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Temistocles Ramirez De Arellano v. Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense
Citations: 724 F.2d 143; 233 U.S. App. D.C. 11Docket: 83-1950
Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; February 23, 1984; Federal Appellate Court
The case centers on an appeal by Temistocles Ramirez de Arellano and associated corporations against the Secretary of Defense regarding the alleged wrongful occupation of their property in Honduras, which was repurposed as a military training facility for Salvadoran soldiers. The district court dismissed the case, deeming it a nonjusticiable political question. However, the appeals court disagreed with this dismissal rationale but upheld the decision due to the plaintiffs' failure to present a viable claim for injunctive or other relief. The plaintiffs assert ownership of a large tract of land in northern Honduras, where they engage in cattle ranching and shrimp packing, with a total investment of about $13 million. In March 1983, the Defense Department designated their ranch as the site for a Regional Military Training Center, despite the land's private ownership being revealed later. The facility expanded from an initial plan of 1,500-2,000 acres to approximately 5,300 acres, affecting nearly half of the ranch and 90% of its grazing land. The military's presence has led to significant disruptions, including the destruction of grazing land, interruptions in water supply, harm to livestock, and a decrease in employee willingness to work in the area. No eminent domain proceedings or compensation for the plaintiffs have been initiated, though discussions occurred between Honduran officials and Ramirez regarding potential proceedings. The plaintiffs filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, claiming their property was unlawfully seized and damaged, violating due process and the Alien Tort Statute. They sought an injunction, declaratory judgment, and other relief. The district court dismissed the case, deeming it a nonjusticiable political question, citing the judiciary's reluctance to challenge the Commander-in-Chief's military decisions, the involvement of sensitive executive communications, and the potential interference with U.S. foreign affairs in Central America. However, the plaintiffs argued their case did not contest the legality of U.S. military presence in Honduras but focused on the unlawful deprivation of their land. They asserted that adjudicating land disputes is a traditional role of common-law courts, even in politically sensitive contexts. The court acknowledged that resolution of the case might not necessarily involve sensitive communications, as the existence of the military base is public knowledge, and executive privilege concerns could be addressed if they arose. The district court's concerns about impacting U.S. foreign policy were recognized but clarified that any potential harm would stem from injunctive relief rather than the adjudication of the plaintiffs' claims. The nature of the remedy sought would be significant in determining the overall political implications of the case. A federal appellate court may affirm a lower court's judgment based on different grounds than those provided by the original court. In this case, while the dismissal based on a political question was not justified, the appeal was affirmed because the plaintiffs failed to state a valid claim for relief. The plaintiffs sought an injunction, but general principles of equity, as outlined in the Administrative Procedure Act, suggest that such relief should not be granted, especially when it could interfere with foreign affairs. An injunction requiring the disbandment of a training camp for El Salvadoran troops, currently involved in defensive operations, would intrude on U.S. foreign relations. Furthermore, the potential implications of enforcing such an injunction during recent military actions, like those in Grenada, highlight the difficulties in assessing harm to military operations. If the injunction were to restrict the camp to non-plaintiff-owned adjacent lands, the courts would face challenges related to ongoing supervision, as injunctions generally are not suitable for situations requiring continuous court involvement. The reliance on the executive branch's compliance with court orders does not alleviate concerns over possible disputes regarding property incursions or accountability among military forces. Additionally, enforcing an injunction in a foreign territory raises separation of powers issues and complicates matters of federalism, as courts typically avoid intervening in disputes that cross jurisdictional boundaries. Overall, these factors weigh heavily against granting the requested injunctive relief. Courts are generally hesitant to issue injunctions that challenge foreign laws or the legality of actions taken by foreign officials. In this case, plaintiffs allege that Honduran forces are involved in activities impacting their property rights under Honduran law. Issuing the requested injunction would not only affect these forces but also imply that they are violating their own laws. The combination of various factors presents significant barriers to granting injunctive relief, as the plaintiffs, including Honduran corporations, have opted to seek resolution in U.S. courts instead of Honduran ones. The plaintiffs claim that U.S. officials would not submit to Honduran court jurisdiction; however, this is deemed irrelevant since Honduran courts have jurisdiction over actions affecting property rights there. While the plaintiffs raise constitutional claims that may not be addressed in Honduras, these claims are fundamentally linked to their property rights under Honduran law. They would find remedy in local courts if their rights were upheld. The court notes that it is inappropriate to issue an injunction based on these claims, particularly as the alleged violations are tied to Honduran law. The court's intervention would be no more justified than in a similar case against a private entity. Thus, at this stage, issuing an injunction is deemed inappropriate. Monetary relief is available to plaintiffs through the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1491, for valid claims of Fifth Amendment takings without just compensation, despite the court's refusal to grant an injunction. Although the plaintiffs have avoided using the term "taking," their allegations of unconstitutional seizure and deprivation of property clearly indicate potential claims that could be interpreted as takings. The dissent's argument that the Tucker Act remedy is unavailable due to alleged actions beyond governmental authority is challenged; it is established that illegal actions by government officers do not automatically disqualify them from being within their authority for Tucker Act purposes. A remedy under the Tucker Act is typically available when a taking occurs in the normal scope of an officer's duties unless explicitly barred by Congress. Previous cases cited by the dissent involved exceptions where agents acted outside their authority, as demonstrated in Hooe v. United States, where the court ruled against recovery due to specific limitations on the agent's authority. In United States v. North American Transportation, Trading Co., the Supreme Court ruled that a taking of property by a subordinate military officer was not compensable under the Tucker Act, as the statute granted confiscation power solely to the Secretary of War. Similarly, in Southern California Financial Corp. v. United States, the Court of Claims determined that a taking by the Air Force violated a law requiring Congressional approval for land condemnations valued over $50,000. Conversely, when a government agent acts within the scope of responsibilities assigned by Congress without express authority, Tucker Act remedies may still be available. For instance, in United States v. Causby, the Court found that the use of airspace above the plaintiffs' property for flight operations constituted a compensable taking, despite no explicit Congressional authorization for such takings below the minimum safe altitude. Additionally, in Portsmouth Harbor Land, Hotel Co. v. United States, the Court recognized a potential taking due to government actions affecting the plaintiffs' property, despite a lack of specific Congressional authority. The text asserts that no case has barred Tucker Act recovery solely due to Congress's failure to explicitly authorize a taking by a federal officer performing normal duties. It concludes that if a taking occurred in the present case involving Defense Department officials conducting military operations, a Tucker Act suit would be valid. Furthermore, the court determined that injunctive relief would be inappropriate and that a declaratory judgment, which is also discretionary, would similarly be precluded by prudential considerations, as it would yield the same negative effects as an injunction. A declaratory judgment in this case would compel the Secretary of Defense to either withdraw troops from the disputed area or compensate the plaintiffs, which would effectively mirror the remedies sought under the Tucker Act. However, because the property at issue exceeds $10,000, exclusive jurisdiction lies with the Claims Court, making it inappropriate for the district court to issue a declaratory judgment. Jurisdiction cannot be circumvented by framing the complaint as seeking only declaratory relief. The plaintiffs also seek relief under the Alien Tort Statute, which, even if applicable against the U.S., is limited to transitory actions, making ejectment or damages for trespass inappropriate as they are local actions. The district court may only grant monetary compensation under the Tucker Act, which limits claims to those under $10,000, while claims exceeding this amount must be directed to the Claims Court. The complaint's value exceeds this limit, thus affirming the Claims Court's exclusive jurisdiction. The court refrains from addressing the constitutional issues raised, noting dissenting opinions that assert the plaintiffs' claims are resolvable in their favor, but also questioning whether the Honduran corporations possess constitutional rights regarding actions taken in Honduras. Additionally, the constitutional claims of Ramirez and the Puerto Rican corporations are based on injuries to the Honduran corporations, and no precedent allows shareholders to bypass corporate structures to assert constitutional rights in such contexts. The principle that corporations, lacking 'citizenship,' do not enjoy 'privileges or immunities' under the Fourteenth Amendment is underlined, referencing Paul v. Virginia. In the context of warrantless surveillance, unincorporated associations are classified as 'United States persons' based on their members' citizenship, while corporations are treated according to their incorporation location, irrespective of stockholder citizenship. The dissent's argument that shareholders can claim constitutional rights related to corporate actions is primarily supported by the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, where the relevant shareholder was also a creditor, leaving the court's stance on the claim's basis unclear. The dissent accuses the majority of prejudgment and of obstructing plaintiff Ramirez's opportunity for relief, which the majority rejects. It clarifies that U.S. plaintiffs are not required to pursue claims in Honduran courts but must seek standard monetary compensation due to their status as shareholders. The majority also refutes the notion that the foreign affairs context shields unlawful conduct from scrutiny, asserting that while claims may be valid, an injunction is not warranted in this case. The dissent's appeal to the judicial protection of individual rights is noted, but the majority emphasizes a balanced approach to judicial intervention, stressing the need to uphold government functions and the separation of powers. The majority expresses confusion over the dissent's view that a district court can unconditionally intervene in ongoing constitutional violations by executive officials, arguing that such a perspective conflicts with their understanding of judicial and executive powers. The vision articulated emphasizes the limitations of the common-law tradition regarding injunctions as extraordinary remedies, highlighting the need for a balanced approach that respects both individual rights and the responsibilities of the legislative and executive branches. The judgment of the district court is affirmed, acknowledging that while the traditional relief available may not glorify the judicial role in protecting individual liberties, it aligns more closely with constitutional preservation. In dissent, Circuit Judge Wilkey argues against the majority opinion that dismisses plaintiff Temistocles Ramirez de Arellano's claim for equitable relief regarding the seizure and destruction of his cattle ranch by U.S. officials. Wilkey believes the district court has the authority to grant relief and advocates for remanding the case for further factual examination. The procedural background outlines that Ramirez and six corporate plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in July 1983 against high-ranking U.S. officials, alleging unconstitutional actions resulting in the construction of a military camp on Ramirez's property in Honduras. The plaintiffs claimed their property was seized without due process and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the case involved a nonjusticiable political question, which the district court accepted. Despite the political nuances, it is asserted that the district court had the jurisdictional authority under Article III to address the constitutional disputes arising from executive actions, regardless of their political implications. Plaintiff Ramirez's claim against federal officers for unconstitutional deprivation of property is deemed appropriate for federal court jurisdiction. The district court's dismissal of this claim for lack of jurisdiction was incorrect. Ramirez has sufficiently stated a claim that meets the standards for relief under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires the court to accept all material allegations as true and to interpret them in favor of the plaintiff. Dismissal is only warranted when it is clear that no facts could support the claim for relief. The appellate court's role is to rectify any improper reliance on external factual materials by the district court, which should not have considered evidence outside the complaint, especially if it favors the defendants. The majority's approach of examining extrinsic materials and concluding that they undermine Ramirez's well-pleaded complaint infringes upon the legal rights afforded to the plaintiffs, as it should be treated as a motion for summary judgment instead. Furthermore, even if external materials were permissible, any ambiguities should be interpreted in favor of the plaintiffs. The majority's interpretation improperly favors the defendants, misapplying the standard for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) by drawing inferences against the plaintiffs and neglecting supportive factual allegations. Speculation supporting the defendants suggests that Honduran troops may be involved in training activities, but the evidence does not conclusively establish that U.S. actions would obstruct Honduran military operations. The plaintiffs contend that Honduran officials desire the relocation of a U.S. training center, contradicting claims that equitable relief would harm Honduran interests. The majority opinion resolves doubts against the plaintiffs, asserting that relocating the camp would significantly burden public interest and create compliance issues for the district court. The analysis used to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) is criticized for improperly resolving disputed factual matters, which undermines the plaintiffs' rights in federal court. If proper standards are applied, dismissal is deemed inappropriate as plaintiff Ramirez's allegations may warrant relief. Plaintiff Ramirez is a U.S. citizen and the chief executive of a significant agricultural operation in Honduras, with a history of community service and substantial investment in the region. His property, valued at over $13 million, was allegedly seized following a decision by the U.S. Department of Defense in March 1983 to establish a military training center in Honduras, as alternative locations were not viable. The Honduran government initially resisted the U.S. Defense Department's decision to establish a military training camp in Honduras, citing a lack of suitable locations. However, in April 1983, the U.S. Department of Defense selected a specific site on plaintiffs' property for the camp. Construction commenced with the Army Corps of Engineers planning a facility for 1,000 personnel, despite plaintiff Ramirez informing U.S. Embassy officials of the camp's location on his land. As a result, the majority of the ranch’s 14,000 acres and 90% of its grazing land were repurposed for military use, including a tent camp, buildings, an ammunition storage facility, and a firing range, where over 100 U.S. Army Special Forces trained alongside 1,000 soldiers using live ammunition. The ranch suffered significant damages: prime grazing land was bulldozed, water flow to a meat-packing plant was disrupted, and cattle were harmed by stray bullets. Ranch employees, fearing for their safety, ceased cattle tending, leading to undernourished livestock. No compensation or eminent domain proceedings were initiated by either the Honduran or U.S. governments. Efforts by plaintiff Ramirez to resolve the issue with the State and Defense Departments were unsuccessful. The plaintiffs claimed multiple injuries, including the loss of property use, threats to their business, and personal intimidation from military activities. Additionally, the military presence made them potential targets for terrorist retaliation due to the perception that Ramirez was sponsoring the U.S. military camp. The plaintiffs' complaint asserts that the defendants' actions in establishing and operating the training camp on their property exceeded their lawful authority under U.S. laws and the Constitution. They argue that the Executive branch's power to seize private property must be rooted in Congressional action or constitutional provisions. A taking of private property by the Executive is unconstitutional unless authorized by Congress or the Constitution, as established in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, where the Supreme Court ruled against the President’s seizure of steel mills without legislative approval. In Count I of Ramirez's complaint, the claim asserts that federal defendants unlawfully seized his ranch, presenting an adjudicable case of unconstitutional deprivation of property. Count II alleges a violation of the Fifth Amendment due to the lack of prior notice and a hearing before the seizure, also presenting an adjudicable due process claim. If the plaintiffs succeed, the district court may grant relief against the defendants' unlawful actions, including injunctive or declaratory relief, even if damages against the U.S. government are not available. The court has broad equitable powers to shape remedies that address constitutional violations, balancing the nature of the violation against public and private interests. The court must determine the appropriateness of equitable relief based on the specifics of the violation, the injuries suffered, and the interests at stake. The plaintiffs’ claims suggest they lack adequate legal remedies, and the balance of equities favors granting relief. Therefore, the district court's dismissal of the case is deemed erroneous. The district court's potential finding of unlawful actions by federal defendants regarding the seizure of plaintiff Ramirez's property raises concerns about the adequacy of monetary relief. The claims suggest that such relief might be unavailable or insufficient. Notably, equitable relief cannot be dismissed simply because monetary compensation might be pursued in the Claims Court. The plaintiffs are contesting the defendants’ authority to seize their property, not merely the lack of just compensation. The applicability of the Tucker Act to the alleged unconstitutional seizure is questioned, as it might not allow recovery from public funds due to the defendants' unauthorized actions. Established case law, including the Supreme Court's decisions, indicates that unauthorized seizures by federal officers do not create a liability for compensation in the Claims Court. Specifically, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that a taking of property without legal authority does not constitute a government act, thus precluding recovery in the Court of Claims. Jurisdictional limitations of the Claims Court are well-established, with the determination of whether executive actions are sufficiently authorized under the Tucker Act dependent on case-specific facts and the lawful powers granted to defendants. Not all unlawful acts by government officials are deemed unauthorized regarding compensation claims. Recovery is possible where the government officials' actions are a direct consequence of congressionally sanctioned measures or discretion granted by Congress. Cases like United States v. Causby and Portsmouth Harbor Land Hotel Co. v. United States illustrate scenarios where actions taken under congressional authority could lead to compensation claims, emphasizing the importance of determining the scope of authority in each case. Military officials were initially authorized to construct a fort and staff it with weapons, making the Court hesitant to find a lack of authority regarding the firing of guns that caused property damage. However, the case was remanded to the Court of Claims to assess whether the officials had sufficient authority to fire the guns, which would determine if the government could be held liable for the property damage. Actions taken by officials outside their statutory or constitutional authority are deemed unauthorized under the Tucker Act, which does not allow for monetary recovery against the government unless actions are in substantial compliance with congressional grants of authority. The Claims Court has reiterated that Congress retains control over government obligations related to property seizures. A recent case, Southern California Financial Corporation v. United States, illustrated these limits when the Court of Claims found that Air Force officials lacked authority to seize land for military purposes, denying monetary relief under the Tucker Act. Although claimants can seek injunctions or declaratory judgments against unauthorized government actions, the dismissal of Ramirez's complaint was not justified on Tucker Act grounds, as the determination of authority and merits of the case had not been fully explored. The appellate decision improperly addressed the merits of the case during a jurisdictional appeal, which is considered an abuse of discretion. The majority's conclusion regarding the scope of the defendants' authority for a Tucker Act remedy will be treated as res judicata in the Claims Court. Monetary relief may be inadequate for plaintiff Ramirez's claims regarding the unconstitutional seizure of property by government officials. The core issue is not simply the absence of just compensation, but rather the defendants' legal authority to expropriate property. The Fifth Amendment’s just compensation clause governs lawful eminent domain but does not imply that monetary damages can remedy unconstitutional actions. The court must assess whether damages can adequately address the constitutional violations claimed. The plaintiffs' injuries, including the seizure of land, threats to their agro-industrial complex, and risks to personal safety, are difficult to quantify in monetary terms and typically deemed irremediable at law. Equitable relief may be necessary to address unconstitutional takings and nuisances. The potential loss of plaintiff Ramirez's business, coupled with the threat to his family's safety—allegedly heightened by defendants' actions—cannot be remedied through financial compensation alone. Such violations create life-threatening conditions that monetary damages do not adequately address. The district court can appropriately conclude that legal remedies are insufficient for the alleged constitutional violations. The claim that plaintiffs should be restricted to the Claims Court lacks merit, as it undermines the fundamental right to seek relief for ongoing violations of constitutional rights. Ramirez is entitled to pursue injunctive and declaratory relief, along with damages, in the district court against the named defendants. Monetary relief may be deemed inadequate, allowing the district court to favor equitable relief based on the circumstances outlined in the plaintiffs' complaint. Plaintiff Ramirez asserts an unconstitutional invasion of his property by U.S. military officers, jeopardizing his land, a 20-year investment, and personal safety. This case transcends typical trespass disputes, invoking significant legal principles regarding judicial protection against unconstitutional government actions. The court is inclined to grant equitable relief unless there is substantial public harm demonstrated against such relief. The location of the plaintiffs' land in a foreign country does not impede the court's ability to provide relief, as courts can issue equitable decrees regarding foreign property when they have personal jurisdiction over the defendants. The Supreme Court has affirmed that the presence of necessary parties allows for judicial action regardless of the property's location. Additionally, when federal law governs the plaintiffs' claims, as is the case here against U.S. officials, the court's jurisdiction takes precedence, and any relevant foreign law must align with federal principles. The application of local law in this context is irrelevant, as the case primarily revolves around U.S. legal standards. Courts are willing to issue equitable decrees regarding foreign land if there is no compelling reason to require claims to be pursued in the foreign jurisdiction. In the case of Plaintiff Ramirez, a U.S. citizen alleging constitutional rights violations by U.S. officials, it is inappropriate to force him to seek relief in Honduran courts, which would distort equitable discretion principles. Equitable relief in this context would not challenge Honduran sovereignty or law, as it would solely address the rights of the plaintiff under U.S. law without impugning Honduran military actions. The absence of a claim by Honduras regarding ownership of Ramirez's ranch further supports this position. The involvement of Honduran military forces in U.S. military training exercises remains a disputed fact and does not bar equitable relief against U.S. officials for constitutional violations. Concerns about separation of powers do not prevent judicial relief for unlawful actions by Executive Branch officers, including in foreign affairs. Judicial inquiry is permissible regardless of the officer's location or duties, and unlawful military activity can be addressed through equitable relief, as reaffirmed in case law. The Supreme Court has consistently maintained that military officers are accountable for specific unlawful conduct, allowing for remedies such as damages or injunctive relief based on equitable principles. If the court determines that executive authority has been exceeded and that equitable relief via injunction is necessary to protect the injured party, it cannot be argued that judicial power is restricted simply because the injury stems from a military order. Although Laird v. Tatum advises against ongoing judicial oversight of executive policy, it affirms the courts' responsibility to address claims of actual injury from unlawful executive actions. The plaintiffs' allegations do not suggest that an equitable decree would hinder the Executive's ability to conduct foreign affairs, as relief could be structured to comply with U.S. constitutional and statutory requirements without disrupting relations with Central American countries or military policies. Concerns regarding enforcement and supervision of such a decree are unfounded and based on hypothetical scenarios not substantiated by the plaintiffs' claims. The court should assume that federal officers will comply with judicial orders, reflecting a longstanding tradition of military support for judicial enforcement. The majority's conclusion that equitable relief presents compliance issues is flawed, as it overlooks the possibility of alternative sites for military activities and the feasibility of limiting training to specific areas without conflict. No legitimate factors suggest restraint in granting injunctive relief in this case, and even if there were prudential considerations against it, a fair assessment of the equities favors the plaintiffs and supports the district court's discretion to grant relief. The majority opinion neglects the plaintiffs' equities and the public interest in upholding the Constitution, denying relief based on misinterpretations of the plaintiffs' claims and irrelevant facts. The district court retains authority to address the plaintiffs' claims regarding the unconstitutional occupation and seizure of their land by U.S. military officers, as the plaintiffs have adequately stated a claim for relief. The Declaratory Judgment Act aims to provide a less coercive remedy than injunctive relief and can offer the defendants options for compliance that a specific injunction would not. A declaration of the plaintiffs' rights could prompt the defendants to seek congressional authorization, pursue lawful expropriation, limit activities to public land, settle, or take other actions. The potential for monetary relief derived from a declaration does not negate the court's authority to grant such relief. The court must consider the plaintiffs' claims, which are not insubstantial or frivolous, and cannot bar declaratory relief based on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Claims Court without addressing the merits of the claims. The majority's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims undermines federal remedial powers intended to protect individual rights against unconstitutional military actions, contradicting historical commitments to safeguard citizens’ rights. The continuation of alleged unconstitutional military occupation of private property cannot be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The majority’s stance erroneously suggests that addressing such military overreach falls outside the judicial authority. A U.S. district court has the authority to intervene and halt ongoing constitutional violations against a citizen, asserting that monetary relief should not be the sole remedy available after the fact, particularly when U.S. officials are involved. The dissent emphasizes that citizens should not be forced to seek redress in foreign courts for grievances caused by U.S. officials' actions, such as the destruction of property and personal safety. In a letter dated November 18, 1983, Temistocles Ramirez de Arellano urgently informs U.S. Ambassador John Dimitri Negroponte about the unauthorized invasion of his property in Puerto Castilla by U.S. armed personnel and tanks, which contradicts previous assurances from U.S. officials that such an incursion would not occur. The letter details the invasion, including demands made by the tank commander for access to the property, and expresses legal and moral accountability for the U.S. government's actions. The document also notes procedural aspects of a district court's dismissal of a case regarding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. It outlines that the court considered extrinsic evidence, which necessitates treating the motion as one for summary judgment. The court's reliance on the complaint and affidavits is affirmed, indicating that any procedural errors did not affect the plaintiffs' substantial rights. The dissent emphasizes the district court’s acknowledgment of essential disputes regarding material facts in the case. While there are indeed disputed facts, the majority has resolved all in favor of the plaintiffs but concludes that they still fail to state a claim, justifying dismissal. The dissent's suggestion that the camp could be relocated away from the plaintiffs' property is interpreted as effectively advocating for the closure of the existing camp and establishment of a new one. The majority asserts that determining the geopolitical and military merits of various potential training camp locations is beyond their expertise and considers the closure of the existing camp an intrusion. The only alternative to the conclusion that an injunction would intrude upon foreign affairs is allowing the current camp to continue operating on its existing site adjacent to the plaintiffs' property. The dissent raises a possibility that the injunction could exclude a portion of the ranch known as the "designated area," but the majority notes that even if such an exclusion was possible, supervision issues would remain. The dissent’s reference to courts issuing equitable decrees involving property outside their jurisdiction is acknowledged, but the majority maintains that enjoining a trespass in another jurisdiction is not supported by prevailing authority. Furthermore, the Defense Department’s claim that U.S. forces are present only at the invitation of the Honduran government cannot be evaluated at this stage due to the controversy surrounding it, and is not applicable to the motion under consideration. The affidavits submitted by plaintiffs detail ongoing military activities observed in the Taya Crique and Los Presos areas, including the presence of American soldiers (Green Berets) and Honduran and Salvadoran troops entering and exiting with military equipment. Specific affidavits indicate that groups of soldiers, sometimes numbering up to 100, have been seen almost daily. Plaintiffs have sought assistance from U.S. and Honduran military officials for escorting workers into the fields, and it is acknowledged that Honduran troops are involved in operations, though they did not participate in the preliminary site selection for a training camp, which is a significant point for the plaintiffs. The dissent argues that the district court improperly relied on extrinsic facts favoring the defendants, but it is clarified that such materials must be considered under Rule 12(b)(6) when submitted. The plaintiffs’ appeal focuses on whether the district court wrongly accepted portions of these materials that were favorable to the defendants. Ultimately, the decision does not harm the plaintiffs' substantial rights since it is based on their submissions. Additionally, the Federal Tort Claims Act does not provide recourse for damages occurring abroad, which is relevant to the case's context. The dissent refrains from commenting on the validity of the Alien Tort Statute claim, suggesting that the Honduran plaintiffs may still pursue a monetary remedy. It references the Restatement of Agency, noting that a master can be liable for trespass or conversion by a servant acting within their employment scope. The Secretary exercised authority later, while the initial action by a subordinate officer was relevant only to the timeliness of a Tucker Act claim, which was ultimately denied to preserve another remedy. The dissent questions the correctness of the Southern California Financial Corp. outcome, particularly since the Court of Claims later determined that the applicable statute, 10 U.S.C. § 2662(c), pertains only to formal acquisitions, not inverse condemnations like the current case. The dissent's concerns regarding Tucker Act relief are further addressed, emphasizing that 10 U.S.C. § 2676 does not eliminate such relief in inverse condemnation cases against the military. The discussion references past cases to support the argument that a broad exemption from Tucker Act liability for military actions has not been previously suggested. It critiques the dissent's interpretation of the Portsmouth case, clarifying that the Supreme Court's remand did not imply a lack of authority but rather a procedural necessity due to the case's status. The dissent's reliance on Youngstown Sheet. Tube Co. v. Sawyer is noted as misguided since it conflates the issues of authority under the Tucker Act with constitutional authority. Lastly, the dissent's view that the Tucker Act remedy is inadequate due to the immeasurable nature of property damage is countered by asserting that such reasoning would undermine the government's eminent domain power. The argument that threats to an individual's physical safety constitute irreparable harm is dismissed, as it presumes intent to harm by the government that is not present. The threat to the plaintiff's physical safety is directly linked to their ongoing occupation of the land in question. It is established that a government taking cannot be prevented simply because the land is repurposed into a use that poses hazards to the former owner. The dissent's argument regarding the intertwining of jurisdictional issues with the merits of the case is addressed, affirming that it is acceptable for an appellate court to uphold a dismissal based on jurisdictional grounds even while considering the merits. Jurisdictional determinations are often interrelated with the substantive issues of a case, such as standing, which can influence the entitlement to relief under the relevant statute. The plaintiffs claim an investment worth $13,000,000 in the property, with significant portions occupied by a military base. The court notes that the effect of a declaratory judgment is equivalent to a successful outcome in a Tucker Act suit, challenging the dissent's view that this equivalence is merely a pretext. Since the plaintiffs did not seek monetary relief and could refile their claims in the Claims Court without any time constraints, the case will not be transferred under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1631. The dissent's suggestion of asserting standing issues is countered by recognizing that the American plaintiffs have a valid constitutional claim. Lastly, the dissent's cited cases do not pertain to claims by foreign corporations regarding actions outside U.S. jurisdiction, establishing a distinction in legal precedents. A corporation chartered in the Philippines claims a taking of property that occurred while the Philippines were a U.S. possession under the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934. The dissent references a letter from plaintiff Ramirez to the U.S. Ambassador to Honduras, written after the appeal was argued, but the majority finds this irrelevant and regrets its potential to encourage improper appellate practices. The court agrees with the majority's conclusion that the plaintiffs' claims are justiciable and not nonjusticiable political questions. The plaintiffs include two U.S. nationals (Puerto Rican) and four Honduran corporations, who collectively hold the title through Ramirez. The third count of the complaint alleges violations of the Law of Nations under the Alien Tort Claims Act. The court mentions that the majority implies, but does not definitively hold, that the U.S. plaintiffs may lack standing due to their ownership structure. However, this issue was not raised in the litigation, and the majority's decision did not hinge on it. The U.S. plaintiffs have alleged substantial harm to their businesses in Honduras due to the defendants' unconstitutional seizure. As sole owners of their businesses, they are entitled to sue for this alleged unconstitutional destruction. Additionally, their status as ultimate shareholders of the corporations holding title to the land gives them a legally protected property interest against the alleged unconstitutional actions. Reference is made to a precedent where a sole shareholder was found to have sufficient interest to challenge a taking of property without just compensation. U.S. plaintiffs maintain the right to sue regardless of corporate ownership of the land involved. Established legal precedent affirms that U.S. citizens retain protections against unconstitutional takings of their property, even if located overseas. For instance, a U.S. citizen's property in Austria was protected when seized for U.S. military use. The incorporation of a U.S. entity abroad does not diminish the plaintiffs' property interests in this context. Additionally, the alien Honduran corporations can independently assert claims of unconstitutional seizure, irrespective of U.S. citizenship ownership. Historical practices show American investors have incorporated abroad to align with local entities regarding taxation and labor laws, without diminishing their constitutional protections against U.S. actions. The implication that such incorporation affects these rights raises significant concerns for corporate legal counsel. Procedural rules require that if matters outside the pleadings are presented during a motion to dismiss, it must be treated as a motion for summary judgment, allowing both parties to present relevant materials. However, plaintiffs did not receive these procedural rights, and summary judgment is inappropriate due to existing material factual disputes, as noted by the District Court. The uncertainty surrounding the involvement of Honduran troops further emphasizes these disputes. Conflicting declarations exist regarding the involvement of Honduran troops in U.S. military operations on the plaintiffs' property, with some indicating occasional escorting of American forces while others deny any participation. The Green Berets conducted reconnaissance for training areas without Honduran military presence, according to Mr. Bobilya's declaration. Mr. Ramirez reported that American soldiers were observed surveying his ranch independently of Honduran forces. Ramirez also stated that the Honduran Armed Forces would relocate the military camp at the request of the U.S., reflecting a power imbalance where U.S. interests dominate. Plaintiffs claim that the Honduran perspective sees the issue as primarily a U.S. problem. They argue their ability to demonstrate that equitable relief wouldn't affect Honduran actions or laws is hindered, and that logistical challenges exist regarding potential relocation or compliance with court orders. Ramirez's declarations assert that discussions with Honduran officials about eminent domain were limited to a specific section of his ranch and did not initiate lawful expropriation proceedings. The majority opinion misinterprets the plaintiffs' claims as demands for just compensation under the Claims Court's jurisdiction, while the plaintiffs argue their constitutional claim is based on the illegality of the defendants' actions, which may not fall under the Claims Court's purview. The Supreme Court determined that the capture of foreign fishing vessels by U.S. officials off the coast of Cuba during wartime was unlawful due to a lack of congressional authorization. Plaintiffs' claims rely on precedents requiring prior notice and a hearing before depriving individuals of property rights, citing cases such as Fuentes v. Shevin and Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank. The Claims Court has exclusive jurisdiction for monetary claims over $10,000 under the Tucker Act, but the current claims may not fall within its jurisdiction. Courts are generally hesitant to issue interim equitable relief, especially before claims are proven, as seen in Adams v. Vance, which emphasized the need for a strong showing by plaintiffs for preliminary injunctions against the Executive. The majority opinion suggested that all forms of equitable relief would necessarily lead to the termination of a military training camp, a conclusion not grounded in the plaintiffs' allegations; alternative remedies could be available, such as confining activities to a designated area or utilizing non-adjacent public property. The document also references the flexibility of courts of equity to tailor remedies to specific cases. Several cases are cited throughout, reinforcing principles related to property rights, equitable relief, and jurisdiction under the Tucker Act. Acquisition of private property by military officials is strictly limited to instances where it is explicitly authorized by law, as stipulated in 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2676. The defendants in this case failed to provide any congressional authorization for the alleged military acquisition of the plaintiffs' land. The authority for military property acquisition may come from specific statutes, including the annual Military Construction Authorization Acts or provisions that allow the Secretary of a military department to acquire limited interests in land, such as leaseholds or interests costing less than $100,000. The legality of the military's actions hinges on the property's value, the type of interest acquired, and other relevant facts not yet determined. The majority opinion asserts that statutory requirements for military property acquisition do not apply to inverse condemnations, yet Congress intended to retain control over military expropriations regardless of the method used. Even if procedural missteps do not negate a Tucker Act compensation claim in some inverse condemnation scenarios, substantial compliance with legal authority remains essential. In Armijo v. United States, the Court of Claims ruled that failure to adhere to reporting requirements did not invalidate the authority for a Tucker Act claim, provided the inverse condemnation was otherwise authorized. However, the defendants have not cited any legal basis for the claimed inverse condemnation in this case. The majority opinion holds that the Tucker Act provides a cause of action for compensation when the government exercises lawful eminent domain, which precludes due process claims. However, it does not resolve whether a Tucker Act remedy is applicable when officials do not utilize authorized eminent domain powers. The majority's assertion that a former property owner cannot retain possession after government acquisition overlooks the fact that U.S. defendants have explicitly disclaimed any property interests in the plaintiffs' land, thus negating any obligation for the plaintiffs to vacate their property in response to alleged unconstitutional actions. Additionally, the majority incorrectly interprets the action as governed by Honduran law and misapplies the relevance of foreign government participation to the court's authority to grant equitable relief. This mischaracterization affects the merits of the plaintiffs' case regarding potential violations of constitutional rights, independent of the damages or equitable relief sought. In *Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld*, the court references several cases regarding the government’s liability for unlawful destruction of property and the scope of executive action. Key cases include *United States v. Caltex*, which addresses military officials' actions in the Philippines, and *Reid v. Covert*, which touches on federalism and executive authority. The excerpt notes that courts can impose limitations on military activities and suggests that equitable relief may not be granted if it necessitates long-term oversight of a business. The document highlights the judiciary's role in determining compliance and appropriate penalties in disputes, as well as the continued jurisdiction of the court even if a declaratory judgment may lead to monetary damages. Additionally, it emphasizes the constitutional provision against quartering soldiers without consent and includes a recent letter from plaintiff Ramirez to the U.S. Ambassador to Honduras, detailing ongoing events that prompted his legal action.