State Of Washington v. Jacob Ivan Schmitt, & Prp Of Schmitt

Citation: 196 Wash. App. 739Docket: 46773-9-II; 47706-8-II

Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; November 23, 2016; Washington; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Jacob Ivan Schmitt, after pleading guilty to two counts of first degree theft and one count of second degree burglary, appeals the decision regarding his 1996 second degree robbery conviction, asserting it should wash out due to his incarceration for a subsequent federal bank robbery in 2001. The court determines that the 1996 conviction did not wash out because Schmitt's intervening federal felony offense, for which he served over ten years, disqualified him from the washout provision under RCW 9.94A.525(2)(b). The statute requires a ten-year period in the community without any further convictions to wash out a class B felony. Although the court acknowledges there is no direct comparable Washington offense for federal bank robbery, it concludes that the federal conviction interrupts the washout period. The court affirms the judgment and sentence but reverses the imposition of discretionary legal financial obligations (LFOs), mandating an individualized assessment of Schmitt's ability to pay. Schmitt’s consolidated Personal Restraint Petition is denied, and appellate costs are waived.

Schmitt, who was convicted of federal bank robbery in 2001 and released in 2013, has a prior 1996 second-degree robbery conviction. Federal bank robbery is classified as a serious violent felony under federal law and is not comparable to any robbery offense under Washington law. However, Washington's RCW 9.94A.525(3) mandates that federal felonies without a comparable state offense be treated as class C felonies. Consequently, Schmitt’s federal conviction interrupts the washout period for his 1996 conviction, as he did not spend ten consecutive years in the community without a subsequent conviction. Schmitt committed a new offense in December 2013, and his federal conviction, classified as a class C felony, confirms that his prior robbery conviction did not wash out. The court also addressed Schmitt's claims regarding the involuntariness of his plea, ineffective assistance of counsel, and the sentencing court’s failure to consider his ability to pay when imposing legal financial obligations (LFOs). The court affirmed the judgment and sentence but remanded to strike discretionary LFOs from the judgment, while denying Schmitt's personal restraint petition.

Schmitt's plea agreement acknowledged his disagreement with the State's offender score calculation but affirmed his voluntary, knowing, and intelligent acceptance of the plea, including the recommendation for an exceptional sentence. During the plea hearing, the trial court addressed Schmitt's objection regarding his federal bank robbery conviction, agreeing to deduct one point from his offender score. After consulting with his attorney, Schmitt chose to proceed with the guilty plea, confirming that it was given freely and voluntarily. The trial court subsequently accepted the plea and sentenced Schmitt to a total of 360 months in prison, along with various legal financial obligations totaling $1,300, without assessing his ability to pay or any objections from his defense counsel.

Regarding the validity of Schmitt's guilty plea, he argued that it was not made knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily, claiming he was coerced into pleading guilty due to fear of being classified under the Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA) as a "three strikes" offender. He believed that his first-degree robbery charge would count as a third strike, but he now contends that the federal bank robbery should not be included in his offender score and that his 1996 conviction should wash out, leaving him with only one strike. The State contends this argument was waived, as a defendant must demonstrate a manifest constitutional error to withdraw a guilty plea for the first time on appeal. Due process mandates that a guilty plea must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, with any plea induced by coercive factors being invalid. The determination of whether a plea meets these criteria is based on the totality of the circumstances. Under the POAA, a "persistent offender" must have two prior convictions for most serious offenses, but certain class B felonies can "wash out" after ten years under specified conditions.

The trial court determined that Schmitt's 2001 federal bank robbery conviction did not impact his offender score due to the absence of a comparable Washington offense. Schmitt contended that since this conviction did not count, the time served should not affect the assessment of whether he had been 'in the community' for 10 years prior to his current offense, which would allow for the washout of his 1996 robbery conviction. However, it was ruled that the 2001 conviction interrupted the washout period, meaning Schmitt did not meet the criteria for having 10 consecutive crime-free years, and thus, his 1996 conviction remained valid.

Schmitt also claimed he was unlawfully induced into pleading guilty, but the court found he had been adequately informed about his prior convictions and the implications for his current charge. His assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel was dismissed as counsel had correctly advised him regarding his prior strikes and effectively negotiated a plea agreement.

Additionally, Schmitt raised a pro se argument regarding the sentencing court's failure to assess his ability to pay legal financial obligations (LFOs) before their imposition. The court noted that only attorney fees and defense costs were discretionary and properly challenged. Although Schmitt did not object at sentencing, the court chose to address the issue. It was established that the court must conduct an individualized inquiry into a defendant's ability to pay before ordering costs. Given Schmitt's long incarceration and lack of detailed employment information post-release, the court found that the trial court had not made the required inquiry, leading to a reversal of the imposition of discretionary LFOs and a remand for proper assessment of Schmitt's financial capabilities.

Collateral relief under a Personal Restraint Petition (PRP) requires the petitioner to demonstrate actual prejudice, with no presumption of such prejudice during collateral review. The petitioner must show either a prima facie constitutional error leading to substantial prejudice or a nonconstitutional error that results in a complete miscarriage of justice. In Schmitt’s case, the court reversed the imposition of discretionary legal financial obligations (LFOs) and did not consider his ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding those LFOs.

Schmitt contended that the sentencing court miscalculated his offender score by improperly considering prior convictions, asserting that all convictions except one from 1993 had washed out. He also claimed ineffective assistance during plea negotiations. However, the court determined that Schmitt’s incarceration for a federal felony interrupted the 10-year washout period, meaning none of his prior offenses had washed out, thus rejecting his arguments regarding offender score miscalculations and ineffective assistance of counsel.

Schmitt failed to establish a prima facie case for constitutional or nonconstitutional errors warranting relief, leading to the denial of his PRP. Regarding appellate costs, Schmitt objected based on his indigency status, which was recognized by the trial court. The appellate court, exercising discretion, decided against awarding costs to the State. The judgment and sentence were affirmed, with the exception of the discretionary LFOs, which were reversed and remanded for further consideration of Schmitt’s ability to pay. Appellate costs were waived.