William Taylor v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Citation: Not availableDocket: 06A01-1511-PC-1876

Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; October 28, 2016; Indiana; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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William Taylor appeals the denial of his post-conviction relief petition, arguing that he received ineffective assistance from trial counsel, specifically due to counsel's failure to communicate a plea offer. The Court of Appeals of Indiana affirms the post-conviction court's decision, concluding that Taylor did not demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his counsel's performance. 

The sole issue under review is the alleged error in denying Taylor's petition. The factual background reveals that Taylor was the stepfather of N.H., and he engaged in multiple sexual offenses against her from ages five to eight, including fondling and forcing her into sexual acts. Despite N.H.'s threats to report him, Taylor manipulated her into silence, claiming dire consequences for their family. Eventually, N.H. disclosed the abuse to her mother, leading to police involvement and a forensic interview. 

The memorandum also notes that the decision is not to be regarded as precedent except for establishing res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

N.H. informed Taylor during a recorded phone call that she had disclosed their sexual encounters to her mother, prompting Taylor to express panic about his situation, fearing lifelong imprisonment. He acknowledged the incidents, claiming they were limited to "just that one time" and expressed remorse, attributing his actions to being "in love" with her and wanting to educate her about sex. Following this conversation, detectives arrested Taylor on December 17, 2009, after consulting with the Hendricks County Prosecutor's Office regarding ten charges against him, including two Class A felony child molesting counts. Additionally, Taylor faced a separate charge in Boone County for a prior Class B felony child molesting incident, for which he retained attorney Allen Lidy. 

In September 2010, Taylor wrote to Lidy, expressing distress over his incarceration and questioning the differing charges between counties. Lidy aimed for a global plea deal but was only offered a guilty plea to a Class A felony in Hendricks County, which Taylor rejected. In January 2011, the Boone County prosecutor proposed a plea deal for the Class B felony charge, which Lidy failed to communicate to Taylor, leading to the State amending the charges to two Class A felonies. Taylor was subsequently convicted on both counts in February 2011 and sentenced to forty years for each, to be served consecutively.

Following the Boone County convictions, the Hendricks County trial for William L. Taylor was rescheduled, leading to plea negotiations with the prosecutor. Taylor ultimately pled guilty to multiple charges, including Class C felony child molesting and Class D felony child seduction, receiving a concurrent twenty-five-year sentence alongside his eighty-year Boone County sentence. Taylor later sought post-conviction relief, arguing that his attorney, Allen Lidy, was ineffective for failing to communicate a plea offer from Boone County.

At the post-conviction hearing, Lidy testified that his strategy aimed for a global plea agreement to avoid a de facto life sentence, admitting he did not relay the Boone County plea offer to Taylor. Lidy indicated that Taylor would not have accepted the offer, as he was unwilling to plead guilty to any felony. He also expressed concern that a guilty plea in Boone County would hinder any favorable resolution in the pending Hendricks County case.

Taylor, however, contended that he would have accepted the Boone County plea to spare his family from a trial. The post-conviction court issued detailed findings, noting that Taylor, aged sixty-one at the time of his charges, faced significant allegations, including several Class A felony counts. The court found Lidy's strategy to pursue concurrent sentences reasonable, acknowledging that Taylor had made self-incriminating statements and that the complaining witness was prepared to testify against him.

Lidy expressed skepticism about Taylor pleading guilty to a B felony due to potential repercussions in a separate Hendricks County case, where such a plea could be used as 404(b) evidence against him. Lidy believed that admitting to the B felony would likely prompt the Hendricks County Prosecutor to withdraw a plea offer that capped Taylor’s sentence at 45 years, a concern deemed reasonable by the Court. Taylor had consistently resisted admitting any conduct beyond fondling, even after receiving an 80-year sentence, and only expressed a desire to plead guilty to the B felony after his conviction, motivated by a wish to reduce his sentence.

The Boone County Prosecutor's sole offer was a 20-year sentence for the B felony, contingent on not amending the charge to an A felony or filing additional charges. Lidy did not recall communicating this offer to Taylor before a pre-trial conference, a belief supported by the Court. It was inferred that Lidy thought it unnecessary to convey the offer, given the strategy to avoid a life sentence, which would make accepting a 20-year plea seem unwise. 

Taylor's claims of wanting to plead guilty to spare his family were dismissed by the Court as insincere; evidence showed he had sought to defend against the charges and was exploring discrepancies in witness testimonies. Ultimately, the Court did not believe Taylor would have accepted a plea to the B felony in January 2011.

Taylor aimed to leave prison alive, and pleading guilty to a crime with a twenty-year sentence posed risks to that goal. To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both deficient performance and resulting prejudice, as established in Strickland v. Washington. In this case, attorney Lidy failed to convey a plea offer to Taylor, which was deemed unreasonable and deficient, satisfying the first part of the Strickland test. However, Taylor was not prejudiced, as he would not have accepted the plea offer even if informed timely; his objective was to contest the charges rather than plead guilty to a B felony, which he believed would not help him achieve his goal of eventual release.

Taylor appealed the denial of his post-conviction relief petition, arguing that the court erred in its decision. Post-conviction proceedings allow for raising issues not previously available, but a petitioner must prove claims by a preponderance of the evidence. The standard of review on appeal is stringent, focusing only on evidence supporting the original judgment without reweighing or reassessing witness credibility. The post-conviction court’s denial will be upheld unless the evidence overwhelmingly supports a different conclusion, and while legal conclusions by the court are not deferred to, factual findings are accepted unless clearly erroneous.

Taylor contends that the post-conviction court incorrectly denied his petition, claiming he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel who failed to communicate a plea offer. To establish ineffective assistance, a petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was below reasonable professional standards and that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have differed had counsel performed adequately. Although counsel has significant discretion in strategy, the failure to communicate a plea offer is recognized as deficient performance. 

The key issue in this case is whether Taylor was prejudiced by this deficiency. The post-conviction court found that Taylor did not prove a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea offer, questioning his credibility based on his age and a letter indicating a desire to challenge the charges rather than plead guilty. Additionally, the court noted that accepting a plea could have jeopardized his ability to negotiate with another county regarding pending charges. Thus, the court concluded that it would not have made sense for Taylor to accept the plea deal, affirming the denial of his petition. The ruling was upheld by the Court of Appeals of Indiana.