Dixon, William Michael

Citation: Not availableDocket: PD-1013-15

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; August 11, 2015; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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William Michael Dixon, the petitioner, seeks discretionary review from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals regarding his conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI) as a third offender, which resulted in a 40-year sentence. The case originated in the 208th District Court of Liberty County and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the 14th District. Dixon was indicted on June 7, 2013, with trial proceedings commencing on June 18, 2014. After the jury returned a guilty verdict on June 20, 2014, the trial judge sentenced him the same day. Dixon filed his notice of appeal on the same date. The Court of Appeals upheld his conviction on July 7, 2015, and Dixon did not seek rehearing. The petition highlights potential violations of the Fourth Amendment concerning his confession and questions the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Oral argument is requested to assist the court in resolving these issues. The document lists the identities of parties and counsel involved in the case, including trial and appellate attorneys, judges, and prosecutors.

The trial court's denial of Petitioner’s Motion to Suppress his recorded confession is under review. Petitioner contends that the court erred by allowing statements made to Officer Martinez, alleging that he was not provided the required Miranda warnings or those mandated by Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. It is acknowledged that Petitioner did not receive any warnings before making his statements during an interrogation by Martinez, who had handcuffed Petitioner and placed him in the back of his vehicle, thus indicating a level of restraint on freedom. Although Martinez did not explicitly inform Petitioner that he was under arrest, he testified that Petitioner was not free to leave and had already formed the belief that Petitioner was intoxicated. 

Petitioner inquired about going to jail, to which Martinez replied he was unsure. Despite Martinez's testimony that Petitioner had admitted to driving, Petitioner maintained he had not done so. The legal analysis emphasizes that handcuffing alone does not equate to custody; however, the overall circumstances suggested that a reasonable person in Petitioner’s position would feel they could not terminate the interrogation. The Dowthitt test reveals that three of four criteria indicating a lack of freedom were met: Petitioner was restrained (handcuffed and in the vehicle), would not feel free to leave, and there was probable cause for arrest without clear communication about his freedom to leave. The Court of Appeals previously determined that the brief transport to the substation did not sufficiently imply a formal arrest, which contrasts with the findings in the current review.

Petitioner was restrained in a patrol car for nearly an hour, leading to the assertion that he was effectively under arrest during questioning, contrary to findings by the trial court and court of appeals. The key legal question presented is whether the evidence was insufficient to convict Petitioner of Driving While Intoxicated (DWI). Witness Castaneda's testimony indicated she saw Petitioner exit the driver’s side after the accident, but she was not asked by officers if he was the driver, and later expressed uncertainty during a photo lineup. Additionally, another witness, Martinez, stated that Petitioner was already in the patrol vehicle when Castaneda identified him, and the pickup truck partially obstructed her view. Petitioner introduced evidence suggesting he was not driving; a defense witness invoked the Fifth Amendment regarding driving status, and another witness, Coronado, testified that Keeton was actually driving and that not all vehicle doors functioned properly. Despite the usual deference to jury credibility, the presence of potentially illegally obtained evidence warrants reconsideration of the case. The court of appeals' ruling on the motion to suppress was deemed erroneous, prompting a request for discretionary review to assess the sufficiency of evidence for conviction. The Petition concludes with a request for appropriate relief and confirmation of service to the district attorney’s office.

William Michael Dixon petitions the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to review the affirmation of his conviction for driving while intoxicated as a third offender, resulting in a 40-year sentence from the 208th District Court of Liberty County. The appeal follows a jury's guilty verdict delivered on June 20, 2014, after a trial that began with jury selection on June 18, 2014. 

Dixon raises concerns about the legality of his confession, specifically questioning whether it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and if the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. He argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress his recorded confession, contending that he was not provided with Miranda warnings or the statutory warnings mandated by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.22 prior to his statements. It is noted that Dixon was detained by Officer Martinez, who handcuffed him and placed him in a police vehicle without informing him of an arrest or advising him of his rights, which raises the issue of whether Dixon was in custody during the interrogation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction on July 7, 2015, and Dixon did not seek a rehearing.

Martinez testified that he believed the Petitioner was intoxicated before their second conversation and subsequently transported him to the Humble substation for field sobriety tests. During the transport, the Petitioner inquired about going to jail, and although Martinez expressed uncertainty, he noted that the Petitioner had previously admitted to driving. The Petitioner claimed he was not Mirandized prior to this questioning. Martinez acknowledged that the Petitioner asked why he was being taken to the substation but could not recall his response. 

In reviewing the legal standards, the trial court erred in denying the Petitioner’s motion to suppress his statements. The mere act of handcuffing does not automatically indicate custody; instead, the question is whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave. The circumstances of the interrogation suggested that the Petitioner was not free to terminate the encounter. Three of the four conditions outlined in Dowthitt were met: the Petitioner was physically restrained in a patrol vehicle, a reasonable person would not feel free to leave, and although there was probable cause to arrest him, Martinez did not inform him that he could leave. The Court of Appeals' assertion that the short transport distance did not equate to a formal arrest overlooked the fact that the Petitioner was handcuffed and confined for nearly an hour, leading to the conclusion that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the Petitioner was not under arrest during questioning.

The legal sufficiency of evidence to convict the Petitioner for Driving While Intoxicated is challenged, stating that no evidence confirmed he was driving at the time of the accident. Witness Castaneda observed the Petitioner exiting the driver’s side but did not confirm he was the driver during her interactions with police. She expressed uncertainty in a photo lineup and indicated she had written about a "possible man" when identifying the Petitioner. Officer Martinez noted he had placed the Petitioner in his vehicle before Castaneda identified him and mentioned that the view was obstructed. Testimony from Keeton, who asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege, and from Coronado, who claimed Keeton was driving, further supports the Petitioner’s defense. The document argues that while courts typically defer to jury credibility determinations, the presence of illegally obtained evidence warrants a review of the appellate court’s ruling regarding the motion to suppress. A petition for discretionary review is requested to address the legal sufficiency of evidence against the Petitioner, along with a prayer for any appropriate relief.