United States v. James Kruger

Citation: Not availableDocket: 15-3203

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; October 5, 2016; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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James M. Kruger, the appellant, was convicted following a series of criminal acts in southwestern Wisconsin in 2013, which included robbing his uncle, kidnapping a 69-year-old farmer, and multiple vehicle thefts while attempting to evade police at high speeds. He pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), resulting in a 180-month prison sentence imposed by the district court. Kruger appealed, arguing that the court erred in applying the Sentencing Guidelines regarding the use of a firearm in the kidnapping and in calculating his criminal history.

The appellate court found no plain error regarding the firearm enhancement and noted that any potential error in calculating Kruger’s criminal history did not influence his sentencing range. Kruger’s background includes a troubled upbringing, substance abuse starting at a young age, and a lengthy criminal record that prohibited him from legally possessing firearms. He arranged for a .22 caliber rifle and ammunition to be purchased by another individual, which were eventually found in his possession. Evidence indicated that he had threatened his uncle with the firearm during an altercation.

Kruger demanded money from Dale, who opened a basement safe, allowing Kruger to take some cash. Kruger also stole firearms from a gun cabinet before Dale escaped to a neighbor's house to call the police. Kruger fled to the Reidl farm, where he threatened Linda with a handgun. Walter Reidl arrived and engaged Kruger in conversation, attempting to defuse the situation. To protect Linda, Walter proposed to take Kruger to Bloomington, which Kruger accepted. After changing clothes, Kruger forced Walter into the passenger seat of their truck, took a shotgun and his handgun, and drove away with Walter and a cow in tow.

During a two-hour drive to Dodgeville, Kruger inhaled crushed pills and refused Walter’s requests to be let go. Upon reaching Dodgeville, Walter convinced Kruger to let him call his wife, then locked himself inside a taxidermy shop, informing the proprietor of his hostage situation. Hearing police sirens, Kruger fled in the truck, abandoning the trailer and cow. A multi-agency manhunt ensued, involving local law enforcement and a state patrol aircraft. Kruger engaged in further criminal acts, including confronting another resident with a gun and stealing another vehicle. He was ultimately captured after a high-speed chase ended with spike strips puncturing his tires.

Kruger faced multiple state charges, but his firearm usage drew federal attention. A federal grand jury indicted him on three counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 922(g)(1). Count One involved a shotgun and ammunition purchased by Bonnie Forseth for Kruger in June 2013. Count Two related to his possession of the same shotgun and ammunition during mid-August 2013. Count Three stemmed from his possession of three firearms during his crime spree on September 10, 2013. Kruger pleaded guilty to Counts Two and Three in a written plea agreement.

Kruger expressed uncertainty regarding the timeline of his possession of a .22-caliber rifle and ammunition during a two-week period in August 2013, as charged in Count Two of the indictment. The government highlighted the end of this period, indicating police were informed by Kruger’s housemates about his possession of the rifle, which led to the impounding of the truck where it was stored. Kruger admitted to constructive possession of the ammunition on multiple occasions between August 14 and August 28 but could not pinpoint specific dates. At sentencing, his offense level and criminal history were assessed using the November 2014 Sentencing Guidelines, grouping Counts II and III together. Due to his possession of firearms in connection with other felonies, including robbery and kidnapping, his offense level was calculated based on the kidnapping guideline, resulting in the highest level. A two-level enhancement was applied for the use of a dangerous weapon during the kidnapping, where the court found he used a nine-millimeter handgun to coerce his victim. Kruger received six criminal history points, placing him in Category III, which included points for ongoing probation during the offense and a prior DUI conviction. This led to an adjusted offense level of 38, resulting in a Guidelines range of 292 to 365 months; however, the statutory maximum was 240 months, given the nature of the counts. After considering arguments from both sides and mitigating factors such as Kruger’s troubled upbringing and mental health issues, the district court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 180 months, citing serious offenses and a need for public protection while noting that a longer sentence for specific deterrence was not necessary. Kruger subsequently appealed the calculation of his advisory sentencing range, emphasizing that the court must properly determine that range at sentencing, referencing relevant case law on the matter.

Failure to correctly apply sentencing Guidelines and calculate a defendant’s sentencing range is considered a 'significant procedural error' as the Guidelines are crucial for structuring sentencing discretion. Kruger challenges a two-point increase in his offense level under Guidelines section 2A4.1(b)(3) based on the claim that he merely brandished a firearm during the kidnapping of Walter Reidl and did not 'otherwise use' a dangerous weapon as defined by U.S.S.G. 1B1.1, comment. n.1(I). Additionally, Kruger disputes the assignment of three criminal history points, asserting his category should be II instead of III. Since these arguments were not raised during the trial, they are subject to plain error review. The court concluded there was no plain error regarding the firearm use enhancement and determined that any potential error in criminal history calculation did not impact the advisory sentencing range, negating the need to assess that claim. To establish plain error, Kruger must demonstrate that the district court (1) erred, (2) the error was obvious, and (3) it affected his substantial rights. Guidelines section 2A4.1(b)(3) mandates a two-point enhancement for using a dangerous weapon in kidnapping. The commentary clarifies that 'otherwise used' exceeds mere brandishing. The court found Kruger’s actions, including having a handgun in his lap during the kidnapping, constituted 'otherwise use' that created a specific threat of harm to Reidl, justifying the enhancement without error.

Kruger did not explicitly threaten Walter with a gun during their departure from the farm; however, the broader context of their encounter indicates ongoing threats. Upon arriving at the Reidls’ farm, Kruger pointed a gun at Mrs. Reidl and later threatened to kill both Mr. and Mrs. Reidl. Walter's suggestion to accompany Kruger to ensure his wife’s safety came after these threats. Kruger maintained a visible handgun in his lap during their departure, which Walter perceived as a continuing threat. Walter was under Kruger’s control, having asked to be released but was denied, only managing to escape later. The district court found that Kruger used the firearm to intimidate Walter and convey threats, which was not an error.

Regarding Kruger’s criminal history points, he contested the assessment of one point for a 2013 conviction of operating a vehicle under the influence, arguing it was improperly included in his history. Additionally, he received two points for conducting a subsequent offense while on probation, which he claimed was incorrectly applied since his probation ended prior to the offense date. Even if these points were incorrectly assigned, they would not affect Kruger's sentencing range, which was capped at 240 months due to exceeding the statutory maximum. If Kruger’s adjusted offense level were reduced to 36 and his criminal history category to II, the range would then be 210 to 262 months, still capped at 240 months.

The district court's decision to apply a two-level enhancement for weapon use during the kidnapping was not plainly erroneous, and this is the sole challenge raised by Kruger regarding his offense level. Even if errors were found in the three contested criminal history points, resulting in a drop to a criminal history category II, Kruger’s sentencing range would still be 262 to 327 months, well above the statutory maximum. His advisory sentencing range would remain at 240 months, identical to what the district court used to determine his sentence. Ultimately, the court imposed a significantly lower sentence of 180 months. Kruger has failed to demonstrate any prejudice from the criminal history category assessment error, as it did not impact the advisory sentencing range. Consequently, there is no evidence that his sentence would differ without the alleged error. The court affirms Kruger’s sentence.