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in the Matter of C.M.M.
Citation: Not availableDocket: 14-16-00427-CV
Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; November 7, 2016; Texas; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
On November 8, 2016, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court regarding appellant C.M.M., a juvenile charged with capital murder of his mother and her unborn child. The appeal contested the juvenile court's order to waive jurisdiction and transfer the case to criminal district court, asserting two main arguments: (1) lack of probable cause due to insufficient evidence regarding the unborn child's cause of death, and (2) that the trial court abused its discretion by not adequately considering the required factors for transfer. The factual background indicates that C.M.M., aged 14, engaged in various activities between September 22 and September 27, 2015, including socializing with friends and obtaining marijuana. During this period, he expressed to his friends that he was unhappy about his mother's pregnancy and made comments about potentially harming her or the baby, which he later dismissed as jokes. After a visit to his friend Carlos, C.M.M. claimed he found his mother attempting self-harm and subsequently killed her to alleviate her suffering. The recorded statements made during this time were admitted into evidence during the transfer hearing without objection. Carlos suspected that Nicole was under the influence of drugs at the time of an incident involving appellant, who he urged to turn himself in, but the appellant refused. Carlos, his mother, and the appellant traveled to Houston, where the appellant consumed alcohol and marijuana. Carlos did not inform his mother about Nicole's death, and it is implied she was unaware of the situation, as she later encouraged the boys to "make things right" with Nicole. Nicole’s body was discovered by a neighbor on Saturday after they noticed her front door ajar. The police estimated she had been dead for three to four days. La Marque Police Department officers described the crime scene as violent and horrific, with blood covering the kitchen floor and evidence of struggle, including a bloodied knife in appellant’s bedroom and bloodstained clothing in the bathroom. Appellant was identified as a resident of the house but was absent, leading police to report him as a missing person. On Sunday, the appellant contacted relatives, who picked him up, and his aunt informed the police of his whereabouts. Appellant was found at his grandparents' house, where it was noted that the family was already aware of Nicole's death. Despite being a located missing child, appellant refused to return to his father, and concerns about his safety with his father were raised by family members. When police approached appellant, he agreed to discuss the matter. He directed them to the Astro Inn to recover his vehicle and was taken to the police station for questioning, which lasted two hours and twenty minutes. Appellant was not initially considered a suspect, but he was admonished in case the situation changed. The interview, which involved multiple officers and included a recorded session, revealed inconsistencies in appellant's account, particularly about an argument with Nicole regarding his school attendance. Appellant reported that after an argument, Nicole left with a white male in an Escalade, while appellant stayed at home in a Nissan. By Wednesday evening, Nicole was still absent, prompting appellant to pick up friends. During police interviews, appellant provided inconsistent details about his cell phone usage and clothing. He expressed grief over his mother’s death and claimed ignorance regarding the circumstances. When confronted, he made a series of statements suggesting he would have hidden a murder more effectively if he had committed one. Appellant alleged he found Nicole bleeding from a self-inflicted stab wound and, believing she was high on methamphetamine, he claimed to have pulled a knife from her throat and later strangled her to spare her suffering. This narrative was met with skepticism from the officers. Appellant maintained that Nicole had a motive related to her drug use and pregnancy, asserting that he stabbed her out of anger and a belief that she did not deserve to live due to past losses. He admitted to dragging her body and then showering before leaving the scene again. The position of Nicole's legs, corroborated by crime scene evidence, raised concerns about the truthfulness of appellant's account, particularly as he had not seen the photos prior to mentioning it. An autopsy conducted by Dr. Nobby C. Mambo from the Galveston County Medical Examiner’s Office revealed that Nicole died from strangulation, classified as homicide. The autopsy identified a two-strand electrical cord around her neck, which was linked to a fracture of her left hyoid bone. Nicole sustained 55 stab wounds across various parts of her body, with some penetrating deep into muscles and soft tissue. Toxicology results showed the presence of alcohol, amphetamine, and methamphetamine. Additionally, a male fetus estimated to be 17 weeks gestation was found in Nicole’s uterus, with loops of the tri-vessel cord around its neck. The report did not address the cause or manner of death for the fetus. In October 2015, the State filed a petition in a county court alleging delinquent conduct by the appellant. A petition for waiver of jurisdiction and discretionary transfer to district court was filed in February 2016, leading to a four-day hearing in May 2016. Testimonies from various witnesses and nearly 150 exhibits were presented. Ultimately, the trial court decided to waive jurisdiction and transfer the case to district court, providing specific reasons for the decision in a later signed order. This decision prompted a timely appeal. Legal standards indicate that Texas juvenile courts have exclusive jurisdiction over alleged criminal conduct by children aged 10 to 16. A juvenile court may waive this jurisdiction and transfer a child to district court if certain criteria are met. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals emphasizes that such transfers should be exceptions, advocating for the protection and rehabilitation of juveniles rather than subjecting them to the adult criminal system. The waiver process is characterized as critically important, requiring adherence to due process and fair treatment standards established in Kent v. United States. The statutory requirements for the waiver of jurisdiction and transfer of a juvenile to criminal court include: (1) the child is accused of a felony; (2) the child’s age at the time of the offense must be at least 14 for capital or first-degree felonies, or 15 for second or third-degree felonies, with no prior adjudication hearing; and (3) a juvenile court must find probable cause that the child committed the offense and that community welfare necessitates criminal proceedings. Factors considered by the court include the nature of the offense, the child’s sophistication and maturity, their prior history, and the potential for public protection and rehabilitation. Not every factor needs to support the transfer, and the court must document its findings in a written order. Appellate review of a transfer order involves two steps: assessing the sufficiency of evidence for the juvenile court's findings and determining if the court abused its discretion. Evidence is evaluated under legal sufficiency standards, where favorable evidence is credited, and under factual sufficiency standards, considering whether the findings are against the weight of the evidence. An abuse of discretion occurs if the transfer decision is arbitrary, while a well-reasoned application of the statutory criteria is generally upheld. A juvenile court that adequately explains its decision is unlikely to be reversed. Appellant challenges the probable cause finding for his alleged capital murder, arguing there is insufficient evidence linking his actions to the death of Nicole's unborn child. The legal standard for probable cause requires enough facts for a prudent person to believe an offense occurred, which is less stringent than the standards for conviction. Appellant is charged with capital murder related to multiple deaths in a single incident, with "individual" defined to include unborn children at any gestational stage. He contends that the unborn child could have died from other causes, such as a tri-vessel cord complication or Nicole's drug use. However, evidence supports probable cause, particularly appellant's statement that Nicole was unable to afford an abortion, indicating she had a viable pregnancy. The trial court's finding of probable cause stands independently of this statement, as it is established that appellant strangled Nicole, who died as a result, and lay understanding suggests maternal death can lead to fetal death. Considering the totality of circumstances, there is sufficient information for a reasonable person to conclude that appellant's actions resulted in the deaths of both Nicole and her unborn child. Thus, the court overrules appellant's first issue. The appellant challenges the trial court’s decision to waive exclusive juvenile jurisdiction and transfer his case to district court, arguing it abused its discretion concerning the findings related to the four factors outlined in section 54.02(f) of the Texas Family Code. The court reviews whether the juvenile court adhered to relevant rules and principles, even without a direct challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the findings. The appellant claims the court failed to consider all required factors before concluding that the community's welfare necessitated criminal proceedings due to the offense's seriousness and his background. The section 54.02(f) factors include: (1) the nature of the alleged offense (with more weight for offenses against individuals), (2) the child’s sophistication and maturity, (3) the child's record and history, and (4) the potential for public protection and rehabilitation through available juvenile court resources. Evidence for these factors was presented through evaluations by two psychologists: Dr. Jenine Collins Boyd, appointed by the court, and Dr. Bryan Sweeney, engaged by the appellant. Dr. Boyd evaluated the appellant, a 15-year-old, twice in a juvenile facility, administering intelligence, achievement, and personality tests, and conducting interviews with him and his father. Her report was accepted into evidence without objection, and she testified at the hearing. Dr. Boyd characterized the appellant as respectful and cooperative, with no signs of mental health issues. His father described him positively, while the appellant shared a troubled childhood, having been removed from his mother’s care and placed in foster care multiple times due to alleged abuse or neglect. Dr. Boyd did not have access to departmental records regarding these removals. Appellant lived with his father and paternal half-sisters from March 2010 until June 2013, when his half-sisters moved out, leaving him alone with his father. After his father was incarcerated a year later for unclear reasons, appellant lived with his paternal grandparents for six months. During this time, he repeatedly requested to live with his mother, which his grandparents initially denied but eventually allowed in December 2014. Appellant's mother, Nicole, was hospitalized for seizures in February 2015, prompting him to stay with her friend Opal, where he engaged in self-mutilation. When Opal contacted the police due to concerns over appellant's safety, the police planned to return him to his father, which he resisted, leading him to run away and stay with friends until he was eventually found and returned to his mother. While living with his mother, appellant expressed a desire to avoid her boyfriend and temporarily moved into a motel, where he experienced suicidal ideation and substance use. He began drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana at age 12, the latter with his father, and had a pattern of marijuana use during his three years living with him. Appellant participated in Native American sweat lodges but it was unclear if he used peyote. His mother struggled with drug abuse and financial instability, impacting their living conditions. Dr. Boyd's evaluation revealed no significant educational deficits despite limited access to school records, although appellant had been suspended multiple times for drug use and fighting. He displayed average intellectual potential, strong math skills, and some behavioral issues typical of adolescents, alongside conduct problems as reported by his father. Dr. Boyd diagnosed him with conduct disorder, cannabis abuse, and neglect and physical abuse as a victim. She recommended rehabilitative services in a secure facility to address his educational and counseling needs, behavior modification, substance abuse treatment, and monitoring of his mental health due to past self-harm and suicidal thoughts. Appellant, at 15 years old, is assessed by Dr. Boyd, who concludes that the juvenile system cannot sufficiently serve him before he ages out. She finds no contraindications for his custody under the Texas Department of Criminal Justice if certified as an adult. During cross-examination, Dr. Boyd acknowledges that appellant could also remain in the juvenile system under determinate sentencing, which allows for sentences up to 40 years. Dr. Sweeney conducted a thorough evaluation of appellant, spending seven to eight hours interviewing him and administering psychological tests. Although he has treated juveniles, he has no direct experience with the juvenile justice system and based his understanding on external sources. He reviewed Dr. Boyd’s evaluation data and performed additional assessments. While he largely agrees with Dr. Boyd, he expresses doubts about her diagnosis of conduct disorder, noting appellant's lack of problematic behavior and a stable upbringing. Dr. Sweeney describes appellant’s childhood as unstable and reflects on his complex relationship with his mother. He rates appellant as having average intelligence but emotionally less mature than peers due to a lack of security and bonding. He believes appellant would benefit from juvenile services and finds no contraindications for him remaining in the juvenile system. The review of the trial court's transfer decision examines whether it acted without reference to guiding principles, determining if its actions were arbitrary or a reasonable application of legislative criteria based on section 54.02(f) factors. Legal sufficiency is assessed by crediting evidence favorable to the findings, while factual sufficiency considers all evidence to determine if the finding is against the weight of the evidence. Not all factors in section 54.02(f) must favor transfer for the juvenile court to waive jurisdiction; a combination of criteria can be sufficient. The trial court determined that all factors support transfer, stating that the seriousness of the offense and the child's background necessitate criminal proceedings. The alleged offenses are classified as Capital Felonies against a person, and the court found the offense particularly egregious. The appellant was deemed sophisticated and mature enough to waive rights and understand court proceedings, as well as to assist in their defense. The court expressed concerns about the likelihood of rehabilitation and the protection of the public from future offenses. Regarding the sufficiency of evidence, the appellant is accused of an offense against a person, which carries greater weight for transfer under Texas law. The court noted the circumstances surrounding the victim's death, supported by autopsy reports and witness testimonies. Evidence included threats made by the appellant against family members, reinforcing the findings. The trial court's assessment of the appellant's sophistication and maturity relied on Dr. Boyd's report, which indicated no intellectual deficits and no history of psychiatric issues. Dr. Sweeney's minor disagreements with Dr. Boyd did not undermine the overall findings. The appellant disputed the clarity of Dr. Boyd's conclusions about his mental health, particularly concerning past suicidal thoughts. The appeal focuses on whether the trial court's decision lacked a principled basis. The trial court's reliance on an admitted fact is deemed appropriate, as it acted within established legal principles. Findings by the trial court are upheld unless there is no supporting evidence. The court acknowledged the appellant's challenging upbringing, which included allegations of abuse and drug use by his parents. Despite this, Dr. Boyd opined that the appellant's home environment did not impact his cognitive abilities. The appellant argues that Dr. Boyd’s opinion is unreliable due to her not reviewing Department records, claiming her conclusions would differ with such information. However, Dr. Boyd assumed the validity of the alleged abuse and neglect in her evaluation, and there is no indication that the records would have altered her opinions. Dr. Sweeney, the appellant’s expert, reviewed the Department records and concurred with Dr. Boyd's assessments, further stating that the findings remained unchanged after his review. The trial court noted Dr. Boyd's testimony indicating that the appellant is capable of making good decisions but has previously chosen not to, particularly in the case involving the violent death of his mother and unborn sibling. This testimony provides sufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings on the relevant factors. The appellant's claim that Dr. Sweeney suggested he lacks the emotional capacity to make good decisions is unsupported by the record. Even if such testimony existed, the trial court could choose to accept or reject it, maintaining its role as the sole judge of credibility. The trial court also considered the appellant’s history of deceitfulness, stealing, and gang involvement, as detailed in Dr. Boyd's report, which included information from the appellant's father and records of the appellant's disciplinary history. Thus, the trial court did take into account the appellant’s record and history. Appellant faced a five-day suspension for smoking marijuana in a school restroom and had a prior history of suspension for fighting. Witness Beth reported that appellant claimed involvement in gangs and expressed violent thoughts, including killing his father. The trial court's findings on appellant's background were substantiated by Dr. Boyd's report and Beth's statements, indicating both legally and factually sufficient evidence. Regarding public protection and rehabilitation, Dr. Boyd argued that the juvenile system could not adequately rehabilitate appellant in the limited time available before he aged out at 19, while Dr. Sweeney believed it could. The trial court, as the sole judge of credibility, opted to credit Dr. Boyd’s opinion, which supported findings that the public was not adequately protected from appellant’s future conduct and there was minimal likelihood of successful rehabilitation within the juvenile system. Appellant contended that the State did not demonstrate that the determinate-sentencing option under section 54.04 of the Family Code would be insufficient for community welfare. This statute allows for extended confinement terms for juveniles, including those guilty of capital murder, potentially up to 40 years. Nonetheless, Dr. Boyd maintained that adult sentencing was appropriate and not contraindicated. Dr. Sweeney did not oppose this conclusion regarding sentencing options. The trial court was justified in relying on Dr. Boyd's assessment that adult sentencing for appellant, if found guilty, was not contraindicated. The trial court's findings are supported by sufficient legal and factual evidence, leading to the decision to waive jurisdiction and transfer the case. The court evaluated the matter over four days, considering crime scene evidence, police testimonies, and an autopsy report, all indicating that Nicole suffered a violent death. Testimony from two psychologists and arguments from the appellant’s counsel regarding the appellant's unstable childhood were also heard. The transfer order met the requirements under section 54.02, with all findings adequately supported by evidence. The decision was not arbitrary; it adhered to established rules and principles, demonstrating a principled application of legislative criteria. Consequently, there was no abuse of discretion in transferring the appellant to district court. The court affirms the trial court's order.