Bobbie Dewayne Grubbs v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 12-14-00210-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; June 3, 2015; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The document pertains to the appeal case of Bobbie Grubbs against the State of Texas, listed under case number 12-14-00210-CR in the Twelfth Court of Appeals in Tyler, Texas. The appeal arises from the 273rd Judicial District Court of Shelby County, Texas, with the presiding judge being Honorable Charles R. Mitchell. Bobbie Grubbs is represented by appellate counsel W. Stephen Shires and trial counsel John R. Smith, along with attorney Robert A. Goodwin. The State is represented by special prosecutors Ralph Guerrero and Wesley Mau, as well as Kenneth Florence, the Shelby County District Attorney.

The brief includes several critical components: a request for oral argument, a comprehensive list of parties and their counsel, a table of contents, and a statement of issues to be addressed. Key arguments presented by the appellant include claims of trial court errors, specifically:

1. Failure to grant a mistrial due to the introduction of an inadmissible DVD containing Grubbs' admission.
2. Lack of inclusion of a definition and instruction regarding "involuntary intoxication."
3. Improper handling of statements made by Grubbs to law enforcement officers, arguing for their suppression.

The document concludes with a prayer for relief and certificates verifying service and compliance with word count requirements.

The appellant, Grubbs, requests oral argument in his appeal regarding a capital murder conviction. He asserts that oral argument is necessary due to significant legal issues and unique factual circumstances. The relevant legal references include significant case law, Texas statutes, and rules of evidence related to the case. Grubbs raises four main issues on appeal: 

1. The trial court's error in denying a mistrial or excluding an inadmissible DVD statement played during the trial.
2. The failure to provide a definition and instruction on "involuntary intoxication."
3. The court's refusal to suppress statements made to a detective at the Montgomery County Sheriff's Office.
4. The court's refusal to suppress statements made to a DPS Trooper during transport to the sheriff's office.

Grubbs was indicted for capital murder on September 25, 2012, and later re-indicted on February 19, 2014, for one count of capital murder and two counts of aggravated assault. The state successfully transferred the original indictment to the re-indicted case, leading to a trial that commenced on May 13, 2014. On May 19, 2014, the jury found him guilty, resulting in a life sentence without parole for capital murder and life sentences for the aggravated assaults. Following an unsuccessful motion for a new trial, Grubbs filed a notice of appeal on July 23, 2014. The charges stemmed from an incident at the Joaquin Country Inn on April 27, 2012.

Grubbs and his wife, Deedra Grubbs, are alleged to have fled Montgomery County, Texas, on April 26, 2012, after robbing Mary Jane Cashdollar at her home, where Deedra previously worked as a cleaner. Following the robbery, the couple traveled north through Texas toward Louisiana but encountered car trouble in Joaquin, Texas. They spent the night at the Country Inn, where Grubbs, unable to afford car repairs, shot and robbed two housekeepers and a handyman the next morning, resulting in one housekeeper's death. The couple subsequently fled in the handyman's car but returned to Texas, intending to check on their children. They were located by authorities through their mobile phone usage and apprehended on April 27, 2012.

Grubbs was interrogated by law enforcement after his arrest and made statements that he argues were not voluntary and should have been excluded from evidence. At trial, he admitted to shooting the victims but claimed he was legally excused from prosecution due to a psychosis induced by involuntary intoxication from a substance called "Pump-It Powder." Grubbs described purchasing and ingesting this substance after being advised by a convenience store clerk. Expert testimony during the trial indicated that "Pump-It Powder," a synthetic amphetamine classified as a type of "bath salts," can cause severe psychological effects, including psychosis, delusions, hallucinations, and aggression.

Dr. Gripon provided expert testimony regarding the effects of bath salts, specifically their rapid onset and temporary duration of disturbance following ingestion. He explained that a person might appear normal before taking a substantial dose of bath salts, become disturbed for three to six hours, and then return to normal after eight hours. Dr. Gripon acknowledged he did not observe Grubbs purchasing or using Pump-It Powder but relied on Grubbs' self-reported experiences. Grubbs indicated he had purchased ten doses of Pump-It Powder, which he described as having stimulant effects that caused significant energy, insomnia, paranoia, and a distorted perception of others. Dr. Gripon noted that while such effects are known, they vary based on dosage and individual response.

Mr. Jimmy Stockton corroborated Grubbs’ claims, recalling a conversation in which Grubbs expressed he was not acting like himself and mentioned using bath salts. Stockton confirmed that Grubbs suggested he felt under a different influence during the events leading to his arrest, indicating a belief that he was being pursued, which contributed to his actions.

The excerpt highlights several critical points regarding the trial of Grubbs. During the proceedings, Stockton confirmed he had heard Grubbs mention "salts," countering the State's claim that this was not included in his statement to authorities. The defense attorney emphasized that Grubbs had indeed communicated about "bath salts" and challenged the credibility of any claim that Grubbs had not disclosed this information. Additionally, Detective Echols presented a DVD of Grubbs' statement, which was supposed to be redacted to exclude references to inadmissible evidence, including prior convictions. However, the version shown to the jury inadvertently included statements about Grubbs’ previous incarceration and threats made to a witness, which led to a bench conference and the eventual substitution of the DVD with a correctly redacted version. Grubbs' motions to exclude the statement and declare a mistrial were denied by the trial court. Ultimately, the jury convicted Grubbs of capital murder and aggravated assault, resulting in life sentences without parole. Grubbs contends that the trial court erred by not granting a mistrial due to the admission of inadmissible evidence and by failing to provide proper instructions on "involuntary intoxication."

Grubbs' defense centered on asserting a lack of legal responsibility due to psychosis caused by involuntary intoxication from Pump-It Powder. The trial court failed to instruct the jury on "voluntary intoxication," effectively removing Grubbs' defense from their consideration. Additionally, Grubbs argued that his statements to Montgomery County Sheriff Detective Keith Echols and DPS Trooper Sean Barnes were not made voluntarily and should have been suppressed. 

Grubbs raised four grounds for appeal to reverse his convictions and obtain a new trial. Firstly, he contended that the trial court erred by not granting a mistrial or excluding a DVD played at trial, which erroneously contained an inadmissible admission by Grubbs. Despite the State's acknowledgment of the mistake during a bench conference, the trial court denied Grubbs' requests to exclude the statement and subsequently denied his mistrial motion. 

The inadvertent admission of this evidence violated a pretrial agreement to redact references to extraneous offenses, including prior incarceration. Grubbs argues that this constitutes reversible error, as the violation of a motion in limine generally warrants relief. The trial court has broad discretion in such matters, and the failure to act on this violation was an abuse of discretion.

A trial court's discretion is considered abused when its decision lacks a basis in established rules and principles, resulting in arbitrary or unreasonable outcomes. To reverse a judgment due to evidentiary errors, the appellant must demonstrate that the trial court made an error that likely affected the judgment outcome. In this case, the trial court failed to exclude a statement from the jury after a significant error by the State, violating TEX. R. EVID. 404(b), which prohibits using evidence of prior acts to imply character conformity. The defendant, Grubbs, faced a challenging situation due to the egregious facts against him and his defense of involuntary intoxication. His admission of prior incarceration severely undermined his defense's credibility. The trial court denied Grubbs' request for a curative instruction and merely allowed the State to replace erroneous evidence without adequately addressing the issue. This oversight warranted a mistrial because the objectionable evidence was inherently prejudicial and could not be mitigated by a curative instruction. The trial court's failure to grant a mistrial constitutes reversible error, necessitating the overturning of Grubbs' conviction and the awarding of a new trial. Additionally, the trial court erred by not providing a definition and instruction regarding "involuntary intoxication" and its implications.

Grubbs' defense highlighted evidence of his unintentional intoxication from "Pump-It Powder," which he consumed in place of his regular energy drink, unaware of its effects. The substance, although legal at the time, can produce effects similar to PCP, as confirmed by DPS Trooper Dustin Ramos, who noted that bath salts can lead to severe behavioral changes. Grubbs argued for a jury instruction on "involuntary intoxication," based on the precedent set in Torres v. State, where involuntary intoxication can absolve criminal culpability if the accused did not exercise independent judgment in taking the intoxicant and was unable to recognize the wrongfulness of their actions. In Torres, the defendant involuntarily ingested Thorazine without knowledge, leading to a similar situation where the court reversed her conviction for lack of voluntary action due to intoxication. Grubbs contended that his circumstances mirrored those in Torres, thus he was entitled to the same jury instruction regarding his involuntary intoxication defense.

The Court determined that the jury holds the authority to assess the limits of a defense, including witness credibility and evidence weight. Grubbs' defense largely hinged on claiming he was not legally culpable due to psychosis from involuntary intoxication by Pump-It Powder. However, the jury was instructed on “insanity” but not on “involuntary intoxication,” which is crucial and distinct from “voluntary intoxication,” the latter being irrelevant to his charges per Texas Penal Code § 8.04. The omission of an "involuntary intoxication" instruction in the jury charge was deemed a reversible error, warranting a reversal of Grubbs’ convictions and a new trial.

Additionally, the trial court erred by failing to suppress Grubbs' statements made to Detective Echols, as they were not made voluntarily. According to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.22, only voluntary statements can be admitted in court. The Court of Criminal Appeals has indicated that factors such as the defendant's mental state, including illness and intoxication, must be considered when assessing voluntariness. In a suppression hearing, it was revealed that Grubbs faced pressure during interrogation, including a “quid pro quo” arrangement to see his children, and was confined in a small room with two officers closely positioned. Grubbs was recovering from psychosis and had not slept for several days, heightening concerns about his mental state during the interrogation. Given these circumstances, the totality of the situation suggests that his statements were not freely made, further supporting the argument for suppression. The trial court's decisions regarding evidence suppression are subject to an abuse of discretion standard.

Grubbs exhibited nervous behavior during his interrogation, including foot tapping, and made incoherent statements regarding Deedra's involvement, which did not make sense to the interrogating officer, Echols. Given Grubbs' state of mind at the time, it is argued that he could not have provided a knowing and voluntary statement; thus, the trial court should have excluded his statements to Echols, constituting reversible error and necessitating a reversal of his convictions and a new trial. 

Additionally, Grubbs' statements to DPS Trooper Sean Barnes during transport and at the arrest scene were also deemed involuntary and should have been suppressed. During the May 6, 2014, hearing on this motion, defense counsel highlighted the chaotic environment of the arrest, which involved multiple armed officers, helicopters, and significant noise. Grubbs was physically restrained, and his wife, Deedra, was also secured and placed in an ambulance. He was not informed that his discussions with Trooper Barnes were being recorded, and the camera was not directed at him until after he had made several statements. Grubbs did not provide a written waiver of his rights, was recovering from a psychosis due to involuntary intoxication, and was distressed about his family's welfare. 

Considering the totality of these circumstances, it is argued that Grubbs could not have made a knowing and voluntary statement at the time of his arrest, warranting the exclusion of his statements to Trooper Barnes. This failure by the trial court is also deemed reversible error, supporting the request for a new trial.

Appellant Bobbie Grubbs requests the Court to: i) grant oral argument, ii) reverse his convictions and order a new trial, and iii) provide any additional relief he may be entitled to. The submission is made by attorney W. Stephen Shires of the Law Office of Stephen Shires, PLLC, located in Center, Texas. The document certifies that a copy was served to Mr. Kenneth Florence, the Shelby County District Attorney, in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Additionally, it states that the word count of the Appellant's Brief is 7,028 words, verified using a word processor's count function.