Patricio Alejandro Castaneda v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 08-14-00192-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; August 24, 2016; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Patricio Alejandro Castaneda appeals his conviction for assault on a public servant, arguing that the evidence was insufficient and that he was denied effective counsel during the guilt/innocence phase of his bench trial. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas affirms the conviction.

Castaneda was indicted for assaulting Officer Miguel Garza while incarcerated. He pled not guilty and waived his right to a jury trial. During the bench trial, the State presented testimony from Officer Garza and his supervisor, Corporal Frank Hernandez. On the incident date, Garza was on duty at the El Paso County Sheriff’s Office jail when Castaneda began banging on the guard station window and crossed a designated line. After questioning Castaneda about his request for a wristband, he threatened Garza, stating he would "f--k you up." When Garza attempted to handcuff him, Castaneda resisted and struck Garza in the stomach, causing him to fall backward against the wall and experience pain. Garza also reported the incident to his supervisors, providing photographs of his injuries.

Hernandez corroborated Garza's account, confirming he witnessed Castaneda's aggressive behavior and the subsequent altercation. Following the conviction, Castaneda admitted to prior offenses during sentencing, which resulted in a 25-year prison term.

Hernandez assisted Officer Garza in securing the Appellant and testified that he did not witness the exact manner in which the Appellant struck Garza but observed that it appeared Garza was hit in the midsection. During cross-examination, Hernandez confirmed that Garza did not hit a wall after being struck. The Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, arguing it was physically impossible for him to have struck Garza as described. The State counters that this challenge pertains to witness credibility.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court examines all evidence favorably towards the verdict, determining if a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The essential elements are defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge, which accurately reflects the law, is authorized by the indictment, and does not unduly increase the State’s burden of proof. The fact finder is the sole judge of witness credibility and may accept or reject testimony as they see fit, resolving inconsistencies in favor of the verdict. The sufficiency review applies to both direct and circumstantial evidence.

For a conviction of assault on a public servant, the court must find that the Appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury to Officer Garza while he was lawfully performing his official duties.

In Thomas v. State, the court determined that the manner and means of an assault are not essential elements of the offense and do not need to be included in the jury charge. The appellant challenged the sufficiency of evidence regarding whether he caused bodily injury to Officer Garza, arguing that Garza’s position behind him made it impossible to strike him on the right side with his left forearm. The court noted that this argument primarily questioned the credibility of the State’s witnesses, a determination that lies with the trier of fact, supported by precedent where similar credibility issues were upheld. The trial court's observation of Officer Garza's reenactment of the incident warranted greater deference to its credibility assessments. The appellate court concluded that the trial court could reasonably find that the appellant caused the required bodily injury, thus overruling the sufficiency challenge.

Regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant claimed that his attorney's cross-examination of witnesses was too brief and that counsel failed to present a justification defense, argue for a lesser-included offense, and deliver an adequate closing argument. These claims were categorized into four specific sub-parts, questioning the overall effectiveness of counsel during the trial's guilt/innocence phase.

The standard for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is established by Strickland v. Washington, requiring the appellant to demonstrate two elements: (1) the attorney's performance was deficient, falling below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) this deficiency prejudiced the defense, creating a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different but for the attorney's errors. The presumption is that the attorney's representation is within a reasonable range of professional assistance, and claims of ineffective assistance must have a solid basis in the record. If the record does not explain the attorney's conduct, as in this case, the presumption stands. 

In the specific claim regarding closing arguments, the appellant argued that counsel should have more vigorously attacked Officer Garza's testimony, which he believed would have influenced the jury's decision. However, the record indicated that trial counsel did challenge Officer Garza's credibility by highlighting inconsistencies in testimonies and the absence of physical evidence. The appellate court held that the appellant's assertions about the potential impact of a stronger argument were speculative and did not satisfy the burden of proving ineffective assistance, as claims must be substantiated by the record and shown by a preponderance of the evidence.

Appellant argues ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on two claims: the failure to present a justification defense and the failure to advocate for a lesser-included offense of resisting arrest. Under Texas Penal Code sections 9.02 and 9.21, a justification defense requires the defendant to admit committing the crime but claims the conduct was justified. Appellant’s argument hinges on Officer Garza's testimony, suggesting he could have inadvertently contacted the officer while complying with an order. However, to assert a justification defense, a defendant must acknowledge all elements of the charged offense, which Appellant did not do. Consequently, the record shows no basis for a justification defense, negating claims of ineffective assistance in this regard.

Regarding the lesser-included offense of resisting arrest, the Aguilar/Rousseau test determines if such an instruction should be given. This involves assessing whether the proof for the charged offense encompasses the lesser offense and whether evidence indicates that, if guilty, Appellant is only guilty of the lesser offense. The trial judge can evaluate this step before or during the appeal. Under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.09, a lesser-included offense must be established by the same or fewer facts than the charged offense or differ only by a less culpable mental state. The document outlines that Appellant's counsel did not err by not pursuing a lesser-included offense, as the necessary legal criteria were not met.

The Court of Criminal Appeals has established the cognate-pleadings approach for determining if an offense qualifies as a lesser-included offense under article 37.09(1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. An offense is considered lesser-included if the indictment for the greater offense either alleges all elements of the lesser offense or includes elements plus facts that allow deduction of the lesser offense's elements. The analysis compares both statutory elements and descriptive averments from the greater offense indictment to those of the lesser offense. If a descriptive averment matches an element of the lesser offense or allows deduction of such an element, it contributes to the analysis. The elements of the lesser offense do not need explicit pled in the indictment if they can be inferred from the allegations.

The functional-equivalence analysis may be applied to determine if the elements of the lesser offense are functionally the same or less than those of the charged offense. Under article 37.09(3), an offense can also be a lesser-included offense if it requires a less culpable mental state. If determined to be a lesser-included offense, the next step is to evaluate if there is evidence allowing a rational jury to find the appellant guilty only of the lesser offense. This second step is a factual inquiry based on trial evidence. If any evidence, regardless of its strength or credibility, raises a fact issue on the lesser offense, the appellant is entitled to an instruction on it.

In the case at hand, the indictment alleged that the appellant caused bodily injury to Officer Garza, a public servant, while he was performing his official duties. Thus, the State needed to prove that the appellant acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly in causing the injury while knowing the officer's status.

The elements of resisting arrest require a person to intentionally prevent or obstruct a known peace officer from making an arrest using force. In contrast, assault on a public servant is classified as a felony, while resisting arrest is typically a misdemeanor. The analysis from Dunklin v. State and Johnson v. State reflects that the assault offense allows conviction based on a knowing or reckless mental state, whereas resisting arrest necessitates intentional conduct. The case of Lofton v. State demonstrated this distinction, where the defendant, after resisting arrest and injuring an officer, was found guilty of assault despite claiming a right to a lesser charge of resisting arrest. The Court of Criminal Appeals upheld this conviction, emphasizing that the use of force to resist arrest constitutes assault. In the current case, the appellant's actions of striking Officer Garza while resisting arrest confirm that resisting arrest is not a proper lesser-included offense of assault on a public servant. Consequently, the defense counsel's decision not to request an instruction for the lesser offense was not ineffective assistance.

Appellant argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by making significant misrepresentations about the record, specifically regarding the State's failure to prove that Officer Garza experienced pain. Despite acknowledging the misstatement, the court does not find counsel's performance deficient, emphasizing that deficiency occurs only when it falls outside reasonable professional norms. The right to effective assistance does not require perfection; isolated errors do not equate to ineffectiveness. Previous rulings support that temporary confusion or misstatements do not compromise the standard of reasonable assistance. Consequently, the court overrules Issue Two and affirms the trial court's judgment.