Bonner v. S-Fer International, Inc.

Citations: 207 F. Supp. 3d 19; 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124402; 2016 WL 4919873Docket: Civil Action No. 2016-0531

Court: District Court, District of Columbia; September 14, 2016; Federal District Court

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Tasha Bonner, an African-American woman, filed a lawsuit against S-FER International, Inc., operator of the Salvatore Ferragamo boutique, alleging discrimination based on her appearance during a September 2015 shopping visit in Washington, D.C. Bonner claims that after being treated rudely by a store employee, who questioned her ability to afford a $4,500 jacket and insisted she leave the store, she felt embarrassed and threatened. The employee allegedly falsely stated that Bonner needed a membership to shop and later called the police, preventing her from leaving for several minutes. Bonner's original complaint, filed in December 2015, included three state law claims: violation of the D.C. Human Rights Act, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. After the defendant removed the case to federal court, Bonner amended her complaint to include a fourth count under 42 U.S.C. 1981, which addresses discrimination in contract enforcement. The parties are diverse, with Bonner residing in D.C. and the defendant based in New York. Bonner seeks damages exceeding $75,000. The court is considering the defendant's motion to dismiss three of Bonner’s four claims, emphasizing the requirement for a plausible claim in the complaint under federal rules.

The Court evaluates dismissal motions by accepting all complaint allegations as true, except for bare recitals and conclusory statements. It assesses whether remaining factual content allows for a reasonable inference of the defendant's liability, which must be plausible, not merely possible. 

Bonner claims Ferragamo denied her service based on race, violating the D.C. Human Rights Act (DCHRA) and federal law under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits racial discrimination in contract-related activities. Bonner alleges she was asked to leave due to her race, color, or personal appearance, and asserts that Ferragamo's actions constituted a denial of her rights to equal service.

Ferragamo argues Bonner's claims lack sufficient factual support to establish plausibility, suggesting alternative explanations for her treatment, such as a supposed membership requirement and her attitude. The Court, however, finds Bonner presented more substantial evidence, including her demeanor, interactions with employees, and the context of their statements, indicating that the reasons provided by Ferragamo for her removal may be pretextual. The Court concludes that Bonner's allegations support a reasonable inference of racial discrimination.

Plaintiff contends that the employees' inconsistent justifications for her dismissal may indicate discriminatory intent, referencing case law that supports the notion that shifting rationales can suggest pretext. The discussion includes whether to apply the framework from *Callwood v. Dave & Buster’s, Inc.*, which allows plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating they were denied services while similarly situated individuals outside their protected class were not, or that they received services in a hostile and unreasonable manner. This approach is deemed applicable in cases with limited comparator data, as customers often interact with service establishments in isolated instances. The court finds that the factual allegations sufficiently support a plausible claim that Bonner was denied service due to her race, resulting in the denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss her claims under the D.C. Human Rights Act (DCHRA) and Section 1981.

Additionally, Bonner asserts a common law claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED), alleging that Ferragamo’s employees engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct by preventing her from shopping due to her race and locking her inside the store, leading to severe emotional distress. The defendant challenges this claim, arguing that Bonner has not adequately pleaded the requisite elements of extreme and outrageous conduct or the causation of severe emotional distress.

Conduct is deemed 'extreme and outrageous' only when it surpasses all bounds of decency, being regarded as atrocious in a civilized community. Insults, indignities, and minor annoyances do not meet this standard. While racial discrimination can qualify as extreme conduct, it typically requires a pattern of harassment rather than isolated incidents. In the case at hand, Bonner's allegations describe behavior that is insulting but do not constitute the extreme conduct necessary for an intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claim, as there is only a single episode of discrimination. Additionally, Bonner fails to demonstrate 'severe emotional distress,' which must be of such a nature that it could lead to physical harm; mere feelings of embarrassment and demeaning treatment are insufficient. Consequently, the court will grant the motion to dismiss Bonner's IIED claim, while denying the motion concerning another count.