United States v. Domingo Salinas-Calderon

Citations: 728 F.2d 1298; 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 24763Docket: 82-2433

Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; March 7, 1984; Federal Appellate Court

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Domingo Salinas-Calderon faced six counts under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) for knowingly transporting an unlawful alien. Prior to trial, Salinas sought to suppress statements made by him and six passengers during a traffic stop conducted by Kansas Highway Patrol Trooper Lt. Alvie Furbeck. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted the suppression motion, prompting the government to appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3731.

The incident began when Lt. Furbeck noticed a blue Ford pickup truck driving erratically on U.S. Highway 50. Suspecting the driver might be impaired, he stopped the vehicle. Salinas, the driver, did not respond to requests for his driver's license, revealing a language barrier as he did not speak English. His wife, present in the cab, claimed to be the primary driver and stated that Salinas, who lacked a driver's license, only drove because she was occupied with their baby. She informed the officer that they were traveling from Colorado to Florida and that Salinas did not possess a "green card."

When Furbeck inquired about the passengers in the truck's bed, Mrs. Salinas identified them as friends from Mexico seeking a ride to Florida and acted as an interpreter when none could provide identification. Unsure of the legal implications, Furbeck contacted the Immigration Service for guidance. Following the advice of the Immigration investigator, he had the group follow him to the Sheriff's office in Dodge City for further questioning.

Upon arrival at a reception area, Bennett communicated in Spanish with Salinas, providing him with Miranda warnings, which Salinas acknowledged understanding. All seven individuals present, including Salinas, admitted to being illegally in the United States, with Salinas confirming his awareness of the passengers' illegal status. Consequently, Salinas faced six counts of transporting illegal aliens under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1324(a)(2). During a suppression hearing, the district court found that Lt. Furbeck arrested Salinas and the six passengers without probable cause, violating Salinas' Fourth Amendment rights. As a result, the court suppressed both Salinas' statements and those of the passengers. The government appealed this suppression order within the required 30 days but failed to file the necessary certification with the district court until after the deadline. The defendant-appellee contended that the appeal should be dismissed due to this delay; however, it was determined that such an irregularity did not affect the jurisdiction of the Court, referencing United States v. Welsch, where similar circumstances did not preclude jurisdiction. A review of the record indicated that Lt. Furbeck did possess probable cause to arrest Salinas, as defined by the standard that facts and circumstances must be sufficient for a reasonable person to believe an offense was committed. The district court initially appeared inclined to find probable cause based on the presented briefs but was ultimately influenced by Furbeck's uncertainty, leading to an erroneous subjective assessment of probable cause.

Probable cause is assessed using an objective standard, where the facts must justify a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed, according to case law including Beck v. Ohio and Henry v. United States. This standard requires that prudent and trained officers evaluate circumstances, and an officer's subjective belief is not necessary if the objective criteria are met, as noted in Florida v. Royer. 

In the case of Lt. Furbeck, his initial lawful stop of a vehicle involved a driver, Salinas, who had no driver's license or green card, and six passengers without identification papers, all from Mexico. Despite language barriers preventing direct communication, the information gathered indicated potential violations of immigration laws. Applying the objective probable cause standard, it was determined that Lt. Furbeck had sufficient grounds for a warrantless arrest.

Moreover, Lt. Furbeck’s later contact with the Immigration and Naturalization Service did not negate the probable cause established prior to that communication. It is acknowledged that officers can collaborate to establish probable cause, solidifying the conclusion that Lt. Furbeck acted within his lawful authority despite uncertainties regarding the immigration law violations.

The district court's decision to suppress evidence was based on the precedent set in Dunaway v. New York, where the Supreme Court ruled that the police violated the Fourth Amendment by seizing a suspect without probable cause. However, in the current case, probable cause was established, distinguishing it from Dunaway. Additionally, the argument regarding the need for Miranda warnings for the individuals at the highway scene was deemed academic, as one individual, Salinas, did not have standing to challenge any potential Fifth Amendment violations concerning others' rights due to the lack of warnings. The officer's inquiries were limited to identification and origin, which did not constitute custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. The statements made at the Sheriff's Office were given after proper Miranda warnings in Spanish, thus upholding Salinas' Fifth Amendment rights. The judgment was reversed, and the order to suppress was vacated, confirming the lawfulness of the initial stop and subsequent inquiries regarding immigration matters. The state trooper's actions were justified based on reasonable suspicion, not racial profiling, and the arguments against his authority and knowledge of immigration laws were rejected.