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State of Tennessee v. Pamela Moses
Citation: Not availableDocket: W2015-01240-CCA-R3-CD
Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; September 6, 2016; Tennessee; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Pamela Moses entered guilty pleas to multiple charges, including theft, tampering with evidence, forgery, perjury, stalking, and escape, resulting in a seven-year effective sentence. Following her pleas, she sought to withdraw them, but the trial court denied her motion after a hearing. On appeal, Moses contended that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision but remanded the case to correct clerical errors in the judgment forms. During the plea submission, there was a discrepancy regarding her sentence length; although the State indicated an effective eight-year sentence, an agreement modified her escape conviction sentence from eleven months and twenty-nine days to one day, leading to the seven-year effective term. Moses faced multiple indictments from the Shelby County Grand Jury for various offenses, including two theft charges and other serious crimes. At a hearing on April 29, 2015, the prosecutor raised concerns about Moses violating a court order prohibiting her from contacting the Clerk's Office, suggesting the termination of her phone privileges, which her attorney contested. The prosecutor acknowledged uncertainty regarding whether administrative segregation equated to solitary confinement but indicated he would not oppose modifying the order. He noted that Moses had recently made numerous phone calls in violation of court orders, using them to pressure individuals for information that should be obtained through her attorney. Following this discussion, a bench conference occurred off the record, leading to Moses’s plea submission hearing on April 29, 2015. During this hearing, Moses waived her right to a jury trial and pleaded guilty to several charges across multiple indictments: theft of merchandise (Class A misdemeanor), tampering with evidence (Class C felony), forgery (Class E felony), perjury (Class A misdemeanor), stalking (Class A misdemeanor), and escape from misdemeanor incarceration (Class A misdemeanor). In exchange for her pleas, she received a seven-year effective sentence, with other charges dismissed. The prosecutor provided details supporting each guilty plea. For the theft charge, he described an incident on December 23, 2013, where Moses switched price tags at a Kohl's store. Regarding tampering, he recounted that on February 1, 2014, Moses fabricated a complaint against a judge who had previously held her in contempt. Her forgery involved creating a false notary seal, substantiated by testimony from a Tennessee Bureau of Investigation agent. For perjury, it was noted that Moses had made false statements under oath on the same date. The stalking charge stemmed from repeated attempts to contact the judge and derogatory social media posts during the judge's re-election campaign. Finally, the escape charge involved an incident on February 19, 2014, when Moses, while being transported for contempt, managed to escape from a police car and run across traffic, resulting in injuries to both herself and a pursuing officer. Moses's counsel confirmed a factual basis for her guilty pleas regarding theft and other charges, with both defense attorneys asserting her competence to plead. The prosecutor mentioned a pending mental evaluation and previous recommendations regarding her competency, noting her diagnosis of bipolar disorder but indicating no current competency concerns. During a detailed plea colloquy, Moses acknowledged understanding the charges, potential penalties, and her rights, including the waiver of a jury trial and appeal. She expressed satisfaction with her legal representation, affirmed the voluntariness of her pleas, and confirmed no coercion or unfulfilled promises beyond the plea agreement. Moses entered guilty pleas to multiple charges, including theft and forgery. The court found her competent to plead, understanding the consequences and conditions of her plea, including intensive probation and compliance with mental health evaluations. The court accepted her pleas, imposed the agreed sentences, dismissed remaining charges, suspended her sentences to probation, and recorded the judgments on April 29, 2015. On May 29, 2015, Moses filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea, asserting that it was not made knowingly and voluntarily due to the State's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence beforehand. During the evidentiary hearing on June 23, 2015, the State submitted two exhibits: Exhibit 1, the discovery material provided to defense counsel, and Exhibit 2, additional discovery material that was inadvertently omitted. The prosecuting attorney testified that investigative reports prepared by TBI Agent Fletcher, totaling around two hundred pages, were shared with defense counsel. The prosecutor, new to circuit court and unfamiliar with TBI investigations, relied on Agent Fletcher and a colleague, Cheryl Hayes, to gather all relevant reports from a computer program called ISIS. Hayes provided a disk with investigative reports, which the prosecutor later printed for defense counsel after she encountered issues accessing the files. He acknowledged that he was aware defense counsel also represented Moses in other charges not investigated by the TBI and noted the absence of a transcript for a related contempt proceeding. The prosecutor maintained that he complied with the district attorney's open file discovery policy, unaware of any additional information potentially added to ISIS by the TBI. After a series of events, including a motion for administrative segregation due to Moses's actions, discussions about a settlement led to the guilty plea, which the prosecutor initially did not expect. He consulted with the general sessions judge and both defense attorneys regarding the plea, despite the incomplete final mental evaluation of Moses. The plea entry process lasted two to three hours, and a week later, defense counsel informed the prosecutor of a motion to withdraw the plea, citing undisclosed discovery, particularly statements from Divine Mafa and a friend named “Joe.” Upon inquiry, Agent Fletcher indicated he believed he had provided all pertinent information regarding Divine Mafa and deemed Amy Jo's statement irrelevant to the investigation. Cheryl Hayes accessed investigative reports numbered 1 through 73, revealing that some materials were missing from discovery disclosures. The prosecutor had Hayes compile reports 56 through 73 on a disk for review, noting that certain information pertained to unindicted crimes and thus was not discoverable. He promptly informed the defense counsel of these omissions. Divine Mafa's statement indicated a desire to prosecute Moses for theft, although no charges were filed against her for this. The prosecutor clarified he did not intend to use Mafa as a witness since he was not a victim related to the charges against Moses, specifically two counts of impersonating a licensed professional. These charges arose from Moses attempting to be sworn in as an attorney in court and posing as an attorney for Tasha Liggins. Additionally, Amy Jo Boone Wild's statement, indicating a close friendship with Moses, was deemed irrelevant to the charges, and Wild did not witness any offenses related to Moses's guilty pleas. The prosecutor emphasized that Moses's guilty plea was made knowingly and voluntarily after a thorough voir dire by the trial court. The prosecutor also described the tampering charge linked to a forged document related to a judicial complaint made by Moses against a judge. Moses claimed her guilty pleas were involuntary due to her distress over potential administrative segregation, stemming from her fear of solitary confinement and its impact on her communication with counsel. Her attorney conceded that the motion for administrative segregation was never heard by the trial court at the time of the plea. Moses, who represented herself pro se, alleged misconduct by the TBI and prosecution, claiming these actions hindered her ability to prepare a defense against a potential twenty-five-year sentence. Special Agent Ryan Fletcher of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) interviewed Moses on November 6, 2014, under oath, and she provided a sworn statement, which she signed and initialed. During this interview, Moses mentioned a name, “Jo Boone.” Agent Fletcher indicated that he requested the sworn statement while working on Moses's case, which she may have interpreted as relating to her judicial complaint against a general sessions judge. At the evidentiary hearing's conclusion, the trial court addressed two key issues. First, it examined Exhibit 2, which had not been previously provided. The court expressed concern over the lack of disclosure and considered whether the evidence could prove or disprove any facts or be relevant for sentencing. It assessed whether the evidence was exculpatory and if its absence violated Moses's due process rights. The court concluded that it did not find the omitted evidence to be material or exculpatory, as there was no reasonable likelihood that it would have affected the verdict or created reasonable doubt regarding Moses's guilt. Second, the court evaluated whether Moses's plea was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The judge recalled the plea submission hearing, emphasizing the lengthy and thorough nature of the discussion with Moses to ensure she understood the proceedings. The judge noted that there was a significant recess to allow the attorneys to negotiate due to the complexity of the charges against her. The record included petitions for waiver of trial by jury and acceptance of a guilty plea, all signed by Moses and her lawyers, indicating her understanding of her rights. The judge acknowledged Moses's legal knowledge and intelligence, reinforcing that she had been encouraged to seek legal representation to ensure her rights were fully protected. Everyone involved had the opportunity to review the documents in question, dispelling concerns about a rushed plea process. The court emphasizes that extensive time was spent completing the paperwork and ensuring that Ms. Moses understood her rights before entering the plea. The judge explicitly asked Ms. Moses if she was being coerced or promised anything to plead, to which she responded negatively. During the proceedings, the judge inquired about her concerns regarding her lawyers and confirmed her comprehension of the process. A specific question arose regarding the judge's familial connection to Lanita McCraw, which Ms. Moses indicated did not pose a problem for her. The judge affirmed the commitment to fairness throughout the process, noting that Ms. Moses appeared to understand the proceedings and entered her plea knowingly and intelligently. Despite a prior motion for competency evaluation, the court concluded this was no longer an issue after questioning Ms. Moses. The judge noted sufficient facts on the record to accept the plea and acknowledged discussions about potential future charges. In response to the motion to withdraw the plea, the court stated that such a motion should only be granted to correct manifest injustice, which it determined was not present in this case. The judge reiterated that the plea was taken seriously and that Ms. Moses had understood the implications of her guilty plea. Consequently, the motion to withdraw the plea was denied, with a minute entry recorded on June 23, 2015, reflecting this decision. Ms. Moses filed a notice of appeal the same day, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion. She contended that her plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently, citing the State's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, violations of her due process rights, and the cumulative effect of these errors as grounds for relief. The trial court's denial of Moses’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea was upheld, as there was no abuse of discretion. The review standard involves checking if the trial court applied incorrect legal standards, reached illogical conclusions, misassessed the evidence, or caused injustice. A trial court's discretion is limited if a constitutional violation, such as due process denial, is proven. Moses filed her motion to withdraw her plea within thirty days of judgment entry, meaning the more stringent manifest injustice standard applies for review. This standard allows plea withdrawal under specific conditions: misunderstanding of the plea's effect, failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, plea not being made knowingly or voluntarily, or ineffective assistance of counsel. The burden of proof to show manifest injustice lies with the defendant. Moses claimed her due process rights were violated due to the State's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, including statements from Divine Mafa and Amy Jo Boone Wild, as well as impeachment evidence regarding a general sessions judge. She argued that this undisclosed evidence could have influenced her bond and potentially affected her case outcome. To prove a Brady violation, Moses must establish that she requested the information, the State suppressed it, it was favorable to her, and it was material. In Johnson v. State, the court addressed the burden of proof for establishing a Brady violation, which lies with the defendant to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence. The State conceded that the first two elements of a Brady violation were satisfied. Evidence favorable to the accused includes information that could exonerate the defendant, support their claims of innocence, or assist in investigating alternative suspects. Material evidence is defined as information that could likely alter the outcome of the proceedings if disclosed. The court reviewed Divine Mafa's statement, which Moses claimed was exculpatory but found it to be incriminating. Mafa indicated that Moses provided legal assistance, conducted research, and drafted documents, despite her claims of not being a lawyer. Furthermore, Mafa alleged that Moses misappropriated funds from him. The prosecutor noted that Mafa was not a victim in Moses's case and had no intention of calling him as a witness. Ultimately, the court concluded that Moses did not demonstrate a due process violation as she was aware of her involvement with Mafa and could have sought his statement. The court agreed with the State that Mafa's statement was not favorable to Moses and determined it was not material, as its disclosure would not have affected her decision to plead guilty. Information is deemed material if there is a reasonable likelihood that disclosing it would have altered the outcome of a proceeding. A guilty plea may be retracted under the manifest injustice standard when the prosecution fails to disclose exculpatory evidence, influencing the plea decision. In this case, the State's non-disclosure of Amy Jo Boone Wild’s statement was analyzed. Wild, a close friend of Pamela Moses, indicated in her statement that she had not witnessed the events leading to Moses's charges and had only known her through mutual acquaintances. Although Wild described Moses positively and mentioned potential legal consultations, her assertion that she had not observed the relevant conduct weakened the argument that her statement was exculpatory. The prosecutor confirmed that Wild was not a victim and had not witnessed any offenses. Moses was aware of Wild as a potential witness and could have obtained her statement or subpoenaed her, thus failing to demonstrate that the lack of disclosure constituted a due process violation. The court concluded that Wild's statement did not hold material value, as there was no reasonable probability that its disclosure would have prevented Moses from entering her guilty plea. The trial court acted within its discretion when it denied Moses's motion to withdraw her guilty plea, as the State's alleged failure to disclose statements from Divine Mafa and Amy Jo Boone Wild did not constitute grounds for relief. Moses's argument regarding impeachment evidence related to the general sessions judge was deemed waived because she did not raise this issue during the evidentiary hearing on her plea withdrawal. Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36(a) indicates that issues not brought before the trial court cannot be raised on appeal. Additionally, the court found that the State's failure to disclose the judge's personnel file, which was related to a public record case from over twenty years ago, did not provide any favorable or material evidence for Moses. Furthermore, Moses's claims that her guilty plea was not made knowingly, voluntarily, or understandingly were rejected. The court found sufficient evidence indicating that her plea met the necessary criteria, including that she was aware of the significant consequences of pleading guilty, and it was not the result of coercion or threats. A trial court must evaluate several circumstantial factors to determine if a guilty plea is made voluntarily and intelligently. These factors include the defendant's intelligence, familiarity with criminal proceedings, representation by competent counsel, advice received regarding the charges, and the reasons for pleading guilty, such as avoiding a harsher penalty from a jury trial. In this case, Moses argued her plea was not knowing or voluntary due to concerns for her family and the withholding of exculpatory evidence, which she claimed impacted her risk assessment for trial. However, the court previously determined that the withheld evidence was neither favorable nor material to her case. The plea submission hearing transcript indicated that the trial court thoroughly reviewed Moses's understanding of her rights, the charges, potential sentences, and the plea's consequences. The court affirmed that Moses entered her plea freely and voluntarily, without mental impairment or coercion. The trial court found Moses to be intelligent, well-represented, and had made a strategic decision to plead guilty, as the plea agreement was beneficial, dismissing several charges and offering a suspended sentence. Given these findings, the court concluded that Moses's plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, thus denying her motion to withdraw the plea. Additionally, Moses, while acknowledging she did not object during the plea submission, claimed issues with the factual basis for her guilty pleas, including a lack of clarity on the "official proceeding" related to the tampering charge and a misunderstanding about the nature of the investigation against her. However, because she did not raise these objections prior to her plea or at the evidentiary hearing, the court ruled that these claims were waived. Moses is not entitled to relief based on the facts recited by the State, as the official proceeding she was involved in at the time of her actions was a judicial complaint against a general sessions judge. Agent Fletcher's misleading indication that he was investigating the judge instead of Moses did not affect the legitimacy of the State's factual basis for her plea. Regarding her double jeopardy claim, the State clarified that the facts for her guilty pleas involved fabricating a judicial complaint, forging a notary's signature, and making false statements, which constitute distinct offenses under Tennessee law, thus not violating double jeopardy protections. Moses also contends her due process rights were violated due to the judge's alleged abuse of discretion when holding her in contempt, which she claims was related to her motion for recusal and her status as a pro se litigant. However, since she did not address this issue during the trial court hearing on her plea withdrawal, it is considered waived. Additionally, there is no evidence to support her due process claim, and her attempt to challenge the contempt ruling at this stage is ineffective. Lastly, Moses argues that the cumulative effect of errors should warrant a new trial, referencing case law on coercive circumstances affecting plea voluntariness. However, since she has not demonstrated entitlement to relief on any appeal issues, the cumulative impact does not require further consideration. To invoke the cumulative error doctrine, multiple actual errors must be present during trial proceedings. It has been determined that Moses's guilty plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, with no coercive circumstances involved. However, clerical errors were identified in the judgment forms. Specifically, the transcript confirms that the trial court ordered the theft conviction in Indictment No. 14-05903 to run concurrently with convictions in Indictment No. 14-06502, but the judgment form incorrectly states it runs consecutively. The court is directed to amend this to reflect concurrent sentencing. Additionally, the trial court failed to create separate judgment forms for counts that were either dismissed or resulted in a nolle prosequi, contrary to Tennessee Supreme Court requirements. The case is remanded for the trial court to issue corrected judgments regarding both the concurrent sentencing and the separate judgment forms for the specified counts. The denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea is affirmed.