Commonwealth v. Bois

Citations: 476 Mass. 15; 62 N.E.3d 513Docket: SJC 10725

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court; November 10, 2016; Massachusetts; State Supreme Court

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All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision, with errors reportable to the Reporter of Decisions at the Supreme Judicial Court. In the case of Commonwealth vs. Ryan Bois, decided on November 10, 2016, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, including extreme atrocity or cruelty and felony-murder, following the rape and strangulation of his six-year-old cousin on August 4, 2007. The defendant also faced multiple charges, including armed home invasion. He conceded to the act of killing but claimed insanity as a defense. On appeal, he argued ineffective assistance of counsel regarding evidence for his insanity defense, inadequate judicial response to juror misconduct, insufficient evidence for the home invasion charge, improper jury instructions on felony-murder, and inappropriate closing arguments by the prosecutor. The court affirmed the first-degree murder conviction and declined to reduce the conviction under G. L. c. 278. 33E. However, it acknowledged insufficient evidence for the home invasion conviction, leading to its reversal, while upholding the remaining convictions. The background indicates that the defendant, at 20 years old, had no permanent residence and had previously lived briefly with his grandmother, who refused him entry on the day of the crime.

The defendant arrived at his grandmother's house after all occupants had gone to sleep. He climbed onto the roof of her parked Ford Explorer and cut a hole in the window screen to enter the house. Inside, he encountered the victim, whom he raped and strangled in a front bedroom before wrapping her body in bedding. He stole cash, a cellular phone, and keys from his grandmother and placed the victim's body in the Explorer. At 10:57 P.M., he was recorded on surveillance entering a convenience store nearby but left without making a purchase. After midnight, he used his grandmother's phone to contact an acquaintance, Terrence Gandy, discussing drugs and asking for advice on disposing of a body. 

At approximately 1:15 A.M., a police officer stopped the stolen Explorer for speeding, leading to a high-speed chase. The vehicle crashed into a taxi, and the defendant fled but was apprehended after a police dog was deployed. While being subdued, he shouted for the officer to kill him and was found holding a knife, which he eventually released. Upon arrest, an inventory search of the Explorer revealed the victim's body, and police found evidence of the crime at the grandmother's house, including missing bed linens and traces of blood and seminal fluid. The defendant was indicted on August 30, 2007, for first-degree murder and twelve other offenses, with trial proceedings beginning in March 2009 on various theories of murder.

To prove the defendant's criminal responsibility, the Commonwealth introduced testimonies from the defendant's girlfriend and a friend, who noted that he appeared normal on the day of the murder, engaging in typical activities such as drinking beer and playing horseshoes. Expert testimony established that DNA from the victim's body matched the defendant, and a palm print on the crime scene was also identified as his. The defendant admitted to the rape and murder but claimed insanity as a defense, failing to provide expert evidence of specific mental illnesses or medical records. Instead, he relied on behavior post-crime and testimony from his grandmother about his psychiatric history, including multiple hospital admissions and medication for psychiatric disorders. He also presented general expert testimony on mental illness characteristics without an opinion on his specific mental state.

The jury convicted him of first-degree murder based on extreme atrocity or cruelty and felony-murder, but not premeditation. In October 2012, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for not presenting psychiatric treatment records indicating childhood sexual abuse and mental illness diagnoses, as well as evidence of peculiar behavior on the day of the crime. After a nonevidentiary hearing, the motion was denied by the trial judge. On appeal, the defendant asserts multiple claims: ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the insanity defense, inadequate judicial response to a juror sleeping, insufficient evidence for the home invasion charge, improper jury instruction on felony-murder, and inappropriate prosecutorial remarks during closing arguments. He also requests a reduction in the degree of guilt under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

The defendant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming that his attorney failed to adequately investigate his mental health treatment history, present evidence of unusual behavior prior to the crime, and object to incorrect jury instructions regarding the mental health defense. The court examines these claims under a standard more favorable to defendants, assessing whether any errors during the trial likely influenced the jury's decision. 

The defendant argues that his counsel erred by not introducing psychiatric treatment records, which detail his history of childhood sexual abuse and diagnoses of various mental illnesses, including agitated depression, bipolar disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder. These records span from 1992 to 2004, and he contends they could have supported an insanity defense. 

Counsel acknowledged awareness of the treatment records and had hired an expert psychologist to review them. However, the expert concluded he could not assert that the defendant lacked criminal responsibility at the time of the offense, leading counsel to decide against presenting expert testimony. Although counsel did not explain her decision not to introduce the treatment records themselves, it appears to have been a strategic choice. 

Counsel successfully argued pretrial that the Commonwealth could not access the defendant's mental health records since they were not being introduced at trial. Furthermore, during jury selection, she asked jurors if they could remain impartial without evidence of hospitalization or diagnoses, suggesting a calculated decision not to present documentary evidence of the defendant’s mental health. Counsel’s decisions are evaluated under the premise that strategic choices only amount to ineffective assistance if they were manifestly unreasonable at the time they were made.

Strategic decisions made by legal counsel after a comprehensive examination of applicable law and facts are generally upheld unless shown to be unreasonable. In the case at hand, the defendant argues that counsel's failure to personally review treatment records undermined her ability to conduct a thorough investigation and make informed strategic choices. However, it was established that counsel did consider the relevant records, particularly a competency report summarizing the treatment history and diagnoses, which informed her strategic decision to withhold these records from the jury.

Though counsel did not review the psychiatric history directly, she engaged two experts who evaluated the records and concluded that they did not support an insanity defense. This legal representation did not fall below the standard of care, as the information available to her and the experts allowed for a reasonable tactical judgment. The judge noted that while the records contained sympathetic elements, such as the defendant's abuse history, they also included damaging information, like a criminal record and behaviors suggesting a lack of accountability and remorse. Furthermore, the records could have weakened the insanity defense by revealing that the defendant had been stable and employed shortly before the crime.

Ultimately, the decision not to present these records was deemed not only reasonable but also unlikely to have prejudiced the defendant's case. Additionally, testimonies from individuals present on the day of the crime indicated the defendant was exhibiting unusual behavior, which further contextualized the circumstances surrounding the incident.

The defendant's appeal raises two main issues: the alleged ineffectiveness of trial counsel for not calling a witness, Phinney, and the adequacy of jury instructions regarding the insanity defense. 

Phinney observed the defendant post-shower in a laundry room and described his behavior as consistent with bipolar disorder. The defendant argues that Phinney's testimony could have positively influenced his defense. However, the record suggests that Phinney also indicated the defendant had shown up with a large quantity of beer and was intoxicated, likely leading the jury to attribute his behavior to alcohol rather than mental illness. Phinney’s earlier grand jury testimony painted the defendant as happy and well-adjusted, which could have undermined claims of insanity. Thus, the court concluded there was no prejudice from counsel's decision not to call Phinney.

Regarding jury instructions, the defendant contends that the judge's explanation of the insanity defense improperly implied that the jury could return a guilty verdict if the Commonwealth proved either prong of the insanity test. However, the court found that the instruction, when considered in full context, clearly indicated that a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict was warranted if the Commonwealth failed to prove either prong. The judge had previously articulated the standard clearly, leading the court to believe that the jury would interpret the instructions correctly. Consequently, the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting to the jury instructions was deemed unpersuasive.

The judge instructed the jury that they could convict the defendant of first-degree murder based on "third-prong malice," which involves intent to commit an act that a reasonable person would recognize as likely to result in death. The defendant claims the judge erred by not instructing the jury to consider his mental impairment when evaluating this intent and argues ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the omission. However, the judge clarified that the jury must consider the defendant's mental state regarding his knowledge at the time of the killing, undermining the defendant's claim.

Additionally, a juror reported that another juror had been sleeping during closing arguments, prompting the judge to hold a hearing. Both defense and prosecution counsel did not notice any sleeping juror and expressed no desire for further action. An alternate juror later confirmed observing the same sleeping behavior. The defense counsel, while acknowledging the report, indicated that the juror in question was not actually asleep during the judge’s lengthy charge. The judge decided against further action, and the defendant now argues this was an error, suggesting a voir dire should have been conducted.

However, the court found the defendant's argument unpersuasive, noting that not every allegation of juror inattentiveness necessitates a voir dire. The judge must first assess the reliability of such reports, and in this case, both counsel corroborated that they had not observed any sleeping. The judge's determination was deemed reasonable, as the defense had not established that the judge's handling of the report was arbitrary or unreasonable, thus no further action was required.

In the context of armed home invasion, the judge instructed the jury that the Commonwealth needed to prove the defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon at the time of entry, stating that knives are inherently dangerous. The defendant argued this was erroneous, asserting that the jury should have been tasked with determining if the knife was dangerous based on its use. He further claimed insufficient evidence existed to classify the knife as dangerous, warranting a directed verdict. 

For a conviction under the home invasion statute, the Commonwealth must show the defendant entered while armed with a dangerous weapon and used or threatened force against individuals within the dwelling. The definition of a "dangerous weapon" under common law distinguishes between those that are dangerous per se and those that are dangerous based on usage. Dangerous per se weapons include firearms and daggers, while pocket knives and similar tools do not fall into this category.

The evidence indicated the defendant had a three-and-a-half-inch folding knife, which was not in his hand during his arrest. The court determined that the knife's classification as dangerous per se could not be established without specific information about its design and purpose. Consequently, the jury should have been instructed to assess whether the knife was dangerous based on how it was used, rather than accepting it was inherently dangerous.

The judge, however, upheld the conviction, suggesting sufficient evidence existed to demonstrate the knife was dangerous as used. Yet, the evidence only indicated the knife was used to gain entry without any indication of further threatening behavior or harm to the victim. Thus, while the jury should have received a more accurate instruction regarding the knife's danger, the underlying evidence was inadequate to support a conviction for home invasion.

The court found that the conviction for armed home invasion must be vacated due to the determination that the weapon's perceived danger, as utilized in the crime, was not adequately established. On remand, a directed verdict in favor of the defendant is to be entered. The defendant also contested the judge's instruction on felony-murder, arguing it improperly excluded the jury's consideration of whether the intent to commit the underlying felony demonstrated a "conscious disregard" for human life. The felony-murder rule posits that intent to commit a felony equates to malice aforethought necessary for murder, requiring that the felony in question must inherently display this disregard for life. The judge instructed the jury that the Commonwealth needed to show the defendant killed the victim while committing a felony "inherently dangerous to human life," identifying armed home invasion and child rape as such felonies. The court determined that the jury’s finding of a second predicate felony—child rape—was sufficient to uphold the felony-murder conviction, negating the need to reverse it based on the armed home invasion. The judge's ruling that the inherently dangerous nature of the felony is a legal determination, not a jury question, was affirmed, with no need to revisit established case law. 

In the closing arguments, the prosecutor contended that the defendant acted with calculated intent rather than mental illness, highlighting the premeditated nature of the crime, including the defendant's actions to conceal the murder and establish an alibi. The prosecutor argued the defendant's hospitalizations were linked to behavior rather than genuine mental illness, suggesting the insanity defense was a strategy in light of the strong evidence against him. The defendant objected to these assertions as unsupported by evidence, but the objections were overruled, and similar arguments were raised on appeal, emphasizing that prosecutorial comments in closing must remain grounded in evidence and reasonable inferences.

A prosecutor is permitted to advocate for reasonable inferences that support the Commonwealth's case. When determining if improper statements in a closing argument necessitate a reversal, several factors are considered: whether the defendant objected in a timely manner, if the error pertained to a central issue or was collateral, the judge's jury instructions that may have alleviated the mistake, and whether the error likely influenced the jury's verdict. The arguments in question were based on reasonable inferences, such as the defendant’s break-in with intent to steal, supported by evidence of his entry method and possession of stolen items. 

The jury could infer that the defendant encountered the victim in the house, despite her lack of immediate awareness of the situation. The distinction between speculation and inference is nuanced, and the jury is instructed that closing arguments are not evidence. Any improper inference regarding the defendant's motive for the killing was deemed non-prejudicial, as it was collateral and not essential to the Commonwealth's case. The jury could infer the defendant's post-crime actions indicated a conscious effort to evade capture rather than insanity, including body disposal attempts and behavior at a convenience store, which could suggest an alibi. The high-speed chase and the defendant’s actions towards law enforcement further supported the prosecutor's claims about his intent to avoid capture. Lastly, the defendant's behavior once cornered could be interpreted as an attempt to justify an insanity defense.

In Commonwealth v. McColl, the prosecutor was permitted to challenge the defendant's claim of insanity, suggesting that psychiatric hospitalizations stemmed from substance abuse rather than mental illness, supported by testimony regarding the defendant's marijuana use and cocaine possession. The prosecutor's arguments were based on reasonable inferences from evidence presented. However, during closing arguments, the prosecutor engaged in emotionally charged appeals to juror sympathy, likening the defendant to a "monster" who disrupted the victim's life, repeating this characterization multiple times and exhibiting visible emotion. The defendant objected to these remarks as inappropriate appeals to sympathy, which were overruled by the judge. The court noted that such emotional appeals can obscure jurors' clear assessment of evidence and potentially lower the standard of proof required for conviction. Previous cases highlighted the prosecutor's history of making improper arguments, emphasizing that his behavior was unprofessional and inappropriate. The court acknowledged that while the prosecutor's comments were undeniably improper, the determination of whether they necessitated a reversal depended on their impact on the trial and the presence of a timely objection. Ultimately, the court concluded that, despite the prejudicial nature of the remarks, a reversal was not warranted in this case.

The judge provided instructions to the jury emphasizing that closing arguments are not to be considered as evidence and advised them to remain impartial, avoiding any influence from emotions or personal biases. Despite no specific mention of errors, the judge's general guidance aimed to mitigate potential prejudicial effects. Given the violent nature of the crime, the jury's emotional response was considered normal, and their decisions indicated they were discerning, as they rejected the charge of deliberate premeditation and acquitted the defendant on drug possession and driving without a valid license, while convicting him of a lesser offense related to larceny.

Jurors demonstrated their ability to differentiate between persuasive argumentation and the actual evidence presented. Despite acknowledging the prosecutor's egregious errors, the court found no justification for reversing the verdict based on the jury's understanding and handling of the defendant's insanity defense. The jury's inquiry regarding the independence of each charge suggested they were thoughtfully evaluating the evidence, including the insanity claim.

The defendant's request to reduce the conviction to second-degree murder was compared to a previous case where mental illness significantly influenced the crime. However, this case lacked compelling expert testimony regarding the defendant's mental capacity. Consequently, the court determined there was no basis to alter the jury's verdict. Finally, it was noted that DNA evidence linked the defendant to the crime scene, though the absence of statistical context for this evidence was acknowledged but not raised as an issue by the defendant.

Testimony regarding DNA evidence was improperly admitted without accompanying statistical relevance, as noted in Commonwealth v. Mattei. However, this error did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice since the core fact that the defendant raped the victim was undisputed. The technician's testimony was also considered cumulative of other evidence supporting the claim of rape. Given the limited probative value of the DNA evidence in the broader context of the case, its admission was deemed non-prejudicial. The court vacated the conviction for home invasion and entered a not guilty finding on that charge while affirming the convictions for first-degree murder and other remaining charges. The judgment regarding aggravated rape was not duplicative, as the murder conviction was based on both felony-murder and extreme atrocity or cruelty theories.