Abigail Fredericksen v. Jennifer Olsen, Esq., in Her Individual Capacity Jennifer Olsen, Esq., in Her Capacity as the Court Appointed Guardian and Custodian of Plaintiff's Infant Daughter, Acting Under Color of State Law A.M. and B.M., a Married Couple

Citation: Not availableDocket: 15-0779

Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa; October 12, 2016; Iowa; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Abigail Fredericksen appeals the Iowa District Court's summary judgment favoring her former attorney, Jennifer Olsen, and adoptive parents A.M. and B.M. Fredericksen alleges that the court improperly dismissed her claims against Olsen for legal malpractice, tortious interference with custody, and civil conspiracy related to fraudulent inducement. She also contests the dismissal of her claims against A.M. and B.M. for similar torts. Fredericksen asserts that her constitutional rights were violated due to fraud and misrepresentation that deprived her of her right to parent her child.

The background reveals that Fredericksen, who was a minor when she became pregnant, considered an open adoption, believing it would allow her ongoing contact with her child. After consulting with Olsen, she was introduced to A.M. and B.M., who expressed interest in adopting her child and assured her of maintaining a relationship. Fredericksen claims these assurances were insincere, as A.M. and B.M. never intended to honor them. Despite her desire for an open adoption, Olsen informed Fredericksen that such terms were unenforceable. In December 2011, Fredericksen and the biological father indicated their intent for A.M. and B.M. to adopt the child under the premise of an open adoption, while maintaining contact with the prospective adoptive parents throughout the pregnancy.

Fredericksen and the biological father had a friendly relationship with A.M. and B.M. before the child's birth. In mid-February 2012, Olsen provided them with a "hospital adoption plan" outlining that Fredericksen would need to sign legal documents for the adoption after the birth. The child was born on February 15, and Fredericksen discharged from the hospital on February 18, transferring the child to A.M. and B.M. in the hospital parking lot. Following this, Fredericksen sensed growing resentment from A.M. regarding her ongoing relationship with the child, which led to restricted access. 

On February 20, Fredericksen and the biological father signed a release of custody with Olsen, who assumed legal custody of the child. They were informed they had ninety-six hours to revoke the release before a petition to terminate their parental rights would be filed. A meeting on February 22 included Fredericksen presenting a document outlining future expectations, which A.M. and B.M. accepted, agreeing that Fredericksen would remain involved in the child's life. 

However, on February 24, Olsen filed a petition for termination of Fredericksen's and the biological father's parental rights, stating they did not object after being properly notified. A hearing was scheduled for March 6, during which the court terminated Fredericksen's parental rights, with neither she nor the biological father present. Post-hearing, A.M. and B.M. limited Fredericksen's communication and access to the child, including restricting her from their Facebook page. Despite expressing her dissatisfaction and requesting the child’s return, communication continued to be limited. On March 30, A.M. suggested Fredericksen take the child back, which Fredericksen agreed to pursue with Olsen’s assistance.

On April 2, Olsen informed Fredericksen that she could not have her child returned due to the biological father's refusal to consent. Fredericksen gained limited access to the child through photos on Facebook and was permitted one visit on May 13, 2012, and another in late 2013. On August 30, 2012, Fredericksen's attorney, Rebecca Sharpe, sent a letter to A.M. and B.M., indicating Fredericksen's dissatisfaction with their failure to adhere to a prior agreement and her intention to contest the termination of her parental rights in court. Despite these claims, Fredericksen did not take any legal action to overturn the judgment or intervene in the finalized adoption in Texas in November 2012. She subsequently filed a lawsuit on February 19, 2014. In February 2015, Olsen, A.M., and B.M. sought summary judgment, which the district court granted after a hearing on March 13, 2015, dismissing all of Fredericksen's claims. Fredericksen appealed this decision.

In her appeal, Fredericksen argued that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Olsen on her legal malpractice claim, asserting that her loss of parental rights was a direct result of Olsen's negligence. To establish legal malpractice, a plaintiff must provide evidence of an attorney's breach of duty causing actual injury or damage. The court acknowledged the existence of an attorney-client relationship and a breach of duty by Olsen but determined that any such breach was not the proximate cause of Fredericksen's damages, specifically the loss of her parental rights.

An attorney's negligence cannot be deemed the proximate cause of a plaintiff's damages if the plaintiff hires a new attorney within the statutory timeframe to appeal or rectify the issue, as established in Ruden v. Jenk. Fredericksen contends her situation differs from Ruden, asserting that no subsequent attorney could mitigate the harm caused. She claims the relevant statute of limitations was the thirty-day period after the order terminating her parental rights, which aligns with Iowa Code section 600A.9(2) regarding motions to vacate such termination orders. The facts indicate that Olsen, Fredericksen’s attorney, provided misleading advice just before this deadline, leading Fredericksen to believe the child could not be returned without the biological father's consent. Olsen identified herself as an “adoption facilitator,” which may have influenced her actions in advising the involved parties. Throughout the process, there were opportunities for Olsen to provide better guidance or for Fredericksen to contest the termination. On April 2, 2012, just three days before the deadline to vacate the termination order, Olsen allegedly told Fredericksen that no legal recourse was available to have the child returned. Following the termination of her rights on March 6, 2012, Fredericksen did not secure new legal representation until August 30, 2012, after the thirty-day period had lapsed, which complicated her ability to mitigate the harm caused by the termination. To vacate the order, Fredericksen would have needed to demonstrate that doing so was in the child's best interests, a standard supported by case law. Given that A.M. and B.M. were willing to return the child, and Fredericksen and her parents were prepared to provide care, the district court may have been inclined to grant the motion if it had been filed timely.

To vacate the termination order under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1012, Fredericksen needed to prove that doing so was in the child's best interests and that the termination was achieved through extrinsic fraud. While extrinsic fraud typically suffices for vacating a judgment, additional scrutiny applies in adoption cases, requiring a focus on the child's best interests. Fredericksen faced a heightened burden to demonstrate that vacating the order served the child's best interests, particularly after A.M. and B.M. had been caring for the child for about six months. 

The situation is complicated by the mistaken legal advice from Olsen, which hindered the timely action to vacate the termination order. If Olsen had acted on the Fredericksens' request, the court might have vacated the order within the thirty-day window specified in Iowa Code section 600A.9(2). Although Fredericksen retained the option to challenge the termination after the thirty days, the challenge would require significantly more effort. 

The existence of an attorney-client relationship between Fredericksen and Olsen is uncertain, and various material facts, including communications between parties, need clarification. Both parties submitted expert affidavits regarding their relationship, with Fredericksen asserting an attorney-client relationship and Olsen claiming a facilitator role. This raises a genuine issue of material fact concerning Olsen’s alleged negligence and its impact on Fredericksen. Given that negligence and proximate cause are typically jury questions, the district court incorrectly granted summary judgment, dismissing Fredericksen’s legal malpractice claim against Olsen.

Fredericksen argues that the district court incorrectly granted summary judgment to Olsen, stating that her claim of civil conspiracy to commit fraudulent inducement was dismissed without proper grounds. Under Iowa law, a civil conspiracy requires an agreement between two parties to commit an unlawful act, which must be linked to an underlying, actionable tort. The court dismissed Fredericksen’s claim against Olsen because she did not adequately plead fraudulent inducement, as a proper pleading must notify the opposing party of the intended proof and define the legal issues at stake.

Regarding A.M. and B.M., Fredericksen contends that the court erred by granting them summary judgment as well. To prove fraudulent inducement, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant made a false and material representation intending to deceive, which the plaintiff relied on to their detriment. The court found that Fredericksen could not have justifiably relied on A.M. and B.M.'s promises about an "open adoption" since she had been informed that such adoptions are unenforceable. Despite her belief in their statements, the law dictates that one cannot recover damages if they ignore an obvious danger indicating a statement may be fraudulent. Consequently, the court concluded that Fredericksen's claim of fraudulent inducement was legally untenable, leading to the proper dismissal of her civil conspiracy claim against A.M. and B.M.

Fredericksen argues that the district court incorrectly granted summary judgment to the defendants regarding her claims of tortious interference with custody. To establish such a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) a legal right to a custodial relationship with their child; 2) that the defendant took action to abduct or induce the child to leave their custody; 3) that this action was willful; and 4) that the defendant acted with knowledge of the parent's rights and without consent. The district court ruled that Fredericksen's consent to the child's removal invalidated her claim, as she had signed a release allowing it. Fredericksen contends that her case should be an exception, arguing that the defendants' actions aimed to terminate her parental rights and that her consent was obtained through fraud, rendering it invalid. However, she failed to prove fraudulent inducement against the defendants, and her claims did not include fraudulent inducement against one defendant, Olsen. Although the court acknowledges the possibility of a tortious interference claim arising from fraudulent consent, Fredericksen was unable to establish that her consent was obtained fraudulently. Consequently, her claims were dismissed appropriately.

Fredericksen also asserts that the order terminating her parental rights was unconstitutional, claiming it violated her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. She argues that her waiver of rights was not knowing and voluntary, despite the court record indicating she received the necessary information prior to the termination.

On February 11, 2012, four days before the child's birth, Olsen provided Fredericksen with a "hospital adoption plan" detailing the legal steps required for the adoption process. This plan required Fredericksen to meet with Olsen post-birth to sign necessary legal documents, including a temporary custody agreement, allowing for the child's discharge to Olsen for placement with adoptive parents. The plan identified the situation as a legal risk placement, where the adoptive couple would care for the child during a 96-hour period before legal proceedings.

On February 20, Fredericksen signed a release of custody, acknowledging that Olsen would petition the Juvenile Court for her appointment as Guardian and Custodian of the child and that a petition for termination of parental rights would be filed following this release. The release stipulated that if not revoked within 96 hours, it could lead to the termination of the parent-child relationship. Fredericksen was informed that she could request the Juvenile Court to revoke the release within that timeframe or later with clear and convincing evidence of good cause, including fraud or coercion, with the child's best interests being paramount in any determination.

After the 96 hours elapsed, Olsen filed for termination of Fredericksen's parental rights, claiming she did not object after being properly notified. A hearing was scheduled for March 6, and Fredericksen accepted service of the petition but chose not to attend the hearing. Throughout the process, Fredericksen was aware that the promises regarding future contact with the child could not be enforced. Even if she had not read the documents she signed, she was deemed knowledgeable of their contents and consequences, as she is bound by her signed agreements, per legal precedent.

A party to a contract who can read and has the opportunity to do so cannot claim ignorance of the contract's terms to avoid obligations. The court evaluated whether Fredericksen's waiver of parental rights was voluntary, referencing a Nebraska case where parents were coerced into relinquishment due to misleading promises of an "open" adoption. However, no Iowa cases were found to support that such promises are coercive, and the court determined that Fredericksen's waiver was knowing and voluntary, thus upholding the application of Iowa Code chapter 600A. The court identified a genuine issue of material fact regarding Olsen's alleged inaction and its impact on Fredericksen, leading to a reversal of the summary judgment favoring Olsen on the legal malpractice claim. The ruling on all other claims was affirmed, resulting in a decision that was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.