State v. Whisenant

Citations: 791 S.E.2d 122; 249 N.C. App. 456; 2016 N.C. App. LEXIS 917Docket: 16-82

Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina; September 6, 2016; North Carolina; State Appellate Court

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Jackson Cain Whisenant appeals from judgments entered on 16 July 2015 after being found guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon, possession of methamphetamine, and simple assault. The case stemmed from an incident on 20 December 2014 at a Kmart in Waynesville, North Carolina, where Whisenant was observed stealing jewelry valued at $95.95. After being confronted by Kmart loss prevention associate William Pate, Whisenant attempted to flee, brandished an unopened knife, and threatened Pate by stating, "I will kill you." Following the altercation, Whisenant sprayed Pate and another security officer with pepper spray before fleeing, during which police later found the stolen items and methamphetamine hidden under a truck nearby.

Whisenant's trial proceeded despite his attorney's request for a continuance due to inadequate preparation, which the trial court denied. On appeal, Whisenant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the robbery charge, asserting that the knife was unopened and that the State did not prove that Pate's life was in danger. Additionally, he contends that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated due to his counsel's lack of preparation and the denial of his requests for a continuance and substitute counsel. The Court of Appeals found no error in part and dismissed other claims without prejudice.

Robbery with a dangerous weapon requires substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense and proof that the defendant is the perpetrator. Substantial evidence is defined as relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. When evaluating a motion to dismiss, the evidence must be viewed in favor of the State. The court reviews the denial of such motions de novo.

The defendant argues that a knife must be opened with an exposed blade to qualify as a dangerous weapon. However, a dangerous weapon is any item likely to produce death or serious bodily harm. The determination of whether an object is a dangerous weapon considers the nature of the instrument, its intended use, and the victim's perception of it. Previous cases have established that conduct and perception are as significant as the weapon itself. 

Case law demonstrates that even a closed knife can serve as a dangerous weapon during a robbery. For instance, in North Carolina, a robbery conviction was upheld when the victim did not see the knife but was threatened by the defendant holding it. Other jurisdictions have similarly found that gestures with an unopened knife can fulfill the dangerous weapon requirement if they instill fear of imminent serious injury or death.

In this case, the defendant's actions—threatening the victim with statements of violence while brandishing the knife—establish that the unopened knife met the criteria for being classified as a dangerous weapon. Therefore, the defendant's conduct, combined with the circumstances surrounding the incident, supports the conclusion that the knife was indeed a dangerous weapon.

Defendant was found to have wielded a knife during a theft, threatening Mr. Pate when he attempted to call the police, thereby meeting the criteria of endangering Mr. Pate's life as outlined in N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-87 (2015). The state presented sufficient evidence that indicated more than mere possession of the weapon; Mr. Pate testified he felt threatened when the knife was drawn, and Defendant's explicit threats of violence reinforced this perception. Consequently, Defendant's argument regarding insufficient evidence was overruled.

Regarding the motions for continuance and substitute counsel, the trial court's discretion is typically upheld unless there is an abuse. Due process mandates that defendants have adequate time to prepare a defense. Defendant's attorney cited inadequate preparation time due to his own health issues and lack of communication with Defendant during critical periods leading up to the trial. He had been appointed on December 22, 2014, and faced significant health challenges, including surgery and hospitalization, which hindered his ability to prepare adequately. On the trial morning, Defendant indicated he had witnesses and previous contact with the prosecuting witness, raising questions about the adequacy of representation. A constitutional violation could be established if Defendant demonstrates insufficient time to prepare and that counsel's performance was deficient and prejudicial, following the standards set in Strickland v. Washington. The analysis suggests that, while it may be presumed that counsel's performance was deficient, further evaluation is necessary to determine if this deficiency prejudiced the defense.

Under the Strickland standard, the Court evaluates whether the Defendant experienced prejudice from ineffective assistance of counsel. To prove prejudice, the Defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome would have differed had counsel performed adequately. Claims of ineffective assistance raised prematurely on direct appeal are dismissed without prejudice, allowing the Defendant to pursue them in a future motion for relief in the trial court. The current record lacks sufficient evidence to assess whether the Defendant was prejudiced, as there is no information regarding the potential testimony of proposed witnesses, the relationship between the Defendant and the prosecution’s witness, or the specific limitations faced by Mr. Patton due to his health issues. Consequently, the Court dismisses the appeal regarding the denial of a continuance without prejudice, permitting the Defendant to develop a factual record concerning the trial court’s decision on the motion to continue and the appointment of substitute counsel. The trial court's submission of the robbery charge to the jury is upheld, with no errors found. Judges BRYANT and INMAN concur.