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State of Tennessee v. Marcus Thurman Wade
Citation: Not availableDocket: M2014-01418-CCA-R3-CD
Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; September 28, 2016; Tennessee; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Marcus Thurman Wade was convicted by a Coffee County jury of first degree premeditated murder and felony murder in the deaths of Richard Elliott and Timothy Gill, as well as especially aggravated robbery of Elliott. The trial court merged the premeditated and felony murder convictions, resulting in a life sentence without parole plus thirty-five years. Wade's appeal raised four main issues: the sufficiency of evidence for his convictions, the admissibility of testimony regarding a prior bad act, the trial court's refusal to give a specific jury instruction on circumstantial evidence, and the denial of his motion to suppress a statement. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgments. The factual background revealed that on October 30, 2010, police discovered the victims' bodies in a hotel room without signs of forced entry or struggle, suggesting familiarity between the perpetrator and victims. Evidence included bullet holes and shell casings, with Mr. Gill possessing cash while Mr. Elliott had none. Additionally, a crack pipe and cocaine were found in the room, but only the victims' fingerprints were present. The Nixons, who found the bodies, testified about their connections to the victims, highlighting a financial transaction involving Mr. Elliott prior to the murders. Mr. Nixon committed to financially support Mr. Elliott for essentials until the estate was settled, aiming to assist in his life changes. By early September 2010, Mr. Elliott informed Mr. Nixon of his employment with the Winchester Police Department, where he would work as an informant. Mr. Nixon meticulously tracked his financial assistance, totaling approximately $44,000, which included checks of $2,000 and $2,150 and over $1,000 for October lodging at the Quality Inn, where Mr. Elliott occasionally had company from his wife and Mr. Gill. On October 30, 2010, the Nixons attempted to meet Mr. Elliott for a real estate transaction but, after waiting, found him unresponsive in his motel room. Upon entering, they discovered Mr. Elliott and Mr. Gill deceased; Mrs. Nixon, a registered nurse, confirmed their deaths after noticing their bodies were cold and stiff. Subsequent investigations revealed both victims died from gunshot wounds, with toxicology reports indicating presence of cocaine and alcohol. The victims had been working as informants for the police, leading to several drug indictments, though the Appellant was not charged. Testimony from Viola Stephens, Mr. Gill's aunt, indicated that on October 20, 2010, Mr. Elliott sought crack cocaine and made arrangements with the Appellant, resulting in a drug transaction at her home, after which Mr. Elliott and others used the purchased drugs. Ms. Stephens observed Mr. Elliott putting something into his pocket after smoking crack cocaine, leading her to believe not all of it was consumed. After leaving the victims, she learned of their deaths the next morning and contacted the Appellant, who denied any involvement. Her testimony aligned with her earlier statement to Officer Kennedy. Richard Elliott, Jr. recounted the victims visiting his home late on October 29, 2010, where they drank beer and displayed $2,100 in cash. Concerned for their safety due to intoxication, he offered them a place to stay, which they declined. Before leaving, Mr. Elliott made a phone call related to directions to Tullahoma. Officer Kennedy reviewed security footage showing Mr. Elliott at the Quality Inn around midnight to reactivate his room key. Cellular records indicated 22 communications between the Appellant and Mr. Elliott that evening, with the last call occurring at 12:27 a.m. as both phones accessed the same tower. Shortly after, the Appellant called Mr. Hill. Casey Tarrant testified about a discussion with the Appellant and others regarding potential prison sentences, with the Appellant reassuring him. Tarrant later saw the Appellant and Timica Jones leaving Ernie Mill's house in a vehicle. Timica Jones, interviewed by police, eventually confirmed that she and the Appellant were at the Quality Inn that night and mentioned the Appellant discarding a gun, which was not found during a subsequent search. Ms. Jones testified about her activities with the Appellant on the night of October 29. They drove in his mother's white four-door car, during which the Appellant sold crack cocaine to an unfamiliar man. Afterward, they visited the Appellant's mother's house, where he briefly checked on her while Ms. Jones waited in the car. They then went to Walmart, where the Appellant purchased a 'pay-as-you-go' phone, and later to Sonic for food. Following a stop at a trailer park where the Appellant visited his brother, they drove to the Quality Inn. Ms. Jones noted that the Appellant had a gun earlier that night. After hearing two sounds resembling gunshots, the Appellant returned to the car with what appeared to be a touchscreen phone and seemed to put something in a bag. They drove back to his mother's house, where the Appellant interacted with Mr. Hill briefly, and then he took a bag into the house. About ten minutes later, the Appellant returned with the bag and indicated they were going for a ride. Ms. Jones stated she saw him throw a stolen phone away near North Lake Elementary School. During a subsequent speeding stop in Cowan, the Appellant reached into the back seat, prompting Ms. Jones to hear a bag rattling. Afterward, he discarded another bag while driving up Sewanee Mountain. They stopped at a convenience store in Monteagle, where the Appellant bought cigarettes and drinks and asked Ms. Jones to rent a motel room in her name, providing cash for the payment. They spent time in the room watching TV, after which the Appellant woke her up to leave. They drove toward Chattanooga, stopped at an unknown house where they had sex, and then continued their journey. They stopped for gas in South Pittsburg, where the Appellant also visited his stepfather at a nursing home. Afterward, they returned to Winchester, where the Appellant inquired about car rental options and they drove to Estill Springs to rent a van. The Appellant then took Ms. Jones home in the van. Police later confirmed their route via cellular telephone records. Ms. Jones reported that after returning home and sleeping, she learned from her mother about a murder in Tullahoma, where one victim was identified as a man who had bought cocaine from the Appellant. Distressed, she contacted the Appellant, who warned her to remain silent about the incident, threatening her safety. Despite her fears, she did not report the matter to the police. On February 15, 2011, Officers Jason Kennedy and Agent Kendall Barham interviewed the Appellant, advising him of his Miranda rights. The Appellant claimed not to know the victims, yet he referred to one as "the bigger one." He stated he was with Ms. Jones on the night of the incident and was in Cowan, denying any prior knowledge of the victims' involvement in a setup. During a subsequent interview on February 25, 2011, the Appellant was again read his rights. Officer Kennedy informed him that police had detailed information about his activities surrounding the murders, to which the Appellant nodded in acknowledgment. The Appellant confirmed selling crack cocaine and had interactions with the victims prior to their deaths. He also admitted to discarding a cellular phone and a gun during a vehicle drive after the murders. Agent Poff, during the same interview, posed a question about the motivation behind the killings, leading the Appellant to tear up and nod affirmatively when asked whether he killed the victims to avenge a relative. The Appellant had previously indicated he would only harm someone who had harmed his family, which he reiterated in connection to Mr. Hill. Chief Dennis Young testified that he informed the Appellant about police knowledge regarding the gun used in a murder, implicating Mr. Fuqua and Mr. Hill in the transaction of the gun to the Appellant. The Appellant showed no reaction initially but denied receiving payment for the murders, despite claims that Mr. Fuqua and Mr. Hill had each paid him $2,500 to kill the victims. Young acknowledged the Appellant's desire to protect Mr. Hill but questioned the protection of Mr. Fuqua, a non-relative. The Appellant responded he would address the matter upon release from custody. When Officer Kennedy requested details about the murders, the Appellant requested an attorney, ending the interrogation. Later, the Appellant claimed that anyone he had harmed was still alive and denied killing anyone. Kimberly Eddings, the Appellant's girlfriend at the time, testified that weeks before the murders, they drove around Tullahoma with another individual, where the Appellant suggested he intended to rob someone. The Appellant, wearing a hoodie, and Mr. May exited the car with gloves and a knife, but Ms. Eddings remained in the vehicle. Mrs. Elliott, the victim's wife, recounted an encounter with the Appellant and Mr. May, who sought her husband but left when she informed them he was not there. Terry Whitaker, a federal inmate, recounted the Appellant claiming to have shot two individuals who were confidential informants, asserting he acted on behalf of a family member, possibly Andrew Hill. Another inmate, Shannon Quintel Pentecost, shared that the Appellant confessed to him about the murders, expressing regret about not also killing a woman present during the incident. The Appellant described the murders as making it appear like a suicide, and he later disclosed this conversation to the police in January 2012. On April 11, 2012, Mr. Pentecost provided a second statement to authorities, indicating that the Appellant claimed the shooting occurred at a Manchester hotel. Terry Elliott, the Appellant's brother, testified to visiting the Quality Inn around 10:00 a.m. on October 30, 2010, where he learned that Mr. Nixon had discovered the victims' bodies. Nixon reportedly searched Mr. Elliott's pockets for his mother's phone number prior to police arrival. During cross-examination, Terry Elliott did not inform police about Nixon's search, suggesting he believed Nixon had already done so. Ellen Meeks, an employee at Dunlap's Market, described Mr. Elliott as a frequent customer, drug addict, and often intoxicated, noting his increased visits in the months leading to his death. She also mentioned seeing Mr. Elliott and Ray Nixon together occasionally, including an incident where Nixon expressed anger over financial favoritism from their father towards Elliott. Rakish Patel stated that no guests in the same wing of the Quality Inn as the victims lodged noise complaints on the night of the incident. The jury convicted the Appellant of first-degree premeditated murder and felony murder for both victims, as well as especially aggravated robbery, leading to a life sentence without parole and an additional thirty-five years for the robbery, served consecutively. On appeal, the Appellant contested the sufficiency of evidence, the admission of prior bad acts testimony, jury instructions on circumstantial evidence, and the denial of a motion to suppress his statement made to law enforcement. The Appellant argued that questioning should have ceased after he invoked his Fifth Amendment right. A hearing on the motion revealed that the Appellant had been informed of his Miranda rights and initially acknowledged understanding them, while also expressing dissatisfaction with his treatment in jail. The Appellant expressed willingness to assist Officer Kennedy and Agent Barham, despite feeling threatened by Winchester police officers and facing a $100,000 bond that kept him incarcerated. He was responsible for caring for his mother, who fell ill while he was in jail. Agent Barham informed the Appellant that they had previously met his mother, who spoke positively about his care for her. When discussing family support during his incarceration, the Appellant noted his brother lived in Chicago, leading to a light-hearted conversation about their shared Chicago roots and sports teams, particularly the Cubs. The Appellant indicated he rarely visited Chicago due to his mother's health issues. During the interview, Officer Kennedy inquired about the Appellant's knowledge of the victims, to which the Appellant claimed he did not know them personally. He did, however, describe one victim by size and acknowledged a connection through his nephews, who were involved in cases related to the victims. He mentioned hearing that the killing was "professional" and referenced a sum of money found at the scene. The Appellant asserted his reputation for being straightforward and respectful, stating he would only retaliate if his family was threatened. He admitted initial reluctance to speak with the officers due to past negative experiences with law enforcement, and maintained he had no prior relationship with or recognition of the victims. The Appellant admitted to delivering drugs to Viola in September and stated that she informed him the drugs were intended for Mr. Elliott. He claimed not to know Mr. Elliott and expressed distrust towards him, asserting he would not have sold him drugs. The Appellant mentioned he had served drugs through Viola about three times and identified Mr. Elliott as someone who was "setting people up" only after being informed by a man named Ernie during one of these occasions. He did not know the victims’ identities or where they lived prior to their deaths but was aware of Viola's and her sister's residences. During the police interview, the Appellant was cooperative and engaged, noting his willingness to speak was influenced by Officer Kennedy's Cubs fandom and the officers' offer to deliver a letter to his mother. He claimed he would not have left any money if he had been involved in the victims’ deaths. The Appellant stated he was with his girlfriend in Cowan on the night of the murders, where they were pulled over by police. The trial court concluded the Appellant’s statements were voluntary, rejecting his argument that he had invoked his Fifth Amendment rights during questioning. The court found that he continued to provide information without coercion, threats, or promises from law enforcement. On appeal, the Appellant contended that questioning should have ceased after he claimed his right to remain silent; however, the State maintained that the trial court appropriately determined he did not invoke this right. The legal standards governing self-incrimination were cited, referencing the Supreme Court's ruling in Miranda v. Arizona regarding the necessity of procedural safeguards during custodial interrogation. Procedural safeguards require that individuals subjected to custodial questioning receive warnings about their rights: to remain silent, that statements may be used against them, and the right to an attorney, as established in State v. Blackstock. An accused may waive these Miranda rights, with the validity of such a waiver assessed based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation (State v. Van Tran). A trial judge’s findings during a motion to suppress hold the same weight as a jury verdict (State v. Tate), and their decisions are binding if supported by a preponderance of evidence (State v. Odom). In this case, the trial court found that the Appellant's right to remain silent was not violated, as the Appellant did not unequivocally invoke this right during questioning. Although he initially expressed a desire to not talk, he continued to engage with officers and was not coerced into speaking. Furthermore, the Appellant acknowledged understanding his rights and indicated he saw potential benefits in cooperating. The court concluded that his statements were made voluntarily. Additionally, the Appellant challenged the trial court's decision to allow testimony from Ms. Eddings regarding an attempted robbery, arguing it was erroneous. This testimony was intended to counter the Appellant's claim of ignorance about the victims during his recorded statement. The State argued for the admissibility of testimony from Ms. Eddings to establish motive, claiming she would testify that she, along with the Appellant, Ernie May, visited the Quality Inn in Tullahoma with the intent to rob Mr. Elliott prior to the murders. Mrs. Elliott was expected to testify that the Appellant and Mr. May inquired about Mr. Elliott but left when he was not present. The defense objected, asserting the evidence of a failed robbery attempt was unreliable and constituted conformity evidence, making it too speculative for admissibility. During a jury-out hearing, Ms. Eddings recounted that a couple of weeks before the murders, the Appellant and Mr. May left their vehicle with gloves and a knife, intending to rob individuals upstairs whom they believed had money. Ms. Eddings interpreted the Appellant's statement about "hitting a lick" as an intention to commit robbery. After observing the men return quickly to the car, she concluded their target was not present. The trial court found the evidence relevant, noting it supported the motive for the murders and countered claims that the Appellant was unfamiliar with the victims. The court determined that the evidence's probative value outweighed any potential for unfair prejudice and concluded it was admissible under the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, specifically addressing concerns related to character evidence and the relevance of prior actions to the case at hand. The Appellant on appeal does not dispute the evidence's relevance but argues that the proof of a prior attempt to commit a crime was not clear and convincing and that its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(a), character evidence is generally inadmissible to prove that an individual acted in accordance with a specific character trait. Additionally, Rule 404(b) prohibits the introduction of evidence concerning other crimes or acts to establish character; however, such evidence may be admissible for relevant purposes if its probative value surpasses the risk of unfair prejudice. Relevant issues for admitting such evidence include identity, motive, or rebutting defenses like accident or mistake. The court must conduct a pretrial hearing outside the jury's presence, determine the existence of a material issue unrelated to character, document the reasons for admitting the evidence, and ensure the evidence is clear and convincing. If procedural requirements are met, the court's admissibility decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The trial court found that testimony from Ms. Eddings was pertinent to establishing the Appellant's motive for the offenses. Prior acts have been allowed to show motive in cases involving concealment of a crime, desire for financial gain, or prior animosity toward a victim. In this case, the State argued that the Appellant, aware that Mr. Elliott had money, intended to rob and kill to protect or avenge his nephew. The earlier attempted robbery was presented as evidence of the Appellant's motive and knowledge regarding the victims' financial status. The evidence also contradicted the Appellant's claims of not knowing the victims or their location. On appeal, the Appellant asserts that Ms. Eddings's testimony lacked the necessary clarity and conviction to support the prior attempted robbery. The Appellant references Ms. Eddings' testimony, which indicated she was unaware of the victims’ names, the incident's date, and what the Appellant did. The Appellant argues that "to hit a lick" means to make money, while Ms. Eddings asserted it meant to rob someone, claiming the Appellant and Mr. May intended to rob the victims at the motel with gloves and a knife. Additionally, Mrs. Elliott testified that the Appellant and another man visited Mr. Elliott’s motel room around the same time as described by Ms. Eddings. The trial court, having observed the witnesses' demeanor, found the evidence of the initial robbery attempt to be clear and convincing, thus ruling against the Appellant's claims of abuse of discretion. The Appellant also challenged the trial court's ruling on the probative value of evidence against potential unfair prejudice, given that he faced charges of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court determined that evidence of prior intent to rob, established by Ms. Eddings’ testimony that the Appellant had planned the robbery two weeks prior, was relevant to the case and outweighed any unfair prejudice. The court instructed the jury not to consider the prior robbery attempt as indicative of the Appellant's propensity for the current charges, with the presumption that the jury followed these instructions. In terms of jury instructions, the Appellant argues that the trial court wrongly instructed the jury on circumstantial evidence, claiming it violated his constitutional rights against ex post facto laws. He contends that the trial court should have applied the standard from State v. Crawford, which was in effect during the time of the offenses in 2010, rather than the revised standard established in 2011 by State v. Dorantes, which treats direct and circumstantial evidence equally. The appellant argues that the jury instruction based on the Dorantes standard infringes upon constitutional ex post facto provisions by reducing the prosecution's burden of proof for convictions. The State counters that ex post facto provisions do not pertain to judicial decisions like Dorantes, referencing prior rulings that affirm this interpretation. Moreover, it states that retroactive changes to common law criminal doctrines violate due process only if they are unexpected and indefensible according to established law. The court concludes that applying the Dorantes standard does not violate ex post facto provisions, as both the Tennessee Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals applied this standard retroactively to crimes committed before January 2011. Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellant challenges the basis for his convictions. On appeal, the presumption of innocence is replaced by a presumption of guilt, placing the burden on the appellant to demonstrate that no reasonable jury could have found the evidence sufficient to support the convictions. The State is afforded the strongest legitimate interpretation of the evidence, and issues of witness credibility and evidence value are determined by the jury, not the appellate court. Convictions can rely on direct, circumstantial, or a combination of both types of evidence, with a consistent standard of review applied regardless of the evidence type. To secure a conviction for first degree premeditated murder, the State must demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Appellant intentionally and premeditatedly killed the victim as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. 39-13-202(a)(1). Premeditation involves the formation of intent to kill prior to the act, although it does not require a specific period of prior contemplation. Tennessee courts infer premeditation from various factors, including: the relationship between the appellant and the victim, any declarations of intent to kill by the appellant, planning activities preceding the killing, the method of killing (especially involving a deadly weapon against an unarmed victim or in a cruel manner), and the appellant's demeanor before and after the act. Felony murder, under Tenn. Code Ann. 39-13-202(a)(2), is defined as a killing occurring during the commission of a robbery, which is characterized by the intentional or knowing theft of property through violence or intimidation (Tenn. Code Ann. 39-13-401(a)). Especially aggravated robbery involves the use of a deadly weapon where the victim suffers serious bodily injury (Tenn. Code Ann. 39-13-403(a)(1) and (2)). Serious bodily injury is defined as an injury that poses a substantial risk of death (Tenn. Code Ann. 39-11-106(a)(34)(A)). The Appellant challenges the sufficiency of evidence concerning witness credibility, claiming inconsistencies in testimonies, specifically regarding whether he possessed a gun on the night in question and the vehicle he was driving. However, the jury is responsible for determining witness credibility. The jury's assessment favored the State, and the appellate court cannot re-evaluate this credibility determination. The evidence presented at trial indicated that the Appellant's nephew was indicted due to the victims' roles as confidential informants, and that the Appellant reassured his nephew and a friend about their concerns regarding prison prior to the incident. Mr. Elliott arranged for Ms. Stephens to assist him in obtaining crack cocaine from the Appellant, who sold the drugs to Mr. Elliott at Ms. Stephens's house. After using some of the cocaine, the victims went to Mr. Elliott, Jr.'s house, where Mr. Elliott displayed $2,100 in cash. Before leaving, he made a series of calls to the Appellant. Later that night, Ms. Jones identified Mr. Elliott as the purchaser of the drugs. The Appellant, armed with a gun, entered a motel room where Ms. Jones subsequently heard gunshots. Upon returning to the car, the Appellant discarded a cellular phone and a gun. Cellular records confirmed their movements and communications that night, with the last call between Mr. Elliott and the Appellant occurring at 12:27 a.m. on October 30. While in jail, the Appellant confessed to involvement in the murder of two men. He contested the especially aggravated robbery conviction, claiming the State did not prove theft, the use of a deadly weapon, or serious bodily injury. Testimony indicated the Appellant had intended to rob Mr. Elliott and was seen with a gun before the victims were shot in the head. Although Mr. Elliott had shown a large sum of money earlier, he was found without any cash. The Appellant's actions, including the disposal of the telephone, were noted, and the court affirmed the trial court's judgments, concluding that evidence sufficiently supported the convictions.