Brian Fuchs v. Riverbend Assisted Living

Citations: 59 N.E.3d 269; 2016 Ind. App. LEXIS 311; 2016 WL 4446459Docket: 10A01-1602-PO-501

Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; August 24, 2016; Indiana; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Brian Fuchs appeals the issuance of three workplace violence restraining orders against him, granted by the Clark Circuit Court to employees of Riverbend Assisted Living. The court upheld the restraining orders, affirming the trial court's decision. Fuchs's mother resided at Riverbend, where he served as her co-attorney in fact. 

The executive director, Alexa Wheeler, reported multiple incidents involving Fuchs, including a phone call on February 16, 2015, during which he expressed extreme anger over his mother missing personal items. In April, Fuchs called again, screaming about his mother not receiving adequate care. On August 3, 2015, he called Wheeler late at night, aggressively complaining about his mother’s medication. 

Fuchs's behavior escalated, including an incident where he stood inches from Wheeler's face, used derogatory language, and appeared threatening. Four employees expressed intentions to leave due to Fuchs's conduct. Carrie Smith, a medication assistant, described feeling intimidated and scared after Fuchs confronted her over a food tray issue, during which he yelled and invaded her personal space. Smith now actively avoids Fuchs out of fear.

Angela Rice, the business office director at Riverbend, experienced an intimidating encounter with Fuchs on August 4, 2015, when he demanded the cessation of an automatic deduction for his mother's bill. Fuchs confronted Rice aggressively, invading her personal space, causing her to feel threatened and cornered. Following this incident, Riverbend's counsel informed Fuchs that he was restricted from the facility except for specific visitations with his mother. An informal meeting with Riverbend personnel and an ombudsman on September 10, 2015, failed to resolve the ongoing issues, prompting Riverbend to petition for the involuntary transfer of Fuchs’s mother. Although an administrative law judge (ALJ) acknowledged the risk posed by Fuchs, the transfer request was denied due to procedural shortcomings regarding the mother's medical documentation and discharge planning.

The ALJ recommended seeking a workplace violence restraining order under Indiana law to protect Riverbend's employees. Consequently, on December 17, 2015, Riverbend filed petitions for such restraining orders against Fuchs on behalf of four employees. An incident on December 29, 2015, where Fuchs screamed at another employee, further escalated concerns. By January 2016, Fuchs's mother had left Riverbend, and during the consolidated hearing on the petitions, one petition was dismissed while the court granted restraining orders for three employees, prohibiting Fuchs from entering the facility.

Fuchs has appealed the trial court's decision, contesting the validity of the restraining orders based on Indiana Code Chapter 34-26-6, which parallels orders of protection under Indiana Code Chapter 34-26-5. The burden of proof lies with the petitioner to demonstrate the claims by a preponderance of the evidence, and on appeal, the court will assess only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the trial court's ruling, without weighing the evidence or determining credibility.

Indiana Code Section 34-26-6-6 allows an employer to seek a temporary restraining order or injunction on behalf of an employee to prevent further violence or threats from an individual if the employee has experienced unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence, specifically at their workplace. A "credible threat of violence" is defined as a knowing and willful statement or behavior that instills a reasonable fear for safety. "Unlawful violence" includes battery or stalking, with exceptions for lawful self-defense. 

The statute prohibits courts from issuing restraining orders that infringe on constitutionally protected speech or activities, limits the representation rights of parties involved, or alters an employer's duty to maintain a safe workplace. 

Fuchs contended that the trial court lacked authority to issue restraining orders as he was his mother's attorney-in-fact, referencing an administrative code that protects visits from a legal representative unless requested otherwise by the resident. However, since Fuchs's mother is no longer a resident of the facility, this argument was deemed moot, eliminating the need for further examination of his claims.

Fuchs also argued that there was insufficient evidence to justify the restraining orders, asserting that his actions did serve a legitimate purpose and did not instill reasonable fear in the women involved. Comparisons were drawn to a previous case, Torres v. Indiana Family, Soc. Servs. Admin., where similar outbursts and disruptive behavior led to intervention by authorities, indicating that the threshold for credible threats could be contextual.

At a meeting on April 9, 2008, Torres exhibited aggressive behavior, expressing frustration over a malfunctioning assistive listening device. She yelled profanities, made threats, and physically acted out by throwing objects and charging at individuals, particularly targeting Baker. Participants felt threatened, leading to police involvement. The trial court issued a restraining order against Torres, which was upheld on appeal despite her claims that her behavior was mere advocacy. The court noted her actions were far beyond acceptable protest behavior. Similarly, Fuchs's conduct towards Riverbend employees was deemed a credible threat of violence, characterized by harassment, intimidation, and aggressive confrontations, instilling fear in employees. The court found sufficient evidence to support the restraining orders against Fuchs, affirming the trial court's decision. Fuchs's challenge regarding the admission of certain witness statements was considered harmless, as the evidence presented was adequate to justify the restraining orders.