Seneca Surety Co., Inc., Dba Eydie's Bail Bonds, Through Victor Burgess, Agent v. Kalvin Davon Ross

Citations: 507 S.W.3d 798; 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 12650; 2015 WL 8948435Docket: 08-14-00101-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; December 14, 2015; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Seneca Insurance Company appeals a judgment mandating the return of a $750 bail bond premium, raising a question of statutory interpretation regarding the term "reasonable cause" under Section 1704.207(c) of the Texas Occupations Code. This clause pertains to when a trial court may require a bail bond surety to return part or all of a bond premium following the surrender of a criminal defendant. The case involves Kalvin Ross, charged with felony assault and two misdemeanors, who engaged Eydie’s Bail Bonds (Seneca) to post a total of $15,000 in bonds. Ross agreed to a $1,500 premium, paying $700 upfront and intending to pay the remaining $800 over three months, later modified to bi-weekly payments due to his financial situation. By January 2014, Ross had paid $955 towards the premium. On January 24, 2014, Seneca submitted an affidavit claiming Ross failed to meet payment obligations and could not be produced for court, leading to a capias issued on January 30, 2014. Ross appeared in court on January 31, 2014, where bail was set again and a show cause hearing was scheduled to evaluate the reasonableness of Seneca's claim.

Ross, Victor Burgess, and Eydie Burgess provided testimony at the hearing regarding Ross's bail bond situation. Victor, who signed the surrender affidavit, expressed concerns about Ross's court attendance due to non-payment of fees and a lack of communication while out on bond, despite lacking personal knowledge to substantiate his claims. Ross acknowledged agreeing to a $1,500 bond premium and making some payments, but cited job-seeking efforts as the reason for not completing payments. He mentioned an agreement with a Seneca employee to make bi-weekly payments, although he admitted to not adhering to this arrangement fully. Ross attended all scheduled court dates in January 2014.

Eydie, a Seneca manager, confirmed the issuance of three bail bonds totaling $15,000 and explained that payments were allocated pro-rata among the bonds. She maintained that Ross's failure to pay was indicative of a potential flight risk, despite the court suggesting that non-payment was primarily a civil issue. The court expressed confusion over the timing of Seneca's concerns about Ross's court appearances, noting that he had shown up for his court date on January 17, 2014. Ultimately, the trial court concluded there was no reasonable cause for Ross's surrender, stating that the evidence did not support Seneca's claims. The court ordered Seneca to refund the $750 premium to Ross and separated this matter into a different proceeding, making it a final judgment.

When a surety signs a bail bond, it takes on financial risk if the defendant fails to appear. Under Texas law, the surety can relieve itself of this liability by surrendering the defendant to authorities, notifying them of the defendant's incarceration, or filing an affidavit for surrender. Case law allows the defendant to sue for breach of the bail agreement, and a quicker remedy is available under Texas Occupations Code § 1704.207(2), which enables surrender through an affidavit if it provides adequate information about the defendant and the reason for surrender. However, the surrender can be contested if deemed without "reasonable cause," a term not defined by statute or case law.

The review standard for the trial court's ruling is contested. One party favors abuse of discretion review, while the other argues for de novo review based on statutory interpretation. The absence of formal findings means the trial court's judgment can be upheld if supported by any legal theory. Implicit factual findings are not conclusive and can be challenged based on evidence. When mixed questions of law and fact arise, abuse of discretion applies, deferring to factual findings if they are evidence-supported but assessing legal conclusions de novo. The trial court's verbal explanations cannot replace missing formal findings. The trial court's statements indicate potential rationales for refunding the premium, including concerns over risk of flight and unclear documentation regarding payment terms, suggesting multiple possible justifications for its decision.

The case examines the trial court's determination of "reasonable cause" related to a surety's obligation to refund part of a bond premium under Section 1704.207 of the Texas Occupations Code. A surety contested a judgment that required a refund, arguing that their claim of insecurity was reasonable. The appellate court clarified that the central issue is whether there was sufficient evidence supporting the trial court's implied findings rather than solely whether Ross's failure to pay the bond premium constituted reasonable cause.

Key points include the nature of the agreement between the parties, which lacked a definitive written contract outlining payment terms, instead relying on a single-page form and handwritten notes. The trial court had evidence indicating that the bond premium was not delinquent, and acknowledged modifications to the payment terms. Importantly, while the surety argued that non-payment indicated a flight risk, evidence suggested that Ross attended all court dates and remained in contact with the surety, undermining the claim that non-payment increased his risk of flight.

The court determined that the surety's witnesses did not assert that non-payment alone justified surrendering Ross. Consequently, the appellate court overruled the surety's argument and affirmed the trial court's judgment, leaving unresolved the broader legal question of whether a principal’s material breach through non-payment constitutes reasonable cause under Section 1704.207(c). The burden of proof at the reasonable cause hearing was also deemed not necessary to address in this ruling.