United States v. William Clarke

Citations: 842 F.3d 288; 2016 WL 6819688Docket: 15-4299

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; November 17, 2016; Federal Appellate Court

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William Andrew Clarke was convicted by a federal jury of attempting to persuade minors to engage in unlawful sexual activity under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) and sentenced to 120 months in prison and lifetime supervised release. On appeal, Clarke contested the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his vehicle, claimed violations of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(b) regarding jury instructions, and argued insufficient evidence for his conviction. The court, led by Judge Wynn, found no reversible errors and upheld the lower court's decisions. The case stemmed from an undercover operation by a Department of Homeland Security agent, who, posing as a father with fictitious children, engaged in explicit communications with Clarke on a social networking site focused on incest. Their conversation escalated to Clarke expressing interest in meeting to engage in sexual acts with the fictitious children.

Defendant engaged in explicit discussions with Agent Laws regarding sexual acts involving two minors, Mark and Amy. The conversations included inquiries about Mark's physical capabilities and plans for a meeting, where it was suggested that Defendant be referred to as "Andy" to make interactions with the children appear more natural. They agreed to meet on October 11, 2013, and discussed the nature of the sexual acts intended to occur. After their video call, Defendant was arrested at the agreed meeting location. A subsequent inventory and search of his vehicle revealed items such as lubrication, condoms, candy, an overnight bag, and notes with personal details. On May 22, 2015, Defendant was found guilty of attempted coercion and enticement of a minor under 18 U.S.C. 2422(b) and was sentenced to 120 months in prison with lifetime supervised release. Defendant appealed, arguing four reversible errors related to the suppression of evidence, jury instructions, and sufficiency of evidence. The court disagreed with all of his contentions.

Defendant argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from an inventory search and subsequent warrant search of his vehicle, claiming the inventory search violated the Fourth Amendment. He contends that the evidence obtained from the warrant search—specifically lubrication, condoms, and candy—should be suppressed since it was based on information gathered during the allegedly unconstitutional inventory search. The appellate court reviews the district court's suppression ruling de novo for legal conclusions and for clear error regarding factual findings, viewing the evidence favorably to the government. While the Fourth Amendment typically requires a warrant for searches, exceptions exist, including inventory searches, which must follow standardized criteria and be conducted in good faith. 

Defendant claims the government did not demonstrate that the inventory search adhered to standardized criteria, which can be established through written policies or testimonies. For a warrantless search to be justified, the criteria must limit officers' discretion to avoid arbitrary searches. The district court referenced the Virginia Department of State Police’s inventory search policy and the standard form used during the search, concluding that these were sufficient to establish compliance with standardized criteria, a finding that Defendant did not contest regarding the policy's alignment with the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the court properly denied the motion to suppress.

Additionally, Defendant asserts that the district court violated Rule 30(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by failing to inform his counsel of the jury instructions prior to closing arguments, claiming this led to actual prejudice warranting reversal of his conviction. Rule 30(b) aims to ensure fair notice of jury instructions, allowing counsel to effectively argue their case and preserve potential objections for appeal. Defendant proposed an instruction regarding the mens rea for attempted enticement of a minor, asserting the government must prove intent to manipulate the victim, distinguishing it from mere belief about communicating with a person facilitating sexual activity.

The government requested the court to instruct the jury on two key points: the defendant's intent to commit coercion or enticement of a minor for sexual activity and a substantial step taken toward that crime. At the end of the evidence, the court indicated it would instruct the jury first and then allow for objections. Defense counsel objected to several of the government’s proposed instructions, particularly regarding the concept of attempt, and requested a copy of the court's instructions, which was denied. The court instructed the jury to interpret "persuade," "induce," and "entice" in their ordinary meanings, which are synonymous and imply influencing another's actions or mindset.

The court's refusal to share its instructions prior to closing arguments violated Rule 30(b), placing defense counsel at a disadvantage by not knowing the final jury instructions. This also prevented the parties from objecting to the instructions beforehand. However, the violation only warrants reversal if actual prejudice is demonstrated by the defendant. Drawing from the precedent set in Horton, where the defendant was not prejudiced by limited argument time, the court concluded that the defendant also did not show actual prejudice. Defense counsel effectively made essential arguments to the jury that aligned with the court’s ultimate instructions, and the government provided sufficient evidence for a jury to find the defendant intended to persuade minors to engage in sexual acts. As such, the district court's violation of Rule 30(b) did not result in prejudice against the defendant.

Defendant claims the district court incorrectly instructed the jury on the definition of 'induce' under Section 2422(b), arguing that the instructions allowed for a conviction based on insufficient evidence. The court conducts a de novo review of jury instruction claims, assessing whether the instructions, taken collectively, accurately reflect the law. Section 2422(b) penalizes anyone who knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces a minor into illegal sexual activity. The terms 'persuade, induce, and entice' are not defined in the statute but are understood to have their ordinary meanings, which are effectively synonymous. The district court clarified that the jury must find evidence of an effort to alter a minor's mental state rather than simply establishing causation. Thus, the court concluded that its instructions accurately conveyed the law.

Additionally, Defendant argues against the denial of his motion for acquittal, asserting insufficient evidence of an attempt to persuade a minor. The appellate review for such claims is stringent, requiring substantial evidence to support a jury's verdict. The court must view the evidence favorably for the government and determine if a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Conviction under Section 2422(b) necessitates proof that the defendant used interstate commerce to entice a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity.

To secure a conviction for attempt under Section 2422(b), the government must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the intent to commit a crime and took substantial steps corroborating that intent. Mere preparation is inadequate for establishing this intent. The court is tasked with exploring whether a defendant can violate this section by communicating indirectly through an adult rather than directly with a minor. Congress intended Section 2422(b) to criminalize not only the commission of sexual acts but also the persuasion to commit such acts. Courts have consistently interpreted this section to include communications between adults aimed at persuading minors. 

The defendant challenged the sufficiency of evidence regarding his attempt to persuade minors, arguing that the government did not prove he attempted to persuade the minors either directly or through an intermediary. However, the court found that the government provided sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that the defendant intended to persuade the minors and took substantial steps toward that goal. Key evidence included the defendant instructing Agent Laws to use his name when discussing the visit with the children to create a more natural interaction, requesting direct communication with the children, and asking Agent Laws—believed to be in a position of influence—to assist in engaging the minors in sexual acts. Additionally, the defendant brought candy to a planned visit with the children, intending to use it as an enticement for sexual acts. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the defendant's motion for acquittal, concluding sufficient evidence was presented regarding the defendant's intent and actions.