CalPortland Company, Inc. v. MSHR

Citation: Not availableDocket: 16-1094

Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; October 20, 2016; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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CalPortland Company, Inc. petitioned for review of a decision by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission requiring the temporary reinstatement of Jeffrey Pappas under section 105(c)(2) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, pending resolution of Pappas's discrimination complaint. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, having jurisdiction through the collateral order doctrine, determined that Pappas was an "applicant for employment" and therefore not eligible for temporary reinstatement. The Court vacated the Commission's decision, referencing the Mine Act's purpose to protect miners' health and safety and outlining the roles of the Secretary of Labor and the Commission in enforcing mine safety standards and adjudicating disputes. The Mine Act includes a whistleblower provision prohibiting discrimination against miners for engaging in protected activities and specifies that temporary reinstatement is limited to miners, necessitating a determination of the complainant's status as either a miner or an applicant for employment before addressing reinstatement eligibility.

Jeffrey Pappas began working as a miner at the Oro Grande cement plant in San Bernardino County, California, in approximately 1999, employed by Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. In 2014, after reporting unsafe directions from a supervisor to management and subsequently to a MSHA inspector, Pappas faced retaliation, resulting in a deterioration of his workplace relationships and his discharge in March 2014. He filed a section 105(c) discrimination complaint, leading to a settlement that reinstated him.

Upon returning, Pappas experienced harassment from colleagues regarding his complaint and safety concerns, which he reported to upper management, including HR manager Jamie Ambrose, who took no action. In June 2015, CalPortland entered into an asset purchase agreement with Martin Marietta for the Oro Grande plant, effective October 1, 2015, but did not hire any of Martin Marietta’s existing workforce. CalPortland began staffing prior to the acquisition and sought advice from Ambrose, who soon accepted a position with CalPortland.

In mid-September 2015, CalPortland invited existing employees, including Pappas, to apply for jobs but did not publicly advertise the positions. On September 26, 2015, they offered jobs to about 115 of the 130 applicants, excluding Pappas. Following this, Martin Marietta instructed non-hired miners, including Pappas, to leave the plant immediately, compensating them through September 30, 2015, and providing severance packages. After CalPortland's acquisition, Pappas filed another section 105(c) complaint against them, and on December 8, 2015, the Secretary filed for his temporary reinstatement, claiming Pappas was not hired due to his prior discrimination complaint against Martin Marietta.

Pappas was deemed a 'miner' under section 105(c) during his employment at the Oro Grande plant, leading to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) approving the Secretary’s application on January 12, 2016. The Commission affirmed this decision in a 4-1 vote on February 8, 2016, asserting that CalPortland's hiring decisions, characterized as 'miner retention decisions,' were made while Pappas was clearly a miner. The Commission noted that Jamie Ambrose, aware of Pappas's previous discrimination complaint, was involved in the hiring process alongside Martin Marietta, indicating a joint decision-making process. The Commission determined that allowing Pappas to continue working pending the resolution of his discrimination claims aligned with Congressional intent behind temporary reinstatement provisions. CalPortland's petition for reconsideration was denied on February 22, 2016, and they filed for judicial review on March 8, 2016. On appeal, CalPortland contends that the Commission incorrectly classified Pappas as a 'miner' instead of an 'applicant for employment' concerning section 105(c)(2)’s temporary reinstatement. Jurisdiction over temporary reinstatement orders is acknowledged, and while the Mine Act speaks of 'orders,' it is interpreted to limit appellate review to final agency actions, which must mark the end of the agency’s decision-making process and have legal consequences. The status of a section 105(c)(2) temporary reinstatement order as a final order for appeal remains contentious, though precedent suggests it may be considered final. Ultimately, the Commission's order mandating CalPortland to reinstate Pappas is deemed immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine.

Courts of appeals have jurisdiction over appeals from all final decisions of U.S. district courts, except where direct review is available in the Supreme Court (28 U.S.C. 1291). The Supreme Court interprets this statute broadly, including certain collateral rulings that, while not concluding the litigation, are deemed final. The collateral order doctrine, which allows for immediate appeal of specific orders, requires that an order must (i) conclusively determine a disputed question, (ii) address an important issue separate from the case's merits, and (iii) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. This doctrine is a limited exception to the general rule that a party can appeal only after a final judgment.

In this context, the Commission's temporary reinstatement order directed CalPortland to hire Pappas, satisfying all three requirements for collateral order appeal. The order was a fully consummated decision, with no further agency action available to CalPortland to contest it. Although theoretically modifiable, there was no indication from the Commission that reconsideration was expected, particularly since it denied a subsequent petition for reconsideration, affirming the order's definitiveness. Therefore, the Commission's temporary reinstatement order is considered immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine.

The Commission’s order meets the separability condition necessary for appeal, as a temporary reinstatement order does not influence the ultimate outcome of a discrimination complaint. The case distinguishes between whether Pappas qualifies as a "miner" or an "applicant for employment," which is pertinent only to the temporary reinstatement issue and does not impact the merits of the complaint against CalPortland. Temporary reinstatement orders are significant because they can lead to unreviewable expenses for operators if a miner is later found not to have a valid claim. Miners, in particular, may face severe financial hardship during the complaint process, which could discourage them from reporting safety violations. Without the ability to appeal temporary reinstatement orders, parties risk losing the opportunity for judicial review of these claims. The Commission’s order fulfills the collateral order doctrine's requirements, allowing for jurisdiction over the petition for review. CalPortland argues that the Commission erred by ordering Pappas's reinstatement despite his not being employed there. The Commission’s legal interpretations are granted deference under the Chevron standard, with factual findings reviewed for substantial evidence.

The Secretary's position in litigation before the Commission qualifies for Chevron deference, akin to the Secretary's authority to create health and safety standards. Under the first step of Chevron, the court assesses if Congress has clearly addressed the issue at hand. Agencies can only exercise discretion where statutory silence or ambiguity exists and must adhere to the explicit intent of Congress. The Mine Act's section 105(c)(2) allows miners or applicants alleging discrimination to file a complaint with the Secretary, leading to potential immediate reinstatement if the complaint is deemed non-frivolous. The term "miner" in this context is contested, with the Secretary arguing that Pappas qualifies as both a "miner" and an "applicant for employment" at the Oro Grande plant. The Secretary claims that the Mine Act does not clarify whether a miner applying for a position with a future operator is eligible for reinstatement. The Commission found Pappas eligible for temporary reinstatement, interpreting that he was a miner at the plant during the hiring decisions. To analyze statutory meaning, the court employs traditional statutory construction methods, considering both specific language and the statute's overall design. Ambiguity arises from context rather than mere definitional possibilities, and the presence of complex statutory issues does not inherently indicate ambiguity. The court defers to agency interpretations only when judicial construction does not clarify congressional intent.

The term 'miner' is broadly defined under the Mine Act as any individual working in a coal or other mine. Pappas qualifies as a 'miner' for Martin Marietta at the Oro Grande plant during the relevant timeframe. The central issue is whether Pappas is eligible for reinstatement under section 105(c)(2) of the Mine Act, which uses 'reinstatement' to mean restoring someone to their previous position. The definition of 'reinstatement' is supported by various dictionaries and emphasizes the necessity of having previously held the position in question.

The Commission agrees that one cannot be reinstated to a position they have never held. Pappas has never worked for CalPortland, and while there may be grounds to order CalPortland to hire him if a violation of the Mine Act is found, he cannot be reinstated to a position he never occupied at this preliminary stage. Additionally, Pappas's status as an applicant for employment with CalPortland remains unaffected by Ambrose's involvement in the hiring process. Allegations of discrimination related to Ambrose do not alter Pappas's eligibility under section 105(c)(2).

The Secretary's argument that the temporary reinstatement provision should apply based on Pappas's status as a miner at the Oro Grande plant lacks statutory support, as the provision pertains to specific employers rather than physical locations. Commission precedent reinforces that the remedy is employer-specific, not mine-specific.

Pappas's status as both a miner and an applicant for employment does not qualify him as a miner under his complaint against CalPortland. Citing relevant case law, the document clarifies that prior violations by CalPortland do not shield its owner from liability regarding Pappas's rights as an applicant. Since Pappas had no previous employment or relationship with CalPortland and applied for a new position there, he is classified as an applicant for employment concerning his discrimination complaint. Despite being employed as a miner at a different company, this does not differentiate him from other applicants for CalPortland. Consequently, he is not eligible for temporary reinstatement under section 105(c)(2) of the Mine Act, as the statute does not allow for reinstatement of someone who has never been employed by the operator in question. The Commission's decision is vacated in favor of CalPortland's petition for review.