Range Development Company of Chisholm v. Star Tribune, Paul McEnroe

Citations: 885 N.W.2d 500; 44 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2444; 2016 Minn. App. LEXIS 69Docket: A16-122

Court: Court of Appeals of Minnesota; September 12, 2016; Minnesota; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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In the case A16-0122, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed a district court's order requiring journalist Paul McEnroe to disclose the identity of a confidential source related to a defamation action brought by Range Development Company. The court emphasized that under the Minnesota Free Flow of Information Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate that revealing a journalist's confidential source would yield persuasive evidence on key elements of a defamation claim, specifically falsity or malice. 

The background involves an incident at Hillcrest Terrace Assisted Living Facility where a resident was found unresponsive and later diagnosed with urosepsis. Following this, a report alleging neglect was filed, leading to an investigation by the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH), which substantiated the neglect claim. McEnroe obtained this critical MDH report from a confidential source and published an article that allegedly contained nine inaccuracies regarding the resident's condition and the neglect findings. The court found that the district court erred in compelling McEnroe to reveal his source without the requisite showing that such disclosure would provide persuasive evidence for the defamation claim.

Range initially appealed the MDH findings, leading to a revised basis for the maltreatment determination. Subsequently, Range filed a defamation lawsuit against Star Tribune, McEnroe, Chisholm Ambulance Service and its employees, and McEnroe's unnamed source. During discovery, Range attempted to identify McEnroe's source but was unsuccessful. McEnroe provided an affidavit stating that he relied solely on the MDH report for his article, supplemented by his own medical research and general knowledge of the relationship between licensing agencies and law enforcement regarding vulnerable adults.

Range moved to compel the disclosure of the source's identity, arguing inconsistencies between McEnroe's statements and the MDH report, particularly regarding claims that the resident was "barely alive" and that the case was referred for criminal charges. The district court ordered McEnroe to reveal his source, reasoning that understanding the source's identity could illuminate whether McEnroe acted with actual malice in making the disputed statements.

McEnroe appealed this order under Minnesota Statutes section 595.025, subdivision 3. The district court also dismissed Range's corporate principals as plaintiffs and granted summary judgment in favor of Chisholm Ambulance Service and its employees. However, it denied summary judgment for Star Tribune and McEnroe, finding that three statements met the criteria for jury consideration regarding material falsity and actual malice. Star Tribune and McEnroe sought discretionary review, which was denied, leading to a focus solely on the order compelling source disclosure.

The key issue is whether the district court erred in ordering the disclosure based on the defamation exception in the Free Flow of Information Act. The analysis revolves around common-law defamation, First Amendment rights, and the potential application of a journalist's privilege. McEnroe argues for a qualified journalist's privilege under the First Amendment and relevant state statute, contending that the court must first evaluate the merits of the defamation claims before compelling source identification. In contrast, Range argues that Minnesota law does not recognize such a privilege and that a prima facie case is not a prerequisite for source disclosure in defamation suits.

The court has previously addressed the intersection of defamation law and journalists' rights in a similar case, Bauer v. Gannett Co., establishing a balancing test that considers both the First Amendment and statutory protections for journalists' confidential sources. In Weinberger v. Maplewood Review, the Minnesota Supreme Court later narrowed the interpretation of statutory privilege, impacting subsequent cases. In this case, the court evaluates whether the district court improperly ordered the disclosure of McEnroe's confidential source, using a legal standard that requires an affirmative showing that such disclosure would yield persuasive evidence related to a defamation claim. The court emphasizes that district courts must assess the merits of the defamation claim without imposing a prima facie case requirement. Since Range did not establish that revealing McEnroe’s source would produce compelling evidence of falsity or malice, the court reversed the disclosure order. The analysis hinges on the act’s requirements and relevant Minnesota case law, which mandates a clear demonstration of the connection between the source's identity and the elements of defamation. The debate over the First Amendment's protection of journalists' sources remains unresolved, with historical cases like Garland v. Torre illustrating the tension between protecting journalistic sources and the public interest in justice.

In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court established that public officials or figures must prove actual malice with clear and convincing evidence in defamation cases involving public concern, limiting common-law defamation liability under the First Amendment. However, the question of whether a party can compel a reporter to disclose a source to prove malice remains unresolved. In Branzburg v. Hayes, the Court declined to recognize a broad testimonial privilege for reporters, indicating that while the First Amendment offers some protection for newsgathering, it does not create a constitutional privilege against source disclosure. This has led to a divided response from state and federal appellate courts regarding the recognition of a journalist's privilege. Some courts recognize a First Amendment reporter's privilege, requiring plaintiffs in defamation cases to demonstrate that the source’s identity is essential to establishing malice. Minnesota has enacted the Free Flow of Information Act in response to Branzburg, which aims to protect reporters from subpoenas and uphold the confidentiality of source relationships, balancing the interests of effective news gathering with individual reputational rights. The Act is designed to confer a substantial privilege on journalists regarding source disclosure to maintain the public's interest in the free flow of information.

The act provides news media a significant privilege against disclosing sources, with specific exceptions, particularly for defamation cases. A court may compel disclosure if the requester shows that identifying the source will yield relevant evidence of actual malice. Disclosure requires probable cause to believe the source possesses clearly relevant information that cannot be obtained through less intrusive means. Previous cases have shaped the interpretation of these requirements. In 1997's Bauer, a balancing test was established to weigh individual privacy interests against the free flow of information. However, in 2003's Weinberger, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted a narrower interpretation, affirming the disclosure of confidential sources and requiring an affirmative showing of relevance consistent with Minnesota Rules of Evidence. It defined probable cause in a civil context as a reasonable belief in the facts essential for the case. Although Weinberger did not directly address First Amendment journalist's privilege, it effectively overruled Bauer's inconsistency without clarifying which of Bauer's factors remained applicable. In a subsequent attorney-discipline case, the supreme court acknowledged the First Amendment privilege but refrained from establishing new legal principles, noting that existing statutory protections for confidentiality were sufficient.

The supreme court recognized a qualified journalist's privilege under the First Amendment, assuming its existence without definitive ruling. It referenced Cervantes, stating that to compel disclosure of a journalist's confidential source, the requesting party must concretely demonstrate that revealing the source's identity will lead to persuasive evidence regarding malice. The court examined statutory requirements, concluding that the party must affirmatively show both relevance and probable cause to believe the source possesses pertinent information. The case of In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct clarified that the privilege could be overcome if the party could demonstrate that the source's identity would yield relevant evidence on defamation elements. The court emphasized that this requirement balances the journalist's right to protect sources, the plaintiff's privacy interests, and public justice interests. It rejected the argument that a prima facie case of defamation is necessary for disclosure, stating that only a demonstration that the source will lead to relevant evidence and that probable cause exists is required. The district court is tasked with objectively assessing the evidence to ensure it aligns with the act's intent to protect public interest and uphold journalists' substantial privilege not to reveal sources.

Range did not successfully demonstrate that revealing the identity of a confidential source would yield persuasive evidence regarding the defamation claims of falsity and malice. The standards for defamation require Range to prove: (1) a false and defamatory statement about the plaintiff, (2) published to a third party without privilege, and (3) that harmed the plaintiff's reputation. Falsity means the statement is not "substantially true," and minor inaccuracies do not suffice. As a limited-purpose public figure, Range must provide clear and convincing evidence of actual malice, defined as knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.

Range identified two potential connections between the source and evidence of falsity or malice. First, it argued that McEnroe's claim of sourcing everything from the MDH report contradicted the report's actual content. However, there is no evidence that McEnroe communicated with the source beyond the report itself, undermining the assertion that the source could provide relevant evidence. Second, Range contended that the source could clarify discrepancies between the preliminary and public MDH reports, but this argument also lacks substantiation and relies on speculation regarding the source's conversations with McEnroe.

Ultimately, the court concluded that Range's arguments do not adequately support the claim that disclosing the source's identity would lead to persuasive evidence of actual malice or falsity, as McEnroe himself stated he relied solely on the report for his article.

Range contends that the ruling in Weinberger justifies the district court's order for disclosure of a confidential source. However, Weinberger pertained to defendants directly implicated in defamatory statements, satisfying the statutory criteria for relevance and probable cause. Following Weinberger, the supreme court indicated that persuasive evidence regarding defamation elements is necessary for the district court's disclosure decision. Range argues that not ordering disclosure allows McEnroe to evade scrutiny, but the burden lies with Range to show that the source has relevant information and probable cause that such information relates to falsity or actual malice. This showing does not need to reach the level of a prima facie case but must be affirmative. Range failed to make the required showing to justify an exception to the general rule protecting reporters from disclosing confidential sources, having not proved that knowing the source's identity would yield relevant evidence or established probable cause concerning the source's information on defamation. Despite McEnroe possibly embellishing his article, there is no evidence that the source provided more than the report itself, thus failing to demonstrate that revealing the source's identity would lead to persuasive evidence on falsity or malice. The district court's conclusion that the statutory requirements were met was erroneous, leading to the reversal of the order to disclose McEnroe's confidential source. The decision highlights that statutory relevance and probable cause standards under the Minnesota Free Flow of Information Act necessitate a clear demonstration that disclosure would provide persuasive evidence regarding defamation issues.