Robert John Anthony Martinez A/K/A Roberto Martinez A/K/A Robert John Martinez A/K/A Robert Martinez v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 13-13-00714-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; August 31, 2015; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Robert John Anthony Martinez appeals his murder conviction from the 103rd District Court of Cameron County, Texas, raising four issues. First, he contends that his second oral statement to police violated Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and should not have been admitted as evidence. Second, he claims the trial court erred by failing to include a jury charge instruction regarding the voluntariness of his statement. Third, he argues that comments made by the trial court during the State’s voir dire improperly influenced the jury's understanding of reasonable doubt. Lastly, he asserts that comments made by the prosecutor during the punishment phase constituted misconduct, warranting a mistrial. The appellate court affirmed the conviction. 

The case background reveals that on November 19, 2012, Martinez stabbed Angel Perez multiple times, resulting in Perez's death. Martinez testified that he confronted Perez while searching for him after hearing about a vehicle break-in. He claimed self-defense, stating that he was overpowered during a physical altercation and used a knife to fend off Perez. Initially arrested for possession of marijuana, Martinez later confessed to stabbing Perez during questioning by police. His first interview was not recorded, but a second, videotaped statement was taken after Miranda warnings were given. The State subsequently indicted him for murder, leading to his conviction and a fifty-year sentence. The appeal focuses on the admissibility of his statements and procedural fairness during the trial.

A trial court’s suppression ruling is reviewed using a bifurcated standard. Appellate courts must assess evidence favorably to the trial court's ruling, recognizing the trial judge as the sole factfinder during suppression hearings. Findings of fact, particularly those based on credibility assessments, are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, while mixed questions of law and fact not reliant on credibility are evaluated de novo. The court of appeals must uphold a trial court's suppression ruling if supported by the record and legally correct under any applicable theory.

Statements by defendants to law enforcement are regulated by Article 38.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Written statements from custodial interrogation are inadmissible unless the defendant received Miranda warnings. Oral statements are admissible if they are electronically recorded and the defendant is informed of their rights before the recording, knowingly waives those rights, and the recording meets specific criteria, including accurate identification of all voices. The defendant's attorney must also receive a copy of the recordings at least 20 days before trial.

Miranda warnings must inform the accused of their right to remain silent, the potential use of their statements against them, their right to legal counsel, the right to have a lawyer appointed if they cannot afford one, and the right to end the interview at any time. The Court of Criminal Appeals has determined that oral statements need only substantially comply with the required warnings for admissibility.

Misuse of Miranda safeguards has been highlighted in legal cases. In *Missouri v. Siebert*, the Supreme Court ruled against the "question first" technique, where a defendant confessed before receiving Miranda warnings, deeming it a deliberate circumvention of the rights notification. Similarly, in *Martinez v. State*, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that obtaining a second statement after initial questioning without warnings rendered it inadmissible. However, in *Carter v. State*, the court differentiated a situation where an officer inadvertently failed to issue warnings before asking questions but promptly corrected the oversight, leading to the affirmation of admissibility as it did not represent deliberate misconduct. Courts must assess whether an officer intentionally employed a two-step interrogation method to bypass Miranda protections, relying on the credibility of the officer’s testimony and the overall circumstances of the interrogation, a factual finding reviewed for clear error.

In the case of Martinez, he contended that his 38.22 warnings were given mid-interview and were non-compliant with legal standards. The State bears the burden of proving the admissibility of the confession and a valid waiver of Miranda rights. During pre-trial, officers involved in Martinez’s interrogation testified that he received his warnings before both questioning sessions. The initial session was not recorded as it focused on unrelated matters, but both officers confirmed that Martinez was properly informed of his rights. They indicated that Martinez appeared to understand and waive his rights, as he continued to converse with them, and that the subsequent videotaped session was conducted to comply with legal requirements.

Detective Ambriz confirmed that no promises were made to Martinez regarding a reduction of charges in exchange for his cooperation. Although the initial interrogation was neither recorded nor written, Ambriz asserted that he could testify about it in court. Martinez's trial counsel sought to suppress the video confession, citing the "question-first, warn-later" technique discussed in *Seibert*, but the trial court found that the interrogation did not fit this description and denied the motion. During the trial, Martinez admitted to stabbing Perez when testifying in his defense. Based on the evidence from the suppression hearing and trial, the court concluded that the videotaped confession did not result from the prohibited interrogation technique, thus upholding the trial court's decision.

In addressing Martinez's second issue regarding the trial court's failure to include a voluntariness instruction in the jury charge, the standard of review involves identifying any error in the charge and analyzing the resulting harm. If an error is preserved through a timely objection, reversal is warranted if the defendant suffers some harm. However, if no objection was raised, only "egregious harm" is grounds for reversal. The assessment of harm takes into account the jury charge, evidence presented, arguments by counsel, and the overall trial record. To prove harm, actual, rather than theoretical, harm must be shown. The trial court's omission of the voluntariness instruction was not objected to by trial counsel, which limits the grounds for appeal.

The review focuses on two key issues: whether there was an error in the jury charge and, if so, whether that error caused egregious harm to Martinez. Under Section 6 of Article 38.22, a judge must determine the voluntariness of a defendant's statement before it can be presented to the jury. The jury must be instructed that they cannot consider the statement unless they believe it was made voluntarily beyond a reasonable doubt. Section 7 mandates that the trial judge instruct the jury on the law concerning such statements when evidence raises the issue. Article 38.21 allows the use of a statement against the accused if it was made freely and voluntarily.

A defendant is entitled to an instruction on the voluntariness of their statement if evidence at trial suggests it was not given voluntarily. The prosecution must then prove voluntariness if the defendant raises this issue. In Martinez’s case, although his counsel questioned police officers about the voluntariness of his statements during the suppression hearing, this issue was not raised during the trial itself. No evidence presented to the jury indicated that Martinez did not voluntarily cooperate with authorities. The State demonstrated that Martinez received the necessary legal warnings and voluntarily waived his rights.

For a jury instruction on voluntariness to be warranted, there must be a genuine factual dispute, which was absent in this case. Martinez did not assert during his testimony that he had not received warnings or that his statement was involuntary. He also failed to identify any trial evidence that warranted a voluntariness instruction. The trial judge is obligated to provide an accurate jury charge but is not required to include instructions on every potential defensive issue absent evidence supporting those issues. Consequently, the trial court did not err by failing to include the proposed instruction on voluntariness, leading to the conclusion that there was no error in the jury charge, and Martinez’s second issue is overruled.

Martinez asserts that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and breached Texas Rule of Evidence 605 by commenting on reasonable doubt during voir dire, claiming this constitutes fundamental error. To preserve such a complaint for appellate review, a timely and specific objection must be made, along with an adverse ruling from the trial court; Martinez did not object, thus waiving his right to appeal except for instances of fundamental error. The determination of fundamental error hinges on whether the violation concerns a waivable right or an absolute requirement. Previous rulings have established that comments from a judge may be raised on appeal if they demonstrate a bias. 

According to Rule 605, a judge cannot testify in their own proceedings, and whether a judge's statement equates to testimony depends on its necessity for judicial function. Errors that do not affect substantial rights may be deemed harmless if the appellate court can assure that they did not influence the jury significantly. During voir dire, a prospective juror questioned the concept of reasonable doubt. The trial court engaged with the juror to clarify their confusion, emphasizing the necessity of proof to assert knowledge of guilt. The court's comments were deemed a part of its judicial function in clarifying legal standards.

The trial court acted appropriately in addressing confusion without expressing opinions on the evidence or making inappropriate legal assumptions. Martinez's right to an impartial judge was upheld, as the court demonstrated no bias towards the State or against him. While comments made by the court could be viewed as errors, they were deemed minor and not impactful enough to affect the jury's verdict. The court emphasized the need for evidence beyond a reasonable doubt and refrained from revealing personal beliefs about the case, avoiding fundamental error.

Regarding prosecutor misconduct, Martinez contended that the trial court erred by not granting a mistrial due to the prosecutor's behavior during the punishment phase. The standard for reviewing mistrial motions is based on whether the trial court abused its discretion, considering the severity of misconduct, any curative actions taken, and the likelihood of the same punishment being imposed regardless of the misconduct. Generally, a jury instruction to disregard improper arguments suffices to mitigate harm, with the presumption that jurors follow such instructions unless evidence suggests otherwise.

Martinez's specific claim of misconduct involved a confrontation with the prosecutor, who challenged his characterization of life's difficulties. The court sustained the defense's objection to the prosecutor's remarks as irrelevant, indicating an attempt to control the proceedings and maintain focus on pertinent issues.

The court proceedings involved objections raised by the defense regarding the prosecution's line of questioning about the witness's life experiences, which included references to racial demographics and the Ku Klux Klan. The judge sustained the objections and instructed the jury to disregard the statements made by the witness as irrelevant to the case at hand. Despite the defense's request for a mistrial due to the prosecutor's comments, the court denied this motion, emphasizing that the jury is presumed to follow the court's instructions. The analysis of the situation considered the severity of the misconduct, the curative measures taken by the trial court, and the likelihood that the jury was influenced by the improper remarks. Ultimately, it was determined that the prosecutor's comments were of slight severity, that appropriate curative measures were implemented, and that there was no evidence suggesting the jury disregarded the judge's instructions. The court affirmed its judgment, concluding that there was no abuse of discretion in denying the mistrial.