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Christopher Click and Jerry Lindemann v. Transport Workers Union Local 556
Citation: Not availableDocket: 05-15-00796-CV
Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; October 14, 2015; Texas; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Chris Click and Jerry Lindemann appeal a ruling from the 116th Civil District Court of Dallas County, Texas, regarding a civil action initiated by the Transport Workers Union Local 556, which sought damages related to Click and Lindemann’s tenure as Officers in the Union. The case originated on November 8, 2013, when the Union filed against them, and subsequently, Click and Lindemann sought to consolidate this case with another involving Stacy Martin, which was unopposed by the Union’s counsel. Both Click and Lindemann served on the Union's Executive Board from May 2012 to May 2013. On November 26, 2014, their attorney filed a motion for summary judgment, which was opposed by the Union. Following oral arguments, Judge Tonya Parker ruled in favor of Click and Lindemann, granting their motion for summary judgment and excluding them from the upcoming jury trial set for December 19, 2014. The document includes a detailed table of contents, identity of parties, and a list of referenced legal cases supporting the arguments presented in the brief. Defendant TWU Local 556 did not appeal the trial judge's decision within the required thirty days, rendering the judgment granting the Motion for Summary Judgment final. A jury trial in the case of TWU Local 556 v. Stacy Martin commenced on January 29, 2015, presided over by Judge Tonya Parker, resulting in a guilty verdict against Stacy Martin and a monetary award to TWU Local 556. Judge Parker signed a final judgment on February 19, 2015, mandating Stacy Martin to pay damages to TWU Local 556, while dismissing the claims against Click and Lindemann. On March 3, 2015, Click and Lindemann filed a Motion to Modify Judgment, asserting that the final ruling did not address the summary judgment. An amended final judgment was issued on June 3, 2015, yet it again failed to resolve issues related to the Motion for Summary Judgment and the dismissal of Click and Lindemann. On July 1, 2015, Click and Lindemann filed a Notice of Appeal with the 116th Circuit Civil Court, which was submitted to the 5th Court of Appeals as case number 05-15-00796-CV. Click and Lindemann believe that oral arguments would not assist the appellate court's decision. They raise several issues for appeal, including whether the trial court erred by excluding awards for them related to the Motion for Summary Judgment, the sufficiency of case law and evidence supporting the trial court's judgment, their entitlement to attorney fees, and whether their Motion to Modify Judgment was timely filed under Texas Procedural Law. They also question the existence of a precedent protecting union officers from baseless litigation and the potential for union reimbursement for successful defenses. Factually, in March 2012, Click and Lindemann were elected as Vice President and Treasurer of TWU Local 556 alongside President Stacy Martin. Throughout their first year, they faced multiple improper charges. In November 2012, they uncovered fraudulent time sheet claims by some executive board members, leading to budget cuts and tensions among board members. Financial findings were later discussed in membership meetings, further upsetting those involved in the pay schemes. The Executive Board initiated charges against Stacy Martin, Chris Click, and Jerry Lindemann, resulting in their removal from office in April, May, and June 2013 for violations of the Local's Constitution and Bylaws, along with a three-year prohibition from holding office. In November 2013, TWU Local 556 filed civil actions against them to recover trial costs and expenses incurred post-removal. In December 2014, Click, Martin, and Lindemann's attorneys filed Motions for No Evidence and Traditional Summary Judgment, with TWU Local 556 opposing these motions. Oral arguments were presented in January 2015, leading to the court granting Summary Judgment for Click and Lindemann, while Martin's motion was denied, resulting in a jury trial for Martin, who was found guilty of the charges against him but not those against Click and Lindemann. In February 2015, Judge Parker issued a final judgment but did not sign the ruling for Click and Lindemann’s Summary Judgment. In March, Click and Lindemann filed a Motion to Modify Judgment, and in June, an amended ruling was issued regarding Martin but did not address Click and Lindemann's motion. In July 2015, Click and Lindemann, acting pro se, appealed the trial court's decision due to the lack of a final ruling on their Summary Judgment, seeking modification from the 5th Court of Appeals in Dallas County. The document outlines the procedural requirements for filing motions to modify judgments under Texas law, emphasizing the necessity of addressing any errors in awards for relief, attorney fees, and costs in order to preserve issues for appeal. On January 22, 2015, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants Click and Lindemann, yet no formal order or judgment addressing their requested relief has been issued. Established case law supports the principle that union officials who successfully defend against charges under Section 501 of the LMRDA are entitled to reimbursement for legal costs incurred during their defense. Notable precedents, including Kerr v. Shanks and Holdeman v. Sheldon, underline the policy allowing unions to financially protect officials from baseless lawsuits. While union officials are expected to retain independent counsel and bear their defense costs, reimbursement is warranted upon prevailing in their cases. Defendants Click and Lindemann seek a modification of judgment to secure the relief they believe they are entitled to. They contend that the Appellee’s argument, which claims that costs incurred for a separate defendant, Martin, absolve liability for Click and Lindemann, is unfounded since their cases were dismissed without trial. The attached affidavit from attorney Dan Nelson specifies fees owed by Click and Lindemann, which contribute to a total exceeding $120,000 spent collectively by all parties involved in the original trial. In their prayer for relief, Defendants request: (1) an order granting their motions for summary judgment, (2) pre- and post-judgment interest at a rate of 5%, (3) reimbursement for court costs, (4) reasonable attorney's fees, and (5) any further relief deemed just by the court. The appendix includes relevant exhibits to support their claims. Defendants Click and Lindemann, representing themselves, formally ask the court to grant their motion for modification and award all requested relief. Final Judgment is issued by the court in favor of Defendants Chris Click and Jerry Lindemann, granting their Motion to Modify. The judgment includes: (A) entitlement to pre and post-judgment interest at a rate of 5%, (B) recovery of court costs attributable to each defendant (amount unspecified), and (C) an award of uncontested attorney's fees totaling $44,371.19. The case, initiated by the Transport Workers Union (TWU) against Defendants including Stacy Martin, Chris Click, and Jerry Lindemann for alleged misappropriation of union funds and breach of fiduciary duty, has been consolidated under cause number DC-13-13347. Defendants have denied all allegations and asserted affirmative defenses. They seek summary judgment, arguing that TWU lacks sufficient evidence to support its claims and has failed to demonstrate any genuine disputes of material fact. A history of leadership transitions within TWU Local 556 leading up to the 2012 elections is also noted, indicating the context of the disputes. Defendant Click announced his candidacy for 1st Vice-President, Defendant Martin for President, and Defendant Lindemann for Treasurer, with the current Executive Board aware of their intentions. In 2012, two candidate groups emerged: the Lauck Group and the Martin Group, with the Martin Group winning the election with 65 votes. Following the election, Thom McDaniel, the acting President, instructed current board members to obstruct the transition for the newly elected Martin Group, hindering their access to the union office. Once in office, members of the Lauck Group engaged in efforts to undermine the Martin Group by filing numerous unfounded charges against them, aiming to disrupt the union's electoral system and remove them from office. Specifically, Cuyler Thompson and Allyson Parker Lauck repeatedly submitted baseless accusations against the Martin Group. In November 2012, an audit revealed excessive payments to board members for unverified work. In response, Defendant Martin proposed changes to reduce board pay after revealing a 190% increase in expenses for some members. The Lauck Group retaliated by alleging that the Defendants were spreading false information. The audit confirmed that the information shared during the December meeting was not confidential, as it was publicly accessible to all members. Subsequently, union member Cuyler Thompson lodged charges against Defendants Lindemann and Click, claiming they acted unprofessionally and violated the TWU International Constitution and Local 556 Bylaws. At the same time, Click participated in a Washington DC rally against TSA policy changes regarding knives on aircraft, carrying a sign that some found offensive. This led to charges of racial discrimination against him, resulting in Click's suspension from his position as 1st Vice President. In April 2013, the TWU Local 556 Executive Board reviewed the charges from Thompson and member Corliss King Hale against Lindemann and Click, deeming them valid and scheduling trials. Certified letters were sent to both Defendants on April 30, 2013, informing them of the charges and trial committees formed to oversee the proceedings. The letters allowed the Defendants to challenge members of the Trial Committee by May 8, 2013. The hearings for Click were set for May 14 and 15, 2013, and for Lindemann on May 15, 2013. On May 8, 2013, Click emailed the Executive Board to challenge certain committee members, citing their involvement in a recall petition against him; however, these challenges were denied. Defendant Click arrived in Dallas on May 13, 2013, before his scheduled hearings on May 14 and 15. He was informed via email by Matt Hettich that the hearings were rescheduled, which he discussed with President Defendant Martin. Martin asserted that the hearings would proceed as originally scheduled, believing Hettich lacked the authority to cancel them. Consequently, Click attended the May 14 hearing as directed by both the Plaintiff and Martin. On May 15, both Defendants Click and Lindemann participated in their hearing, during which two Executive Board members announced a supposed rescheduling for the first time. The Trial Committee deliberated but decided to continue the hearing, lacking authority to postpone it. Both defendants were not given the option to alter the hearing schedule. Despite attempts by the Local 556 Executive Board to persuade Martin to delay the hearings, he maintained that the Transportation Workers Union Constitution only permitted rescheduling under specific conditions, neither of which applied. Thus, the hearings proceeded on May 14 and 15, with all necessary parties in attendance except for the Plaintiffs. The Trial Committee ultimately found both defendants not guilty of all charges. Dissatisfied with this outcome, the Plaintiff initiated new hearings against them post-verdict. Defendants Lindemann and Click's Trial Committee Hearings, originally scheduled for May 14-15, 2013, were rescheduled to May 24, 2013. Defendant Click requested a new date due to unavailability of his witnesses and counsel, but his request for a continuance was denied. He further sought Positive Space Air Transportation to attend the hearings, which was also denied. Following the May 15 hearing, Defendant Lindemann went on medical leave and requested a continuance due to his inability to attend the hearing, which was denied as well. The hearings proceeded without both defendants, leading to their permanent removal from the Executive Board and a three-year ban on re-election. Subsequently, without exhausting internal union disciplinary procedures, the Plaintiffs filed three lawsuits against the defendants for misappropriation of union funds, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion of union property. In the Plaintiffs' Original Petition against Defendant Lindemann, it is alleged that due to scheduling conflicts, the Article XIX trial needed to be postponed. The Executive Board instructed Lindemann to reschedule, but he insisted on proceeding with the original date, resulting in unnecessary expenses of $2,484.10 for which he refused to reimburse the union despite repeated demands. Similarly, the Plaintiffs' Original Petition against Defendant Click alleges postponement of his Article XIX trial due to logistical issues, with the Executive Board also directing him to reschedule. Sufficient notice was provided to Defendant Click regarding the need to postpone the Article XIX trial; however, he insisted on proceeding with the trial as originally scheduled, disregarding the Executive Board's instructions. This decision led to significant wastage of time and resources, which resulted in costs of $2,484.10 attributed to Defendant Click. Following his removal from office, Defendant Click unlawfully occupied the Plaintiff's offices, incurring an additional cost of $4,422.40, of which his share was $2,211.20. Furthermore, after his suspension, he misused Union funds by taking his wife on a trip to London for a conference, charging $1,164.05 to the Plaintiff, despite being warned that his attendance was unauthorized. The Plaintiff has repeatedly sought reimbursement from Defendant Click for these expenses, but he has refused to respond. The allegations against Defendant Click are taken verbatim from the Plaintiff's Original Petition, to which he denies any wrongdoing. Similarly, Defendant Martin received notice of the need to postpone the trial but insisted on proceeding, leading to further waste of resources, with his share of the expenses also totaling $2,484.10. Defendant Martin unlawfully occupied the Plaintiff’s offices after being removed from office through trials, refusing to vacate until ordered by the TWU International President. This occupation resulted in costs to the Plaintiff amounting to $4,422.40, with Martin's share being $2,211.20. The Plaintiff has requested reimbursement from Martin for these expenses, which he has repeatedly ignored. Additionally, Martin has unlawfully converted Union property by failing to return or pay for a laptop valued at $4,275.00, despite demands for its return or payment. Martin denies these allegations, which are taken verbatim from the Plaintiff's Original Petition. The document also outlines six issues for determination, including the existence of fiduciary relationships and duties involving other defendants during their respective hearings and actions regarding office vacating and attendance at meetings after suspension. Furthermore, it references Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a regarding summary judgment, stating that a party seeking summary judgment must show no genuine issue of material fact exists and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. If the movant establishes this, the burden shifts to the non-movant to present evidence of a genuine issue. The requirements to establish a breach of fiduciary duty are also mentioned, though not detailed in this excerpt. A fiduciary relationship existed between the Plaintiff and Defendant, which the Defendant breached, resulting in either injury to the Plaintiff or benefit to the Defendant. To establish a breach of fiduciary duty, the Plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of a fiduciary relationship and that the Defendant violated this duty. A fiduciary relationship arises when one party is legally or contractually obligated to act in the best interest of another. Determining whether such a relationship exists is a legal question. The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) was enacted to address issues of corruption and protect individual employee rights by providing a "bill of rights" for union members, including election safeguards and financial reporting requirements. Under the LMRDA, union officers and representatives, defined as those in positions of trust, have specific fiduciary responsibilities, including the duty to manage union resources solely for the benefit of union members and to refrain from conflicts of interest. The scope of these fiduciary duties is outlined in Section 501(a) of the LMRDA, which mandates that fiduciaries must act in accordance with the organization’s constitution and by-laws, manage funds responsibly, avoid adverse dealings, and not have conflicting personal interests. Fiduciaries are required to account for any profits obtained in connection with business conducted on behalf of the organization, as per the LMRDA, Section 501(a). The plaintiff alleges that Defendant Click breached his fiduciary duty by misappropriating Union funds. The crux of the breach centers on Click's actions during his Article XIX Trial Committee Hearings scheduled for May 14-15, 2013. The plaintiff claims that due to scheduling conflicts and logistical issues, sufficient notice for postponement was communicated to Click, but he insisted on proceeding with the hearings as originally set, resulting in wasted resources and expenses incurred by the plaintiff. Although the events leading to the claims occurred from late 2012 to early 2013, the plaintiff does not specify exact dates of notice provided to Click. Correspondence from May 16, 2013, indicates that the Executive Board believed no trial had occurred since it was reset for May 10, 2013, and notice of this change was given. In April 2013, the plaintiff suspended Click from his duties as 1st Vice President, stripping him of authority. The LMRDA defines fiduciaries as individuals in positions of trust within a labor organization, including officers and agents. “Officer, agent, shop steward, or other representative” is defined to include elected officials and key administrative personnel, but excludes non-supervisory staff. Defendant Click, after being suspended as 1st Vice President and stripped of duties, no longer held a fiduciary relationship under Section 501(a) of the LMRDA. Consequently, Plaintiff's claims of Misappropriation of Union Funds and Breach of Fiduciary Duty related to Click's actions during the Trial Committee Hearings are legally unfounded, as evidence shows no genuine issue regarding the existence of a fiduciary relationship. Furthermore, Click’s alleged unlawful occupation of union offices after his removal from office cannot be considered an official act since he had been removed and was not reinstated. Plaintiff's judicial admissions confirm that Click was no longer an officer, invalidating claims regarding his occupancy of the offices. Lastly, regarding Click's trip to London, Plaintiff asserts he misused union funds post-suspension. However, Click’s suspension occurred in early April 2013, and the timeline in Plaintiff's petition lacks clarity. For a breach of fiduciary duty claim to hold, a fiduciary relationship must be established, which is absent based on the evidence and judicial admissions. Thus, claims related to the trip to London also fail legally due to the lack of a fiduciary relationship at that time. Plaintiff cannot prove that Defendant Click owed any fiduciary duty regarding the hearings on May 14th and 15th. Defendant Click asserts that no fiduciary relationship existed. Even if a relationship were recognized, the relevant legal framework is Section 501(a) of the LMRDA, which has limited judicial interpretation in Texas. The 5th Circuit's ruling in Hoffman v. Kramer, 362 F.3d 308 (2004) is pivotal, establishing that fiduciary obligations primarily concern financial stewardship and conduct related to a union’s resources. The court emphasized that disputes over administrative decisions are not suitable for legal action under the LMRDA, suggesting these issues should be resolved internally within union processes rather than through federal litigation. In Hoffman, the allegations against the defendants included conspiracy to rig an election and mishandling union affairs, such as record destruction and undisclosed benefits. The court found no breach of fiduciary duty for the election-related claims, stating that any electoral issues should be addressed by the Labor Department, not through the courts. Similarly, the court ruled that the alleged maladministration did not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty but rather involved internal management matters better left to the union’s membership. Overall, the 5th Circuit concluded that the actions in question were related to performance and administration rather than fiduciary responsibility. Plaintiff claims Defendant Click caused unnecessary expenditure of time and resources by insisting on holding the Article XIX trial on originally scheduled dates, despite being aware of scheduling conflicts that would prevent the accusing party from proceeding. This allegation suggests a breach of fiduciary duties under Section 501(a) of the LMRDA, requiring fiduciaries to manage resources according to constitutional and by-law provisions. The evidence indicates that the earliest possible notification to Defendant Click about a need to postpone the hearings was on May 10, 2013, but he was not informed of any rescheduling until May 13, 2013, just before the hearings on May 14th and 15th. An email sent the day before the hearings does not constitute sufficient notice. Furthermore, Plaintiff's assertion that Defendant Click had the authority to order the hearings to proceed is challenged. Evidence shows that Click was informed on April 30, 2013, about his hearing dates but was unsuccessful in challenging the Trial Committee members. Upon receiving the rescheduling email on May 13th, Click verified with the LOCAL 556 Union President, who advised him that Plaintiff likely did not have the authority to reschedule. Consequently, Click attended the hearings on May 14th and 15th, where all parties were present and ready to proceed, leading him to reasonably believe the hearings were not postponed. Defendant Click's May 14th and 15th Hearings proceeded at the request of the Trial Committee Members, not due to any insistence by Click. He was found not guilty of the allegations against him. The certified transcripts reveal that the Trial Committee deliberated on Plaintiff's authority to reschedule the Hearings and decided to proceed. The Hearings were scheduled by the Plaintiff and confirmed by the Union's Local Chapter President, with the Trial Committee choosing to move forward on the original dates. Plaintiff's allegations do not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty under Section 501(a) of the LMRDA. Even if the court disregarded the evidence indicating otherwise, Click's actions would not meet the threshold for breach as established in the case of Hoffman, where the defendants were accused of misusing union funds related to election procedures. The Hoffman court ruled that defective election processes should be remedied through Labor Department intervention rather than lawsuits, and that general allegations of misconduct do not inherently indicate a breach of fiduciary duty. Similar to the Hoffman case, Plaintiff’s claims of Click misusing union funds by proceeding with the Trials despite alleged notifications of rescheduling do not constitute a breach under 501(a). Furthermore, the expenditures related to rescheduling and retrying the Hearings were detrimental to Click, who was ultimately found guilty and removed from office. The court emphasized that issues of time, attendance, and performance within the union's administration are not breaches of fiduciary duty but are to be resolved through democratic processes within the union. Consequently, Plaintiff’s claim of misappropriation of union funds lacks merit. The claim of breach of fiduciary duty against Defendant Click, based on alleged misuse of Union funds and failure to vacate Union offices after removal as 1st Vice President, is dismissed due to lack of material fact supporting a breach. Evidence indicates no fiduciary relationship existed after Plaintiff removed Defendant Click from office. Even if a fiduciary relationship was assumed, Click's alleged failure to vacate does not constitute a breach under Section 501(a) of the LMRDA. His occupation of Union offices, even if unlawful, stems from disagreement with the Executive Board's authority to remove him, rather than a breach of fiduciary duty. The 5th Circuit's ruling in Hoffman indicates that disputes over employment decisions do not qualify for breach of fiduciary duty claims under the LMRDA. Thus, Click's actions, even if they resulted in costs to the Union, do not meet the criteria for breach under Section 501(a), as issues of administration and performance are outside its purview. Defendant Click's refusal to vacate Union offices, viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, is characterized as a mere dereliction of duty as 1st Vice President, stemming from disagreement with an Executive Board directive. This behavior does not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty under Section 501(a) of the LMRDA, leading to the dismissal of the Plaintiff's claims of misappropriation of Union funds and breach of fiduciary duty. Furthermore, regarding Defendant Click's trip to London for a TWU International meeting, no fiduciary relationship existed post-removal from his office, and his attendance does not represent a breach. Prior to his suspension, Click had received specific requests from TWU International to attend the conference, and the budget for his attendance had been approved by the Plaintiff. Despite being suspended two days before departure, both the TWU International President and the local Union President advised him to attend due to non-refundable costs. Click began attending the conference but ceased participation upon Plaintiff's later directive. His attendance at the conference was sanctioned and budgeted, reinforcing that no breach of fiduciary duty occurred in this context. Defendant Click was explicitly instructed by the President of the TWU International that his attendance at a conference in London was necessary and expenses had been covered. He was not informed that attendance was no longer required until the second day of the trip, after which another representative was contacted to replace him. Even if Plaintiff's allegations that Click was warned about his suspension and attended the conference regardless are accepted as true, these actions do not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. The 5th Circuit has ruled that claims regarding the mismanagement of union affairs typically do not warrant monetary damages unless they directly benefit the defendants, which was not the case here. The facts establish that: 1) Plaintiff budgeted for Click's attendance prior to his suspension. 2) Funds were allocated for his conference-related expenses. 3) Click was suspended just two days before the conference without an alternative representative being chosen. 4) Click was informed by Local President Martin that expenses were non-refundable and he was still required to attend. 5) Upon learning of his non-attendance status on the second conference day, Click ceased participation and was replaced. 6) Click gained no financial benefit from the trip. The allegations amount to disputes over administrative decisions rather than breaches of fiduciary duty. The 5th Circuit has clarified that disagreements regarding the appropriateness of administrative actions do not constitute actionable claims under the LMRDA. Therefore, Plaintiff's claims of misappropriation of union funds and breach of fiduciary duty against Click for attending the conference without authorization lack both factual and legal merit, as evidence shows no breach occurred. Regarding Defendant Martin, the Plaintiff alleges that Martin also breached a fiduciary duty by misappropriating union funds, although detailed specifics of these claims were not provided in the excerpt. Defendant Martin was not in a fiduciary position when he allegedly failed to vacate union offices after his removal from TWU Local 556. The Plaintiff acknowledges in its Original Petition that Martin was removed and not reinstated, indicating he lacked any official authority. Consequently, the claims against him for misappropriation of union funds and breach of fiduciary duty fail as there is no evidence of a fiduciary relationship. Regarding the allegation that Martin wasted resources by insisting on proceeding with the trials of Defendants Lindemann and Click on the originally scheduled dates, the Plaintiff contends this action was improper due to scheduling conflicts. However, the evidence shows that the earliest the Plaintiff could have requested a postponement was May 10, 2013, when the Executive Board was still deliberating on objections to the trial committee members. The Board eventually voted on May 12 to move the hearings to May 24, but Martin, believing the Board lacked the authority to reschedule, informed the trial committee that the hearings would take place on May 14 and 15. Additionally, communication indicating the hearings had been rescheduled was sent to Defendant Click after Martin's decision. Thus, Martin did not breach any fiduciary duty in this context. Defendant Martin communicated with Defendant Click, expressing his belief that the Executive Board lacked authority to reschedule his Hearings, insisting he needed to attend as originally scheduled. On May 14, 2013, the Executive Board convened, initially deciding to inform Committee Members of the rescheduling of Defendant Click's Hearing. However, before Martin could relay this decision, the Board voted to suspend him from his presidential duties. Martin had previously been informed that the Executive Board planned to reschedule Hearings for other defendants. He consulted the Union's Constitution and determined that the Board's authority to reschedule Hearings was limited to specific circumstances, which were not met in this case. The allegations against the defendants stem from internal disagreements regarding union administration rather than breaches of fiduciary duty as defined under Section 501(a) of the LMRDA. The court in Hoffman ruled that claims of maladministration do not warrant monetary damages or fall within the scope of Section 501. Even if Martin's insistence on holding the Hearings as originally scheduled resulted in wasted resources, it does not constitute a breach under the LMRDA. The court emphasized that disputes over administrative decisions should be resolved through internal union processes rather than federal litigation. The Hoffman Court determined that Section 501(a) does not allow derivative actions for alleged failures in employment duties by union officials, emphasizing that such disputes should be resolved internally within the union rather than in federal court. The Court noted that the actions of former union officers, regardless of their perceived foolishness, pertained to operational issues rather than breaches of fiduciary duty. Even if Plaintiff's allegations against Defendant Martin, the union President, were accepted as true, they would merely reflect a disagreement over union policy administration, which was addressed through internal procedures, including a suspension and eventual removal from his position. Furthermore, Martin's alleged failure to vacate union offices after his removal does not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty under Section 501(a) of the LMRDA, as there was no fiduciary relationship post-removal. Even if he occupied the offices unlawfully, this act stemmed from a disagreement regarding administrative decisions rather than a breach of duty. The situation reflects a dereliction of officer duties rather than a violation of fiduciary obligations, reinforcing the Hoffman precedent that derivative actions for such derelictions are not permissible. The 5th Circuit Court's ruling in Hoffman establishes that disputes regarding the appropriateness of administrative actions do not qualify for litigation under Section 501(a) of the LMRDA concerning breach of fiduciary duties. In this case, Plaintiff’s Executive Board decided to remove Defendant Martin as President, a decision Martin contested based on Union policy. Even if Martin failed to comply with the directive to vacate Union offices, leading to costs for the Union, such actions do not meet the threshold for fiduciary duty breaches as outlined in Section 501(a). The court emphasized that issues related to time, attendance, and administrative performance do not constitute breaches of fiduciary duty. Consequently, the Plaintiff's claims against Martin for misappropriation of Union funds and breach of fiduciary duty fail because the evidence shows no genuine issue of material fact regarding any breach. Regarding Defendant Lindemann, the Plaintiff alleges he misappropriated Union funds by insisting on proceeding with a trial despite scheduling conflicts. However, the evidence indicates that Lindemann was not informed of any postponement until the morning of the trial, contradicting claims of wasted resources. The earliest notice to Lindemann about a possible rescheduling occurred on May 10, 2013, but he only learned of the rescheduled hearings on May 15, 2013, during the trial itself. Thus, the allegations against Lindemann for breaching fiduciary duties under Section 501(a) also lack merit. Defendant Lindemann was informed by a letter dated April 30, 2013, about his Trial Committee Hearing scheduled for May 15, 2013. On that date, all parties, including Defendants, witnesses, and attorneys, were present and prepared for the Hearing. Defendant Lindemann was first notified of a potential rescheduling when Plaintiff sent individuals to interrupt the proceedings that morning. The Trial Committee Members decided to proceed with the Hearing, believing Plaintiff lacked the authority to reschedule it. Thus, Lindemann did not insist on proceeding with the Hearing; rather, it was the Trial Committee's decision to continue. Moreover, Plaintiff's allegations against Lindemann do not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty under Section 501(a) of the LMRDA. Even if the court were to consider Plaintiff's claims valid, Lindemann's actions do not rise to the level of misconduct as seen in prior cases, such as Hoffman, where defendants were accused of misusing union funds during elections. In Hoffman, the Court determined that there was no sufficient cause to pursue claims regarding the misuse of union funds, emphasizing that the appropriate remedy for issues arising from a defective election process lay with the Labor Department rather than litigation. The Court noted that expenses incurred for re-running elections did not personally benefit the defendants and that general allegations of illegal elections did not constitute a breach under section 501(a) of the LMRDA, although they might violate other provisions. Similarly, the Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Lindemann for allegedly misusing union funds by proceeding with Article XIX Trials, despite notifications of rescheduling, fails to demonstrate a breach of fiduciary duty as outlined in section 501(a). The funds used for rescheduling did not benefit Lindemann, who ultimately faced negative consequences, including removal from his position after a retrial. The Court reiterated that even if Lindemann's actions were perceived as wasteful, they do not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty, as such matters should be resolved through internal union processes rather than federal court intervention. The Plaintiff's claims against Lindemann, Martin, and Click lack sufficient evidence to establish any genuine issues of material fact or demonstrate a fiduciary relationship. Consequently, the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment, and the Plaintiff has not met the legal requirements to proceed with their allegations. The document concludes with a request for attorney’s fees under relevant Texas rules. Sanctions may be imposed under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 against attorneys or parties who file pleadings that are (1) groundless and made in bad faith, or (2) groundless and intended to harass. A "groundless" pleading is defined as lacking any legal or factual basis and not supported by a good faith argument for changing existing law. Additionally, Chapter 10 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code permits sanctions for filings that lack reasonable factual or legal grounds. To impose sanctions under Chapter 10, it must be shown that the pleading was filed for an improper purpose, that the legal arguments are unfounded, or that the factual claims lack evidentiary support. Sanctions may involve ordering the offending party to pay the reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by the opposing party due to frivolous filings. In their motion for summary judgment, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's lawsuits are groundless and intended solely to harass them, asserting that the Plaintiff admitted to having no basis for these claims. They request that the court grant their motion for summary judgment, dismiss all of the Plaintiff's claims with prejudice, and award reasonable attorney's fees and costs, alongside any other appropriate relief. The excerpt concludes with a certificate of service, confirming that copies of the document were sent to all relevant parties. The court subsequently granted the Defendants' motion for traditional summary judgment. Defendants Chris Click and Jerry Lindemann have filed a Motion to Modify Judgment under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 329b. The procedural history outlined reveals that on July 14, 2014, the Defendants submitted a No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment, followed by a Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment on November 26, 2014. An oral hearing for both motions was scheduled for January 16, 2015, but was continued to January 22, 2015, when the court granted the Motions for Summary Judgment for the Defendants. Despite this ruling, as of the filing date of the modification, no formal judgment or order has been entered granting the relief the Defendants are entitled to. The motion argues that if a judgment fails to award a party the relief entitled or improperly awards relief to another party, it must be addressed in a written motion to the trial court. Specific references are made to the need for modification when the correct amount of prejudgment interest, attorneys' fees, or costs is not awarded, citing various case law for support. The Defendants seek to have the court issue the appropriate judgment reflecting the relief requested, including attorneys' fees, costs, and interest, which they claim they are justly entitled to. Longstanding precedent supports a policy that allows union officers who successfully defend themselves against charges under Section 501 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) to be reimbursed by their union for defense costs. Key cases include Kerr v. Shanks, which highlights the protection of union officers from baseless litigation, and Holdeman v. Sheldon, which establishes reimbursement for successful defenses as a financial safeguard against nuisance lawsuits. Additional references include McNamara v. Johnston and Gabauer v. Woodcock, reinforcing the notion that while union officials should retain independent counsel and bear initial defense costs, they are entitled to reimbursement upon prevailing in their defense. Defendants Chris Click and Jerry Lindemann seek modifications to the judgment, requesting: A. An Order of Judgment granting their summary judgment motions; B. Pre and post-judgment interest at a rate of 5%; C. Coverage of all court costs associated with their defense; D. Uncontested reasonable attorneys’ fees as per their affidavit; E. Any further relief deemed appropriate by the court. The court has considered all relevant pleadings and arguments and is inclined to grant the motion to modify. The document concludes with certification of service and attorney details. Final Judgment is awarded to Defendants Chris Click and Jerry Lindemann, granting them the following: A. They are entitled to pre- and post-judgment interest at a rate of 5%. B. They are entitled to court costs attributable to each Defendant. C. They are awarded uncontested attorney's fees totaling $44,371.19. The affidavit supporting these fees, submitted by attorney John Nelson, details his qualifications, the reasonable and customary rates for legal services in Dallas County, and justifications for the claimed fees. Nelson asserts that the total legal fees for the representation amount to $41,500.00, with an additional $15,000.00 for potential appeals to the Court of Appeals and $10,000.00 for a Supreme Court appeal. Furthermore, an additional $2,871.19 has been incurred in litigation-related expenses. The affidavit provides a rationale based on various factors including the complexity of the case, customary fees in the area, and the experience of the attorneys involved. Defense counsel has invested over 150 hours addressing Plaintiff's allegations, involving client meetings, pleadings analysis, defense pleadings preparation, legal research, motion preparation, hearing attendance, document review, mediation, discovery, and trial preparation. Defendants Chris Click and Jerry Lindemann filed a Motion to Modify Judgment under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 329b, following their No-Evidence and Traditional Motions for Summary Judgment filed on July 14 and November 26, 2014, respectively. An oral hearing was held on January 16, 2015, and continued on January 22, 2015, resulting in the Court granting their motions. However, no formal judgment or order has been issued regarding the relief entitled to the defendants. The motion argues that if a judgment fails to provide all entitled relief or grants excessive relief to another party, it must be addressed through a written motion. Relevant case law supports the need for such a motion to correct issues regarding prejudgment interest, attorney fees, costs, or other errors in the judgment. The defendants assert their request for both special and general relief at law and in equity. On November 26, 2014, Defendants filed a Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment seeking relief including attorneys' fees, court costs, pre and post-judgment interest, and other just entitlements. On January 22, 2015, the court granted Defendants Click and Lindemann's motions for summary judgment, but no order or judgment has been issued regarding their requested relief. Established legal precedent supports the reimbursement of union officials' legal costs when they successfully defend against charges under section 501 of the LMRDA, highlighting a policy that protects such officials from frivolous litigation. Citing cases such as Kerr v. Shanks and Holdeman v. Sheldon, it is noted that while union officials should retain independent counsel and bear their defense costs, they may be reimbursed if they prevail. Defendants Click and Lindemann assert their entitlement to the relief sought and request the court to modify the judgment to grant their requests, which include: A. An order granting their motions for summary judgment. B. Accrual of pre and post-judgment interest at a rate of 5%. C. Coverage of all court costs incurred. D. Award of reasonable, uncontested attorneys' fees as detailed in an attached affidavit. E. Any additional relief deemed appropriate by the court. The defendants pray for the court to grant their motion for modification of judgment and to award all requested relief. John F. Nelson and another attorney, representing defendants Chris Click and Jerry Lindemann, certify that a true and correct copy of a legal document was served to all parties on March 13, 2015. The document pertains to a case in the 116th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas, involving Transportation Workers Union Local 556 as the plaintiff against the defendants. The court granted the defendants' Motion to Modify, awarding them final judgment that includes the following: 1. Accrual of pre- and post-judgment interest at a rate of 5%. 2. Court costs attributable to each defendant. 3. Uncontested attorney fees amounting to $44,371.19. An affidavit by John F. Nelson supports the attorney fees, stating he is licensed in Texas, familiar with legal fees in Dallas County, and that all legal services rendered were reasonable and necessary. Nelson values the hourly rates for himself and another attorney at $275.00 and $375.00, respectively, estimating total legal fees for the case at $41,500.00. He further states that, should the case be appealed, additional fees of $15,000.00 would be warranted, along with $10,000.00 for further representation. Attorneys' fees of $10,000 are deemed reasonable and necessary for an appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas, alongside $2,921.19 in litigation-related expenses incurred by the defendants. The opinion on these fees is supported by various factors, including the time and labor required, the complexity of the legal questions, customary local fees for similar services, the overall time spent, client-imposed timelines, the nature of the client-attorney relationship, and the attorneys' experience. Since November 2013, the defendants have spent over 150 hours defending against multiple lawsuits filed by the plaintiff, which involved activities such as client meetings, analysis of pleadings, preparation of defense documents, legal research, motion preparation, hearing attendance, document review, mediation, discovery, and trial preparation. The document is certified as served to the Appellee's counsel on October 15, 2015, with the necessary signatures and notarial acknowledgment included.