Jones, indicating a conspiracy to murder the victim for life insurance proceeds. After her testimony, Kuretich relocated to Kansas, where she improved her life circumstances. The prosecution located her and brought her back under a material witness warrant, while the trial court required Kuretich’s address in Kansas to be disclosed to the defense under a protective order. The defense sought Kuretich’s parents' address to verify her sobriety claims, but the prosecution argued this could prompt Kuretich to flee again. The trial court proposed a compromise to allow interviews with Kuretich and her parents in the defense’s office, which the defense accepted, leading to the court declining to disclose the parents' address. This decision was deemed not to constitute statutory or constitutional error, as defense counsel's acceptance of the compromise was seen as a reasonable tactical choice. Additionally, Kuretich's trial testimony about overheard admissions was partially admitted under the coconspirator hearsay exception, despite the defendant's motion to exclude it.

Defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to present statements made by coconspirators, claiming insufficient evidence existed to establish that these statements were made during an ongoing conspiracy, which violates Evidence Code section 1223 and her constitutional right to due process. The court found sufficient evidence of an ongoing conspiracy, rejecting defendant's claims. Prior to trial, the defendant sought to exclude testimony from Kuretich regarding statements she overheard from Phillip and Carolyn Sanders and Robert Jones, asserting these statements violated her confrontation rights and lacked sufficient independent evidence of a conspiracy to kill or collect insurance proceeds. The trial court initially denied her request for a hearing to establish the conspiracy but later allowed it, indicating that both the existence of the conspiracy and the defendants' involvement at the time of the statements needed to be demonstrated. The prosecution organized Kuretich's statements into four categories, which included conversations about hiring a hitman, discussions of the planned murder, agreements on the murder's execution, and post-murder actions regarding the disposal of the murder weapon.

The trial court found sufficient evidence of a conspiracy to allow the admission of certain hearsay statements from coconspirators, specifically those categorized as No. 2 and No. 3. However, statements categorized as No. 1 and No. 4 were excluded due to a lack of evidence showing that the Sanderses were involved in a conspiracy to kill at the time Carolyn asked Kuretich about finding a hitman. Additionally, Jones's statement regarding melting the gun was deemed inadmissible as it occurred after the victim's death and did not further the conspiracy. 

Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible, but statements made by coconspirators can be admitted if independent evidence establishes the existence of a conspiracy. According to Evidence Code section 1223, three criteria must be met for admission: (1) the declarant was part of the conspiracy when the statement was made, (2) the statement furthered the conspiracy's objective, and (3) the party against whom the evidence is offered was involved in the conspiracy at that time. The admission of such evidence is evaluated under an abuse of discretion standard. 

The court rejected the respondent's claim that the defendant forfeited the issue by not objecting to Kuretich's testimony at trial. While generally a party must object at the time evidence is introduced to preserve the issue for appeal, a definitive pre-trial ruling can also maintain that claim.

A well-established legal exception allows a pretrial motion in limine to preserve an evidentiary claim for appeal if the motion is sufficiently specific and the same issue is raised on appeal. In this case, the defendant's motion targeted specific evidence related to statements made by Phillip and Carolyn Sanders and Robert Jones, which the trial court appropriately ruled on at a relevant time. Although it is preferable to renew objections during trial for clarity, the defendant did not forfeit the issue by not objecting to Kuretich's testimony.

On the merits, the prosecution provided adequate evidence that hearsay statements, categorized as No. 2 and No. 3, were made by coconspirators involved in a conspiracy to murder Melvin Thompson, justifying the trial court’s admission of the evidence under Evidence Code section 1223. Key evidence included: 

1. Eyewitness Michael Lutz identified Phillip Sanders and Robert Jones driving a vehicle near the victim's business, hearing gunshots shortly after.
2. Police traced the vehicle to Phillip and Carolyn Sanders’s home, where they found circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy, including car keys linked to the murder and a phone number associated with the defendant.
3. Carolyn Sanders's call to Christine Kuretich after Phillip's arrest suggested a desire to discuss preventing the discovery of the conspiracy.
4. Telephone records indicated frequent communication between Phillip Sanders’s home and the victim’s workplace, suggesting an ongoing conspiracy.
5. Upon arrest, the defendant claimed minimal acquaintance with Phillip, contradicting the evidence of their involvement.

The trial court's ruling on the admissibility of the evidence was deemed appropriate given the circumstances.

Police had not disclosed evidence implicating Phillip Sanders, yet the defendant's spontaneous remark suggested she was being dishonest about her relationship with him, indicating a potential concealed connection. A search of the victim’s repair shop uncovered a letter in the defendant’s handwriting detailing the victim's appearance and work schedule, which the trial court reasonably interpreted as information relevant to an accomplice or coconspirator. Evidence presented indicated that Phillip and Carolyn Sanders had previously participated in a financial fraud scheme with the defendant in 1989. During this scheme, they posed as a different couple to refinance a property co-owned by the victim and his ex-wife, with Carolyn Moore falsely vouching for their identities. Phillip received several thousand dollars for his role, suggesting a prolonged conspiracy aimed at defrauding the victim of his assets, thereby establishing a motive for the murder and subsequent insurance fraud.

Following the murder, the defendant assigned the victim's life insurance proceeds to Tony DeGreef to reacquire ownership of her previous home, indicating desperation to regain that property. The prosecution needed to establish a basis for the admissibility of hearsay statements under the coconspirator exception. Sufficient evidence must be presented to allow the jury to determine the existence of a conspiracy by a preponderance of evidence. The trial court concluded that the prosecution provided enough evidence, aside from the statements themselves, to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy related to the murder of Melvin Thompson for the purpose of collecting his life insurance. Although the defendant contested this conclusion, asserting that the evidence did not demonstrate a conspiratorial agreement, the trial court could reasonably infer intent from the circumstantial evidence presented. Overall, the evidence supported an inference of a mutual understanding among the parties to commit a crime.

The existence of a conspiracy can be inferred from the actions, relationships, and interests of the alleged conspirators prior to and during the conspiracy. An agreement in a conspiracy is demonstrated through the defendants’ mutual actions in executing a criminal act. In this case, the court found sufficient evidence to infer that Phillip Sanders, Carolyn Sanders, Robert Jones, and the defendant were engaged in a conspiracy to murder the victim for life insurance proceeds, despite the defendant's claims that she was not a participant at the time statements were made. The court noted evidence such as frequent communication between the defendant and the Sanderses, her financial motive, lack of evidence showing she withdrew from the conspiracy, and her statement made upon arrest, which the court interpreted as acknowledging her knowledge of the murder. The trial court acted within its discretion to admit certain hearsay evidence, finding no error that would violate the defendant's due process rights, as the admission was harmless given the testimony and cross-examination of co-defendants. 

Additionally, the trial court was justified in admitting evidence of the defendant’s past financial misconduct to establish motive for the charged crimes, despite the defendant's arguments against its admissibility under state evidentiary laws and constitutional claims. The prosecution highlighted instances of the defendant's financial fraud, including embezzlement from a former employer and forging her husband’s signature to repay debts, further supporting the prosecution’s case against her.

Defendant ceased payments on a note, leading to the foreclosure of the Hillary Drive house, which was then purchased by BID Properties. Subsequently, she secretly arranged to rent the house back from the buyer. In a further attempt to regain ownership, she negotiated with Tony DeGreef, a co-owner of BID Properties, using Isabelle Sanders to impersonate her mother. She falsely claimed her husband was ill and stated that she anticipated receiving funds from a fictitious trust to repurchase the property. Additionally, she obtained fraudulent identification to impersonate her husband’s ex-wife, Mellie Thompson, and, with Phillip Sanders posing as murder victim Melvin Thompson, refinanced Mellie's home on South Sycamore Avenue, a property she did not own. The defendant misappropriated part of the $98,000 from this refinancing to cover her rent for the Hillary Drive house.

Defendant also attempted to buy back the Hillary Drive home under her maiden name without her husband's knowledge, seeking a $475,000 loan by falsely claiming he had funds with a nonexistent bank. She objected to the introduction of evidence regarding her embezzlement of funds from Edith Ann, which the trial court partially excluded, allowing the evidence of her debts but ruling the majority admissible under Evidence Code section 1101 to demonstrate motive and scheme. The court also denied her Evidence Code section 352 motion, determining the probative value outweighed potential prejudice.

The prosecution aimed to introduce evidence of defendant's actions following her husband's funeral, including having a friend remove jewelry from his body, which she pawned and used for gambling shortly afterward. Tommy Thompson, the victim's son, testified that the defendant appeared less upset after the murder than after her cat's death. The court ruled this evidence was admissible to counter the defendant's claims of a loving relationship, finding its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect. The discussion emphasizes that the admission of evidence regarding prior conduct is regulated by Evidence Code section 1101, which generally prohibits using character evidence to prove conduct on a specific occasion, and section 352, which allows exclusion of evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by potential prejudicial effects. The prosecution's intent to introduce evidence of the defendant's financial misconduct aimed to establish her motive for the crime.

Evidence of a defendant's prior crimes can be admitted in court if it is relevant to establish facts at issue, such as motive, intent, preparation, or identity. The trial judge has discretion to admit this evidence, weighing its probative value against potential prejudicial effects. When evaluating the admissibility of such evidence, courts consider three factors: the materiality of the fact in question, the probative value of the prior crime evidence in proving or disproving that fact, and any exclusionary rules or policies that may apply. If the connection between the prior offense and the disputed fact is unclear, the evidence should be excluded. The standard of review for these rulings is for abuse of discretion under Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352.

In this case, the trial court determined that evidence of the defendant's prior financial crimes was admissible to demonstrate motive for the charged offenses of conspiracy and murder, despite the differences in the nature of the crimes. While motive is not a direct element of the charged offenses, it serves as an intermediate fact relevant to the defendant's intent. The connection between the prior and charged offenses does not require a detailed comparison; rather, the mere existence of a motive suffices. An example of this principle is illustrated in People v. Edelbacher, where the defendant's financial obligations to the victim were deemed relevant to his motive for murder, with the court affirming that the evidence's relevance outweighed any undue prejudicial impact.

Evidence indicating the defendant's motive to avoid capture was pertinent to establish the intentional and premeditated nature of the murder. The court found that evidence of the defendant's prior financial frauds, despite the defendant's argument of a lack of direct connection to the murder, was relevant to demonstrate her motive for killing her husband to collect on life insurance policies. The trial court appropriately excluded some evidence of the defendant's past embezzlement but deemed other financial misconduct relevant, illustrating her desperation regarding the ownership of a property following a fraudulent refinancing incident. This desperation suggested a motive for murder as a last resort to resolve her financial troubles, further supported by the involvement of Phillip Sanders in her financial schemes.

Additionally, the prosecution could introduce evidence about the defendant's actions after her husband's death, such as pawning his jewelry to fund a gambling trip and her emotional state, to counter her claims of a loving relationship and her distress over his murder. Testimonies from various individuals had painted a picture of a happy marriage, which allowed the prosecution to present evidence of her lack of genuine grief and potential motive for the crime, thereby rebutting her good character claims. The trial court's admission of the evidence was upheld, as it did not constitute an abuse of discretion under Evidence Code sections 1101 or 352, and the defendant's constitutional challenges were also rejected.

The routine application of state evidentiary law does not violate a defendant's constitutional rights. The court noted that the defendant failed to provide additional argument regarding these claims, leading to their dismissal. In relation to alleged Griffin error, defense attorney Takakjian confirmed that the defendant, Thompson, chose not to testify, understanding the irrevocability of her decision once the prosecution presented its case against co-defendant Phillip Sanders. The trial court emphasized the limited scope of rebuttal testimony if she chose not to testify, and defense counsel affirmed that Thompson understood her rights. Following the testimony of the final witness, defense counsel indicated they would rest without calling Thompson. A motion for mistrial was made, claiming the court's comment on Thompson's silence violated her right to remain silent, which is protected under the Fifth Amendment and has been interpreted to forbid comments on a defendant's failure to testify. The court's remark, while possibly intended to clarify the trial's status, risked implying to the jury that her silence could be considered as evidence of guilt, thus infringing upon her constitutional rights.

In previous rulings, short and isolated comments by prosecutors regarding a defendant's silence have generally been deemed harmless, provided they do not suggest an inference of guilt. This principle is supported by case law, including People v. Boyette and People v. Turner. However, when such comments originate from a trial judge, they are likely to carry more weight with jurors. In this case, despite a judge's single brief query regarding the defendant's silence, it was concluded that the comment did not imply guilt and that the jury was instructed not to infer anything from the defendant's choice not to testify. The court determined that any potential error from the comment was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, referencing the Chapman standard.

Regarding polygraph evidence, witness Christine Kuretich admitted to previously lying about the murder and changing her testimony out of fear of a polygraph examination. The prosecution did not object when Kuretich mentioned her reluctance to take a polygraph. A defense objection to a subsequent question about her willingness to take a polygraph was upheld, and the court instructed the jury on the inadmissibility of polygraph evidence, emphasizing its irrelevance. The defendant argued several legal points related to this interaction, claiming that the defense's questions about the polygraph were permissible and that the prosecutor's inquiry was improper.

The trial court's jury instruction did not rectify prosecutorial errors and negatively impacted defense counsel's legitimate impeachment efforts regarding Kuretich, leading to prejudicial effects that necessitate reversal under state law. Additionally, these errors are claimed to have violated the defendant's constitutional rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by hindering the effective cross-examination of Kuretich and introducing information that the defendant could not confront or rebut. 

Evidence Code section 351.1 prohibits the admission of polygraph-related evidence in criminal proceedings unless there is mutual stipulation. This includes any reference to an individual’s decision to take or not take a polygraph test, reinforcing the exclusion of unreliable evidence. The court applies an "abuse of discretion" standard for evidence admissibility rulings, with no reason found to deviate from this standard in polygraph cases. 

In the trial, Kuretich's mention of a polygraph test arose during defense cross-examination, where she indicated that her fear of the test influenced her decision to tell the truth. This testimony did not violate Evidence Code section 351.1 as it did not constitute an offer to take or a failure to take a polygraph. Conversely, when Kuretich stated she had never taken a polygraph test, it represented inadmissible evidence of a "failure to take," as elicited by defense counsel to challenge her credibility.

The trial court exercised its discretion appropriately by excluding polygraph-related evidence and instructing the jury to disregard it. A specific instance occurred during redirect examination when the prosecutor inquired if witness Kuretich would take a polygraph test, which was deemed improper and objected to. The court’s subsequent decision to strike the question and provide a curative instruction was justified. Although the defendant argued that this instruction was insufficient and hindered her ability to challenge Kuretich's credibility, this claim was unfounded. Kuretich was able to express her fear of taking a polygraph, which the jury could consider in evaluating her credibility. The court's admonition specifically addressed Kuretich's statement about never having taken the test, which was barred under Evidence Code section 351.1. The defendant's concerns regarding the effectiveness of the admonition lacked clarity, and previous cases cited did not demonstrate that the instruction was ineffective in this instance. Unlike in *People v. Basuta*, Kuretich was not a primary witness, and no significant evidentiary errors occurred. The trial court had adequately warned the jury, and the timing of the admonition was appropriate, as it followed a brief discussion after the polygraph evidence was introduced. The arguments against the instruction's clarity and timing were not substantiated, aligning with precedents that a timely admonition can cure any potential prejudice from improper evidence.

The court in Cox determined that the trial court effectively mitigated any prejudice from the admission of polygraph evidence by promptly striking an improper question and providing a strong admonition to the jury. Despite the defendant's claims that the admonition was "confusing and contradictory," she failed to specify how it was deficient. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's actions under Evidence Code section 351.1 and rejected the defendant's argument that the polygraph evidence violated her federal constitutional rights.

Regarding the jury instruction on motive, patterned after CALJIC No. 2.51, the defendant contended it infringed upon her constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process. The instruction clarified that motive is not an element of the crime and could be considered by the jury, but it did not imply that motive alone could establish guilt. The court reaffirmed this by referencing prior case law, explaining that the instruction, when viewed alongside other relevant jury instructions, did not suggest that motive could substitute for proof of the crime’s elements. The court also dismissed the defendant's assertion that the instruction conflated "motive" with "intent," emphasizing that motive relates to the reason for committing a crime, distinct from the required mental state. Lastly, the court rejected the argument that the instruction improperly shifted the burden of proof, clarifying that the term "innocence" was intended as guidance, not as a directive to the jury to find her innocent, and upheld the prosecution's burden of proof as adequately instructed.

CALJIC No. 2.51 does not impose a burden on the defendant to present an alternative motive to that proposed by the prosecution, ensuring that no juror would misinterpret it as a standard of proof that diverges from the reasonable doubt standard outlined in CALJIC No. 2.90. The court found no error under state law and rejected claims that the instruction violated the defendant's federal constitutional rights to a fair trial or due process.

During the penalty phase, it was established that the defendant had previous felony forgery convictions in 1974 and 1975. Testimony from Carolyn Jones, the victim's daughter, highlighted her emotional loss following her father's murder, emphasizing their close relationship. In mitigation, witnesses Lelia Miotzek and Karen Brudney, chaplains at the jail where the defendant was held, testified to her positive character traits, including faithfulness and compassion. Girard Jacquet, the defendant's son, also provided testimony about his emotional connection to the victim and the values instilled in him by his mother.

The defendant challenged the trial court's decision to allow cross-examination regarding her past financial misdeeds during the penalty phase. Generally, the prosecution cannot introduce evidence of a defendant's bad character unless it qualifies as an aggravating factor. However, when the defense presents mitigating evidence, it opens the door for the prosecution to present rebuttal evidence related to the defendant's character. The court has discretion over the admissibility of such rebuttal evidence, which must directly relate to the specific character traits asserted by the defense. The chaplain testified about the defendant's reliability and commitment to her faith, affirming her positive character.

The prosecutor questioned Miotzek about the defendant's past criminal behavior, including theft and embezzlement from various employers and identity fraud, despite defense objections regarding the relevance to direct testimony. Miotzek maintained that these incidents did not alter her opinion of the defendant. The court found no abuse of discretion in allowing this line of questioning, determining that the defense's presentation of the defendant’s good character opened the door for cross-examination regarding her negative character traits. The defendant argued that the prosecutor's questions exceeded the scope of the direct testimony, focusing only on dependability rather than honesty. However, the court concluded that the evidence of past crimes was admissible for impeachment purposes. 

Additionally, the defendant attempted to introduce evidence regarding the method of execution in the gas chamber, which the trial court excluded based on a new law allowing lethal injection and the prosecution's objection to introducing conditions of confinement for life prisoners. The trial court stated it would not intervene if both parties agreed on the evidence, but since they did not, the evidence was excluded. The prosecutor later compared the defendant to a Nazi soldier in closing arguments, referencing testimony from jail chaplains that depicted the defendant as compassionate. The trial court upheld the exclusion of the gas chamber evidence as correct.

Information regarding the administration of the death penalty is deemed irrelevant for juries when determining individualized sentences. In a rebuttal, the defense criticized the prosecutor's analogy comparing the defendant's execution to Nazi gas chambers, arguing that lethal gas is an unconscionable method of execution. The defense posed provocative questions about the jurors' willingness to witness an execution, emphasizing the gravity of their decision.

Following the defense's remarks, the prosecutor requested the jury be instructed that the defendant could choose lethal injection instead of lethal gas, a change in the law effective January 1, 1993. The trial court granted this instruction over the defense's objections. The defendant argued this instruction violated her Eighth Amendment rights by undermining the jury's sense of responsibility for their sentencing decision, citing Caldwell v. Mississippi. The Supreme Court in Caldwell emphasized that a death sentence cannot rest on a jury misled to believe that others bear the responsibility for their verdict. Subsequent cases have suggested a narrower interpretation of Caldwell, focusing on whether jurors were misled about their responsibility.

To assess if the jury was misled by the instruction, the court considers how a reasonable juror would interpret it. The trial court's instruction regarding execution methods was found not to mislead the jury regarding its ultimate responsibility in the penalty decision.

The court clarified to the jury that lethal gas was not the sole execution method available, as a new law allowed the defendant to choose an alternative. This information did not imply that the jury's responsibility for the life-or-death decision was diminished. The court rejected the defendant's argument that this instruction could lessen the jurors' sense of accountability, affirming that it did not violate the Eighth Amendment. 

Regarding CALJIC No. 8.88, the defendant argued it was constitutionally flawed for being vague and misleading about critical deliberative principles. However, the court found no compelling reasons to overturn established precedents affirming the adequacy of this instruction. The phrase "so substantial" was ruled not unconstitutionally vague, and the instruction appropriately conveyed that the jury must determine death as an appropriate penalty. It was also determined unnecessary to define "mitigation," and the instruction did not mislead the jury about the burden of proof concerning the death penalty.

The defendant challenged California’s death penalty law, specifically section 190.3, claiming it was constitutionally defective. The court reiterated prior rulings that this statute does not lead to arbitrary imposition of the death penalty and confirmed that neither the state nor federal Constitution requires the prosecution to prove aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt at the penalty phase. The court also noted that recent Supreme Court decisions regarding Sixth Amendment rights do not alter these principles.

Section 190.3 of the California Penal Code is deemed constitutional, as it does not require juries to reach a unanimous decision on aggravating circumstances. The Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments do not mandate written or specific jury findings regarding these factors. Additionally, federal constitutional rights do not necessitate intercase proportionality review on appeal. The jury is allowed to consider evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity without needing to verify its truth beyond a reasonable doubt. The inclusion of such evidence does not violate due process, as jurors are instructed to only consider it if they find the defendant committed the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Claims that procedural protections provided to capital defendants differ unfairly from those of noncapital defendants, such as the absence of disparate sentence review or unanimous findings, do not constitute a violation of equal protection. 

The defendant's assertion that California's death penalty process contravenes international human rights treaties, specifically the ICCPR, has been previously rejected, as the U.S. signed the treaty with the reservation to enforce capital punishment under its constitutional framework. 

Finally, the defendant argues that the cumulative effect of errors during the trial undermines confidence in the proceedings. However, the court has determined that most claims, including those of Griffin error and exclusion from discussions regarding discovery obligations, either lack merit or resulted in no prejudice. Thus, the cumulative effect of these claims is also deemed harmless.

Defendant's claim of cumulative prejudice is rejected. The court affirms both the guilt and penalty judgments in their entirety. Justices Werdegar, Cantil-Sakauye, Chin, Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, and Kruger concur. The case is titled People v. Thompson, with an unpublished opinion dated December 1, 2016. The appeal originated in the Los Angeles Superior Court, presided over by Judge George W. Trammell, III. The defendant was represented by State Public Defender Michael J. Hersek and deputies Denise Kendall and Gail R. Weinheimer. The plaintiff was represented by Attorneys General Bill Lockyer, Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, among others. Counsel details for those who argued in the Supreme Court are provided but are not intended for publication with the opinion.