Webb v. Greater N.Y. Auto. Dealers Assn., Inc.

Citations: 2016 NY Slip Op 8067; 144 A.D.3d 1136; 43 N.Y.S.3d 91Docket: 2015-06226

Court: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York; November 29, 2016; New York; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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In the case of Webb v. Greater New York Automobile Dealers Association, Inc., the plaintiff, Maureen Webb, appealed a decision from the Supreme Court of Queens County that granted the defendant's motion to dismiss several causes of action related to employment discrimination and breach of contract. The court affirmed the order without costs or disbursements. Webb's legal history includes a 2008 action against her former employer for sexual harassment and fraud, which was dismissed due to improper service and her attorney's failure to maintain a New York office. A subsequent action in 2012 also faced dismissal for time-barred sexual harassment claims, although a breach of contract claim was reinstated. In 2013, Webb initiated a third action featuring similar claims, which was dismissed based on res judicata. Following the reinstatement of her breach of contract claim in 2014, Webb amended her complaint in the 2012 action to include causes of action identical to those in the dismissed 2013 action. The defendant sought dismissal of these new claims and requested costs and sanctions against Webb and her attorney.

The Supreme Court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the first through fourth causes of action based on CPLR 3211(a)(5) and (7), ruling that the first, third, and fourth were barred by res judicata, while the second cause of action failed to state a valid claim. The court denied the defendant's request for costs and sanctions. The plaintiff is appealing the dismissal of the first through fourth causes, while the defendant cross-appeals regarding the denial of costs and sanctions and seeks sanctions against the plaintiff and/or her attorney for the appeal.

The court correctly dismissed the second cause of action, which claimed breach of contract due to constructive discharge, as the plaintiff was an at-will employee. The plaintiff's argument that the employment terms were impliedly modified to restrict termination was deemed insufficient, as any such modification must be express.

However, the court erred in dismissing the first, third, and fourth causes of action based on res judicata. The dismissal of the original sexual harassment claims was not a merits-based determination, and the dismissal in a prior action due to procedural issues (failure to serve and attorney misconduct) did not constitute a judgment on the merits. Prior statements about the dismissal being based on res judicata do not bind the current appeal, as they were made in the context of discussing time-bar issues.

The dismissal of the first, third, and fourth causes of action is affirmed based on CPLR 3211(a)(7) due to the plaintiff's failure to adequately state claims for fraud, promissory fraud, and promissory estoppel. The claims for fraud were deemed insufficient as they merely alleged that the defendant entered into an employment contract without intent to perform, and the plaintiff, being an at-will employee, could not reasonably rely on the defendant's alleged misrepresentations. For the promissory estoppel claim, the court noted that the plaintiff's status as an at-will employee negated reasonable reliance on any promise, and she did not demonstrate 'unconscionable injury' from a breach. The breach of contract claim based on constructive discharge was also dismissed; the court emphasized that an at-will employment relationship cannot be altered without an express agreement that the employee relied upon, which the plaintiff failed to allege. The Supreme Court acted within its discretion by not imposing costs or sanctions on the plaintiff or her attorney. The request for sanctions based on the plaintiff's appeal conduct was also declined.