United States v. Carolyn Landis, Fred Landis, and Lee Norman Clark

Citations: 726 F.2d 540; 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 25264Docket: 83-1085, 83-1086 and 83-1103

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; February 22, 1984; Federal Appellate Court

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Defendants Carolyn Landis, Fred Landis, and Lee Norman Clark were convicted of multiple offenses related to the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine, including conspiracy and possession of precursor chemicals. They appealed the denial of their pretrial motions to suppress evidence obtained from searches of their residences, arguing that the affidavit used to secure the search warrants was insufficient. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision.

The court evaluated whether probable cause existed for the searches based on the standards set forth in Illinois v. Gates, which replaced the Aguilar-Spinelli test with a more flexible approach. The issuing magistrate must assess the totality of circumstances, including the informant's veracity and basis of knowledge, to determine if there is a fair probability of finding contraband or evidence of a crime.

In particular, information regarding Lee Clark's activities was primarily sourced from an informant referred to as Source 1. This informant claimed to have knowledge of Clark's drug-related activities, stating that Clark was a physician who derived income from selling methamphetamine and had observed suspicious chemicals in Clark's residence. Source 1 also mentioned that Clark's son had provided information about his father's drug manufacturing activities. The informant's assertions were deemed sufficient to affirm the existence of probable cause for the search warrants.

Source. 1's information regarding Lee Clark's methamphetamine laboratory was deemed reliable due to the informant's close relationship with Clark and corroboration from a police investigation. Although Clark was a medical doctor, he did not appear to practice medicine, as there was no evidence of a medical practice at his home, no listed phone number, and he only prescribed controlled substances to family members. Phone records indicated calls to chemical suppliers unrelated to medical practice. The court concluded that Source. 1’s information provided sufficient probable cause for a search warrant based on continuous illegal activity, despite Clark's argument that the information was stale, as corroboration occurred shortly before the warrant was issued.

In contrast, the search of the Landis residence presented a more complex scenario. On June 8, 1982, Source. 3 informed DEA agents that Clark was at the Landis residence in Chico, California, and reported seeing glassware associated with methamphetamine production. This source had no criminal record and had previously provided reliable information. Agent Gregory observed two of Clark's vehicles at the Landis residence and noted sounds consistent with clandestine laboratory operations coming from an outbuilding. Additionally, agents learned that Fred Landis would be away for several days and that Clark had been absent from his own home for extended periods. The isolated location of Landis' residence further aligned with characteristics of clandestine operations.

Telephone records indicated that the Landises and Clark made calls to suppliers of glassware and chemicals associated with methamphetamine production. The only direct link between the Landis residence and methamphetamine manufacturing was through a confidential source, referred to as Source. 3. For the information from a confidential source to establish probable cause, the affidavit must suggest the source's reliability and the basis of their information. The affidavit provided sufficient grounds for Judge Halbert to credit Source. 3's claims of criminal activity.

Source. 3 had a history of reliability and based her current claims on personal observations of distinctive glassware, enhancing her credibility. The investigation corroborated her information, as two vehicles belonging to Lee Norman Clark were identified at the Landis residence, and Agent Gregory heard suspicious sounds from an outbuilding, which he associated with potential criminal activity due to his training.

This case is distinguishable from United States v. Tate, where the mere presence of a smell was insufficient for probable cause. In this instance, the combination of Source. 3's specific claims, the corroborating details from the investigation, and the presence of glassware associated with chemical manufacturing collectively supported the conclusion that methamphetamine was likely being produced at the Landis residence. The interrelated information from multiple confidential sources further bolstered the credibility of the claims. Thus, the affidavit presented a substantial basis for establishing probable cause, aligning with the legal standard requiring a probability of criminal activity rather than a prima facie showing.

The judgments of conviction are affirmed, with Circuit Judge Poole dissenting. Poole argues that the affidavits lack sufficient facts to establish probable cause for the search warrant. He critiques the majority's interpretation of the Clark affidavit, asserting that it misleadingly suggests that Source 1 had observed the methamphetamine lab. The affidavit only relays that Clark’s children purportedly informed an anonymous source about drug manufacturing, without evidence of Source 1’s personal knowledge or observation of a lab. Poole highlights that the affidavit does not support claims that Source 1 heard or smelled anything indicative of drug production in Clark's home. He further contests the majority’s assertion that Source 1 had seen the basement, noting that the affidavit lacks such confirmation. The mention of "unfamiliar" chemicals found in Clark's bedroom is questioned as irrelevant and unsupported, as no expertise in chemical identification is indicated. Poole also points out that police corroboration of unrelated, innocuous details about Clark does not substantiate the allegations of drug manufacturing. He concludes that the majority's reliance on insignificant corroborative facts to validate Source 1’s credibility is flawed.

A warrant for a search must be based on facts directly related to the alleged criminal activity; without this connection, the warrant should not be issued. The affidavit in question lacks firsthand knowledge and appears deliberately vague, undermining the probable cause required for a search warrant. In the case of the Landis home, the majority opinion acknowledges the search as a "closer question" but concludes it was permissible, a stance the author disagrees with, citing even less probable cause than for the Clark home. The informant, Source 3, only claimed that Lee Clark was at the Landis home to manufacture methamphetamine without providing details on how this information was obtained, leaving the district judge unable to validate her claims. The sole fact mentioned was the observation of glassware, with no description or evidence linking it specifically to methamphetamine production. Comparisons to Illinois v. Gates highlight the lack of detail in Source 3's information. Agent Gregory's observations, which included common household sounds and a general assertion about the remoteness of the Landis home, do not sufficiently establish probable cause as they are not distinctive enough to imply criminal activity. Additionally, the calls made to chemical supply companies do not indicate any illegal intent, as they could pertain to legitimate products. Overall, the evidence presented is deemed insufficient to justify the search, as it does not meet the "totality of the circumstances" test, and the author argues that approval of the warrant undermines legal protections. The outcome of the search yielding evidence for a conviction does not validate the inadequacy of the probable cause.