Raul Trevino Lara Jr. v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 13-14-00123-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; September 18, 2015; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The document pertains to the appeal case Raul Lara v. The State of Texas, identified as Cause No. 13-14-00123-CR, filed in the Thirteenth Court of Appeals in Corpus Christi, Texas. The appeal originates from the 275th District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas, presided over by Judge Juan Partida. The State of Texas is represented by Criminal District Attorney Ricardo Rodriguez, Jr., with Glenn W. Devino as lead counsel for the appellee.

The document includes a detailed identification of parties and attorneys involved in the case: Raul Lara as the appellant, represented by Judith Pena-Morales, E. Omar Maldonado, and O. Rene Flores at trial, and Rolando Garza on appeal. It notes that E. Omar Maldonado has transitioned to a judicial role and had his motion to withdraw as appellant's counsel granted prior to the trial proceedings.

Additionally, the document describes citation formats for referencing records and transcripts in the appeal. It clarifies the proper notation for Clerk’s Records and Reporter’s Records, including specific references to various proceedings and discrepancies in volume numbering to prevent confusion. The document is officially filed and accepted on September 18, 2015.

Identification of parties and counsel is outlined, followed by a note on citation form and a detailed table of contents. The document includes an index of authorities, a statement of the case, issues presented, and a summary of arguments. Key issues include the trial court's decision regarding the classification of witnesses as accomplices and the admissibility of written custodial statements. The appellant, charged with murder, filed motions to suppress evidence, including written and recorded statements, and sought a hearing on the intentions of co-defendants regarding their Fifth Amendment rights. The court granted motions for discovery related to any agreements affecting witness testimony. Ultimately, the appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to 55 years in prison, with no motion for a new trial filed, followed by a timely notice of appeal.

The trial court did not err in allowing the jury to decide whether two witnesses were accomplices, nor is the appellant entitled to a reversal based on alleged errors regarding the admission of written custodial statements. 

During a suppression hearing prior to trial, the appellant underwent two recorded interviews with different investigators. In the first interview, the appellant received and acknowledged his Miranda rights, waived them knowingly and intelligently, and provided a written statement that was not influenced by threats or promises. The investigators informed the appellant about other witnesses implicating him, but he did not express confusion about his rights or invoke his right to counsel.

In the second interview, conducted after additional witness information was obtained, the appellant again waived his rights, which appeared to be done knowingly and voluntarily, although the investigator prompted him to initial the waiver form. The written statement from this interview was also a summary rather than a verbatim account, and the appellant chose to have the investigator draft it instead of writing it himself. At no point did the appellant indicate confusion regarding his rights or request further explanation.

Appellant had the opportunity to review and modify a draft statement before signing it but did not request any changes. The investigator from the second interview acknowledged that he would have used different questioning techniques compared to the first interrogation, which was recorded only in audio. The second interview was both audio and video recorded, capturing Appellant reading a waiver of rights. During this recording, Appellant confirmed his willingness to answer questions and stated he did not want an attorney present, indicating he understood his rights without coercion. 

A cross-examination revealed that the investigator believed Appellant understood his rights, based on him reading the waiver and agreeing on video. At the suppression hearing, Appellant filed a motion to suppress his written statement. He argued that the statement did not demonstrate on its face that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights, as required by Texas law. Additionally, he claimed the lack of a direct question regarding his waiver and suggested that coercion influenced his initial statement. Appellant also argued that his limited formal education impaired his ability to make a valid waiver. The prosecutor countered that the video evidence and related documents showed Appellant comprehended his rights and made a valid waiver, fulfilling all necessary legal requirements.

The prosecutor argued that the Appellant demonstrated sufficient intellectual understanding during interrogation, as he comprehended and responded intelligently to questions and rights waivers, despite potentially being unable to read. The Appellant contended that the assessment of voluntariness should be considered in isolation. Both parties agreed that arguments regarding the admissibility of initial interview waivers and statements would also apply to subsequent interrogations, with the defense providing additional arguments for the waiver from the second statement. The Appellant raised concerns about the admissibility of recordings, citing issues related to gang affiliation, prior convictions, and information from codefendants invoking the Fifth Amendment. The prosecutor acknowledged the inappropriateness of presenting the full recordings to the jury and proposed ensuring only appropriate portions were played. The defense expressed objections to the redaction process and the admission of recordings into evidence without proper redaction, suggesting that any jury review of recordings should occur in court with only the permissible segments shown. The trial court ultimately denied the suppression motions regarding both statements and recordings and recognized the need to document findings on the admissibility of the challenged statements, responding to the defense's request for such documentation. The defense also objected to the recordings being presented without a transcript of the interviews.

Lucinda Tijerina and Julissa Tijerina, both juveniles at the time of the incident, were detained in connection with a shooting, but no delinquent conduct petitions were filed against them. During a pre-trial conference, defense counsel noted that a "reveal the deal" motion had been granted, confirming that none of the co-defendants had agreements to testify against the appellant, Mr. Lara. The prosecutor reiterated that there were no anticipated agreements and that the two juveniles previously involved had their cases dismissed, with no deals made regarding their potential testimony.

Later, it was revealed that Lucinda Tijerina accepted an immunity offer in exchange for her testimony related to the murder investigation, ensuring she would not be prosecuted for her actions that night. This was confirmed during her examination by both her attorney and the appellant's counsel. A similar immunity offer was noted for Julissa Tijerina, with both individuals having provided statements to authorities prior to any discussions about immunity.

In the trial's evidentiary phase, a neighborhood resident testified to hearing sounds resembling fireworks, later discovering a bullet had struck his home. Another witness described loud firecracker sounds. Additionally, Stevie Ray Aguilar testified about visiting a friend's home with others on the night in question, noting that they encountered a gathering that was more of a casual get-together rather than a loud party.

Aguilar observed a gathering of ten to twelve predominantly male individuals in a parking lot, near vehicles including a black GTO and a maroonish Malibu Impala. An argument broke out, prompting Lucinda and Julissa Tijerina to leave after being told they were underage. Lucinda had also received a call from her sister, Yaritza, indicating their mother wanted them home. After unsuccessfully seeking a ride from friends, the two girls started walking. Yaritza later picked them up a short distance away, and the van returned to the gathering site. Aguilar noted the van, initially driven by a man, was later driven by Yaritza when it made a U-turn back to the party. 

Upon their return, an individual in the van called out to someone at the party, expressing concern over his 'prima.' Juan Pablo Sosa, addressed by the caller, responded without understanding the context. Tension escalated when the individual in the van brandished a pistol, causing Sosa to back away. As the situation intensified, Aguilar witnessed the gunman cock the weapon, prompting a panicked reaction from the crowd, which began to scatter. Witness Antonio Navarro corroborated that after a brief exchange, the gunman loaded his weapon. Both Lucinda and Julissa identified two gunmen who opened fire, each wielding their own guns. Navarro noted that the shooting appeared indiscriminate rather than targeted at a specific vehicle. Aguilar, in a bid to avoid gunfire, ducked in the backseat of a car as shots were fired, noting the sound of glass shattering and bullets hitting the vehicle while it moved slowly away from the scene.

The victim, Miguel Vasquez, was shot at multiple times while driving, rendering him unable to accelerate and causing the vehicle to move uncontrollably until Aguilar intervened to stop it. Witnesses were transported by police for questioning about the incident, leading officers to a property where a van matching the suspect's vehicle description was found. Several witnesses, including Julissa Tijerina and Nicholas Zapata, identified the Appellant as the shooter. Zapata recognized the Appellant from news media images after the shooting, stating that he would never forget the shooter's face. Other witnesses corroborated this identification, including Juan Pablo Sosa, who recognized the Appellant from a newspaper and felt that one would not forget someone who attempted to take their life. A witness identified another individual, Eric Atwood, as being present during the incident but admitted uncertainty regarding the Appellant's voice. After the shooting, the Appellant mentioned to others in the van that he hadn't engaged in such behavior recently and indicated it was "fun." Upon arriving at a friend's home, the Appellant and another individual searched the van for evidence. During his first custodial interview, the Appellant was advised of his rights by Investigator Ileana Pena, acknowledged understanding, and chose to waive those rights.

No threats were made to the Appellant during the interview process. The Appellant read and understood the waiver form before signing it. An investigator informed the Appellant that other witnesses had implicated him but failed to mention that a witness, Jasmine, indicated another person, El Negro (Atwood), was the shooter. During the trial, it was established that investigators typically do not lie during interrogations, although the investigator confirmed that it was true others pointed fingers at the Appellant. The Appellant’s first written statement denied any knowledge of the shooting, and Investigator Pena found his account untruthful, prompting further witness interviews.

After the first interview, law enforcement officials initiated a second interrogation at the direction of their lieutenant. The Appellant was again advised of his rights, which he acknowledged by reading the waiver aloud before signing. The investigator admitted that he directed the Appellant to sign the waiver and that witnesses on the form did not observe the rights being issued. The investigator maintained that the waiver was obtained prior to the interrogation, and the Appellant did not invoke any rights during the process.

In his second written statement, the Appellant admitted to being in the van during the shooting but denied any engagement with individuals in the parking lot, instead claiming that ‘Little Bear’ (Leonardo Moreno) was responsible for the gunfire. He stated he was initially seated in the middle of the vehicle and later moved to the rear, from which position he opened the driver-side passenger door.

The testifying officer stated that reaching a passenger door latch from the rear seat of the vehicle would require an individual to be exceptionally tall. The record indicates minimal discussion regarding the jury charge, with a correction made to the case number without objection. The defense did not object to the proposed jury instructions, affirmatively stating twice that there were no objections. The jury charge, recorded at CR250, included instructions on the law related to statements made by the accused and posed the question of whether witnesses Julissa Tijerina and Lucinda Tijerina were accomplices.

The trial court clarified that an accomplice is someone who participated in the crime and that there must be evidence of an affirmative act to assist in the crime. A witness cannot simply be deemed an accomplice based on knowledge of the offense or presence at the scene. The prosecutor noted a lack of evidence of affirmative acts by the witnesses, and even if they were determined to be accomplices, their testimony could still be considered if corroborated by other evidence, such as eyewitness accounts, fingerprints, and the defendant's own statements.

The trial court did not err in allowing the jury to decide on the witness status or in admitting the appellant's statements, which were made voluntarily and without coercion. Any potential error in admitting the statements did not affect the conviction. The appellant requested oral argument, but the State of Texas asserted that the existing briefs and record sufficiently presented the issues, making oral argument unnecessary.

The State of Texas argues against the necessity of oral argument in the current case, reserving the right to present one if the Court permits the Appellant's request for it. The State contends that the trial court did not err in allowing the jury to determine whether witnesses Lucinda Tijerina and Julissa Tijerina were accomplices. A witness is considered an accomplice as a matter of law only when they have been charged with the offense or when the evidence clearly establishes their status as such. The trial court must provide correct jury instructions regarding accomplice testimony. Since the status of the Tijerina witnesses was disputable, the court appropriately left the determination to the jury, requiring corroboration of their testimony for a conviction.

The Appellant claims that the trial court should have classified both witnesses as accomplices due to their immunity grants. However, the State asserts that the mere granting of transactional immunity does not automatically render a witness an accomplice. The Appellant was only entitled to have the matter submitted as a factual question to the jury. Furthermore, neither Lucinda nor Julissa had been formally charged with any crime related to the case, and both had provided statements to authorities prior to any discussion of immunity. Lucinda had also testified before a grand jury without immunity prior to the trial.

An agreement granting immunity to Lucinda was established prior to the Appellant’s trial, while Julissa's immunity agreement was made during the trial. Both Lucinda and Julissa were never charged with any related offenses and had provided statements to law enforcement without immunity. Lucinda had also testified before the grand jury before immunity was discussed. For a witness to be classified as an accomplice, there must be evidence of an affirmative act aiding in the commission of the offense, which was not present for either witness in this case. Mere presence at the crime scene does not qualify someone as an accomplice. The trial court determined that doubts about a witness's status as an accomplice could be left to the jury. Testimony regarding Julissa's comments was clarified, indicating she did not instruct the shooter to target anyone, supporting the conclusion that neither witness was an accomplice as a matter of law. The trial court did not err by allowing the jury to decide on this matter. Even if an error existed, it would not warrant a reversal of the conviction since the Appellant did not object to the jury instructions, and there was no demonstration of egregious harm.

The defense did not challenge Julissa's testimony regarding a claimed conversation during her testimony. The omission of a proper accomplice instruction is generally considered harmless unless the corroborating evidence is so weak that it significantly undermines the prosecution's case. The Appellant, through a written statement admitted as evidence, acknowledges his presence in the vehicle during the shooting and his action of opening the van's sliding door. His fingerprints on the vehicle further corroborate this connection. Crucially, five independent witnesses identified the Appellant as the shooter. Appellant's arguments rely on the assumption that Julissa and Lucinda provided false testimony to protect others, yet he failed to demonstrate the necessary harm for a reversal. Even disregarding Julissa and Lucinda's testimonies, sufficient direct evidence remains to support the conviction. The jury's general verdict does not clarify whether they found Julissa or Lucinda to be accomplices, complicating the assessment of required corroboration. Texas law allows for the review of non-accomplice evidence to determine if it links the accused to the crime, and the courts are divided on how to interpret jury determinations regarding accomplices in such cases.

The memorandum opinion addresses the application of the 'accomplice witness' rule, indicating that if the jury deems a witness to be an accomplice, their testimony would require corroboration. However, there is sufficient other evidence linking the Appellant to the offense. The appeal regarding the admission of Appellant’s written custodial statements is denied, as the trial court has made necessary findings and conclusions under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.22, section 6, rendering the Appellant's request for abatement moot. Appellant argues the statements were involuntary, but it is noted that, while the interviews were recorded, the recordings were not admitted into evidence and thus did not influence the conviction.

The principles regarding the voluntariness of statements require a hearing outside the jury's presence, where the trial court assesses the weight and credibility of evidence. The prosecution bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the statements were made voluntarily. A statement is deemed involuntary if it results from official coercive conduct that undermines free choice. The trial court's determinations on disputed evidence are final unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. Appellate courts review whether the trial court's findings are supported by the record without re-evaluating the evidence.

The trial court determined that the appellant's custodial statements were made voluntarily and without coercion, following a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights, and that the appellant did not invoke his rights to silence or counsel. These findings are supported by extensive record evidence. The court concluded that both statements were admissible and emphasized that an involuntary statement warrants reversal unless it can be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not impact the conviction. The analysis of potential harm from the admission of a confession considers the incriminating nature of the statement and other evidence of guilt. In this case, the appellant's statements were not directly incriminating, and there was substantial evidence against him, including identifications by five independent witnesses. Even assuming an error in admitting the statements, it was determined that such error was harmless and did not warrant a reversal of the trial court's judgment. The appellee requests affirmation of the trial court's judgment.