United States v. Mario Thomas

Citations: 838 F.3d 926; 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 17459; 2016 WL 5349289Docket: 16-1283

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; September 26, 2016; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Mario Thomas appeals his sentence enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines following his conviction for distributing cocaine base. The district court applied the career-offender enhancement based on two prior convictions, including one for first-degree battery under Arkansas law, which involves causing serious physical injury using a deadly weapon. The statute defines "serious physical injury" and "deadly weapon," allowing for a broad interpretation of conduct that constitutes a crime of violence.

The Eighth Circuit Court affirmed the district court's decision, referencing its previous ruling in United States v. Boose, which established that the Arkansas statute encompasses conduct beyond what qualifies as a crime of violence under the Guidelines. The district court utilized the "modified categorical approach" to ascertain whether Thomas's conviction fell under a relevant subsection of the first-degree battery statute. The court found that the charging document implied Thomas was charged under a specific subsection that necessitates the use of violent force. Consequently, the court determined his prior conviction was a crime of violence and applied the career-offender enhancement, resulting in a sentencing range of 188 to 235 months. After a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, Thomas was sentenced to 188 months. Thomas's appeal contends that the charging document's lack of specificity and his interpretation of subsection (a)(1) do not meet the violent force requirement.

The district court's application of a career-offender enhancement, based on a prior conviction, is reviewed de novo. This enhancement applies to defendants with at least two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence or controlled substance offenses, as defined by U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a)(3). A "crime of violence" is characterized by the use or threatened use of physical force, requiring imprisonment for over one year (U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(1)). The Supreme Court's analysis in Johnson v. United States, which clarifies what constitutes a "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act, is utilized to assess if an offense qualifies as a crime of violence. 

In the case reviewed, the district court's affirmance allows it to sidestep further arguments regarding Thomas's past convictions for second-degree battery and kidnapping. According to Johnson, a conviction is a crime of violence if it includes as an element the use of "violent force." The district court may determine this based solely on the conviction and the statutory definition of the offense, as per Taylor v. United States, using a "categorical approach." However, if the statute encompasses both qualifying and non-qualifying crimes, a "modified categorical approach" is applied, allowing the court to examine specific record evidence to ascertain the nature of the conviction (United States v. Ossana).

In this instance, the only record confirming the factual basis for Thomas's conviction under Ark. Code Ann. 5-13-201 is the charging document. Thomas contends that this document does not demonstrate a conviction under subsection (a)(1) of the statute. The district court, under the modified categorical approach, must establish the conviction by a preponderance of the evidence. The court agrees with the government’s inference that Thomas was convicted under subsection (a)(1), as the charge aligns with its language and is the only subsection referencing a "deadly weapon." The state court's criminal docket supports this interpretation, as the information was not amended, and the plea agreement and sentencing order do not contradict this conclusion.

Thomas contends that Ark. Code Ann. 5-13-201(a)(1) should not be classified as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(1). However, the statute requires the infliction of serious physical injury, which, as defined, necessitates the use of physical force. The Supreme Court of Arkansas, in Smith v. State, clarified that striking a victim with a gun constituted "physical injury," but not "serious physical injury" needed for a more severe charge. If serious physical injury is inflicted, it must involve "violent force," as outlined by Johnson, indicating that such force is capable of causing pain or injury. The text emphasizes that serious physical injury cannot be caused without physical force, as reinforced by definitions in the Arkansas Code that describe deadly weapons as physical instruments. Precedents, such as United States v. Rice, support that Arkansas's second-degree battery statute qualifies as a crime of violence. Thomas's appeal does not hold, particularly since the ruling in Rice is binding.