Ex Parte William West Riley

Citation: Not availableDocket: 03-16-00350-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; October 11, 2016; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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William West Riley appealed the denial of his habeas corpus application by the Travis County court, which followed his conviction for misdemeanor assault causing bodily injury related to family violence. As part of a plea agreement, Riley pleaded no contest, resulting in deferred adjudication and a one-year community supervision period, during which he was required to pay fines, complete counseling, and undergo education. Less than two months into supervision, the State moved to adjudicate guilt, citing Riley's failure to pay fees and complete required assessments. This was followed by an amended motion due to non-compliance with counseling and a new criminal offense. In October 2014, despite unsatisfactory compliance, the court noted that Riley's community supervision period had expired. Eighteen months later, he filed for habeas corpus, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel rendered his plea involuntary, specifically citing erroneous advice about punishment and failure to inform him of the implications for firearms and military service. The court held a hearing and denied the application, with Riley arguing on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in finding no ineffective assistance. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision. 

Background evidence included a 911 call made by Riley's wife’s mother, reporting a domestic disturbance. Officer K. Garvey's affidavit detailed that Riley initially denied physicality but later admitted to holding his wife in a manner that impeded her breathing during a heated argument. The prosecuting attorney did not pursue charges regarding a subsequent offense mentioned in the affidavit.

Riley was involved in an incident where he held J.G. in a "bear hug," during which J.G. struck Riley's head against her chest. J.G. experienced pain and difficulty breathing, prompting her to call her mother to request 911 due to fears about Riley's reaction. J.G. reported abdominal and lower back pain and required hospitalization. Riley was arrested for assault family violence, classified as a Class A misdemeanor under Texas Penal Code § 22.01(a)(1)(b). He subsequently entered a plea agreement resulting in one year of deferred adjudication community supervision, a $200 fine, counseling, and a family violence finding, ultimately leading to his unsatisfactory release from supervision.

Riley later filed an application for writ of habeas corpus, arguing he did not voluntarily enter his plea based on allegedly inaccurate legal advice. He claimed his attorney, Don Campbell, misinformed him that rejecting the plea could lead to felony charges, that his arrest records could be nondisclosed, and that deferred adjudication would not affect his military eligibility. During the habeas hearing, Riley and his mother testified about their communications with Campbell regarding the potential felony charge and the implications for military service. The mother stated she was not informed that deferred adjudication would impact Riley's ability to join the military, despite Riley being just over 18 at the time of the assault. Campbell testified he sought an affidavit of non-prosecution from J.G. and was told that the case could be elevated to a felony due to the injuries sustained by J.G., which he communicated to Riley as part of their discussions on plea options. On appeal, Riley dropped the claim regarding the nondisclosure of his arrest records.

Campbell testified regarding his discussions about military options for Riley, specifically noting he spoke with Riley’s mother but not with Riley himself. The court denied Riley’s writ application and issued findings of fact including: Campbell obtained a plea offer of 12 months deferred adjudication after an initial 18-month probation offer; he submitted an Affidavit of Non-Prosecution; the Prosecutor indicated potential enhancement due to suffocation/strangulation; Campbell informed Riley about all offers and the possibility of felony enhancement; he did not claim that Riley's record would be eligible for expunction but assured that successful completion of deferred probation would prevent a conviction from appearing on his record; and he did not discuss Riley's military eligibility post-case but may have mentioned it to Riley's mother. The case was filed in February 2013, with a plea entered in August 2013, resulting in unsuccessful discharge in October 2014.

The court concluded that Campbell provided effective assistance of counsel and that Riley was not prejudiced by this representation. It determined Campbell accurately advised Riley regarding collateral consequences, including gun ownership and military enlistment post-plea, and found Campbell credible while deeming Riley's testimony not credible. 

The discussion included the standard of review for habeas corpus applications, establishing that appellate courts assess trial court rulings under an abuse of discretion standard, with the applicant bearing the burden of proof. The fact-finder's credibility assessments are paramount in habeas proceedings.

In habeas proceedings under Texas Penal Code article 11.072, the trial court acts as the sole trier of fact, with appellate courts granting significant deference to the trial court's factual findings, particularly those involving credibility. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an applicant must demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced the outcome of the case, as outlined in Strickland v. Washington. Both prongs must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence; failure to do so negates the claim.

A defendant is entitled to effective assistance during plea proceedings, and a guilty plea must be a voluntary and informed choice among available options. If a plea results from ineffective counsel, it lacks the necessary voluntariness. When challenging the validity of a plea due to ineffective assistance, the focus is on whether the counsel’s advice met the competence standards for criminal attorneys and whether the defendant would have likely chosen differently without the counsel's errors.

In Riley's case, he contends that his attorney, Campbell, provided misleading advice regarding the potential range of punishment, claiming he was told that rejecting a misdemeanor plea would expose him to a felony charge. Riley argues that the facts presented did not support a felony conviction. However, the trial court found that Campbell merely informed Riley that the prosecution might consider felony enhancement, which was corroborated by Campbell’s testimony regarding the prosecutor’s intentions. The trial court also deemed Riley's testimony regarding Campbell's advice as not credible.

The trial court found no merit in Riley's claim that his attorney, Campbell, misrepresented the potential felony charges he faced if he rejected a plea deal. Instead, the court determined that Campbell accurately informed Riley about the prosecution's consideration of upgrading the charge to a felony. Riley's second argument contended that Campbell failed to advise him about the negative implications of the plea on his future military service. Riley asserted that Campbell assured him he would not face issues joining the Marines after completing probation, but later learned that the deferred adjudication could prevent firearm possession under federal law, thus hindering his military eligibility. Campbell testified he did not recall discussing military implications with Riley, and the trial court found Campbell's testimony more credible than Riley's. Riley did not challenge the accuracy of Campbell's advice regarding military service but argued that the potential consequences of the plea on military eligibility were significant enough to warrant explicit counsel, similar to immigration consequences addressed in Padilla v. Kentucky. In Padilla, the Supreme Court ruled that effective assistance of counsel includes informing non-citizen defendants about deportation risks associated with guilty pleas, thus extending the Sixth Amendment's protections.

Riley argues that military service eligibility, like immigration consequences, is a collateral consequence that warrants Sixth Amendment protections, citing Ex parte Davis. However, the reliance on this case is flawed, as Davis dealt with the jurisdictional question of “confinement” in the context of post-conviction habeas corpus relief for misdemeanor offenses, specifically whether collateral consequences like military service denial constituted “confinement.” The Davis court ruled it did, but did not address whether failing to inform a defendant about the impact of a plea on military eligibility constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.

Riley has not provided any case law supporting the extension of Sixth Amendment protections to require attorneys to inform clients about military service eligibility. The court noted it need not determine this issue, as Riley failed to show prejudice from his counsel's alleged error. To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance, an applicant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different but for the counsel's mistakes. This includes showing that he would have foregone the plea bargain had he been properly advised.

The court emphasized that the totality of circumstances must indicate that Riley specifically considered the impact of the plea on his military eligibility. However, Riley's affidavit revealed that he was primarily concerned about being charged with a felony and believed he could seal his record, leading him to accept the plea deal. Consequently, the court concluded that Riley did not demonstrate that he would have rejected the plea and opted for trial based on concerns about military service eligibility, thereby failing his claim of prejudice.

The trial court determined that Riley's testimony lacked credibility while Campbell's was credible. Campbell testified that he did not recall discussing military options with Riley, only that his mother suggested the military might be an option for him. The court found no evidence supporting Riley's claim that concerns about his military service influenced his decision to accept a plea. An evaluation of the circumstances indicated that rejecting the plea would not have been rational. Factors considered included the likelihood of conviction for assault family violence, as Riley admitted to initiating physical contact that caused difficulty breathing, which suggested a high probability of conviction. A conviction could result in a fine of up to $4,000 and a year in jail. By accepting the plea and opting for deferred adjudication community supervision, Riley avoided jail time and a conviction. Ultimately, the court concluded that Riley failed to show he was prejudiced by Campbell's alleged failure to inform him about the plea's potential impact on military service eligibility. The court affirmed the denial of Riley’s habeas corpus application, concluding no abuse of discretion occurred.