Perez, Jose Diaz v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: PD-0728-15

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; August 27, 2015; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Jose Dias Perez, the appellant, filed a Petition for Discretionary Review concerning his case, appealing the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Judicial District, Tyler, Texas. The petition raises six grounds for review:

1. **Admissibility of Personal Writing**: The appellant argues that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's admission of a personal writing seized under an evidentiary search warrant.
   
2. **Custodial Statement Admission**: The appellant contends that a statement made to Detective Battley post-defective Miranda warnings was improperly admitted.
   
3. **Jailor Statement Admission**: He challenges the admission of a statement made to Jailor Creel while in custody without any Miranda warnings.

4. **Juror Bias**: The appellant claims the Court of Appeals incorrectly upheld the trial court’s decision not to excuse a biased juror after the trial had begun, despite no agreement for dismissal between the parties.

5. **Sufficiency of Evidence**: He questions the Court of Appeals’ conclusion regarding the sufficiency of evidence after dismissing his first three issues.

6. **Extraneous Offense Evidence**: Lastly, he argues against the admission of an extraneous unadjudicated offense from over thirty years ago, asserting that the trial court failed to grant a mistrial after unsolicited testimony about this offense was presented.

The petition includes a request for oral argument to aid the court in comprehending the facts and issues involved.

Petitioner was indicted on April 23, 2012, for the murder of Martha Caselin Ramirez. The defense sought to suppress a personal writing and statements made by Petitioner to law enforcement, but the Trial Court denied these motions, allowing the evidence to be presented during the jury trial. A juror disclosed prior knowledge of a witness related to an unadjudicated extraneous offense from over 30 years ago, expressing a bias towards the witness's credibility. Although both parties agreed to excuse the juror, the Trial Court did not do so. The jury ultimately convicted Petitioner of murder, imposing a 50-year sentence. Petitioner’s Motion for New Trial was denied by operation of law, leading to an appeal. 

In procedural history, Petitioner was convicted of murder on April 22, 2014, with the Tyler Court of Appeals affirming the conviction on May 29, 2015. No rehearing motions were filed. The Court granted an extension to file a Petition for Discretionary Review, which was submitted by the deadline on August 18, 2015.

The grounds for review include: 
I. Challenging the admission of a personal writing obtained via an evidentiary search warrant. 
II. Questioning the admissibility of a statement made to Detective Battley following defective Miranda warnings. 
III. Examining the admission of a statement made to Jailor Creel without any Miranda warnings. 
IV. Addressing the Trial Court's failure to excuse a biased juror after trial commencement. 
V. Assessing the sufficiency of evidence after the Court overruled prior issues. 
VI. Evaluating the admissibility of an extraneous offense and the denial of a mistrial following unsolicited testimony about that offense.

The Court of Appeals overlooked the illegal seizure of the Petitioner's personal writings, which violate both State and Federal laws. According to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Tex.C.C.P. art. 18.02(1), personal writings of the accused are not permissible as evidence. The State improperly introduced a personal writing, identified as State’s Exhibit SE. 73, despite objections from the Petitioner. This writing, in Spanish and found on a kitchen table, was translated into English by the State. The State claimed it was a last will and testament; however, it did not meet the legal requirements under the Texas Family Code and Texas Property Code, and instead appeared to be a personal draft. The Court of Appeals incorrectly ruled that the personal writing was admissible, despite it not being included in the search warrant which was limited to weapons and blood. This ruling contradicts the 'Fruit of the Poisonous Tree' doctrine established by the Supreme Court, which prohibits the use of evidence obtained unlawfully. Additionally, the personal writing did not fall under the 'plain view' exception to warrant requirements. The search warrant did not authorize the seizure of items unrelated to the specified search criteria, thereby undermining legal principles and creating a potential conflict with existing state and federal jurisprudence.

Arguments Two and Three focus on the admissibility of statements in light of the principles established in Miranda v. Arizona. The Fourteenth Amendment mandates that only voluntary confessions may be admitted as evidence; any involuntary statement renders evidence inadmissible, regardless of reliability. Violations of due process occur when a conviction is based, even partially, on involuntary statements. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the Appellant's statement did not comply with Tex.C.C.P. art 38.22, Subsection 3(a), yet upheld its admission due to an exception under Subsection 3(c). This reasoning is contested as it undermines established constitutional protections against self-incrimination, as outlined in Miranda.

The prosecution must demonstrate that proper safeguards were utilized during custodial interrogation; failure to do so results in a violation of constitutional rights, regardless of the statement's truth. The voluntariness doctrine encompasses any interrogation practices that may pressure an individual into making non-free choices. The Court of Appeals' assertion that certain questions posed during booking do not elicit incriminating responses overlooks the need for clear warnings regarding the right to silence. The privilege against self-incrimination is absolute and cannot be mitigated by circumstantial factors. The Court of Appeals' interpretation of Tex.C.C.P. art. 38.22, 3(c) conflicts with Supreme Court precedent, raising significant issues for both state and federal law.

During the guilt-innocence phase of trial, juror Geraldine Griffin disclosed her five-year working relationship with Witness Ward, indicating she would favor Ward's testimony. The Petitioner requested Griffin's dismissal, proposing to proceed with eleven jurors, citing Texas Code of Criminal Procedure (C.C.P.) articles 33.01, 33.011, and 36.29. The State opposed this, asserting no agreement to excuse the juror and claiming the Court did not err. The Court of Appeals mistakenly concluded that the Petitioner did not wish to dismiss Griffin, although the Trial Court had ruled against her dismissal despite objections. The Petitioner argues this misinterpretation warrants the Court of Criminal Appeal's review.

The fifth argument hinges on the first three arguments, claiming that without the Petitioner’s personal statements and other inadmissible evidence, the remaining evidence is insufficient to support a murder conviction. Citing Jackson v. Virginia, the Petitioner contends that when considering the evidence neutrally, it does not prove actions beyond mere accident or self-defense in the shooting of Ramirez.

In the sixth argument, the Court of Appeals allegedly disregarded protections against extraneous evidence, ruling that the Trial Court did not err in admitting such evidence, contrary to the defense's objections. The Petitioner references Texas Rules of Evidence, specifically Rule 609, arguing that a thirty-year-old unprosecuted alleged attempted murder should be inadmissible under Rules 404(b) and 405. The Court of Appeals' reliance on case law to justify the admission of this outdated evidence is deemed flawed, as unadjudicated extraneous offenses should not be admissible to imply character conformity.

The admission of unadjudicated offense evidence that closely resembles the charged offense can significantly impact a case. However, such evidence must be relevant to material facts in dispute; otherwise, it is inadmissible according to Rules of Evidence 404(b). The Supreme Court has ruled that while propensity evidence may hold some relevance, its prejudicial effect—risking jury conviction based on past crimes rather than the current charges—outweighs its relevance. This principle indicates that the Court of Appeals' decision contradicts established legal norms and warrants the Court of Criminal Appeals' oversight due to its misinterpretation of statutes and rules. The petition requests the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas to grant a discretionary review based on these grounds. 

Jose Dias Perez, the petitioner, was convicted of murder and sentenced to fifty years in prison. He challenges the trial court's evidence admission, juror service decision, and evidence sufficiency. The background details the relationship between Perez and the victim, Martha Caselin Ramirez, leading up to the fatal shooting, after which Perez reported the incident to 911. The jury ultimately found him guilty. 

The petitioner's certificate of service confirms that the relevant documents were sent to the District Attorney and the State Prosecuting Attorney.

Appellant challenges the admissibility of a handwritten note, statements made to law enforcement, and extraneous offense evidence. The standard for reviewing a trial court's evidentiary decisions is abuse of discretion, where rulings are upheld if reasonably supported by the record and legally sound. 

After Appellant's arrest, officers executed a search warrant for specific items and discovered a notepad with a note in Spanish, purportedly signed by Appellant, which expressed his wishes regarding his possessions. The note was seized as evidence. Appellant argued at a pretrial suppression hearing that the note was inadmissible as a "personal writing" under Article 18.02(10) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which protects personal writings from seizure unless specified in the warrant. The State contended that the note was not a personal writing and that it fell under the plain view exception, as it was discovered during a lawful search.

The trial court denied Appellant's suppression motion, and Appellant's objection was overruled at trial. The court found that Article 18.02(10) did not apply since the note was not listed in the search warrant. Additionally, the officers were justified in seizing the note under the plain view exception during a good faith search, as they had a reasonable basis to connect the note to the ongoing investigation. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the note into evidence, leading to the overruling of Appellant's first issue.

Appellant called 911 and agreed to meet police at his house, where he was handcuffed and advised of his rights, a process recorded by police equipment. He subsequently led officers to the body of Ramirez. During an interview with Detective Gina Battley, Appellant confirmed he understood his rights and described an altercation where he shot Ramirez, believing she was armed. Appellant later claimed his statement was involuntary due to intoxication and pain from the handcuffs, arguing it should be suppressed. The determination of a confession's voluntariness relies on the totality of circumstances, including factors like detention length and interrogation conditions. Intoxication alone does not render a confession involuntary unless it severely impairs the ability to make a free choice. A recording from the interview revealed Appellant requested his handcuffs to be loosened, which was promptly addressed by Detective Battley. She noted his slight intoxication but found him capable of communication. The trial court concluded that Appellant's statement was voluntarily given, and there was no abuse of discretion in this finding. Additionally, Appellant argued the statement was inadmissible under Article 38.22, which requires that oral statements made during custodial interrogation are admissible only if the accused is informed of their rights and waives them knowingly and voluntarily, and if all voices on the recording are identified.

The State contends that a statement made by the Appellant, although not fully compliant with Subsection 3(a), is admissible under Subsection 3(c). This subsection allows the admission of statements containing factual assertions that are later corroborated and establish the guilt of the accused. Detective Battley testified that during the interview, the Appellant made several assertions about the shooting, including its location and details about the victim, which were unknown to law enforcement at the time but later confirmed as true. Consequently, the court found that the Appellant's statement was admissible despite non-compliance with Subsection 3(a), leading to the overruling of the Appellant's second issue.

Regarding the Appellant's statements to a jailer upon booking for the murder of Ramirez, he claimed he killed his girlfriend due to her alleged witchcraft and provided further details about the incident unprompted. The Appellant argues these statements are inadmissible as they stemmed from a custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings. However, 'interrogation' is defined as express questioning or actions by police that likely elicit an incriminating response. Routine booking questions, such as those asked by the jailer, are exempt from Miranda requirements as they are considered part of standard procedures associated with arrest. The court noted that these questions must relate to legitimate administrative concerns, which they did in this case.

A trial court must evaluate whether a question is reasonably related to a legitimate administrative concern, considering both the question's content and the context in which it is asked. In this case, the jailer routinely asked prisoners, including Appellant, about their awareness of their situation during the booking process to ensure they were coherent and not too intoxicated. The jailer specifically inquired if Appellant knew why he was there, particularly due to the smell of alcohol. She maintained that her intention was not to extract incriminating information, as the question did not necessarily lead to such a response. The court concluded that the inquiry served a legitimate administrative purpose, thus affirming the trial court's decision to admit Appellant's statements under the booking question exception to Miranda.

During Appellant's case, he claimed the shooting of Ramirez was accidental. The State introduced evidence of an extraneous offense to counter this claim, detailing an incident from January 1986 where Appellant shot his then-wife, Barbara Ward, multiple times. Although Ward survived and later filed an affidavit of non-prosecution leading to dismissed charges against Appellant, he argued that this extraneous offense evidence should not have been admitted due to a lack of similarity and its remoteness in time, citing Rule 404(b).

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is generally inadmissible to prove a person's character to show conformity; however, it can be admissible for establishing motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or to negate accident. If a defendant asserts that their actions lacked criminal intent, previous offenses may be relevant to establish such intent. The similarity required between the extraneous offense and the charged offense differs depending on whether intent or identity is in question. In this case, the extraneous offense was sufficiently similar to the charged offense, as both involved Appellant shooting women with whom he had relationships, after they had left him, and under comparable circumstances. The evidence from the extraneous offense was deemed admissible to counter the claim of accidental shooting.

Appellant argued that the age of the extraneous offense would lead to unfair prejudice, but after a pre-trial hearing, the court determined the jury could reasonably find the extraneous offense credible. There is no strict rule regarding the remoteness of extraneous offenses; instead, the relevance and probative value must be assessed considering factors such as time separation. In this case, the extraneous offense was not too remote to be admissible for intent. Lastly, Appellant contended that the trial court erred in admitting this evidence under Rule 403, which allows for exclusion if the prejudicial effect outweighs probative value. However, Rule 403 generally favors admissibility, presuming that relevant evidence has more probative value than prejudicial impact.

A Rule 403 analysis involves four factors: (1) the probative value of the evidence, (2) its potential to irrationally influence the jury, (3) the time required to present the evidence, and (4) the necessity of the evidence for the proponent. Extraneous offenses can suggest a defendant's character conformity, but this can be mitigated with a limiting instruction. In assessing the trial court's discretion regarding the admission of extraneous offense evidence, the following points were noted: 

1. Evidence of Ward's shooting increased the likelihood of the Appellant's intent to kill Ramirez and countered the Appellant's claim that the shooting was accidental.
2. A limiting instruction was provided to the jury to reduce any improper character conformity inferences.
3. The prosecutor spent minimal time presenting the extraneous offense evidence.
4. While other evidence could establish the Appellant's intent, including a handwritten will and multiple gunshots, the State's need for the extraneous offense evidence to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt was valid.

Consequently, the court found no abuse of discretion in admitting the extraneous offense evidence and overruled the Appellant's sixth issue.

Regarding the fourth issue, the Appellant argued that the trial court erred by not excusing a juror who had a prior work relationship with a witness, Barbara Ward. The juror disclosed her past connection but asserted she could remain fair and impartial. The Appellant objected to Ward's testimony and sought a mistrial, which the court denied. Although the State indicated it would not oppose proceeding with eleven jurors, the Appellant did not pursue this option. On appeal, the Appellant did not claim the juror was disqualified but argued that the trial court should have excused her based on an alleged agreement to proceed with eleven jurors. However, since there was no formal agreement confirmed by both parties, the court overruled the Appellant's fourth issue.

Appellant contended that his conviction lacked sufficient evidence without his handwritten note and statements to law enforcement. The court had previously ruled these items admissible, leading to the overruling of this argument. Regarding Appellant's sixth issue, he claimed the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial after a witness inadvertently referenced an extraneous offense during cross-examination. The court applies an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing such denials, presuming that juries follow curative instructions to disregard inappropriate testimony. Mistrials are reserved for situations where the objectionable event is so inflammatory that it likely prejudices the jury against the defendant, with the determination based on case-specific facts.

During cross-examination, a detective referenced a prior incident involving Appellant's first wife, which defense counsel objected to, leading to a motion for mistrial that the court denied, instead instructing the jury to disregard the remark. The court found that the detective's comment was inadvertent and that curative instructions were sufficient, especially since evidence related to the extraneous offense had been deemed admissible. Thus, the court concluded there was no abuse of discretion in denying the mistrial motion. Ultimately, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, overruling all of Appellant’s issues.