In re Estate of James Kemmler Rogers

Citation: Not availableDocket: M2015-01439-COA-R3-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; October 17, 2016; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Appellant Patricia Porter Kryder, claiming to be a creditor of Decedent James Kemmler Rogers, appealed the trial court's denial of her petition to open probate for Decedent's estate in Tennessee. The trial court did not address the issue of Appellant's standing before denying the petition. The Court of Appeals of Tennessee concluded that without a ruling on standing, the trial court's order was not final and thus not appealable under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 3(a). Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Decedent, who died on June 11, 2014, had been living in California and had no property in Tennessee at his death. His estate was probated in Kern County, California, where his daughter, Jennifer Rogers-Etcheverry, was appointed administrator. Appellant filed her petition in Tennessee on November 7, 2014, after the estate was opened in California and after the Decedent's will was introduced. The trial court held hearings on the petition in late December 2014 and early January 2015, ultimately issuing a final judgment denying the petition on February 10, 2015.

James Kemmler Rogers was found to be domiciled in California at the time of his death, with no grounds for probate proceedings in Tennessee. On February 13, 2015, the trial court awarded Appellees discretionary costs of $4,777.41. Following this, on March 9, 2015, Appellant Ms. Kryder filed a renewed petition for ancillary probate, citing a 2012 California tax return as evidence of Decedent's intent to remain domiciled in Tennessee. Appellees responded with a motion for Rule 11 sanctions on June 8, 2015, alleging Ms. Kryder had not paid the ordered costs and had engaged in delay tactics by filing extraneous motions after the court's February ruling. 

On June 12, 2015, Appellees raised the issue of Ms. Kryder's standing to pursue ancillary probate. Ms. Kryder contested the sanctions on July 1, 2015, arguing her filings aimed to address the trial court's failure to make necessary findings regarding proof and burden of proof, as well as inconsistencies in the court's determinations. On July 7, 2015, she filed a cross-petition for sanctions against Appellees. The trial court denied Ms. Kryder's petition for ancillary probate on July 14, 2015, stating she did not present new evidence for a rehearing, and did not specifically address the standing issue raised by Appellees. The court also denied her request for additional findings of fact. 

Ms. Kryder appealed on July 30, 2015. On September 21, 2015, the court denied Ms. Kryder's Rule 11 motion but granted Appellees', finding that her subsequent pleadings were intended to harass and delay proceedings. A final judgment was entered on October 30, 2015, awarding Appellees $5,311.85 in discretionary costs and $34,705.61 in damages under Rule 11, stating it resolved all claims in the case and was appealable under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.

Ms. Kryder filed a supplemental notice of appeal on October 6, 2015, following a court order. On November 24, 2015, the Appellees requested the trial court to amend the final judgment to reflect Ms. Kryder’s alias, Patricia K. Gainer. The court remanded the case on December 8, 2015, indicating it may not have jurisdiction without a ruling on this motion. The trial court granted the motion on February 12, 2016, amending the judgment accordingly.

Ms. Kryder raised nine issues in her appeal; however, two primary issues were identified as dispositive: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying her petition to open probate of the Decedent's estate in Tennessee, and (2) whether the court erred in awarding Rule 11 sanctions against her while denying her request for sanctions against the Appellees.

In their response to Ms. Kryder's renewed petition for ancillary probate, Appellees challenged her standing, asserting she is neither an heir nor a beneficiary of the decedent, but rather a purported creditor. The court noted that without a viable creditor claim, Ms. Kryder lacks standing to pursue probate. Appellees argued that under Tennessee law, a creditor must file a claim within one year of the decedent's death, which had not occurred. The trial court reserved judgment on the standing issue but did not provide a ruling thereafter. Standing is critical as it determines whether a litigant is entitled to judicial relief, focusing on the right to bring a claim rather than the merits of the case.

Two categories of standing govern civil causes of action: non-constitutional standing and constitutional standing. Non-constitutional standing addresses judicial restraint and statutory interpretation, determining if a complaint raises issues better suited for another government branch or if a statute specifies who can bring a cause of action. Constitutional standing, relevant here, requires a party to meet three essential criteria to establish justiciable controversy. First, the plaintiff must demonstrate a "distinct and palpable" injury, avoiding conjectural or hypothetical claims. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the challenged conduct, with the injury being "fairly traceable" to the defendant's actions. Third, the injury must be capable of being remedied by a favorable court decision. Standing is evaluated by examining the complaint’s allegations to ascertain the plaintiff's entitlement to adjudication of the claims. The trial court's order dated October 30, 2015, indicates a final judgment resolving all claims, allowing for an appeal under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.

Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02 allows courts to enter a final judgment on one or more claims or parties in cases with multiple claims or parties, provided there is an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. Without this express determination and direction, any decision that resolves fewer than all claims or parties does not terminate the action and remains subject to revision until a final judgment is entered. The trial court's reliance on Rule 54.02 raises questions regarding its failure to rule on Ms. Kryder's standing, which is critical to determining the finality of its judgment and the appellate court's subject-matter jurisdiction under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a). Final judgments in civil actions are appealable as of right, but orders that do not adjudicate all claims or rights are not enforceable or appealable. The authority to hear matters related to subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and can be considered by the court sua sponte. Generally, the trial court's certification of a final judgment under Rule 54.02 is reviewed for abuse of discretion and requires two conditions: (1) the order must resolve one or more but fewer than all claims or parties, and (2) it must explicitly direct the entry of final judgment with a finding of no just reason for delay. A judgment must fully resolve the rights of the parties concerning the claim to be considered final, leaving no further issues for the court to address.

Ms. Kryder's standing to file petitions for primary or ancillary probate is a critical preliminary issue that must be resolved before her petitions can be fully adjudicated. The trial court's inclusion of Rule 54.02 language in its order does not address this issue and is insufficient to finalize the judgment because it lacks the necessary finding that "there is no just reason for delay." This omission parallels precedents where appeals are dismissed if the certified judgment does not contain the requisite findings or improperly asserts that there is no reason for delay. As such, the trial court's order does not adequately determine Ms. Kryder's standing, rendering the claims unresolved. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed for lack of a final judgment, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings necessary to resolve the standing issue. Costs of the appeal are to be borne by the Appellant, Patricia Porter Kryder, and her surety.