United States v. Dennis R. Szymkowiak

Citations: 727 F.2d 95; 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 25657Docket: 83-3364

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; February 8, 1984; Federal Appellate Court

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Dennis Szymkowiak appealed his conviction for possession of an unregistered weapon, arguing that the district court incorrectly denied his motion to suppress the weapon seized during a police search, claiming it violated the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. On February 22, 1982, Toledo police executed a search warrant for specific jewelry and a television but instead found and seized two firearms not mentioned in the warrant. During the search, Detective Higbie discovered items in a safe, while Officer Gerken found an AR-15 next to a couch, along with ammunition. The officers were unable to ascertain whether the firearms were illegal to possess without further examination. After consulting an ATF agent, who indicated potential state law violations but not clear federal violations, the officers decided to seize the firearms based on his recommendation.

Szymkowiak was charged with unlawful possession of two automatic weapons, specifically the Colt AR-15, which is the focus of this appeal. He moved to suppress the rifle, asserting that its seizure violated the Fourth Amendment. A magistrate suggested that the seizure fell under the "plain view" exception, a recommendation adopted by the district judge. However, the appeals court found that the seizure was unlawful, vacating the district court's judgment.

The "plain view" exception to the warrant requirement was established in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, where the Supreme Court outlined three criteria for seizing evidence: 1) a valid prior intrusion, 2) an inadvertent discovery, and 3) that the evidence's unlawful nature was "immediately apparent." The current case acknowledges that the officers' intrusion and inadvertent discovery of the weapon meet these criteria. The primary question is whether the criminality of Szymkowiak's actions was "immediately apparent" to the officers based on the weapon's visibility.

In Texas v. Brown, the Supreme Court applied this "immediately apparent" test, determining that the criminal nature of a knotted party balloon was evident due to the officer's experience with its use for narcotics. The Court emphasized that the "plain view" exception aligns with the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement, asserting that seizing property in plain view is generally reasonable if a connection to criminal activity is probable.

The Brown case supports the view that evidence may be seized when officers have probable cause for a nexus between the item and criminal activity. The Court noted that the balloon's use for illicit purposes made its criminal nature evident. This interpretation of the "immediately apparent" test aligns with earlier cases, such as Gray, where the seizure of rifles was deemed unconstitutional because their incriminating nature was not apparent at the time of discovery. In Gray, the officers' lack of knowledge about any related crimes led to the conclusion that any criminality was not immediate, as it was only after further investigation that the rifles were identified as stolen.

In United States v. Truitt, the court reaffirmed guidelines for the "plain view" exception to the Fourth Amendment, upholding the seizure of a sawed-off shotgun discovered during a lawful search. The court found that probable cause was "immediately apparent" to the officers due to the nature of the object and the context of its discovery. Unlike the situation in Gray, the officers in Truitt could reasonably conclude that the shotgun was incriminating from the moment they first saw it, as a sawed-off shotgun is not considered an innocuous object—its possession is a serious crime under normal circumstances.

The court established that the standard for assessing probable cause requires a case-by-case analysis to determine if the officers had immediate and apparent probable cause based on the object's nature. This standard is aligned with the Supreme Court's caution against broadening exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The need for probable cause to be both immediate and apparent aims to prevent officers from abusing their authority to conduct extensive searches without warrants. Furthermore, when evaluating probable cause, courts should consider the subjective training and experiences of the executing officers. If probable cause is neither immediate nor apparent, the individual's privacy rights and society's interest in lawful enforcement are significantly undermined.

The analysis determines that the officers lacked "immediate" and "apparent" probable cause to associate the seized weapon with criminal activity. No connection existed between the weapon and the items specified in the search warrant. ATF agent Haverstick, a firearms expert, testified that he could not ascertain whether the weapon was an automatic firearm or if its possession violated Ohio law. The lack of clarity regarding the weapon's legal status meant that, even at a late examination stage, probable cause remained absent. The officers, similarly, could not determine the legality of the weapon at the time of its discovery, as evidenced by their actions to verify the serial number and consult with ATF. The conclusion drawn is that the officers did not possess probable cause derived from the discovery of the firearm, leading to the determination that the seizure violated the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, the Motion to Suppress should have been granted, resulting in the vacation of the conviction.