Schlittler, David

Citation: Not availableDocket: PD-1505-14

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; April 20, 2015; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Cause Number PD-1505-14 involves the case of David Schlittler against the State of Texas, with the State's brief submitted to the Court of Criminal Appeals on April 20, 2015. The brief supports the trial court's decision that Texas Penal Code § 38.111, which restricts communication and parenting rights of individuals in prison, is constitutional in Schlittler's case. 

Key arguments include:

1. **No Right to Communicate or Parent**: At the time of the offense, Schlittler was legally barred from communicating with or parenting his son from prison, negating claims of entitlement to those rights.
   
2. **Due Process**: The brief argues that § 38.111 does not infringe upon Schlittler’s constitutional right to Due Process.

3. **Equal Protection**: It further contends that the statute does not violate Schlittler’s constitutional right to Equal Protection under the law.

The brief references various federal and state case laws to support its assertions and includes a table of contents outlining the structure of the document, including issues presented, a statement of facts, summary of arguments, and a prayer for relief. Certificates of compliance and service are also included.

The trial court rejected Schlittler's motions challenging the constitutionality of Texas Penal Code 38.111, asserting violations of Due Process and Equal Protection. Schlittler is currently serving a sentence for Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child, specifically his son, B.M., whose half-brother, B.S., is also Schlittler's son. A prior court order prohibits any contact between Schlittler and B.S. until B.S. turns 18, and Schlittler has no visitation rights while incarcerated.

The indictment alleges that Schlittler contacted B.S. through Bonita Rolston in violation of this order. The trial court found that the statute does not infringe upon Schlittler’s constitutional rights and serves a compelling state interest in protecting B.S. from potential harm. Testimony revealed that B.S.'s mother secured the order limiting Schlittler's contact, and that Schlittler sent messages to B.S. from prison, attempting to influence him to persuade his sister, B.M., to recant her allegations of sexual assault.

Schlittler contends that the statute violates his rights, but the court concluded that he lost any fundamental right to communicate with his children due to his prior convictions. The court maintained that the statute is specifically designed to protect minor victims of sexual assault and is appropriately tailored to address instances where convicted offenders might attempt to abuse their parental rights. Thus, both of Schlittler's grounds for review are denied, affirming the statute's constitutionality and its necessity in safeguarding children from potential coercion by their convicted parents.

Schlittler's claims of violations of his rights to Due Process and Equal Protection are unfounded, as he had no legal right to communicate with his son from prison due to a prior court order barring such contact. Penal Code § 38.111 applies to Schlittler because he was incarcerated for Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child, a listed offense under Article 62.001(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is established that Schlittler had contact with his son, B.S., who is the sibling of his victim, B.M., despite knowing he was court-ordered to have no contact. Consequently, he lost the fundamental right to communicate with his son, a right that could not be violated thereafter.

The State argues that Schlittler's Due Process claim fails because he lacks the asserted rights under the circumstances. Furthermore, while acknowledging the compelling state interest in protecting minor victims from trauma, Schlittler contends that Penal Code § 38.111 is overly broad. However, the State maintains it is narrowly tailored to serve this compelling interest, thus upholding its constitutionality. The legal precedent indicates that claims of rights violations require proof of an expectation of those rights, which Schlittler cannot demonstrate.

Section 38.111(a)(1) restricts Schlittler from contacting his son due to his son's connection to the victim's family. Schlittler’s prior illegal contact was intended to harass the victim and manipulate her into recanting her allegations against him. The statute aims to prevent undue trauma to the victim and is applied to Schlittler only after he was proven guilty of aggravated sexual assault, meeting the Due Process requirement of clear and convincing evidence for parental termination, as established in Santosky v. Kramer. The state demonstrated Schlittler's unfitness as a parent through his guilty plea, which sufficiently justified limitations on his parental rights. The law recognizes that abusive behavior toward one child can justify actions against another. Schlittler’s criminal actions and subsequent civil actions by his ex-wife led to the breakdown of his family. It is asserted that the state’s application of Penal Code 38.111 was not an attempt to disrupt family unity but rather a protective measure against Schlittler’s behavior. The statute is deemed narrowly tailored, serving a compelling state interest by only applying to those proven to be sexual offenders, thereby safeguarding young victims. Additionally, the statute does not violate Schlittler’s Equal Protection rights, as it is subject to strict scrutiny standards in cases involving fundamental rights or suspect classes.

Schlittler contends that Texas Penal Code 38.111 violates the Equal Protection clause by exclusively applying to sex offenders, while other prisoners are not similarly affected. However, both state and federal courts have determined that convicted sex offenders do not constitute a suspect class, undermining Schlittler's argument. The fundamental right to parent must be considered alongside the necessity for laws like 38.111, which should be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The state argues that 38.111 is appropriately narrow as it only criminalizes contact with sexual assault victims under 17 years old. The Supreme Court has consistently affirmed that states have a compelling interest in protecting children, including safeguarding their psychological well-being and addressing crimes against vulnerable individuals. 

In Schlittler's case, the application of 38.111 aims to prevent disruption in family dynamics affected by his crime, particularly concerning his son's relationship with his mother. The communications between Schlittler and his son have negatively impacted their familial relationships and pressured the victim to alter her account of the abuse. The protection of the sexual assault victim and her brother underscores the compelling state interest at stake. Ultimately, the application of Penal Code 38.111 to Schlittler is deemed not to violate the Equal Protection clause, supporting the conclusion that his second ground for review should be rejected.

The State requests the court to withdraw its grant of review, arguing that the case facts demonstrate a family law court had already revoked Schlittler's fundamental right to communicate with his son while he was in prison, prior to the application of Section 38.111. The State contends that Section 38.111 cannot deny rights that Schlittler did not possess. Alternatively, the State seeks affirmation of the trial and lower appellate court's judgment. The brief is submitted by Melinda Fletcher, Appellate Attorney, and includes a certificate of compliance confirming the document contains 3,613 words in accordance with Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, as well as a certificate of service indicating that a copy was sent to Schlittler's attorney via email on April 20, 2015.